CLUSTER BASED WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORK
SECURITY MODEL USING GAME THEORY AND
RISK ASSESSMENT

By

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction:

A sensor is a type of transducer. Most sensors are electrical or electronic, although other types exist. Sensors exist in various types which include thermal, mechanical, chemical, electromagnetic, optical radiation, ionization radiation, and acoustic. Sensors are used in everyday life. When these sensors are connected with each other through a wireless protocol, they constitute a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN). A WSN is a wireless network consisting of spatially distributed autonomous devices using sensors to cooperatively monitor physical or environmental conditions, such as temperature, sound, vibration, pressure, motion or pollutants, at different locations. The development of wireless sensor networks was originally motivated by military applications such as battlefield surveillance. However, wireless sensor networks are now used in many civilian application areas, including environment and habitat monitoring, healthcare applications, home automation, and traffic control. It is crucial that the security of sensor networks be monitored and diagnosed to ensure correct behavior.

1.2 Problems in existing models:

Due to resource scarcity of sensors, protecting sensor networks is a more difficult problem than protecting conventional networks using traditional schemes. Sensor networks have limited resources in terms of power and memory which is constraint on the computational capabilities of the nodes. Conventional security models focus mainly
on key management based techniques. A typical traditional public-private key scheme involves management and safe keeping of a small number of private and public keys. Although a lot of work has been done in protecting sensor networks, most of this work has focused on providing effective key-management techniques for authentication or secure routing of messages. Such techniques cause huge communication and computing overhead [3], [5], [6]. In certain models [4] the nodes collect the data and decide on their own. This adds too much complexity to each node which is typically constrained in terms of resources. Not much work has been done on responding to an attacker\attack based on the objective of the network. In this thesis, we look at a security model that focuses on using game theory and risk assessment to improve the security of the network.

1.3 Proposed Work:

The model shown in this thesis uses game theory concepts and risk estimation to secure the wireless sensor network. In a cluster based wireless sensor network we look at a game theoretic model where the payoff is used to identify the response of the network to an attack.

The game is played between the attacker and the network. The nodes collect utility parameters which tell us the life time, integrity and throughput of the nodes. Each node’s payoff is a function of the above said parameters. We develop a risk assessment model that quantifies the overall threat to the network and the every node’s estimated risk of exposure. Factors such as vulnerabilities and perceived damage of attack are considered for estimating the damage and we use fuzzy logic to determine the threat. Accurate risk estimation helps to choose an appropriate response that will maximize the payoff by minimizing the risk. The risk assessment is integrated into the game. We use
the basic game framework given in [4] for parameter and payoff formulations. We extend the framework with risk assessment and analyze the strategies and the game equilibrium. When an attack is identified, the payoff is calculated and the network looks at the various possible responses to the attack. Based on the objective of the network, the payoff is defined, and therefore the strategy that gives the maximum payoff is chosen by the network. Although some work has been done on using game theory for securing sensor networks, using risk assessment and game theory is a relatively unexplored area.

1.4 Document Outline:

The rest of the document is organized as follows. Chapter II summarizes related literature review on security protocols and risk assessment for sensor networks. Chapter III presents the security model including the parameter definitions, payoff function, game formulation and risk assessment model in a detailed manner. Chapter IV discusses the test study of the risk model explained and the game equilibrium Chapter V is conclusion of the work.
CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND

2.1 Literature Review

The limited resource of sensor nodes makes it undesirable to use public-key algorithms, such as Diffie-Hellman key agreement [8]. A sensor node may need tens of seconds or even minutes to perform these operations. As sensor nodes are usually deployed in large numbers, it is desired that each sensor be low cost. Consequently, it is hard to make them tamper-resistant [5] [4].

Different security protocols are available for sensor networks. The SNEP Protocol [5] has low communication overhead, providing baseline security primitives like data confidentiality, two-party data authentication, reply protection and message freshness. The TESLA protocol [9] uses a symmetric key mechanism. A wide range of attack detection mechanisms have been developed [17] and developing the guidelines to assess risk in organizations [18] and financial markets [19]. In wireless sensor networks it is hard to estimate risk accurately because of the complexity of factors involved. To generate one-way key chain, the sender chooses the last key randomly and generates the remaining values by successively applying one way function. The protocol discloses the key once per time interval and restricts the number of authenticated senders. To bootstrap, each receiver needs one authentication key of one-way function key chain. In [4] a key pre-distribution scheme is proposed that relies on probabilistic key sharing among nodes within the sensor network. The LEAP protocol [1] is based on the
observation that no single security requirement accurately suites all types of communication in a wireless sensor network. Therefore four different keys are used depending on whom the sensor node is communicating with, for example one key for group communication etc. Chan and Perrig [10] describe a mechanism for establishing a key between two sensor nodes that is based on the common trust of a third node somewhere within the sensor network. A wide range of attack detection mechanisms have been developed [17] and developing the guidelines to assess risk in organizations [18] and financial markets [19]. Risk estimation can be done by identifying the possibility of attacks and extent of damage that can be caused by the attack. Attack trees provide a formal way of describing the security of the systems, based on the varying attacks. In a typical attack tree, the root node is the ultimate goal of the attacker and the leaf nodes are the different possible ways of achieving the goal [20]. A number of approaches have been identified to defend against attacks. For example, Wood and Stankovic [11] defend against attacks by identifying the compromised part of the network effectively routing around the unavailable portion. Agah, Das, and Basu [4] propose a model in which the sensors collect utility parameters and define a payoff function based on the distance between the nodes. They define a game theory based model to form clusters and use the payoff functions to change the cluster setup dynamically. Here a lot of computation is done by the nodes and given the scarcity if resources it raises practicability issues. To the best of our knowledge no reported work uses risk assessment using damage and threat integration through fuzzy logic and cluster level game theory based decision making system for WSN security.
3.1 Problem Definition:

The distributed nature and resource constraints involved in sensor networks make them prone to a wide range of attacks. Although considerable amount of work has been done on sensor security, the focus has mainly been on providing an effective key management technique [7]. Disclosing a key with each packet requires too much energy [5]. Considerable memory and computation is used in storing one-way chain of secret keys along message routes [6]. The key management using a third party requires an engineered solution that makes it unsuitable for sensor network applications [2]. In asymmetric key cryptography, there is no trusted server, but key revocation becomes a bottleneck [3].

Using game theory in sensor network security is not a well explored area. One notable contribution in this section is by [4], in which they propose a model that uses utility parameters such as reputation and quality of security (network’s trustworthiness). The primary objective of the model in [4] is to method to create dynamic clusters in WSN using game theory. However, in this model the decision making unit is distributed and each node is responsible for collecting the utility parameters and computing payoff function. This involves much communication in the part of the nodes and the typical resource constraints associated with sensor network causes certain practicability issues.
3.2 Proposed Solution:

A game theory based model is shown here which uses quantified risk assessment and a game theoretic decision making system. This security model is designed as a non-cooperative game between the attacker and the network.

The model uses utility parameters to collect information and then using game theory concepts use a cost-payoff relation and risk assessment to efficiently secure the wireless sensor network. Under normal conditions the sensor nodes continue to perform their functions as required. Additionally they also collect statistical information which is defined by the base station as utility parameters. These utility parameters indicate the behavioral pattern of the nodes with respect to the neighboring nodes. When a threat is detected by the Intrusion Detection System (IDS) the nodes calculate their own payoff value using the utility parameters available to them at the given time. The payoff value of each node is then sent to the cluster head. The cluster head calculates the payoff function of the cluster and is sent to the base station. The Risk Assessment Engine (RAE) in the base station calculates a quantitative estimate of exposure of the network and amount of threat faced by the individual nodes. Using the risk estimate the Game Theory Based Decision Making System (GBDMS) chooses an appropriate response from the strategy set. The Decision Implementation System (DIS) is responsible for implementing the response chosen by the GBDMS at the node level. We assume that the DIS has information about the cost incurred in implementing each of the available strategy and that the cost value is available for the GBDMS during decision making process. Based on the Current Payoff, Risk estimate and cost of a given strategy, the GBDMS chooses an appropriate response that maximizes the payoff gain.

3.2.1 System Architecture:
Consider a cluster-based wireless sensor network. The network has a base station which is connected to the cluster head which in turn are connected to the end nodes.

![Wireless Sensor Security Model Architecture](image)

**Figure-3.1: Wireless Sensor Security Model Architecture**

Subsystems:

RAE: Risk Assessment Engine

IDS: Intrusion Detection System

GBDMS: Game Theory Based Decision Making System

1. PD : Payoff Definition

2. UPD: Utility Parameter Definitions

DIS: Decision Implementation System
The cluster heads have more capacity (in terms of memory and power etc) than the end nodes and the base station is more capable than the cluster head. The base station is a central unit responsible for decision making and management of the network. We assume that an Intrusion detection system is available which identifies any inconsistency in the network which can be a threat to the network. We also assume that there is a Decision implementation system which handles implementing the decision made by the base station. We assume that the DIS has data pertaining to the cost involved in implementing a given strategy and is available for the base station. The RAE provides an estimation of the risk over the nodes. This assessment is a combination of potential threat and damage that can be cause on the network. The UPD contains the list of all parameters that the sensors can collect and the definition of the parameters. Based on the objective of the network, the UPD defines the set of parameters that will be collected by the nodes. The PD defines the payoff as a relation of utility parameters. When the response is to be chosen by the network it will be based on the risk estimation, payoff and cost of the strategy.

3.2.2 Risk Assessment Model:

The risk assessment model primarily focuses on estimating the amount of damage a given threat can cause to the network and to the individual nodes. Since nodes have limited resources, a relatively accurate estimate of possible damage to the network and the nodes can be used by the base station to choose the strategy better. The base station can implement the appropriate security strategy such that the strategy utilizes the resources efficiently and secures the network as well. The factors that we consider for estimating the risk are Vulnerability (V), Damage (D), Threat (T) and Attack tree (A).
(i) Vulnerability (V):

These are the various security gaps present in the communication protocol that can be exploited by an attacker. Depending on the type, structure and sophistication of the protocol a number of possible holes can be identified which can be used by a potential intruder in order to gain access to information.

(ii) Damage (D):

This is a degree of harm that an attacker can cause on the network if a certain level of security is breached. Depending on the amount of access gained by the attacker and the significance of the resources or data accessed, the damage can be high or low. This damage can be numerically represented and is known beforehand as it is defined by the user.

(iii) Attack Tree (A):

Attack trees provide a formal methodology for analyzing the security of systems and subsystems. An attack tree can be used to ascertain the degree to which an attack can proceed. The nodes in the attack tree are goal/sub-goals that an attacker intends to accomplish. The edges represent the action which results when vulnerabilities in the system is exploited by an attacker. This results in a progress in the tree from one level to next level. Each node is associated with a damage value which is a degree of harm that an intruder at this level of the attack tree can inflict on the network.

(iv) Threat (T):

This is a numerical estimation of the risk that an attacker poses on to the network. This is not easy to obtain as the actions and intentions of the
attacker cannot be determined for certain. We use Fuzzy logic and fuzzy set to quantify the probabilistic risk that an intruder can cause to the network.

3.2.2.1 Risk Estimation:

While estimating the risk we must consider the realistic threat imposed by the attacker on the network and the amount of damage that can be caused given the access gained by the intruder.

Let the Threat be $T$ and Damage be $D$. Then risk estimate can be given as $R_A = T \times D$

3.2.2.1a. Calculating Damage ($D$):

Damage can be seen as the degree of access gained by the intruder in terms of data, software etc. In calculating the damage, the first step is to identify the vulnerabilities in the network. The common wireless protocol used in the sensor networks is the IEEE 802.11. The protocol uses RC4 cipher whose inherent drawbacks can result in number of active and passive attacks using eavesdropping and tampering of wireless transmission etc. [13]. Once the vulnerabilities are identified, possible attack scenarios can be identified. Next, an Attack tree is constructed using the vulnerabilities and the resulting attack scenarios. For example, if the protocol allows eavesdropping then, it is possible for an intruder to obtain node ids and private key information.
Using this information the attacker can gain access to other resources such as application data. The attack tree is constructed with nodes, edges and levels. Each node is an attack tree state, which can be reached by performing an action which may or may not require a combination of lower level states. Figure 3.2 represents an attack tree. Each node has an associated damage value which represents the degree of harm that can be caused on the network by the intruder in that attack tree state. The damage value increases as the level of the associated node increases.

The attack tree can be represented in a matrix form with damage values. The matrix values $d_{ij}$ is the damage value associated with the $j^{th}$ node at level $i$.

$$Matrix\ M_D = \begin{pmatrix} d_{01} & d_{02} & \cdots & d_{0j} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots \\ d_{j1} & d_{j2} & \cdots & d_{ij} \end{pmatrix} \Rightarrow D\ (Damage)$$
3.2.2.1b. Calculating Threat (T):

Threat is the potential harm an attacker can cause on the network. It is hard to estimate threat since it is hard to predict the attacker’s intentions and actions. We consider distance and attacker’s movement with respect to the node being considered to be parameters that can be used for threat estimation. If the attacker is close and/or the attacker is moving closer (both values exceed a certain threshold) then we can determine the threat using classical predicate logic. But the relationship between distance and movement has gray areas in which it is difficult to identify a threshold value above which threat is high and below which the threat is low. In order to accurately to address this issue, we use Fuzzy logic and Fuzzy sets to calculate the threat estimate.

(i) Fuzzy Logic:

Fuzzy logic is determined as a set of mathematical principles for knowledge representation based on degrees of membership rather than on crisp membership of classical binary logic. Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of logical values between 0 (completely false) and 1 (completely true). Classical binary logic can be considered as a special case of multi-valued fuzzy logic. Classic (or crisp) set theory is governed by a logic that uses one of only two values: true or false. This logic cannot represent vague concepts, and therefore fails to give the answers on paradoxes and areas where estimation over a wide set of values is needed. The basic idea of fuzzy set theory is that an element belongs to a fuzzy set within a certain degree of membership.

Let X(distance), Y(Movement) and Z(threat) be linguistic variables; A1, A2 and A3 (far, nearby, close) are linguistic values determined by fuzzy sets on
universe of discourse X (Attacker’s distance from the sensor); B1, B2 and B3 (farther, stable, closer) are linguistic values determined by fuzzy sets on universe of discourse Y (Attacker’s movement); C1, C2 and C3 (low, moderate, high) are linguistic values determined by fuzzy sets on universe of discourse Z (Threat on the node);

We define the rules that govern the fuzzy logic.

Rule: 1

IF X is A1
OR Y is B1
THEN Z is C1

Rule: 2

IF X is A2
AND Y is B2
THEN Z is C2

Rule 3:

IF X is A3
OR Y is B3
THEN Z is C3

Note that the given rules are not comprehensive. Rules for X (A1, A2, A3) and Y (B1, B2, B3) can be given in all possible combinations of linguistic values which we can derive more sets. For example, a valid rule can be when X is A1 and Y is B2 (the distance is far but the attacker is moving closer) then C can be set to C1, C2 or C3 (low, medium, high) depending on the requirement of the user. The rules given here are for illustration.

We use Mamdani-style fuzzy inference to estimate the threat.
Step 1: Fuzzification

The first step is to get the crisp inputs required. Let \( r \) be the actual distance of the attacker and \( s \) is the movement and determine the degree to which these inputs to each of the appropriate fuzzy set.

In fuzzy theory, the fuzzy set \( A \) of universe \( X \) is defined by function \( \mu_A(x) \) called membership function of set \( A \).

\[
\mu_A(x) = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } x \text{ is totally in } A \\
0 & \text{if } x \text{ is not in } A \\
0 < \mu_A(x) < 1 & \text{if } x \text{ is partially in } A 
\end{cases}
\]

For any element \( x \) of universe \( X \), membership function \( \mu_A(x) \) equals the degree to which \( x \) is an element of set \( A \). This degree, a value between 0 and 1, represents the degree of membership, also called the membership value, of element \( x \) in set \( A \).

Thus, by combining the each fuzzy set for \( X \), \( Y \) and \( Z \) we get,

\[
\text{Distance } X = [\mu(X=A1) \cdot \mu(X=A2) \cdot \mu(X=A3)]
\]

\[
\text{Movement } Y = [\mu(Y=B1) \cdot \mu(Y=B2) \cdot \mu(Y=B3)]
\]

\[
\text{Threat } Z = [\mu(Z=C1) \cdot \mu(Z=C2) \cdot \mu(Z=C3)]
\]

Thus from the crisp (actual) values \( r \) and \( s \) we can plot the membership value or the fuzzified inputs which represent the degree to which each input belong to the fuzzy set, within the corresponding universe of discourse. Figure 3.3a and b depicts the process of fuzzifying the crisp inputs to get the membership values.
Let $r_1, r_2, r_3$ and $s_1, s_2, s_3$ be the corresponding membership values resulting from fuzzification of crisp inputs $r$ and $s$, in the fuzzy sets $X$ and $Y$ respectively.

Step: 2 Rule Evaluation
The second step is to take the fuzzified inputs,

\[ \mu_{(X=A2)} = r2, \mu_{(X=A3)} = r3, \mu_{(Y=B1)} = s1, \mu_{(Y=B2)} = s2 \]

and apply them to the antecedents of the fuzzy rules. If a given fuzzy rule has multiple antecedents, the fuzzy operator (AND or OR) is used to obtain a single number that represents the result of antecedent evaluation [14].

**OR Operation:**

\[ \mu_{A_1 \cup B_1}(x) = \max[\mu_{A_1}(x), \mu_{B_1}(x)] \]

**AND Operation:**

\[ \mu_{A_1 \cap B_1}(x) = \min[\mu_{A_1}(x), \mu_{B_1}(x)] \]

Let \( t1, t2, t3 \) be the result of fuzzy logic operators for the fuzzy set \( Z \). Thus we get,

**Rule: 1**

IF \( \text{X is A1 (r1)} \)

OR \( \text{Y is B1 (s1)} \)

THEN \( \text{Z is C1 (t1)} \)

\[ \mu_{C_1}(Z) = \max[\mu_{A_1}(X), \mu_{B_1}(Y)] = t1 \]

**Rule: 2**

IF \( \text{X is A2 (r2)} \)

AND \( \text{Y is B2 (s2)} \)

THEN \( \text{Z is C2 (t2)} \)

\[ \mu_{C_2}(Z) = \min[\mu_{A_2}(X), \mu_{B_2}(Y)] = t2 \]

**Rule 3:**

IF \( \text{X is A3 (r3)} \)

OR \( \text{Y is B3 (s3)} \)

THEN \( \text{Z is C3 (t3)} \)

\[ \mu_{C_3}(Z) = \max[\mu_{A_3}(X), \mu_{B_3}(Y)] = t3 \]

**Step 3: Aggregation of the Rule outputs**
Aggregation is the process of unification of the outputs of all the rules. In other words, we take the membership functions of all rule consequents previously obtained and combine them into a single fuzzy set. The resultant area represents the all the membership values for the threat estimate.

![Aggregation of Rules Outputs](image)

**Figure 3.4: Aggregation of Rules Outputs**

Figure 3.4 depicts the aggregation process. In the figure t1, t2 and t3 indicate the aggregate membership value for each of the rules. ki, kj to kn are the range of values in the universe of discourse Z corresponding to the membership values t1, t2 and t3.

**Step 4: Defuzzification**

The final step is to obtain the numerical estimate of the threat. The fuzziness helps us to evaluate the rules, but the final output of a fuzzy system has to be a crisp number. We use the centroid technique to find the final estimate. We find the value, referred as center of gravity (COG), indicates the
point where a vertical line would slice the aggregate set into two equal masses.

It can be expressed as

\[ COG = \frac{\int_a^b \mu_A(x) x \, dx}{\int_a^b \mu_A(x) \, dx} \]

In theory, the COG is calculated over a continuum of points in the aggregate output membership function, but in practice, a reasonable estimate can be obtained by calculating it over a sample of points.

Thus we get,

\[ COG = \frac{(k_1 + k_2 + \cdots + k_i) t_1 + (k_i + 1 + \cdots + k_j) t_2 + (k_j + 1 + \cdots + k_n) t_3}{(i \times t_1) + ((n+i-j) \times t_2) + ((n-i-j) \times t_3)} \implies T \]

From the calculating shown above we get the final risk estimation.

Thus \( R_A = T \times D \) will give significantly accurate risk estimation for the network.

3.2.3. Game Theory

Our non-cooperative game is defined as: \( \Gamma = (I, S, U) \), where \( I \) is the set of sensor nodes.

\( S = \{S_i\} \), where \( S_i \) is the set of strategies for node \( i \in I \) and \( U = \{ U_i \} \) and \( U_i \) is the payoff function for node \( i \). We need to identify the set of parameters that can be used to define an optimal payoff function that fulfills our objectives for securing a sensor network. The parameters represent the node’s lifetime, reliability and trustworthiness. These are important in calculating the payoff as higher values of these parameters imply higher payoff for the network.

3.2.3.1 Parameters:
This function consists of three parameters:

(i) Average cost incurred,

(ii) Integrity of the node,

(iii) Integrity of the path.

(i) Average cost incurred $[\Omega_{ij}]$:

This parameter is a good indicator of a node’s lifetime is cost. The cost involved in at the node level is measured in terms of power used. Power is spent when the node performs its functions such as packet generation, forwarding and reception. Power is also spent during computation of the various data. Typical power consumption of nodes can be obtained by statistically observing the nodes power levels for a standard interval. Suppose $w_{tot}$ be the total power available for a given node at time $t$. Let $w_g$, $w_r$, $w_f$ be the average power loss incurred during packet generation, forwarding, and reception respectively, such that $w_g$, $w_r$, $w_f > 0$. If $P_{ij}$ be the packets involved between nodes $i$ and $j$, then $E_g$, $E_r$, $E_f$ be the total number of packets that are generated, forwarded and received between the nodes $i$ and $j$ respectively. The total power loss between the nodes $i$ and $j$ at time $t$ is $E_i$ and it can be expressed as the sum of products of the total number of packets that were generated, forwarded and received between nodes $i$ and $j$ and its related power loss. Then the average cost incurred between nodes $i$ and $j$ at time $t$ is the ratio of total loss in power between $i$ and $j$ at $t$ to the total power available at time $t$. The parameter is summarized in the table 3.1.

Table 3.1:

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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total power available</td>
<td>$w_{tot}$</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average power loss during packet generation</td>
<td>$w_g$</td>
<td>$--$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average power loss during packet forwarding</td>
<td>$w_f$</td>
<td>$--$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average power loss during packet reception</td>
<td>$w_r$</td>
<td>$--$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Packets generated between $i$ and $j$</td>
<td>$E_g$</td>
<td>$\sum_{ij} P_{ij}^g(t)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Packets forwarded between $i$ and $j$</td>
<td>$E_f$</td>
<td>$\sum_{ij} P_{ij}^f(t)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Packets received between $i$ and $j$</td>
<td>$E_r$</td>
<td>$\sum_{ij} P_{ij}^r(t)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total power loss between $i$ and $j$</td>
<td>$E_t$</td>
<td>$w_g E_g + w_f E_f + w_r E_r$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average cost incurred</td>
<td>$\Omega_{ij}$</td>
<td>$E_t / w_t$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus the parameter average cost incurred can be expressed as follows

$$
\Omega_{ij}(t) = \frac{w_g \sum_{ij} P_{ij}^g(t) + w_f \sum_{ij} P_{ij}^f(t) + w_r \sum_{ij} P_{ij}^r(t)}{w_{tot}}
$$

(iii) Integrity of the node [$\Pi_{ij}$]:

The integrity of the node indicates how well the node cooperates with the other nodes present in the cluster. When the number of packets handled by a given node is relatively consistent with the number of packets handled by its cluster, we can safely assume that the node cooperates with the network. Similarly, drastic difference in this number indicates deviant behavior of the node.
node. The integrity of the given node can be expressed as the ratio of the number of packets forwarded to the total number of received and generated packets between two nodes at time t.

Thus $\Pi_{ij}(t)$ is the measure of throughput experienced between every node.

$$\Pi_{ij}(t) = \eta \frac{\sum_{ij} P_{ij}^f(t)}{\sum_{ij} P_{ij}^r(t) + \sum_{ij} P_{ij}^g(t)}$$

Where, $\eta$ – misbehavior pattern ($0 < \eta < 1$)

accounts for misbehavior potential due to such factors as past record of mobile code handling and potential tampering of sensor hardware. The integrity value decreases when misbehavior (security violation) is detected.

(iii) Integrity of the path $[\mathcal{O}_{ij}^{\mathcal{C}}]$:

The payoff function should also represent the trustworthiness of the traffic through a given section of the network. We define the integrity of the path, $\mathcal{O}_{ij}^{\mathcal{C}}$, for each cluster as the percentage of exposed traffic (ratio of messages that are exposed to the attacker), if security is compromised. Let $M_{ij}^{\mathcal{C}}$ be the message involved in the cluster J. We have $\sum_{\mathcal{C}} M_{ij}^{\mathcal{C}}$ denote the total number of messages generated between nodes i and j that belong to cluster J in time t and $\sum_{\mathcal{C}} M_{ij}^{\mathcal{C}} \geq 0$ denote the total number of messages dropped between the node i and j during time t in cluster J. The difference between total number of messages generated between two nodes and total number of messages dropped between them is the number of messages that have been
exposed in cluster J but not transferred to the destination, due to untrustworthiness of destination and indicates low support and cooperation between the source and destination. Let $E_j$ be the number of exposed packets in cluster J which can be obtained from the difference between total generated and dropped packets in J in time t. The integrity of the path can be expressed as the ratio of total number of exposed packets in J to the total number of packets generated in J. The parameters are summarized in the table 3.2.

Table 3.2:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Denoted by</th>
<th>Expression</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total messages generated between nodes i and j in cluster J in time t</td>
<td>$\sum_{ij} M_j^g(t)$</td>
<td>$--$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total messages dropped between nodes i and j in cluster J in time t</td>
<td>$\sum_{ij} M_j^d(t)$</td>
<td>$--$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of exposed messages in J at t</td>
<td>$E_j$</td>
<td>$\sum_{ij} M_j^g(t) - \sum_{ij} M_j^d(t)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrity of the path</td>
<td>$\Theta_{ij}(t)$</td>
<td>$\frac{E_j}{\sum_{ij} M_j^g(t)}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus Integrity of the path can be expressed as

$$\Theta_{ij}(t) = \frac{\sum_{ij} M_j^g(t) - \sum_{ij} M_j^d(t)}{\sum_{ij} M_j^g(t)}$$
\( \Theta_{ij}(t) \) represents the proportion of messages that were generated but did not reach their destination successfully.

3.2.3.2 Payoff Function:

For simplicity, we define the payoff utility function, \( U_{ij}(t) \), as a linear combination. The payoff function is defined as a function of the utility parameters and can be expressed as sum of weighted parameters.

\[
U_{ij}(t) = \alpha \Omega_{ij}(t) + \beta \Pi_{ij}(t) + \delta \Theta_{ij}(t)
\]

\( \alpha, \beta, \delta \) are weight parameters and \( \alpha + \beta + \delta = 1 \). Depending upon the sensor application their value can be varied. The payoff of the cluster head will be the aggregated payoff [4] of nodes in the cluster and the payoff for the network will be the aggregated payoff of the clusters.

3.2.4 Game Formulation:

We define a model using game theoretic framework for security in sensor networks. We define a non-cooperative game between an attacker and the network and analyze the strategies. We study the game for Nash equilibrium, leading to the defense strategy for the network. We model our game for the network whose objective is to minimize risk. That is, the network chooses the strategy that maximizes its payoff by minimizing the risk. The net gain for the network for any strategy is calculated based on the payoff value at the given time t, the cost spent on defending a node and the overall risk. In this section we assume that we have N sensor nodes that are clustered. Each cluster has a cluster head we consider them to be the players of the game. As shown in earlier sections, the utility parameters help to identify if a given node co-operates with the network or not. The parameter node integrity \( \Pi_{ij}(t) \) is higher for a node that does not act
selfishly. Each node by supporting the network (forwarding incoming packets) can improve its integrity. On the other hand if the node acts maliciously by not forwarding the incoming packets and performing inconsistently it will have less node integrity value and can be punished.

3.2.4.1 Non-zero-sum game approach:

Consider a two player game involving players $p_1$ and $p_2$, where $p_1$ has $n$ number of strategies numbered $\{1, 2...n\}$ and $p_2$ has $m$ number of strategies numbered $\{1, 2...m\}$. We consider their various payoff values to be given in matrices A and B respectively.

Let $a_{ij}$ be an element of matrix A that represents the payoff of $p_1$ when player $p_2$ chooses strategy $i$ and player $p_2$ chooses strategy $j$, and $b_{ij}$ be an element of matrix B that represents the payoff of $p_2$ when player $p_1$ chooses strategy $i$ and player $p_2$ chooses strategy $j$, where $i = \{1,2...n\}$ and $j = \{1,2,...m\}$. A pair of strategies $(i^*,j^*)$ is said to constitute a non-cooperative a pure strategy equilibrium, otherwise known as Nash equilibrium, solution to the game if the following pair of inequalities is satisfied: $a_{i^*j} \leq a_{ij}$ and $b_{i^*j} \leq b_{ij}$, $\forall i = 1,...,n$ and $\forall j = 1,...,m$. From [15] we can understand that a two player, non-zero-sum game may or may not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.

3.2.4.1(a) Strategies

Consider a node $k$ in a cluster within the sensor network. With respect to that particular node $k$, an attacker has 3 strategies.

1. IS1: the attacker can choose to attack the node $k$
2. IS2: the attacker can choose not to attack at all
3. IS3: the attacker can choose to attack a node other than node $k$
As for the network, it has 3 strategies

1. SS1: the network can choose to defend the node k
2. SS2: the network can choose to defend a different node other than k.

The strategy scenarios are as depicted in Fig 3.5. The dotted lines indicate the strategies of the network and the solid lines indicate the strategies of the attacker. The attacker chooses a strategy to attack a node. The network tries to identify the response that will maximize its payoff.

We construct the payoff matrices A and B which express the payoff of players in the form of 2 X 3 matrices. Let U(t) be the payoff of the network at time t. Let \( L_k \) be the cost of losing a malicious node k and \( C_k \) be the cost of the defending a node k. This cost depends on the importance of the node to the network and the node’s interactivity with other nodes within the cluster. Let \( N_k \) be the number of nodes in the cluster, where node k is the cluster head. Let \( R_k \) be the amount of risk minimized by the network by defending the node k. We also have P(t) which is
the profit gained by the attacker after a successful attack but every successful intrusion by the attacker will incur a cost denoted by $\text{Cost}_{\text{int}}$ for the attacker. Table 3.3 lists the parameters used.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Associated with</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$U(t)$</td>
<td>Payoff of the network at time $t$</td>
<td>Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$L_k$</td>
<td>Cost of losing a malicious node $k$</td>
<td>Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C_k$</td>
<td>Cost of defending a node $k$</td>
<td>Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N_k$</td>
<td>Number of nodes in the cluster, where node $k$ is the cluster head.</td>
<td>Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R_k$</td>
<td>Minimized risk by defending a node $k$</td>
<td>Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P(t)$</td>
<td>Profit of each successful intrusion by the attacker</td>
<td>Attacker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Cost}_{\text{int}}$</td>
<td>Cost of any successful intrusion</td>
<td>Attacker</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3 Payoff related parameters

For the attacker the profit is gained by successfully making an intrusion into the network and that incurs a cost. So the net profit is the difference between the two values $[P(t) - \text{Cost}_{\text{int}}]$. For the network, it has a payoff value at time $t$ calculated using the utility parameters. But for every strategy it uses to defend the node it incurs a cost and hence that must be subtracted from the payoff. Moreover, the node looks at minimizing the risk and therefore every strategy that successfully defends the node $k$ will reduce the overall risk associated with that node and therefore it is a gain for the overall payoff of the network.

We define the network’s payoff matrix as follows:
Here, \( a_{11} \) represents the payoff if the players follow the strategy tuple \((AS1, SS1)\), which is when the attacker and the network choose the same node \((k)\) to attack and to defend, respectively. Thus, for the network, its original utility value of \( U(t) \) will be deducted by the cost of defense. The term \( a_{12} \) represents the payoff corresponding to the strategy tuple \((AS2, SS1)\), which is when the attacker does not attack at all but the network defends node \( k \), so we have to deduct the cost of defense. \( a_{13} \) represents the payoff for the strategy tuple \((AS3, SS1)\), which is when the attacker attacks node \( k_0 \) but the network defends node \( k \neq k' \). In this case, we subtract the average cost of defending one node from original utility, as well as deducting the loss of losing another node. The term \( a_{21} \) represents the payoff of the strategy tuple \((AS1, SS2)\), which is when the attacker and the network choose two different nodes to attack and to defend. \( a_{22} \) represents the payoff of the strategy tuple \((AS2, SS2)\), which is when attacker does not attack at all but the network defends node \( k' \neq k \). \( a_{23} \) represents the payoff of the strategy tuple \((AS3, SS2)\), which is when attacker attacks a node other than \( k \) and \( k' \) and the network defends another node. In this case, we subtract the average cost of defending one node from original utility, as well as deducting the average loss of losing another node.

We define the attacker’s payoff matrix as follows:

\[
A = [a]_{2 \times 3} = \begin{bmatrix}
U(t) - C_k + R_k & U(t) - C_k + R_k & \sum_{i \neq k} L_i \\
U(t) - C_{k'} + R_{k'} - \sum_i L_i & U(t) - C_k + R_k & \sum_{i \neq k, i \neq k'} L_i \\
\end{bmatrix}
\]
Here, $b_{1k}$ and $b_{2k}$ represent attacks to node $k$, while $a_{1k}$ and $a_{2k}$ represent attacks to nodes other than node $k$. We subtract the cost of attack from the profit of conquering a node. Also, $b_{1e}$ and $b_{2e}$ represent non-attack mode. As the attacker in these two modes decides to attack in the future, it would not gain anything. On the other hand, as we would like to encourage the attacker to attack, $b_{1e}$ and $b_{2e}$ are set to be zero.

- Cost of defending a node $C_k$:

For the network, the cost of defense is the price it must pay to protect a node that is most likely to be under attack. We claim that it is dependent on two parameters:

(i) the cost of protecting a node, which is more important in the network-like aggregation point, must be higher than the cost of protecting a normal node; and

(ii) the cost must be dependent on the number of nodes communicating with that node.

We define the cost of defending a node as

$$C_i = y_i + \hat{N}_i$$

where $y_i$ is the weight of the node $i$. The more important a node is to cluster/network the higher is the weight of the node. $\hat{N}_i$ is the number of nodes communicating with the node $i$ which can be derived from the node density $\mu$ as shown in [16].

- Profit of Attacker [$P(t)$]/ Loss of losing a node for a network [$L_i$]:

The profit of a successful attack for an attacker and the loss of a malicious node by the network are functions of the node density $\mu$ and reliability $r_i(C)$ of node $i$ at time $t$. By attacking an important node, the attacker gains more, while losing an important node incurs more loss to the network. The density of the node can range from a few...
sensors to a few hundreds. In general the density can be as high as 20 sensor nodes.

In a zero sum game the value that a player gains must be equal to the loss incurred by some other player. The game we have modeled here is a non-zero-sum game because the network always tries to protect itself but if the attacker does not attack, the payoff one player decreases since the network incurs the defending cost) while the other player’s payoff is steady (attacker does not loose or gain payoff).

3.2.4.1(b) Nash Equilibrium:

To study the equilibrium solution for this game, we have to look at the dominant strategies in game theory. Given a bimatrix game defined by two $m \times n$ matrices $A$ and $B$, which are payoffs of player $p_1$ and $p_2$ respectively, we say that “row i” dominates “row k” if $a_{ij} \geq a_{kj}$ for $j = 1 \ldots n$. In other words, “row i” is called a dominant strategy for player $p_1$. Therefore for $p_1$, selecting “row i” will give it a payoff at least equal to selecting “row k” which is the weak strategy. Since player $p_1$ is a rational player and will look for maximizing benefits, $p_1$ will always choose “row i” and therefore we can remove “row k” from the game because it will never be considered.

From the given payoff matrices we analyze to check for equilibrium. First, in the network’s payoff matrix $A = [a_{ij}]_{2 \times 3}$ and in the attacker’s payoff matrix $B = [b_{ij}]_{2 \times 3}$, we can clearly indentify that SS1 is the dominant strategy. Since SS1 defends the node that is being attacked it will always yield higher payoff than the strategy SS2 (defending another node). This reduces A and B to two $1 \times 3$ matrices. We can also observe that $a_{11}$ and $a_{12} \geq a_{13}$. In $a_{11}$ we have the payoff for the strategy when node
k is attacked and defended. In $a_{12}$ we have the payoff for the strategy when node k is not attacked by the attacker but it is defended by the network. In $a_{13}$ we have the payoff which is obtained when the attacker attacks some other node than k but the network defends k. Hence along with the cost of defending node k the network also incurs the cost of losing a malicious node. Among $a_{11}$ and $a_{12}$, to identify the equilibrium we need to look at four possible cases. Here $N_k$, $Y_k$ and $C_k$ indicate the number of nodes communicating with node k, weight of the node k and cost of defending the node k respectively while $N_{k'}$, $Y_{k'}$ and $C_{k'}$ indicate the number of nodes communicating with node k’, weight of the node k’ and cost of defending the node k’ respectively.

**Case 1:** If $N_k > N_{k'}$ and $Y_k > Y_{k'}$, then $C_k > C_{k'}$ and hence $U(t) - C_k < U(t) - C_{k'}$ and therefore if $R_{k'} > R_k$ then we have $a_{12} > a_{11}$.

**Case 2:** If $N_k < N_{k'}$ and $Y_k > Y_{k'}$, as $\zeta > \eta$ then $C_k > C_{k'}$ and hence $U(t) - C_k < U(t) - C_{k'}$, and therefore if $R_{k'} > R_k$ then we have $a_{12} > a_{11}$.

**Case 3:** If $N_k < N_{k'}$ and $Y_k < Y_{k'}$, then $C_k < C_{k'}$ and hence $U(t) - C_k > U(t) - C_{k'}$, and therefore if $R_{k'} > R_k$ then we have $a_{11} > a_{12}$.

**Case 4:** If $N_k > N_{k'}$ and $Y_k < Y_{k'}$, as $\zeta' > \eta'$ then $C_k < C_{k'}$ and hence $U(t) - C_k > U(t) - C_{k'}$, and therefore if $R_k > R_{k'}$ then we have $a_{11} > a_{12}$.

In the matrix B, clearly $b_{11}, b_{13} \geq b_{12}$ since $b_{12} \leq 0$ and $b_{11} = b_{13}$, which implies that the equilibrium for the game is at $a_{11}$ and $b_{11}$. So we have mathematically and intuitively shown that the strategy pair (IS1, SS1) provides the maximum payoff for the players. The equilibrium of the network is when it chooses...
to defend the node with highest value of \( U(f) - C_k + R_k \) since this node guarantees higher minimization risk. The intuition is that the best strategy for the network is finding the best node to defend, which is the one with the maximum value of \( U(f) - C_k + R_k \). Thus strategy pair \((j1, S2)\) constitutes the Nash equilibrium.

CHAPTER IV

IMPLEMENTATION

4. Implementation:

In this chapter, a case study of the risk assessment model is studied and the game is simulated for the equilibrium is given. The risk assessment model is studied using test values and the overall risk is estimated for those values. For simulating the game we use C language and results of the simulation are shown.

4.1 Risk Assessment Model: Test Study

Here we analyze a test study of the risk assessment model described earlier. We go through the steps with test inputs and obtain the final risk estimate.
(i) Calculating Damage D:

To calculate damage we need to identify the vulnerabilities and construct an attack tree for a possible attack scenario. For wireless sensor networks, the IEEE 802.11 wireless communication protocol is widely used. The protocol uses RC4 cipher whose inherent drawbacks can result in number of active and passive attacks using eavesdropping and tampering of wireless transmission etc.[13]. Let’s consider eavesdropping for our study. Eavesdropping are a passive attack and it does not cause damage to the network by itself. Therefore, we can have a damage value of 0 for that node in the attack tree. Note that if the objective of the network requires that eavesdropping or other passive attacks be considered as serious vulnerabilities themselves then a damage value can be associated with those nodes as well. For our test case, we consider it to be of damage value 5. By eavesdropping an attacker can gain access to the packets and obtain important information, say node ids. Obtaining a node id can help an attacker to make an intrusion into the network through id-specific attacks like Sybil, node replication attacks.
For our test case, we consider eavesdropping to be of damage value 5. By eavesdropping an attacker can gain access to the packets and obtain important information, say node ids. Obtaining a node id can help an attacker to make an intrusion into the network through id-specific attacks like Sybil, node replication attacks. But these attacks require more access privileges to the network packets which in turn require the information about the encryption system used by the network like the keys or port authentication information. Therefore, obtaining a node id is not more damaging compared to obtaining authentication data, and hence the node in the attack tree that represents the attacker obtaining node id gets a smaller damage value compared to the damage value for the node that
represents the attacker obtaining authentication information. We assign a damage value 20 for the former and 50 for the latter. If the attacker successfully reaches these two stages then by combining the information the intruder can cause wide variety of damages like masquerading or denial of service attacks. Using node id and encryption data, an attacker send seemingly legitimate requests to other nodes and obtain more information. In denial of service attacks, let us take flooding or jamming a particular node or a part of the network. This is definitely serious threat and causes more damage than any preceding stage. Hence we give it a higher damage value, say 100. This completes our attack tree with damage values that are assigned based on the known vulnerabilities. Note that the topmost node in our tree can lead to more possible nodes, representing possible attacks. Note that, the tree is not binary and hence, a particular node can result any number of nodes, as long as it addresses an exploitable vulnerability. For simplicity we restrict our study to this attack tree. Figure 4.1 shows the attack tree for the test case. As described in section 3, the damage values get progressively higher as we move up the level of node in the tree.

Next we construct the damage matrix $M_D$. For this attack tree there are 3 levels and the most nodes in a level is 2 so we have a $3 \times 2$ matrix as shown below.

$$M_D = \begin{pmatrix} 5 & 5 \\ 20 & 50 \\ 100 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

(ii) Calculating Threat $T$:

For calculating threat we use fuzzy logic. We employ the rules described in section 3 and we follow the Mamdani method in obtaining the threat value using
fuzzy sets. The inputs are distance and movement of the attacker from a given node.

Rule: 1
IF X is A1 OR Y is B1 THEN Z is C1

Rule: 2
IF X is A2 AND Y is B2 THEN Z is C2

Rule: 3
IF X is A3 OR Y is B3 THEN Z is C3

We apply the same rules from section 3 as shown above.

Here X(distance), Y(Movement) and Z(threat) be linguistic variables; A1,A2 and A3 (far, nearby, close) are linguistic values determined by fuzzy sets on universe of discourse X (Attacker’s distance from the sensor); B1,B2 and B3 (Farther, stable, closer) are linguistic values determined by fuzzy sets on universe of discourse Y (Attacker’s signal strength); C1,C2 and C3 (low, moderate, high) are linguistic values determined by fuzzy sets on universe of discourse Z (Threat on the node);

Step 1: Fuzzification of Inputs.
Let’s take the crisp inputs for distance $r$ to be 19m and movement $s$ to be -13m. We can find the corresponding membership values by projecting the crisp inputs in the fuzzy sets for $X$ and $Y$. Figure 4.2a and 4.2b show this process.

**Fuzzification of input: distance $r$**

![Graph showing fuzzification of input distance $r$.]

Distance $X = \left[ \mu_A(41=0), \mu_A(42=0.4), \mu_A(43=0.1) \right]$  

**Fuzzification of input: Movement ‘s’**
Signal Strength \( Y = \begin{bmatrix} \mu_{B1} = 0.4 \\ \mu_{B2} = 0.2 \\ \mu_{B3} = 0 \end{bmatrix} \)

The crisp input \( r = 19 \text{m} \) (distance) corresponds to the membership functions \( A2 \) and \( A3 \) (close and nearby) to the degrees of 0.1 and 0.45 respectively, and the crisp input \( s = -13 \text{m} \) (movement) corresponds to the membership functions \( B1 \) and \( B2 \) (low and medium) to the degrees of 0.37 and 0.2 respectively.

Step 2: Rule Evaluation

Here we apply the fuzzified inputs to the antecedents of the fuzzy rules.

Applying the fuzzy rules and their corresponding operators we have,

Rule: 1
IF \( X \) is \( A1 \) (0)
OR \( Y \) is \( B1 \) (0.4)
THEN \( Z \) is \( C1 \) (0.4)

\( \mu_{C1}(Z) = \max[0,0.4] = 0.4 \)

Rule: 2
IF \( X \) is \( A2 \) (0.1)
Rule 3:
IF X is A3 (0.4)
OR Y is B3 (0)
THEN Z is C3 (0.4)

\[ \mu_{Z}(z) = \max[0.4, 0] = 0.4 \]

Thus we get t1=0.4, t2=0.1, t3=0.4 be the result of fuzzy logic operators for the fuzzy set Z.

Step 3: Aggregation of Rule outputs

Here we take up the membership functions of all rule consequents previously obtained and combine them into a single fuzzy set. The inputs of the aggregation process are the list of clipped or scaled consequent membership functions and the output is one fuzzy set for each output variable.

Figure 4.3 shows the way in which the rule aggregation is done to get a single fuzzy set for the overall fuzzy output.
Figure 4.3 Aggregations of Rule Outputs

Step 4: Defuzzification

The final step is to obtain the numerical estimate of the threat. We use the centroid technique to find the crisp value for threat.

\[
\text{C}0\text{G} = \frac{(k_1 + k_2 + \ldots + k_l) \times t_1 + (k_i + 1 + \ldots + k_j) \times t_2 + (k_j + 1 + \ldots + k_n) \times t_3}{(i \times t_1 + ((n + i - j) \times t_2) + ((n - i - j) \times t_3)}
\]

Substituting the values, we get

\[
\text{Threat } T = \frac{(0 + 10) \times 0.4 + (20 + 30 + 40) \times 0.1 + (50 + 60) \times 0.4}{(2 \times 0.4) + ((3 \times 0.1) + ((2 \times 0.4))}
\]

\[
T = \frac{57}{1.9} = 30
\]

Thus the threat value is in the given universe of discourse (0 to 60) is 30.

(iii) Final Step: Calculating Risk Estimate

Now that we have obtained the threat and damage value matrix, we can calculate the risk estimate for the network.
Consider the network has found intrusion and that the node ids have been compromised. Then the from the damage matrix, the value corresponding to $d_{12}$ is 20 and hence $D_r$ is 20.

\[
M_D = \begin{pmatrix} 5 & 5 \\ 20 & 50 \\ 100 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \Rightarrow D_r = 20
\]

Then we can finalize the risk estimation as

\[
R_A = T \times D_t
\]

\[
R_A = 30 \times 20 = 600
\]

Thus the final Risk Assessment value is 600 which is about 10%. It can be higher or lower depending on the tolerance level of the network. From the threat model we can observe that even though the attacker is moving away, the distance of the attacker is between close and nearby. Therefore the final threat estimate is 50%. We can also observe that the damage value taken from the matrix at time $t$ was only 20% of the total damage (from root). Therefore the product of these two values would give us a fairly accurate assessment of the risk over the network.

The maximum and the minimum could be set boundary values depending on the requirement of the user. Here in our text case, the lowest threat value possible was 0 and maximum was 60 (distance is close and attacker is very close) and from our attack tree we can see that the minimum damage value is 5 (leaf node) and maximum is 100 (root node). Thus the overall risk estimation can range from 0 to 6000.
4.2 Nash Equilibrium:

For checking the equilibrium of the game the sensor network is simulated using C. A matrix of $5 \times 5$ nodes is simulated with test values. Test values were used for traffic information and node ids and the simulation was run for 60 time units. The number of packets forwarded, received and generated was supplied and the values were varied between 0 and 50 randomly in increasing order for each time unit.

The total power $w_c$ was set to 100 for each node and the average power loss for every packet generated, received and forwarded was set to 5, 5 and 3. The weight parameters are set to $\alpha = 0.3$, $\beta = 0.3 \text{ and } \theta = 0.4$ and misbehavior pattern $\eta$ is initially set to 0.5 and the value is increased if the integrity of the node increased and the value is reduced if the integrity reduces.

The total power $w_c$ was set to 100 for each node and the average power loss for every packet generated, received and forwarded was set to 5, 5 and 3. The weight parameters are set to $\alpha = 0.3$, $\beta = 0.3 \text{ and } \theta = 0.4$ and misbehavior pattern $\eta$ is initially set to 0.5 and the value is increased if the integrity of the node increased and the value is reduced if the integrity reduces. The utility payoff is calculated for time $t$ using the definition of $U(t)$ given in 3.2.3.2.

For calculating the risk assessment the threat and damage values are supplied using test values as shown in the previous section. For simulation purposes the estimated risk for the nodes was set between 20 and 70 percent. For calculating the network’s payoff matrix the cost of defending the node $C_c$ was set based on the weight of the node $\gamma_i$ (cluster heads are more important than end nodes) which was given number between 1 to 5 and the $N_i$ is the number of nodes communicating with the node under consideration.
Similarly the profit of successful attack $P(t)$ for the attacker and the loss of the network when a malicious node $L_t$ are set based on the importance of the node. The objective of the security model is to maximize its payoff while minimizing its risk.

The payoff in the vertical axis is the payoff gained by the network by implementing the chosen response that maximizes the payoff and the horizontal axis is the corresponding iterations for which the payoff is shown (total iterations is 60). Thus the strategy chosen by the network is the one that gives highest payoff while achieving maximum minimization of risk. As shown in section 3.2.4.1b, the best strategy for the network is to select the strategy that gives the highest value of $U(U) - C_k + R_k$.

Given the test values mentioned above, the game was simulated and the net payoff was calculated. Figure 4.4 depicts the graph with network’s payoff against time $t$. Payoff was values were converted into percentile values by scaling [4] and plotted.
against time. It can be seen that the equilibrium is reached around payoff value 0.5 for the strategy. Since the utility parameters were changed randomly for every time t the initial payoff values are a bit wayward but as the reputation values got improved the payoff stabilized with time. The graph shows that the payoff becomes consistent and hence the game has equilibrium under the given strategy.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

5.1 Conclusion:

In this work, a risk assessment model integrated with a game theoretic framework is investigated for efficiently securing a wireless sensor network. A new methodology to effectively estimate risk based on the threat and damage values, using fuzzy logic has been introduced. The cost of defending a node and the related gain in payoff with respect to the objective of the network was considered while analyzing the game. The main focus of this thesis was to secure the sensor network using game theory and accurate estimation of the risk such that the objective of the network can be achieved with maximum payoff. The risk model studied and test case was analyzed. The game was simulated with test values and the strategy set and payoff definition was checked for equilibrium. The game model reduces the computational overhead with nodes by moving the decision making to cluster heads. By choosing appropriate utility parameters and payoff function the network can secure itself efficiently. Future work in this area may focus on identifying more sophisticated parameters for calculating the threat in the risk assessment. The model can also be analyzed for dynamically changing clusters based networks.
REFERENCES


APPENDIX

A) Fuzzy Logic and Sets and Rules
Fuzzy logic is derived from fuzzy set theory dealing with reasoning that is approximate rather than precisely deduced from classical predicate logic. Fuzzy logic is determined as a set of mathematical principles for knowledge representation based on degrees of membership rather than on crisp membership of classical binary logic.

Fuzziness rests on fuzzy set theory and fuzzy logic is just a small part of that theory. Unlike two-valued Boolean logic, fuzzy logic is multi-valued. It deals with degrees of membership and degrees of truth. Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of logical values between 0 (completely false) and 1 (completely true). Classical binary logic can be considered as a special case of multi-valued fuzzy logic.

Fuzzy Sets:

Fuzzy sets are different from classical set theory by the principle of dichotomy. Classic (or crisp) set theory is governed by a logic that uses one of only two values: true or false. This logic cannot represent vague concepts, and therefore fails to give the answers on paradoxes and areas where estimation over a wide set of values is needed. The basic idea of fuzzy set theory is that an element belongs to a fuzzy set within a certain degree of membership. Thus a proposition is not either true of false but may be partly true or partly false to any degree.

A fuzzy set can be simply defined as a set with fuzzy boundaries. Let X be the universe of discourse (the range of all possible values applicable to a chosen variable) and its elements be denoted as x. In classical set theory, crisp set A of X is defined as function \( f_A(x) \) called characteristic function of A.

\[
f_A(x): X \rightarrow \{0, 1\}
\]

where

\[
f_A(x) = \begin{cases} 
1, & \text{if } x \in A \\
0, & \text{if } x \notin A 
\end{cases}
\]

In fuzzy theory, fuzzy set A of universe X is defined by function
For any element \( x \) of universe \( X \), membership function \( \mu_A(x) : X \rightarrow [0,1] \) equals the degree to which \( x \) is an element of set \( A \). This degree, a value between 0 and 1, represents the degree of membership, also called the membership value, of element \( x \) in set \( A \).

Operations of Fuzzy Set:

Operations that can be performed upon a crisp set or a set of crisp sets can also be applied on a fuzzy set, but in a different manner such that the result of fuzzy operation represents a combined membership degree. For example, complement of \( A \), denoted by \( \neg A \), can be calculated by \( \mu_{\neg A}(x) = 1 - \mu_A(x) \). Other operations such as union, intersection, containment etc can also be performed using fuzzy operators [14].

Common crisp set theory laws such as commutativity, associativity, idempotency etc are applicable to fuzzy sets. Fuzzy sets also follow distributive laws [14].

Fuzzy Rules:

In 1973, a paper by Lotfi Zadeh (Zadeh, 1973) outlined a new approach to analysis of complex systems in which he suggested capturing human knowledge in fuzzy rules.

A fuzzy rule can be defined as a conditional statement in the form:

If \( x \) is \( A \)

THEN \( y \) is \( B \)

where \( x \) and \( y \) are linguistic variables; \( A \) and \( B \) are linguistic values determined by fuzzy sets on the universe of discourses \( X \) and \( Y \), respectively.
VITA

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The purpose of this thesis is to model an appropriate response to an attack in a wireless sensor network by implementing game theory concepts coupled with risk assessment. In contrast to the widely analyzed key management techniques which involve computation and communication overhead, the security model is designed as a non-cooperative game between the attacker and the network. By creating and using a model that uses a risk assessment model to quantify risk and employing a cost-payoff relation of the game theory for decision making better resource utilization and better security can be achieved.

Findings and Conclusions:

The risk assessment model integrated with a game theoretic framework is investigated for efficiently securing a wireless sensor network. A new methodology to effectively estimate risk based on the threat and damage values, using fuzzy logic has been introduced. The cost of defending a node and the related gain in payoff with respect to the objective of the network was considered while analyzing the game. The game model reduces the computational overhead with nodes by moving the decision making to cluster heads. By choosing appropriate utility parameters and payoff function the network can secure itself efficiently.