CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE EARLY JAPANESE IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES DURING MEIJI TO TAISHO ERA (1868–1926)

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CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE EARLY JAPANESE IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES DURING MEIJI TO TAISHO ERA (1868–1926)

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of Problem

The Japanese immigration to America began in 1868 at the beginning of the Meiji Restoration (Meiji Ishin, 明治維新). In general, the history of Japanese immigration consists of two phases: 1868 to 1907, and 1908 to 1924. In other words, ending the Japanese labor migration to the United States, the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907–19081 marked the turning point in the nature of Japanese immigration from temporary laborers to permanent residents.2 Their motives for immigration have not been thoroughly explored, partly because Japan is now a country that is receiving immigrants rather than sending them. Nevertheless, Japan was not a wealthy country for several decades after the Meiji Restoration. In order to pursue the national policy called fukoku kyōhei (富国強兵, enrich the nation and strengthen the military) and to be the itto-koku

* Following the Japanese practice, all names are presented with surname first then given name.

1 Under the agreement, Japan agreed not to issue passports valid for the continental United States to laborers. On the other hand, the United States allowed Japan to issue passports for the United States to “laborers who have already been in America and to the parents, wives, and children of laborers already resident there,” according to Alexander DeConde, et al., Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, Volume 2, E–N (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2002), 208.

(一等国, “first-rank nation”), the new Meiji government carried out a series of reforms that radically changed the Japanese society. Japan then was chaotic due to the rapid transition from a feudal system to a modernizing nation through social, economic, administrative, military, legal, and educational reform programs. The leaders of Japan tenaciously tried to be equal with the West after the conclusions of “unequal treaties.” Consequently, these reform programs created not only serious unemployment and trade problems but also severe poverty differences between cities and villages.³

Japan after 1868 was one of the major countries that had encouraged emigration until the 1960s, when Japan experienced rapid economic growth because the Korean War (1950–1953) gave a tremendous economic boost to the Japan’s postwar recovery.⁴ Suffering from the drastic socioeconomic changes following the Meiji Restoration, many Japanese left for Hawaii, Americas, Australia, and Manchuria in order to improve their standard of living, first by accumulating wealth as dekasegi-nin (出稼ぎ人, emigrant or sojourn laborer) and later by establishing themselves in stable settlements as permanent residents. The displaced samurai carried out the first organized emigration to the United States as early as 1869. Especially after the 1880s, inspired by the amount of remittance made by the immigrants, the Japanese government with the help of influential intellectuals promoted the Japanese overseas emigration for the nation’s economic development. In other words, the Japanese overseas emigration not only facilitated industrialization and commercial activity but also alleviated socioeconomic problems


caused in the process of modernization following the opening of Japan. In fact, a large-scale overseas emigration contributed to the development of Japan’s maritime industry as Sasaki Seiji and Nishimukai Yoshiaki pointed out. Meanwhile, the demand for cheap labor enabled the Japanese mass immigration first in Hawaii and then in the United States.

The influx of the Japanese immigrants in a short period eventually instigated the anti-Japanese sentiment both in Hawaii and in the United States; however, the sentiment was more severe in the mainland United States due to the rise of the organized exclusionist movement. Focusing on the period between 1868 and 1926, this study explores the “pushes” (forces that caused the people to leave Japan) and “pulls” (things that attracted the people to go to Hawaii and the United States) with an emphasis on socioeconomic and cultural aspects.

My contribution to this area of study will be to explore why great numbers of Japanese decided to immigrate to America instead of neighboring regions such as Manchuria and how the development of the nation attributed to the interests of immigrants, government, and industries between 1868 and 1926. Better economic opportunities would not fully explain their determination. So, what really “pushed” the Japanese people to America? Utilizing sources that represent the Japanese point of view, I will examine what caused the Japanese mass immigration to America, what were the governmental policies? What were the consequences?

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Until now, scholarly works on the Japanese immigration generally have been published mainly focusing on the Japanese immigrants’ experiences in America. Initially, missionaries and journalists wrote about Japan. For the most part, Japanese immigration history was written by Japanese American scholars who had access to valuable primary sources including experiences of their parents and grandparents being the early Japanese immigrants in America. On the other hand, studies mostly done in the United States seemed to lack primary sources on the Japanese side of story. Today, it has become easier to fly to Japan for research or to obtain primary sources through online; however, back then, due to the limitation on transportation and a language barrier, it required a tremendous amount of time, money, and effort to pursue research on the Japanese socioeconomic condition during the Meiji and Taisho periods (大正時代). As a result, for the past 100 years, many studies on the Japanese immigration have done on “pulls” based on the American-centered view that tended to emphasize economic motivations.

In particular, the crucial period between 1868 and 1900 has remained not fully explored by scholars for several reasons. First of all, many Japanese American scholars examined the lives of immigrants exclusively drawing from their family experiences.

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7 During the Meiji and Taisho periods, most government documents were written in old form of characters. Therefore, many kanji (漢字, Chinese characters used in Japanese writing) were not simplified like today.

Here is another problem: these first generations of immigrants were usually the poor peasantry or the unemployed samurai who did not realize what was really happening at home. Once leaving Japan, they were not fully aware of drastic political and socioeconomic changes brought about by the Meiji Restoration that indeed caused numbers of subsequent problems. As a result, scholarly works done by Japanese American scholars tended to offer great details on the social and economic experiences of the Japanese in America, while not fully explaining the causes for immigration in terms of cultural and intellectual development during the Meiji and Taisho periods.

The other problem is that not many Japanese scholars have worked on the comprehensive Japanese immigration history. As I pursued research, I found considerably few accounts on the Japanese immigration to Hawaii and the United States by the Japanese scholars. Unlike other Asian groups, the Japanese immigration to America did not increase after the end of World War II. While other Asian countries suffered postwar poverty in addition to the outbreak of Communist Revolution in China and the war in Korea, Japan was able to carry out the postwar recovery at an extraordinary speed through becoming a close U.S. Cold War ally. In fact, there were about ten million unemployed, including demobilized soldiers immediately after the war. However, utilizing excess labor force and improvements in heavy industry, Japan was capable of being the U.S. ally.\(^9\) During the Korean War (1950–1953), the U.S. special procurement amounted to $600 million in 1951 and more than $800 million in 1952 and 1953.\(^{10}\) Accordingly, Japan’s rapid economic growth created many job opportunities


\(^{10}\) Ibid.
within the country. Therefore, immigration became a less significant practice to overcome the poverty in rural areas because there was a good labor market in the industrial sectors. Since the 1960s, Japan indeed became a prosperous country that received immigrants instead of sending them out. In consequence, the immigration history turned to be a minor field of study.

Furthermore, the Japanese American scholars after the end of World War II shifted their interest to the experiences of the second-generation Japanese Americans by examining how they were more “American” than previously thought. This change in trend took place partly because of their unforgettable wartime internment experiences that made them to emphasize their “Americanism” in every aspect. Evidently, many Chinese and Koreans continued to create their ethnic enclaves in many regions of America; however, the Japanese community tended to promote the prompt assimilation. Particularly, the Japanese immigrant (Issei 一世, first generation) parents, denied U.S. citizenship, focused on providing their children an access to the high-quality educational institutes because they believed only higher education would facilitate their Nisei (二世, second generation) children to assimilate into the mainstream society.\(^\text{11}\) The scholars began to spend more time and effort on researching how the Japanese Americans have tried to assimilate into the mainstream society throughout time.

Indeed, Japan transformed in various aspects when political power shifted from the feudal Tokugawa Shogunate to the Meiji government in which oligarchs played a

\(^{11}\) Issei are the Japanese people who immigrated to America. Nisei are children of Japanese immigrants who were born, raised, and educated in America. The word consists of Ni (second) + sei (generation). The grandchildren of Issei are Sansei (三世, third generation); san (third) + sei (generation). The great-grandchildren of Issei are Yonsei (四世, fourth generation); yon (fourth) + sei (generation).
central role. So many radical changes took place within a short period, and the majority of scholars considered political, economic, and social changes as more important research subjects than the immigration history. Owning to the great efforts of Japanese American scholars, what “pulled” the Japanese to America has been clearly examined; however, what “pushed” them out of Japan has remained unclear and needs further exploration. The examination and analysis of the Japanese primary sources of the period will reveal “pushes” for immigration from the Japanese point of view. Through analyzing sources generally missing from the history of Japanese immigration to Hawaii and the United States, I would like to explore the causes and effects of the Japanese immigration with an emphasis on “pushes” between 1868 and 1926, a period of rapid transformation.

The Historiographical Context of Japanese Immigration to America

There exists a vast literature on the early Japanese American experiences. Until the 1920s, most accounts on Japanese were produced by missionaries or journalists and there was virtually no study on Japanese Americans. In the 1920s, numbers of anti-Japanese pamphlets were published by members of the Japanese Exclusion League and politicians in California. Yamato Ichihashi’s *Japanese in the United States: A Critical Study of the Problems of Japanese Immigrants and Their Children* (1932) was a scholarly account to countermeasure the anti-Japanese sentiment in California. In general, social scientists dominated the area of study before the emergence of new social history of the

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In order to write about the first generation Japanese Americans, Kazuo Itō’s *Hokubei Hyakunenzakura* (A History of Japanese Immigrants in North America) (1969) and *Zoku Hokubei Hyakunenzakura* (A Sequel to A History of Japanese Immigrants in North America) (1972) are indispensable to examine the experiences of the Issei immigrants.15 Offering valuable first-hand accounts, these sequential volumes

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significantly contributed to the development of the field of Japanese American studies. Based on personal records and a great number of interviews, Itō vividly delineated the lives of the Issei immigrants including miners, railroad workers, farmers, merchants, restaurant and hotel owners, missionaries, the yakuza (Japanese gambler/gangster and later organized crime syndicates) and prostitutes. Itō paid great attention to the role of Japanese language schools in shaping the Nisei’s cultural identity. Additionally, Itō included many events that affected the Issei community in the Pacific Northwest as well as information of numbers of social organizations such as the Fukuin-kai (福音会, Gospel Society), Fujin Home (婦人ホーム, Women’s Home), and Salvation Army, which facilitated Issei adaptation to new environment and life on foreign soil. Then, published in 1972, Hilary Conroy and T. Scott Miyakawa’s East Across the Pacific illustrated the influence of family and community organizations that facilitated the growth of the Japanese town in Seattle in the prewar years.

Born in Aichi prefecture in 1878, Yamato Ichihashi was one of the first able scholars of Japanese ancestry in the United States. Placing emphasis on historical and sociological perspectives, Ichihashi wrote a classic account of the early history of the Issei in the United States as well as his interment experiences during World War II. Teaching Japanese studies and Japanese American experiences at Stanford University,
his influential study of the Japanese American community defended the *Issei* from the rising anti-Japanese movement. As one of the first respected Japanese American scholars, Ichihashi attempted to establish better relations between Japan and the United States.\(^{18}\)

Meanwhile, heavily drawing from primary sources in the archives of Hawaii and in Japanese official documents, Hilary Conroy’s *The Japanese Frontier in Hawaii, 1868–1898* (1953) addressed its shortage of labor in sugar plantations and its effort to secure laborers from Japan led to the mass immigration of the Japanese into Hawaii as early as 1868. Conroy demonstrated that the immigration problem was the core of the Japan-Hawaii relations.\(^{19}\)

A renowned scholar of immigration and Asian American studies, Roger Daniels offered a definitive history of the anti-Japanese movement in California between 1905 and 1924. According to Daniels, not only economic competition but also feelings of racial superiority and purity stimulated the anti-Japanese movement in California.\(^{20}\) Daniels examined how the Japanese exclusion affected the course of the development of the Japanese American community in the United States.

Focusing on the social aspects of the early immigrants in Hawaii, both Kimura and Saiki illustrated how the Japanese immigrants emphasized teaching their children to


\(^{19}\) Conroy, *The Japanese Frontier in Hawaii, 1868–1898*.

\(^{20}\) Daniels, *The Politics of Prejudice*. 
admire, respect, and emulate their Japanese heritage. Ichiokea provided a historical study of the comprehensive Issei experiences in the mainland United States focusing on their thoughts and actions as well as the roles played by the Japanese Associations and Japanese American newspapers in their community. Meanwhile, tracing anti-Japanese movement in Hawaii, a revisionist historian Gary Y. Okihiro argued that Hawaii’s anti-Japanese movement was “systematic and endemic to capitalism in Hawaii” that lasted from 1865 (when the Japanese were first utilized as laborers) to World War II.

However, there are not enough well-established studies on the motivation of the Japanese immigration to the United States that illustrate both Japanese and American viewpoints. When the Japanese immigration began, Japan was middle of the political transformation from the Tokugawa Shogunate to the Meiji oligarchy. Therefore, it is quite difficult to obtain the complete data regarding the issues of Japanese overseas emigration in the early years of Meiji. One of the first articles dealing with an account of Japanese immigration on the American side was Yosaburo Yoshida’s “Sources and Causes of Japanese Emigration” (1909), a classic account of the history of Japanese immigration examining causes in terms of increase of population, economic pressure, and inducement. Demonstrating that the devastating economic conditions made the Japanese leave their homeland, Masakazu Iwata’s “The Japanese Immigrants in California Agriculture” (1962) examined the contributions made by the Japanese


23 Okihiro, *Cane Fires*, xiii, 18.

immigrants to the agricultural development in California before World War II.\textsuperscript{25} However, most scholars agree that drastic socioeconomic change such as rapid modernization and adoption of the Western cultural values and practices stimulated not only farmers but also the samurai class to immigrate to America.\textsuperscript{26} For example, Mikiso Hane’s \textit{Peasants, Rebels and Outcastes: The Underside of Modern Japan} (1982) demonstrated how Japan’s modernization affected the peasantry, particularly second or third sons of farmers who did not inherit land.\textsuperscript{27}

Literature published after the 1990s tended to focus on the socioeconomic causes of Japanese immigration. Yūzō Murayama’s article entitled “Information and Emigrants: Interprefectural Differences of Japanese Emigration to the Pacific Northwest, 1880–1915” (1991), depicted the socioeconomic motives for immigration and addressed differences by prefectures.\textsuperscript{28} Meanwhile, carefully tracing the footsteps of emigrants through examining unexplored part of diplomatic and modern Japanese history, Jōji Suzuki’s \textit{Nihonjin Dekasegi Imin} (Japanese Emigration of Laborers) (1992) offered a survey of history of Japanese emigration.\textsuperscript{29} Examining the Japanese immigration from the late Tokugawa period to pre-war era, Suzuki declared that Japanese immigration was


\textsuperscript{26} Hisashi Tsurutani, \textit{Amerika Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin} (The Opening of the American West and the Japanese) (Tokyo: Nihon Hōsō Shuppan Kyōkai, 1997), 43.

\textsuperscript{27} Mikisō Hane, \textit{Peasants, Rebels and Outcastes: The Underside of Modern Japan} (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982).


based on _dekasegi_ who sought to supplement family income. Also published in 1992, Masaaki Kodama’s _Nihon Iminshi Kenkyū Josetsu_ (An Introduction to the History of Japanese Immigration) contributed to the study of immigration from socioeconomic perspectives by providing numbers of local statistic records that revealed the conditions in rural areas of Hiroshima, Yamaguchi, and Kumamoto prefectures that had the highest rates of immigration. Utilizing a great number of primary sources and considering the trend of the international relations, Kodama focused on analyzing the changing causes of emigration.\(^3\)0 The Imin Kenyūkai (Society of Immigration Study) published a comprehensive study of Japan’s immigration in 1994 entitled _Nihon no Imin Kenkyū—Dōkō to Mokuroku_ (An Immigration Study of Japan—Tendency and Catalog).\(^3\)1 Based on the immigration study up to 1992, this literature examined the countries that sent out immigrants, countries that received immigrants, and connections between the diplomatic relations and immigration.

On the other hand, the study on the emigration companies in Japan has not been explored thoroughly. Alan T. Moriyama was one of the first scholars to examine the reality of the emigration companies. Moriyama’s _Imingaisha: Japanese Emigration Companies and Hawaii, 1894–1908_ (1985) looked into the emergence of major emigration companies and their role in stimulating the Japanese emigration to Hawaii.\(^3\)2

\(^3\)0 Masaaki Kodama, _Nihon Iminshi Kenkyū Josetsu_ (An Introduction to the History of Japanese Immigration) (Hiroshima: Keisuisha, 1992).


Research Methodology

There were in fact several intertwined causes that “pushed” the Japanese to go overseas. Drawing attention to the motivation of the massive Japanese immigration, such as socioeconomic conditions in both rural and urban areas and the goals of the government, business, and intellectual leaders in the late Tokugawa period to the Taisho period, I illustrate the struggle and development of the early Japanese immigrant community. First, in order to estimate the poverty level in the early Meiji period, I heavily relied on the National Diet Library that has over two thousand materials related to Japanese immigration, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that managed immigration. Particularly, the *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho* (Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy) was crucial for estimating a trend of emigration pattern and for understanding the Japanese government’s view on immigration issues.33

For this study, I explored “pushes” by demonstrating the impact of the opening of Japan, the Meiji Restoration, and the modernization policies on the rural population and the *shizoku* (士族, former samurai class). The development of the nation’s maritime industry indeed contributed to facilitating the large-scale transportation of immigrants.34 Therefore, focusing on the history of Mitsubishi that initially emerged as a shipping firm, I traced the relations between Mitsubishi and the government that not only enabled overseas emigration but also upgraded national prestige by pursuing the *fukoku kyōhei* policy. Exploring various Japanese newspapers of the time, I sought to demonstrate that

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Mitsubishi was the powerful agent of implanting the national consciousness and that the rise of the Japanese nationalism attributed to Mitsubishi.

Simultaneously, the emigration companies and agents actively stimulated overseas emigration primarily for their interests. Looking into the relations between the executives of emigration companies and politicians, I examined how these companies exploited the Japanese emigrants by fraudulent practices and why the government did not impose strict regulations on these companies. Unlike some European immigration that was family-based and intended permanent settlement, the Japanese immigration took place as *dekasegi* (temporary emigration), mostly consisting of bachelors. Under such environment, the initial immigrant community had corrupt public morals and the yakuza, operating gambling and prostitution, found a way to thrive in Hawaii and in the United States. The early Japanese community encountered a number of social problems and such “social evils” attributed to the rise of anti-Japanese sentiment in America to some degree. Despite facing such problems, the Japanese community changed its course of development when a great number of “picture brides” entered through the system of “picture marriage”\(^{35}\) and facilitated the establishment of families.

\(^{35}\) Utilized for finding brides for Japanese laborers in Hawaii, it was based on the Japanese custom of arranged marriage called *omiai kekkon* (お見合い結婚) with slight modifications. A man sent his picture and a memo describing his occupation, property, and brief living condition in the United States to a matchmaker or his family in Japan, and then he or she chose a bride and sent back her picture to the man. Otherwise, a man in America asked his parents to find a bride for him. Once his parents and a girl’s parents agreed their children’s partner appropriate in terms of “character, social standing, family relations, genealogy, health and education,” the man in America sent his pictures to a girl, and in exchange received her picture. In fact, the exchange of pictures was not always necessary because frequently brides and grooms were from the same villages or towns and thus already knew each other. If both agreed to marry, bride’s name was added to the groom’s family registry that legally completed their marriage. Then, the “picture brides” would come to Hawaii or the United States to join their husbands. The basis of the arranged marriage was mostly kinship and economic ties and interpersonal relations in a community.
At the same time, I examined “pulls”—primarily the labor shortage in Hawaii and the United States based on statistics. Simultaneously, the practice of “picture marriage” served as both “push” and “pull”: socioeconomic motives and “ideal” life became a “push” while the shortage of women became a “pull” for stabilizing community.

While conducting the research, the primary sources from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs were critical to figure out the number of immigrants who left for America as well as their social status in Japan, level of education and income, and regional varieties. I frequently utilized tables that reflected the transition in number and gender. In order to get the accurate number of immigrants as well as a tendency of immigration patterns, the Census of the United States and Congressional Records provided important information. Published by Consulate-General of Japan, Documental History of Law Cases Affecting Japanese in the United States 1916–1924 (1925) was a valuable account for exploring numbers of laws and policies that specifically targeted Japanese and Japanese Americans.36

In addition, the Japanese newspapers such as Kanpō (Official Gazette), Asahi Shimbun (Osaka and Tokyo) Nichi Nichi Shimbun (Tokyo), Kokumin Shimbun (Tokyo), Hōchi Shimbun (Tokyo), and Jiji Shinpō (Tokyo) provided indispensable accounts on how the Japanese perceived the overseas immigration. Meanwhile, San Francisco-based Japanese American newspapers such as Nichibei Shimbun (Japanese American News) and Shin Sekai (New World) offered useful information that delineated the lives of early Japanese immigrants and their community development.37 The contents of ethnic


37 Nichibei Shimbun (Japanese American News) (San Francisco), 1899–1942; Shin Sekai
newspapers tended to reflect the issues that the Japanese in American were encountering at that time. Despite the devastating San Francisco earthquake of 1906 that destroyed considerable amount of the historical record on Japanese Americans, the Japanese American Research Project (JARP) tried to recover their history through collecting the personal papers, newsletters, manuscripts, photographs, and works of art of the early Japanese immigrants on the West Coast. The great endeavor of the JARP enabled scholars to gain an insight into the history of the Japanese in America. Numbers of digital archives were essential to conduct research in effective manner. The digital archives of the National Archives of Japan, National Diet Library, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs were crucial for obtaining the Japanese primary sources and government papers. In addition, the Library of Congress’s *Chronicling America* and the Digital Archives of the Kobe University provided an access to thousands of valuable newspaper articles and editorials of the period I examined. For the works of Fukuzawa Yukichi, Keiō University Library offered digitalized version of his publications, which allowed me to save a tremendous amount of time. Modern technology facilitated my research by offering access to numbers of indispensable primary sources that supported my argument.

In Chapter II, I will examine the socioeconomic conditions of late Tokugawa period to early Meiji period that created precondition for initiating Japanese overseas

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emigration. Tracing the drastic socioeconomic changes in the period, both internal and external pressure led to the emergence of the mass Japanese emigration, and two castaways—Nakahama Manjirō and Hamada Hikozō—who lived certain years in the United States both directly or indirectly encouraged the elite Japanese to go to America. In addition, Japan’s rapid modernization and the national policy of fukoku kyōhei resulted in promoting the Japanese emigration as a means of obtaining foreign currencies and advanced technology.

In Chapter III, I explore the various causes of the Japanese overseas emigration. After examining the first group of emigrants to Hawaii called Gannen-mono (literary Meiji’s “First Year People”), I pay closer attention to the socioeconomic background in Japan, including topics such as “Conscription and Draft Evasion,” “Labor Demand on Sugar Plantations in Hawaii,” and “Overpopulation Problem and Kaigai Hatten (Japanese Overseas Development).” The severe labor shortage in the burgeoning sugar industry “pulled” the Japanese to Hawaii in numbers. Meanwhile, the socioeconomic changes caused by the Meiji Restoration such as the Matsukata Deflation (financial reform that produced many landless peasants), Conscription Law, overpopulation problem, and Kaigai Hatten “pushed” many rural Japanese to go to Hawaii in order to make a living or to support their own families.

In Chapter IV, dividing the Japanese immigration to Hawaii into four periods, I analyze the characteristic of each period and their distinct cultural development in Hawaii. The Japanese government played an active role in initiating the first organized emigration to Hawaii during the kanyaku imin jidai (government-contracted immigration period, 1885–1894). The urbanization caused the rural economy stagnated and “pushed”
the farmers in Hiroshima and Yamaguchi to Hawaii. During the shiyaku imin jidai (self-contracted immigration period, 1894–1899), the emergence of the emigration businesses further facilitated the emigration process; however, the imbalanced gender ratio among the Japanese emigrants resulted in the prevalence of illegal and immoral activities. During the jiyn imin jidai (free immigration period, 1900–1907), higher wages offered in the mainland United States “pulled” Japanese in Japan and in Hawaii. Establishing families by bringing their wives or “picture brides,” the yobiyose imin jidai (summoned immigration period, 1907–1924) marked a turning point in the history of Japanese immigration—from dekasegi (temporary laborers) to permanent residents. Interestingly, the Japanese emigrants before the yobiyose imin jidai strongly preserved their Japanese cultural identity and considered themselves subjects of Japan who worked in remote areas for supporting the national development to be equal to the West as well as for improving their standards of living.

In Chapter V, I examine the relationship of Japanese immigration with the rise of modern Japanese industry—Mitsubishi zaibatsu in particular. The development of the overseas emigration and Japan’s maritime industry took place simultaneously, and the Japanese government actively encouraged immigration, which in turn stimulated the development of shipbuilding that was intended to get Japan into modern sea power. In cooperation with private firms, the Meiji government facilitated the national policy of fukoku kyōhei that required enormous funds by promoting a large-scale emigration. Supporting Japan’s colonial development and implanting the Japanese nationalism, Mitsubishi played a crucial role in achieving the governmental goals in many aspects. In return, Mitsubishi came to dominate many sectors of industry by obtaining enormous
government subsidies. Simultaneously, the Japanese overseas emigration created competition between shipping companies and consequently boosted the development of the maritime and domestic shipbuilding industries.

In Chapter VI, I deal with two types of publications that encouraged emigration; one appealed to the elite/educated class and the other to the masses. In order to encourage the elite Japanese to go to the United States for studying, the government utilized the prominent Meiji intellectuals such as Fukuzawa Yukichi, the founder of Keio University and the advocate of Western liberalism and Japanese colonialism by the name of overseas development. On the other hand, many guidebooks to America facilitated all classes of Japanese to go to America and to accumulate wealth not only for their own interests but also for contributing to the development of their nation. While the Meiji intellectuals directly or indirectly inspired the elite and the masses for emigration, various guidebooks to America directly appealed to the masses by providing them practical information for emigration. Especially, in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars, the Japanese leaders skillfully instilled a strong sense of nationalism into the Japanese subjects. In this context, the Japanese overseas emigration was a part of the highly articulated justification of Japanese colonialism to equalize with the West by repealing the unequal treaties. Japan’s nationalism that accompanied the nation-state building crashed with the American nativism, and the relations between two nations would significantly deteriorate after the enactment of the Immigration Act of 1924 that completely shut down the Japanese immigration to the United States.

The subsequent Chapter VII focuses on the mediums that involved in the transportation of the Japanese emigrants. As the demand for emigration increased in the
post-Sino-Japanese War period, various emigration companies and agents emerged that assisted the emigrants to find jobs in Hawaii and arranged their passage by collecting high commissions. Additionally, this chapter deals with the labor-contracting system also known as “boss system” that managed the Japanese laborers arrived in the United States by finding jobs, providing an interpreter, remitting money to Japan, and so forth. The emigration companies prospered before the Contract Labor Law became effective in Hawaii in 1900 due to the U.S. annexation of Hawaii. Afterwards, the labor contractors dominated the supply of Japanese laborers to the American industries up until the signing of the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907–1908 that ended the Japanese labor immigration to the United States. The emigration companies and labor contractors exploited the toil of the Japanese emigrants; however, the emigrants, seeking for accumulating wealth mostly for their families, were attracted to the United States and some of them even attempted entering the United States through illegal methods.

This study illustrates that with the restoration period, the government with the help of certain individuals created a climate, which made immigration possible partly because of economic circumstances of the emigrants but partly because of the national policy and attitude towards the West that made the United States the place to go as opposed to China. In other words, examining the development of overseas emigration that intertwined with the national policies, the Japanese immigration was a byproduct of the rapid industrialization and modernization which created a modern nation-state.
CHAPTER II

SOCIOECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF THE LATE TOKUGAWA TO EARLY MEIJI JAPAN

Tracing the historical development of Japan is inevitable to examine the causes of Japanese immigration to the United States. Japan in the nineteenth century underwent numbers of drastic changes due to both external and internal pressures. Besides, Manjirō and Hikozō, former castaways, played a crucial role in the process of Japan’s modernization even before the arrival of Commodore Perry. On the other hand, rapid modernization strained socioeconomic structure of Tokugawa Japan. Finally, the Meiji Restoration of 1868 that politically transformed Japan from feudal society to modernizing nation initiated the first Japanese mass emigration to Hawaii in 1868 and the United States in 1869. This chapter examines key events and figures that set the foundation for the coming of the Japanese immigration to the United States.

External Pressure

Analysis of Japan’s mid-nineteenth century socioeconomic background from various aspects is essential to discuss the causes of Japanese mass immigration to the United States. Banning the Japanese from going abroad, the distinctive seclusion policy of the Tokugawa Shogunate, which lasted more than two hundred years, contributed to
shaping Japan’s unique political system and cultural identity.¹ By the mid-nineteenth century, the system of the Tokugawa Shogunate seemed fragile, yet it managed to sustain its authority until the unexpected arrival of Commodore Matthew C. Perry (1794–1858) with four warships in Uraga (浦賀) in 1853.² The following year, Perry returned with seven warships and further demanded the opening of Japan. Stunned by the overwhelming U.S. naval power, the Tokugawa Shogunate had no choice but to meet the U.S. demands by signing the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Peace and Amity (日米和親条約) also known as the Treaty of Kanagawa (神奈川条約) on March 31, 1854.³ The treaty put an end to Japan’s seclusion policy.

Arriving in Japan in 1856, Townsend Harris (1804–1878), an American merchant and the U.S. Consul General of Japan, was the first U.S. Ambassador who convinced the Japanese officials to open commercial relations with the United States. Observing how the British used force to open China, the Japanese officials considered it was better to open its door voluntarily than by coercion. Then, the United States and the Tokugawa Shogunate signed the Treaty of Amity and Commerce (日米修好通商条約) commonly

¹ Under the seclusion policy, no foreigner could enter Japan and no Japanese could leave the country. Anyone who violated this prohibition was sentenced to death. Japanese generally believed the policy would protect Japanese culture and its independence. Therefore, only limited contact with the Dutch was allowed at the trading post of Dejima (出島) in Nagasaki Bay. Dejima is a small artificial island constructed in 1634. The Dutch was indeed Japan’s only Western trading partners in the past two-hundred years of seclusion.

² Matthew Calbraith Perry was the U.S. Special Envoy and Commander in Chief of naval force in the East Indian Seas. Uraga became a district of Yokosuka in Kanagawa prefecture in 1943.

³ The U.S.-Japan Treaty of Peace and Amity is also known as the Treaty of Kanagawa, which allowed the U.S. ships to enter two Japanese ports, Shimoda (下田) in Shizuoka and Hakodate (函館) in Hokkaido. Furthermore, the weakened Tokugawa Shogunate had to sign similar “unequal treaties” with England France, Holland, and Russia.
known as Harris Treaty in the Ryōsen-ji, a Buddhist temple in Shimoda on July 29, 1858, which went into effect on July 4, 1859.4

Among the most important agreements between the United States and Japanese governments were: exchange of diplomatic agents; opening of the ports of Kanagawa (present-day Yokohama) and Nagasaki on July 4, 1859, Niigata on January 1, 1860, and Hyogo (present-day Kobe) on January 1, 1863 for foreign trade; ability of the United States citizens to live and trade in the cities of Edo (present-day Tokyo) from January 1, 1862 and Osaka from January 1, 1863; fixed low import/export duties, and extraterritoriality for the United States citizens that exempted them from the Japanese jurisdiction system.5 Shortly after that, Japan had to sign similar treaties with the Great Britain, France, Holland, and Russia in October. Due to its nature, the Treaty of Amity and Commerce became known as one of the “unequal treaties.”6

Signing of the “unequal treaties” with the West radically changed the course of the development of feudal Japan in many ways.7 It revealed the Tokugawa Shogunate’s weakening political structure and the possibility of the colonization of Japan by the West like India and China. Significantly, the capitulation of the Tokugawa Shogunate to the demands of the United States made the Shogunate look terribly powerless and helpless,


deserving no respect.\textsuperscript{8}

The Treaty of Amity and Commerce was officially ratified in 1860 through the visit of the first official Japanese diplomatic mission to the United States dispatched by the Tokugawa Shogunate.\textsuperscript{9} The Shogunate decided to utilize the \textit{Kanrin Maru} (咸臨丸, a modern screw-driven steam warship), a used ship purchased from the Dutch, for the first diplomatic mission in order to show the world that Japan had acquired the latest naval ship and navigation technologies only six years after the opening of Japan.\textsuperscript{10} On January 19, 1860, commanded by Katsu Kaishū (勝海舟, 1823–1899) who was a naval officer and statesman from the late Tokugawa to Meiji periods, the \textit{Kanrin Maru} left Uraga for San Francisco, conveying members of Japanese delegation including the legendary Nakahama Manjirō (中濱万次郎, 1827–1898) and the most famous advocate of Westernization, Fukuzawa Yukichi.

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\textsuperscript{9} Payson J. Treat, \textit{The Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Japan, 1853–1865} (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1917), 58–66; Lester H. Brune and Richard Dean Burns, \textit{Chronological History of U.S. Foreign Relations} (New York: Routledge, 2003), 190. Consisting of seventy-seven officials that included two ambassadors, Japan’s first mission arrived at San Francisco on May 17, 1860. After a week of social sessions in California, the mission went to Washington by steamer. During the tour, they displayed Japanese culture including tea, silk products, and lacquerware.
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\textsuperscript{10} Shigeyuki Itō, “Jon Manjirō to Gaikōkan toshitteno Rekishiteki Yakuwari: Nichibeikan no Saisho no Sūjiku” (John Manjiro and His Historical Role as Japanese Diplomat: The First Pivot of Japan and the U.S. Relations), \textit{Kyushu Sangyō University Keieigaku Ronshū (Business Review)} 18, no. 4 (2008): 46. The \textit{Kanrin Maru} was the first warship that crossed the Pacific Ocean under the command of Japanese Captain Katsu Kaishū and Admiral Kimura Yoshitake. Assisted by the U.S. Navy Lieutenant and the Captain of \textit{U.S.S. Fenimore Cooper}, John Mercer Brooke (1826–1906) and his crew who were shipwrecked in Edo, the \textit{Kanrin Maru} accompanied the \textit{U.S.S. Powhatan} because it was the first voyage across the Pacific Ocean commanded by the Japanese officers and crew. Therefore, it was more like a Japanese navigation practice.
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Nakahama Manjirō (John Manjiro; John Mung)

In 1854, upon the arrival of Commodore Matthew C. Perry in Uraga for the second time with seven warships, Nakahama Manjirō played an extremely important role as a nongovernmental interpreter and negotiator for the Tokugawa Shogunate in the peaceful process of opening Japan to the United States.¹¹ Manjirō was indeed one of the first Japanese to arrive in the United States (New Bedford) as early as 1843. Although it took place accidentally, Manjirō was the first Japanese to study in America, to stay with Americans, and to encounter Western civilization. Due to Japan’s closed-door policy from the early seventeenth century, there was virtually nobody in Japan at that time who was well versed in English language and familiar with American people, society, culture, and technology besides Manjirō.¹² Manjirō is more commonly recognized with his Americanized names such as “John Manjiro” or “John Mung” owing to his unique background including years of living and education experience in America.

¹¹ Manjirō was not hired as an official interpreter of the Tokugawa Shogunate until 1860 because the Mito-han regarded Manjirō with hostility. Supporting the Tokugawa Shogunate, the conservative Mito-han did not understand Manjirō’s view on America.

¹² Due to his sailing experiences, Manjirō was able to provide a technical support for Japan’s voyage across the Pacific Ocean when Captain Katsu Kaishū could no longer steer the Kanrin Maru due to a severe seasickness. According to Rosenbach Museum & Library, Nakahama Manjirō’s Hyōsen Kiryaku: A Companion Book: Produced for the Exhibition “Drifting, Nakahama Manjirō’s Tale of Discovery”: an Illustrated Manuscript Recounting Ten Years of Adventure at Sea (Philadelphia, PA: Rosenbach Museum & Library, 1999), 22, most Japanese crew on board suffered seasickness.
To begin with his background, born in 1827 as the second son of an impoverished family in a small fishing village called Nakanohama in Tosa-han (土佐藩, han means feudal domain), Manjirō was naturally to become a fisherman.\textsuperscript{13} According to the institution of feudal Japan, one had no freedom to choose his own occupations. For instance, a fisherman’s son was to become a fisherman, and a farmer’s son was to become a farmer, a samurai’s son was to become a samurai, and so forth. Since his father had passed away when Manjirō was, nine years old, his mother Shiho somehow managed to support her family. At the age of ten, Manjirō began to work for his living.\textsuperscript{14} In January 1841, Manjirō went to Usaura harbor to work for Denzō, a fisherman. Then, on January 5, Manjirō was shipwrecked with four other fishermen due to a severe storm.\textsuperscript{15} They were stranded on a remote uninhibited volcanic island in the Pacific called Torishima (鳥島, literally meaning “Bird Island”) for nearly six months during which they sustained their lives by eating albatross, shellfish, and seaweed, and drinking rainwater.\textsuperscript{16} Living on the uninhibited island, they especially suffered from the lack of


\textsuperscript{15} According to Rosenbach Museum & Library, *Nakahama Manjirō’s Hyōsen Kiryaku*, 30, these four fishermen were Toraemon, Denzō and his brothers, Jūsuke and Goemon.

\textsuperscript{16} Rosenbach Museum & Library, *Nakahama Manjirō’s Hyōsen Kiryaku*, 18. Located 600 kilometers south of Tokyo, Torishima is the island of the Izu Islands, Hachijō Subprefecture of Tokyo. During the Meiji period, some Japanese settled in Torishima for gathering albatross’s guano. Yet, after the major volcanic eruption between August 13 and August 15 in 1902 that killed 150 inhabitants, nobody ever lived in Torishima, according to “Inhabitants of Island All Killed by Volcano: The 150 Japanese Residents of Torishima Dead—Eruption Still Proceeding.”
drinking water. In the circumstances, they had no choice but to substitute their urine for water in order to avoid death of dehydration.\(^\text{17}\) As the turn of the seasons, Manjirō and other survivors nearly starved to death because albatrosses had migrated away from Torishima. Fortunately, on June 27, 1841, they were found and rescued by William H. Whitfield (1804–1886), a New Engander who commanded an American whaler named \textit{John Howland}.\(^\text{18}\) When rescued, Manjirō was barely fourteen years old.

Captain Whitefield decided to take Manjirō and other fishermen to Hawaii, being too dangerous to sail near the Japanese coastal region because Japanese coastguards would relentlessly attack foreign ships according to the exclusion edict of 1825.\(^\text{19}\) Furthermore, during the period of seclusion, any Japanese who left the country would be punished by death. While sailing to Hawaii, due to his honesty, diligence, and willingness to learn English and whaling, Manjirō became popular among the crew and received the name “John,” derived from Captain Whitfield’s whaler, \textit{John Howland}.

Manjirō, induced by Captain Whitfield who foresaw that Manjirō would be an “indispensable” cabin boy, decided to go to America out of curiosity whereas other fishermen stayed in Honolulu.\(^\text{20}\) In May 1843, Manjirō arrived in Captain Whitfield’s

\(\text{The New York Times, August 19, 1902, 1.}\)


\(^\text{19}\) Tokugawa Shogunate issued the Exclusion Edict of 1825 (異国船打払令) that ordered to expel any foreign ships that approached Japanese coastal region and that tried to land on Japan.

\(^\text{20}\) “Modern Japan’s Debt to a New Bedford Whaler: Ambassador Ishii’s Presentation of Samurai Sword to the Skipper’s Grandson Recalls an Adventure in Kindliness Which Bore International Fruitage,” \textit{The New York Times}, July 14, 1918. At first, Whitfield planned to put Manjiro into the orthodox church’s Sunday school; however, the church segregated Manjiro from the whites. Therefore, Manjiro he attended the Unitarian Church.
hometown, Fairhaven, Massachusetts, that flourished with whaling and maritime industries.  

While staying in Massachusetts with Captain Whitfield and his wife for three years, he attended Sunday school of the Unitarian Church and studied under Eben Akin. Captain Whitfield sent Manjirō to the advanced school of Lewis Bartlett, in which his children attended.  Manjirō learned both reading and writing English, mathematics, navigation, and shipbuilding. In this period, the concepts of American freedom and American democracy greatly inspired Manjirō.  Manjirō’s information about America later inspired the young samurai who believed modernization as a way of the survival of Japan in the face of Western imperialism.

Although six years had passed since he left Japan, Manjirō had never forgotten his homeland and finally decided to return to Japan. In 1849, after hearing about California’s gold rush, Manjirō left for Sacramento by ship and worked in a gold mine for nearly seventy days to make some money for return trip. Then, he went to Hawaii to take four other shipwrecked fishermen back to Japan with him. However, Manjirō found out that Jūsuke had passed away, and Toraemon had a family to support. Therefore, only Denzō and Goemon returned to Japan with Manjirō. Afraid of directly entering Japan due to the relentless execution of foreigners in Japan and the repatriated Japanese with foreign


influences, they determined to go to the Ryukyu Kingdom first for their safety.²⁵

Arriving in the Ryukyu Kingdom in February 1851, their interrogation had lasted for five months. Thereafter, sent to Kagoshima, they had to undergo another two months of interrogation. Finally, transferred to the magistrate’s office in Nagasaki, another ten months of interrogation waited them.²⁶ Before allowed entry, Manjirō and other returnees, without exception, had to prove that they had not converted to Christianity by performing *fumie* (踏み絵, literary Step-on Picture, “the practice of desecration, which was mandatory for returned castaways”) because the Tokugawa Shogunate had banned Christianity during the years between 1613 and 1873 as a means of expelling foreign influences in Japan.²⁷ Therefore, performing *fumie* by treading on a bronze plate with a sacred Christian image, they were found not guilty.²⁸ Finally allowed to leave, it took a half month for Manjirō, Denzō, and Goemon to walk from Nagasaki to Tosa. However, the Tosa-han restrained them for two and a half months.

However, the investigation took longer than expected and encountered difficulty one after another because Manjirō had nearly forgotten Japanese after ten years of living

²⁵ The Shimazu clan of the Satsuma-han invaded the Ryukyu Kingdom in 1609 and reduced Ryukyu Kingdom to a tribute state under the jurisdiction of the Satsuma-han. Annexed to Tokugawa Japan, the Ryukyu Kingdom became the Ryukyu-han in 1872. When the Meiji government carried out the abolition of the han (domains) and the establishment of the ken (prefectures), the Ryukyu-han was renamed Okinawa prefecture (沖縄県) in 1879.


ordered Kawada Shōryō (河田 小龍, 1824–1898) to make a thorough investigation of Manjirō. Since Kawada had learned painting and the Dutch language in Nagasaki, Yoshida thought it would be possible for him to investigate Manjirō who could not read, write, and barely speak Japanese after years of living abroad. Therefore, Kawada made good use of drawings to communicate with Manjirō. Manjirō described things he saw in America such as railroads, steamships, Morse code, and voting system, which Kawada recorded in *Hyōson Kiryaku* (漂異紀略, 1852).

Manjirō enlightened Kawada on the advanced civilization in America, and Kawada began to realize that the opening of Japan was crucial for catching up with the West. Kawada also advocated that Japan should buy foreign ships and learn navigation so that Japan could benefit from the foreign trade for the enrichment of the country. Utilizing numbers of drawings that introduced Manjirō’s experiences in America, Kawada and Manjirō’s *Hyōson Kiryaku* helped motivate the Imperial loyalists such as Sakamoto Ryōma (坂本 龍馬, 1836–1867) to act towards the opening of the country and to catch up with the West. In 1852, after one and a half years of interrogation period,

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30 Yoshida Tōyō was a Tosa-han official who charged trade and industry. Yoshida was known for his advocate of Western learning. After his retirement, Yoshida established his private school called Shōrinjuku (少林塾), and Iwasaki Yatarō (founder of Mitsubishi) and Gotō Shōjirō were his pupils. Yoshida was assassinated by sonnō jōi samurai in 1862.


32 Ibid.
Manjirō was finally able to go back to his hometown in Tosa-han on October 5.Officials could see that Manjirō had a great potential for the future of the country. Receiving a samurai rank from Tosa-han soon after his return, Manjirō began to engage in teaching English and things American to young Tosa samurai at the castle. In fact, considering what he had learned in America, Manjirō could have been executed for the violation of the rigid Tokugawa seclusion policy that aimed at excluding foreign influences in Japan. Nevertheless, Manjirō was spared because the Shogunate needed Manjirō’s knowledge about America and its people as well as English skill in order to deal with Commodore Perry. Therefore, the Shogunate summoned Manjirō to Edo, eight days after the departure of Commodore Perry in 1853. Manjirō explained to the Shogunate in detail that the United States was a modern and generous country which desired to establish friendly relations with Japan and which did not intend to invade Japan. Manjirō emphasized the “desirability of making friends with the great land across the sea.” Taking Manjirō’s words seriously, the Shogunate decided to open Japan to American vessels. Greatly contributing to the establishment of U.S.-Japan relations, Manjirō received a higher samurai rank and became a retainer of the Tokugawa Shogun. Being


34 Rosenbach Museum & Library, Nakahama Manjirō’s Hyōsen Kiryaku, 21. Since Manjirō performed *fumie*, he never declared himself Christian; however, his way of thinking was significantly influenced by Christian faith. In The Japan Times Online, March 21, 2004, Manjirō’s great-grandson, Nakahama Hiroshi responded that Manjirō introduced the Christian concept of ‘love your neighbor’ to Japan.

35 Ibid.

samurai, Manjirō was allowed to carry two swords with him. In addition, as a privilege of samurai, Manjirō adopted a surname of “Nakahama” derived from his hometown in Tosa-han.\(^37\)

Appointed as an instructor, Manjirō taught whaling techniques, ship engineering and scientific navigation methods at the Naval Training School in Edo established by the Tokugawa Shogunate.\(^38\) The seamen sailing on *Kanrin Maru* during the first Japanese mission to the United States were indeed trained at the School. Many officials and students eagerly sought after Manjirō because he always delivered an interesting lecture on America including science and technology. Moreover, by 1857 he completed his translation of Nathaniel Bowditch’s twenty-two volumes of *The New American Practical Navigator* known as the “seaman’s bible” into Japanese.\(^39\) Manjirō contributed to the development of the whaling industry in Japan.\(^40\)

Meanwhile, Manjirō taught English to young samurai and intellectuals who realized the importance of acquiring English skills, and Fukuzawa Yukichi who would

\(^{37}\) Hisakazu Kaneko, *Manjiro: The Man Who Discovered America* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1956), 104. Before the Meiji, most Japanese commoners did not have their surnames. Only the samurai, Shinto priests, and a few exceptional commoners were allowed to have their surnames. To wear swords was the privilege of the samurai to protect their daimyo whom they had pledged allegiance.


publish the first English-Japanese dictionary was one of his students. In addition, Manjirō wrote *Eibe Taiwa Shokei* (英米対話捷径, “A Shortcut to Anglo-American Conversation”) in 1859, which was the first English text published in Japan. In *Eibe Taiwa Shokei*, Manjirō introduced the English alphabet, numbers, a song of the alphabet, daily conversation, weather, chat, and correspondence.

Manjirō played a remarkably important role in the achievement of the first Japanese diplomatic mission to the United States in 1860. Although hired as an interpreter, Manjirō became a de facto captain of the *Kanrin Maru* because Admiral Kimura and Captain Katsu, who had no experience of ocean navigation, were down with seasickness right after boarding. As Captain Brooke recalled, the Japanese crew of the *Karin Maru*, despite years of instruction in navigation by the Dutch, were not ready for setting out on a long cruise. Thus, Manjirō had to serve not only as an interpreter but also as a practical Japanese diplomat during the 1860 mission. With the help of Captain Brooke and his crew, Manjirō virtually navigated the *Kanrin Maru* to San Francisco by making good use of his ocean navigation experience as a whaler. Largely indebted to Manjirō’s efforts, the Japanese could accomplish the 1860 diplomatic mission to the

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41 Kawada and Manjiro, *Drifting Toward the Southeast*, trans. Nagakuni and Kitadai, 130. *Kameyamashachu* imported enormous amount of western weaponry from a Scottish merchant, Thomas Blake Glover (1838–1911), in order to build up private military forces to expel foreigners.


United States.

After the Meiji Restoration, Manjirō took a position as a professor of English at the Tokyo Kaisei Gakkō (開成学校) in 1869. Kaisei Gakkō served as a strong advocate of the Western learning, which was crucial for accelerating Japan’s modernization. Originally established by the Tokugawa Shogunate as the Bansho Torishirabejo (蕃書調所, literary Institute for the Study of Barbarian Books) in Edo in 1857 and then as the Kaiseijo (開成所, literary, Institute for Development) in 1863, the Kaisei Gakkō (since 1868) taught “all fields of Western learning including languages, natural science, and military studies.” In 1877, the Tokyo Kaisei Gakkō affiliated the Tokyo Medical School (東京医学校, Tokyo igakko) and became known as the University of Tokyo (東京大学, Tokyo daigaku).

All his life, Manjirō continued to teach his students all that he had learned and experienced in the United States including American traditions of freedom and democracy as well as Western science and technology. The information brought by Manjirō had a significant influence on his students who became known as the founders of modern Japan such as Katsu Kaishū, Fukuzawa Yukichi, Sakamoto Ryōma, Enomoto Takeaki (桙本 武揚, 1836–1908), and Iwasaki Yatarō (岩崎 弥太郎, 1835–1885).

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46 In 1886, the university was renamed Imperial University (帝國大學 Teikoku daigaku). As the Meiji government established numbers of imperial universities all over the nation, it was renamed Tokyo Imperial University (東京帝國大學) in 1887. It was renamed back to the University of Tokyo in May 1947 following the defeat of Japan in World War II. Since its establishment, Tokyo University has remained the most prestigious university in Japan.

Since Iwasaki Yatarō and his company were powerful agents to the Japanese overseas development, I will discuss their contribution in Chapter V.

Sakamoto Ryōma from the Tosa-han was considered as one of the most important leaders of the sonnō jōi (尊王攘夷, literary “revere the emperor and expel the barbarians”) movement in the late Tokugawa period. Financially supported by the Satsuma-han, Sakamoto and the Tosa rōnin (浪人, masterless samurai) established the private navy and the trading company in Nagasaki in 1865 named Kameyamashachu (亀山社中) which later became Kaientai (海援隊, Naval Auxiliary Force) under the control of Tosa-han after April 1867.\(^48\) Facilitated the anti-Shogunate trading operations and learning of navigation, the Kaientai was virtually the first “commercial-military enterprise” in Japan.\(^49\) Significantly, the Kaientai accepted various classes of Japanese including the lower-ranked samurai, rōnin (masterless samurai), village headmen, and villagers, into the association and treated them equally regardless of their domains. In addition, the Kaientai played a crucial role in the establishment of the astonishing Satsuma-Chōshū Alliance of 1866.\(^50\) However, soon after the assassination of Sakamoto in Kyoto on December 10, 1867 along with a leader of the Rikuentai (陸援隊, Army


\(^{50}\) Andrew Cobbing and Takaaki Inuzuka, The Satsuma Students in Britain: Japan’s Early Search for the ‘Essence of the West,’ Volume 9 of Meiji Japan series (London: Routledge, 2000), 186.
Auxiliary Force) Nakaoka Shintarō (中岡 慎太郎, 1838–1867) who also strived for the conclusion of the Satsuma-Chōshū Alliance, the Kaiyōtai lost the cooperative spirit and finally dissolved on June 17, 1868 by order of the Tosa-han. After the dissolution of the Kaiyōtai, Tosa-han continued the shipping business by the name of the Tsukumo Shōkai (九十九商会), appointing Iwasaki Yatarō as a head of a company that became a foundation of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu. Initially, enlightened by Manjirō and Kawada’s view, Sakamoto contributed to the development of maritime industry in Japan and encouraged the causes of the Meiji Restoration. In fact, the development of maritime industry resulted in accelerating the nation’s modernization but also paved the way for the rise of Mitsubishi.

Many of the key figures of the early Meiji period were Manjirō’s students inspired by his ideas. His students interpreted the modernization as a means of survival of the nation. Owing to Manjirō’s dedication to the education of the young Japanese for the development and defense of the country, his students rose to be the center of the new government and industries. Without doubt, the nation’s development in navigation technology may be attributed to Manjirō who introduced modern science and technology that he had acquired in the United States. Simultaneously, the development of the nation’s shipping industry and the subsequent establishment of the regular long-distance overseas routes enabled the mass transportation of the Japanese laborers to Americas.

Although the story of Manjirō has not been taught at school or in textbooks unlike

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51 According to the old lunar calendar, Sakamoto was born on November 15, 1835 and assassinated on his birthday in 1867. Although the members of the pro-Shogunate group Shinsengumi were accused for their murder, the assassin has not yet known. “Nakaoka Shintarō,” Portraits of Modern Japanese Historical Figures, National Diet Library, Japan, http://www.ndl.go.jp/portrait/e/datas/149.html (accessed August 10, 2009).
that of Sakamoto Ryōma, he was indeed the first Japanese who introduced the United States and the Western culture to the Japanese people and who acted as a mediator between the governments of Japan and the United States as a nongovernmental diplomat. Initially, because some Tokugawa officials suspected Manjirō of being an American spy dispatched by the Perry Expedition, Manjirō was not appointed as an official diplomat during the treaty negotiation.\(^{52}\) However, utilizing his English language skills and knowledge about America, Manjirō did play more critical role than any officials of the Tokugawa Shogunate did in dealing with the opening of Japan to the United States in 1854 in peaceful manner.\(^{53}\) Therefore, culturally the creation of modern Japan was largely indebted to Manjirō who had initiated the modernization process in the long-isolated feudal Japan.

On November 12, 1898, Manjirō died in Kyōbashi, Tokyo, ending his eventful life at the age of seventy-five. Upon his death, the Kokumin Shimbun recollected the life of Manjirō and mourned for the death of Manjirō.\(^{54}\) In fact, two of the U.S. Presidents had previously acknowledged the cultural role of Manjirō in the U.S.-Japan relations. First, John Calvin Coolidge, Jr. (1872–1929, in office: 1923–1929), later acknowledged that “when John Manjirō returned to Japan, it was as if America had sent its first ambassador to Japan. Our envoy Perry could enjoy so cordial a reception because John

\(^{52}\) Dodge, Islands and Empires, 309.

\(^{53}\) Itō, “Jon Manjiro to Gaikōkan toshiten no Rekishiteki Yakuwari: Nichibeikan no Saishō no Sūjiku,” 45.

Manjirō had made Japan’s central authorities understand the true face of America.”

President Coolidge deeply valued the distinct role played by Manjirō who facilitated the establishment of the U.S.-Japan relations as well as to expand the American whaling industry in the far eastern Pacific. Then in 1933, ninety years after Manjirō’s arrival in America, Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882–1945, in office: 1933–1945), wrote a letter to Manjirō’s eldest son, Tōichirō (東一郎):

“When Viscount Ishii (the Japanese Ambassador) was here in Washington he told me that you are living in Tokio and we talked about your distinguished father… You may not know that I am the grandson of Mr. Warren Delano of Fairhaven, who was part owner of the ship of Captain Whitfield which brought your father to Fairhaven. Your father lived, as I remember it, at the house of Mr. Tripp, which was directly across the street from my grandfather’s house, and when I was a boy I well remember my grandfather telling me all about the little Japanese boy who went to school in Fairhaven and who went to church from time to time with the Delano family. I myself used to visit Fairhaven … The name of Nakahama will always be remembered by my family and I hope that if you or any of your family come to the United States that you will come to see us.”

On the other hand, Ambassador Ishii paid his respect to Captain Whitfield during his visit to the United States in 1918:

Captain Whitfield was a harbinger of great events among nations. And, there, in Fairhaven, is the old sword of an ancient Japanese Samurai, centuries old, symbol of the gratitude of modern Japan for the part Captain Whitfield played, through Manjirō Nakahama, in opening the door to a new life among the peoples of earth.

Manjirō’s unique experiences in America obviously stimulated the young Japanese


students and later emigrants to go to America who had an ambition to achieve a great success as well as to contribute to accelerate the nation’s development either by obtaining advanced technology or by remitting foreign currency.

Hamada Hikozō (Joseph Heco)

While Nakahama Manjirō was the first Japanese who set foot in the East Coast of the United States, Hamada Hikozō (浜田 彦藏, 1837–1897) was the first Japanese who set foot in the West Coast. Both Manjirō and Hikozō were the famous castaways, rescued by Americans, and received education in the United States. Significantly, Hikozō was the first and only Japanese national to be naturalized as an American citizen for a century.58 Educated in America, associating with the upper-class Americans, and serving for the United States as an official interpreter for the U.S. Consul General, Hikozō had an extraordinary and unprecedented life.59 Without doubt, inspired by Hikozō’s life, the ambitious samurai who advocated “Eastern ethics, Western science” sought to carry out the modernization of Japan while preserving

59 Hikozō’s childhood name was Hikotaro (彦太郎).
Japan’s “cultural traditions and beliefs.”

Born into a wealthy farmer’s family in Harima province (播磨国, present-day Hyogo prefecture) in 1837, Hikozō attended a local Terakoya (寺子屋, literally “temple school”) for learning how to read and write. In fact, it was very rare to see a son of a farmer attending Terakoya because Terakoya was traditionally designed to educate children of the samurai and wealthy merchant class. When Hikozō was thirteen years old, his stepfather Kichizaburō took him to Edo to see the sights. While returning from Edo to Harima province by a junk named Eiriki Maru (栄力丸), Hikozō and sixteen other passengers were shipwrecked in the Pacific due to a heavy storm, and drifted for fifty days. Captain W. F. Jennings of a New England freighter, Auckland, found and rescued Hikozō and others on the way from Hong Kong to San Francisco. Instead of taking them back to Japan, Captain took them to San Francisco in February 1851. Like Captain Whitfield who rescued Manjirō in 1841, Captain Jennings hesitated to sail near the Japanese coastal region due to the Tokugawa Shogunate’s Exclusion Edict of 1825 that authorized indiscriminate bombardment of foreign vessels approaching or landing on Japan.

In 1852, after a year of stay in San Francisco, Hikozō and his group were to leave

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60 Van Sant, *Pacific Pioneers*, 132.

61 *The Far East, An Exponent of Japanese Thoughts and Affairs*, vol. 3 (Tokyo: Office of the Kokumin-no-tomo, etc, 1896), 573.


64 The Dutch and Chinese ships were excluded from the attack because the Tokugawa Shogunate had allowed trading with the Netherlands and China during the period of seclusion.
San Francisco for Japan via Hong Kong where they were supposed to join Commodore
Matthew Perry who planned to urge Japan to open the country for facilitating the
establishment of U.S.-Japan relations for trade. However, while waiting for Perry in
Hong Kong on the way home, an Irish-American master-at-arms, Thomas Troy offered
Hikozō and two other Japanese, Tora and Kame, to return to San Francisco and to learn
English from him; therefore, then they went back to San Francisco with Troy at his
expense in June 1853. Troy introduced Hikozō to a banker and Collector of Customs in
San Francisco, Beverly C. Sanders (1807–1883), who was a devout Catholic. Sanders
accepted Hikozō and took good care of him as his benefactor. Hikozō became a friend of
Eugene M. Van Reed (1835–1873), a Dutch-American, and taught him Japanese. In
1859, following Hikozō, Van Reed went to Japan, worked for the U.S. Consul in Japan,
became a trader, and provided weapons for Satsuma-han during the Boshin Civil War.
Later appointed as the Consul General of Hawaii, Van Reed was responsible for
conveying the first group of Japanese emigrants (Gannen-mono) to Hawaii in 1868.

When Sanders retired from the Customs Office, he moved to Baltimore, Maryland,

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65 Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai (NHK, Japan Broadcasting Corporation), Sonotoki Rekishiga
Ugoita, No. 242 Shim bun Tanjō: Bakumatsu · Josefu Hiko no Chosen (History Moved at That
Moment: The Birth of Newspaper: Late Tokugawa Period, A Challenge of Joseph Heco),
February 1, 2006.

66 Joseph Heco and James Murdoch, The Narrative of a Japanese; What He Has Seen
and the People He Has Met in the Course of the Last Forty Years, vol. 1 (Yokohama, Japan:
(Accessed October 31, 2009).

67 Kevin C. Murphy, The American Merchant Experience in Nineteenth-Century Japan

68 Murphy, The American Merchant Experience in Nineteenth-Century Japan, 155; “Van
Reed, Eugene M.” in Asahi Nihon Rekishi Jinbutsu Jiten (Biographical Dictionary of Japanese
with his family and Hikozō. Recommended by Sanders, Hikozō attended the Catholic school and Catholic Church in Baltimore. In the late 1854, Hikozō was baptized at the Cathedral of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary, adopting a Christian name “Joseph Heco.” After returning to California, Hikozō served as a secretary to Senator William M. Gwin (1805–1885) of California in 1857. In 1858, strongly urged by his benefactor, Sanders, Hikozō became the first Japanese to be naturalized as a United States citizen.

As a Japanese American, Hikozō often encountered racial discrimination and realized that his U.S. citizenship would not guarantee his “social equality.” Mistreated by the mainstream American society, Hikozō seriously began to think about going back to Japan because he had a longing for his home. In those days, treated as a foreigner all the time despite his citizenship, it was hard for a Japanese American to live in the United States among the white Americans because of racial discrimination.

Therefore, then twenty-one years old Hikozō decided to join Ambassador Townsend Harris in Shanghai and had returned to Japan on the U.S.S. Mississippi when the U.S. Consulate General was established at Kanagawa in 1859, following the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce on July 29, 1858. Since then, appointed as an

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72 Ibid., 291–292.

73 The Far East, An Exponent of Japanese Thoughts and Affairs, vol. 3, 575. It is believed that Hikozō was naturalized as an American citizen in order to avoid punishment by
official interpreter for the U.S. Consul E. M. Dorr of California, Hikozō had served for
the U.S. Consulate General before the establishment of his own import-export business in
Yokohama in 1862. Hikozō initially believed that he could become an ordinary
Japanese; however, being American by nationality and a convert to Christianity, the
Japanese treated him as a foreigner. Only allowed to live in the Yokohama kyoryūchi (横
浜居留地, foreign concession in Yokohama), his life in Japan turned out to be more
restrictive. Treated as foreigner in the United States and Japan, Hikozō felt a strong
sense of cultural diaspora.

The jōi (anti-foreign) samurai’s assassination of Denkichi, who was Hikozō’s
friend and former castaway now working for the British legation as an interpreter, gave
him a great shock. In his Narrative of A Japanese (1863), Hikozō expressed his
uneasiness regarding the recent action of the jōi samurai:

September 16th. For the past six or eight months I had been frequently warned by the
native authorities of Kanagawa and Yokohama to be careful of myself. They cautioned
me not to ride out on the Tōkaidō, or to any place at all distant from the Foreign
Settlement, inasmuch as it was a well-associated fact that several rōnin deemed me
worthy of their attention, and were on the outlook for me to cut me down. There
warnings had of late waxed far too frequent for my comfort.

death for those who left Japan during the Tokugawa seclusion policy. In addition, Hikozō had
converted to Christianity in America; therefore, it was too dangerous to enter the Tokugawa
Japan, which banned Christianity. Hikozō wished to be re-naturalized as a Japanese citizen;
however, there was no such a law existed in Japan that allowed him to do so. Only way of
obtaining Japanese citizenship was to marry into the family of his bride, which he refused to do
so. In 1899, two years after the death of Hikozō, the Nationality Law was finally enacted in
Japan, largely owing to Hikozō’s earnest request.

74 Heco and Murdoch, The Narrative of a Japanese, vol. 1, 190; The Far East, An

75 Hsu, “Personality, Race, and Geopolitics in Joseph Heco’s Narrative of A Japanese,”
292.

76 Ibid.

Hikozō left for America for a short period in 1861–62 in order to guard himself from the jōi samurai who tried to kill foreigners and the Japanese associated with foreigners. Considering Hikozō as posing a threat to the Japanese cultural identity, the jōi samurai were ready to assassinate Hikozō. Simultaneously, he aimed to improve his status by getting the “post of U.S. Naval store-keeper” so that he would be treated equal with other American officials. During his second trip to the United States, Hikozō met Abraham Lincoln and shook hands with him at the White House on March 12, 1862. Obviously, Hikozō was the first and only Japanese who personally met Lincoln. When he knew that he could not get the post, he determined to go back to Japan.

While serving as a young American diplomat, Hikozō first negotiated with the Tokugawa Shogunate for the location for the establishment of the U.S. Consulate. Then, requested by the Kanagawa magistrate, Hikozō made efforts to arrange with Captain Brook and the Tokugawa Shogunate the first Japanese mission to the United States in 1860. Then, Hikozō engaged in settling the aftermath of the Namamugi Incident of 1862 (生麦事件, also known as the “Richardson Affair”) in which 28-year-old Charles Lennox Richardson (British merchant) was killed and two other British residing in Yokohama were wounded by two Satsuma samurai on the Tōkaidō (東海道, literary “East Sea Road,” a main road of the Tokugawa period connecting Edo to Kyoto) on September 14, 1862.

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80 These two samurai were identified as Narahara Kizaemon (奈良原 喜左衛門, 1831–1865) who cut Richardson down, and Kaieda Nobuyoshi (海江田 信義, 1832–1906) who delivered the coup de grace to Richardson. In the midst of the anti-foreign sentiment, they were treated as if heroes. Therefore, the Satsuma-han never handed over Narahara and Kaieda to the
The Satsuma samurai argued that they attacked these British because they did neither
dismount nor show respect when they encountered a procession of Shimazu Hisamitsu
(島津 久光, 1817–1887) who was the father of daimyo (大名, feudal lord) Shimazu
Tadayoshi (島津 忠義, 1840–1897) of Satsuma.\(^81\) Then, the resentful British, making a
false show of power, blamed everything on the Japanese and demanded of the Tokugawa
Shogunate an official apology and indemnity of $440,000 in Mexican silver for
compensating the Namamugi Incident, which was equivalent to one-third of the
Shogunate’s annual revenue.\(^82\) Fukuzawa Yukichi, assisted by Sugita Gentan and
Takabatake Gorō, was responsible for translating the British official document into
Japanese for the Shogunate.\(^83\) In order to avoid a confrontation with the powerful British
navy that continued to threaten to bombard Edo, the Rōju (老中, senior councilor)
Ogasawara Nagamichi (小笠原 長行, 1822–1891), who was the highest-ranking official
of the Shogunate, consented to the terms demanded by the British Charge d’affaires,
Lieutenant-Colonel Edward St. John Neale without the Shogunate’s approval.\(^84\) The
British, seeking to interrupt the Russian southward expansion into East Asia, were

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\(^81\) Namamugi was a village in Yokohama, and now it became a part of Tsurumi ward.
Hikozō’s American friend, Eugene M. Van Reed had encountered Shimazu’s procession before
Richardson. Familiar with the Japanese cultural tradition, Van Reed dismounted and showed
respect. Therefore, he had no trouble with them.

\(^82\) Conrad D. Totman, *The Collapse of the Tokugawa Bakufu, 1862–1868* (Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 1980), 69–71. $440,000 was equivalent to £100,000.

Kenkyūjo, 2009), 123–124. Sugita Gentan (杉田玄端, 1818–1889) was a scholar of western
learning who had his own Dutch medical practice.

\(^84\) Michael R., Auslin. *Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties and the
desperate to display their sphere of influence over Japan in order to thwart Russia’s ambition, and they deemed that they achieved their goal.

Being elated at the successful negotiation with the Shogunate, the British Fleet of seven warships left Yokohama for the Satsuma province. Since the Shogunate easily submitted to the British, Neale expected the Satsuma-han would do the same, and thus the British did not expect to engage in a battle with the Satsuma-han at first. In addition, the British were not ready for war against Satsuma since its navy was busy at the Second Opium War in China. Nevertheless, contrary to Neale’s estimation, the Satsuma-han refused the British demands for an apology, the indemnity of £25,000 for compensating the families of the victims, and the execution of the two samurai before the British officers.85 The Satsuma-han’s refusal eventually led to the outbreak of the Anglo-Satsuma War in August 15–17, 1863. In order to extort the indemnity as well as to arrest and execute the samurai who attacked the British subjects,86 the Navy’s seven warships began the indiscriminate bombardment of Kagoshima (the capital of Satsuma) on August 15, 1863 that destroyed the most of the city and the castle.87

After one and a half days, the British Fleet withdrew from Kagoshima and left for Yokohama due to the lack of ammunition and coal as well as high casualties, including

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the death of Captain Josling and Commander Wilmot of the flagship _Euryalis_.\(^{88}\) On the other hand, Satsuma-han had fewer casualties, but the city was nearly destroyed. Satsuma-han already knew that the British Fleet would arrive at Kagoshima Bay; therefore, they were able to prepare for warfare in advance, with the help of a female spy named Omura (おむら), who was a popular geisha (芸者, female entertainer) in Edo. Omura decided to be a Rashamen (羅紗綿, mistress of foreigner)\(^{89}\) in order to spy on the British naval operations in Japan for her boyfriend from Satsuma-han. Volunteering to be the Rashamen of Vice-Admiral Augustus Leopold Kuper (1809–1885), Omura lived with him at the British legation in Yokohama where she could get the British information.\(^{90}\)

According to the Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai’s study, Fukuzawa Yukichi, who was the official interpreter of the Tokugawa Shogunate and pro-western liberal, was greatly responsible for the outbreak of the Anglo-Satsuma War due to his mistranslation of the

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\(^{88}\) Sir Ernest Mason Satow, _Diplomat in Japan: The Inner History of the Critical Years in the Evolution of Japan When the Ports were Opened and the Monarchy Restored, Recorded by a Diplomatist who Took an Active part in the Events of the Time, with an Account of His Personal Experiences during that Period_ (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1921), 86–89.

\(^{89}\) Mistresses of foreigners were commonly called Rashamen according to _Chugai Shimbun_, April 3, 1868 (old lunar calendar), in Yasumasa Nakayama, ed., _Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen Shi, dai 1-kan, Ishin Daihenkakuki_ (A Meiji Chronicle through Newspaper Sources, Vol. 1, Era of Restoration and Reform) (Tokyo: Meiji Hennen Shi Ryōkai, 1965), 45. “Rasha” means raxa in Portuguese, which is woolen cloth. At the same time, “Rasha” indicates foreigner. “Men” means cloth or blanket. Therefore, Rashamen (foreigner’s blanket) indicates being a mistress of foreigner. According to _Kōjien_ (Wide Garden of Words [Japanese Dictionary]), 5th ed., s.v. “Rashamen.” Rashamen was a discriminatory term used against the Japanese women who became mistresses of foreigners.

official protest by the British minister.\footnote{Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai (NHK, Japan Broadcasting Corporation), \textit{Sonotoki Rekishiga Ugoita, No. 255 Maboroshimo Dai-Kantai: Igirisu kara mita Satsuei Ōnshō (History Moved at That Moment: Illusory Fleet: Anglo-Satsuma War from the British Perspective), June 21, 2006.}} Comparing the original document and the translated documents, while the British demanded the arrest and execution of the samurai who killed Richardson, Fukuzawa unbelievably interpreted that the British demanded the execution of daimyo Shimazu Hisamitsu.\footnote{Ibid.} For the samurai who pledged their loyalty to daimyo, sacrifice of their master could never be an acceptable option. Notwithstanding having the odds against the British Fleet, the Satsuma-han determined to fight against them. The militarily inferior Satsuma-han strategically attacked the British Fleet and compelled the British to retreat. Simultaneously, Satsuma-han, accepting their defeat, agreed to pay indemnity of £25,000 to the British.\footnote{Payson T. Treat, \textit{The Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Japan, 1853-1865} (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1917), 291.}

The Anglo-Satsuma War resulted in the establishment of closer relations between Great Britain and Satsuma-han. Because of this warfare, the Shimazu Hisamitsu realized that it was “already impossible to expel foreigners.”\footnote{Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai, \textit{Sonotoki Rekishiga Ugoita, No. 255 Maboroshimo Dai-Kantai, June 21, 2006.}} This warfare caused “the sudden change of front of Satsuma, from leadership in the anti-foreign faction to an appreciation of the strength of the foreigners and the futility of trying to expel them.”\footnote{Treat, \textit{The Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Japan}, 291.}

Simultaneously, the Satsuma-han began to consider the British the “ideal partner” for overthrowing the Shogunate and strengthening the nation by building a modern
Since then, the British switched its support from the Shogunate to the Satsuma-han, and the Satsuma-han secretly sent the young samurais to England for study in order to raise the future leaders. In this way, cooperating with the British, the Satsuma-han rose to be the core of the anti-Shogunate force after the Anglo-Satsuma War.

Hikozō again served as a crucial interpreter during the trial of the Maria Luz Incident of 1872, in which the Meiji government endeavored to rescue coolies from a Peruvian cargo ship. Summoned by a member of the Ministry of Finance, Shibusawa Eiichi (渋沢栄一, 1840–1931), Hikozō was informed that the Governor of Kanagawa, Ōe Taku (大江卓, 1847–1921) who was only twenty-five years old, needed Hikozō’s help for the prosecution of the case. Since Japan and Peru had no diplomatic relations, “the case in question had to come before a Japanese court” and “to be conducted by Counsel, in English.” Governor Ōe was not familiar with English language but desired to understand the court process. Therefore, he requested Hikozō to accompany him as an

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97 Because of his involvement in the establishment of the enterprises such as First National Bank, Oji Seishi (王子製紙株式会社, Ōji Paper Company), Osaka Spinning, Tokyo Gas, Nippon Yusen Kaisha, Japan Railway Company, Imperial Hotel, and the Tokyo Stock Exchange (東京証券取引所), Shibusawa is widely known as the “father of Japanese capitalism.” The enterprises which he had participated numbered at least five hundred, according to Bijinesu Tetsugaku Kenkyūkai, Kokorō o Tsuyokusuru Shidōsha no Kotoba (Encouraging Words of the Leaders) (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyūjo, 2009), 117. Shibusawa was called “Japanese Morgan” by the American media when he visited the United States for attending President Roosevelt’s dinner party, according to Hōchi Shimbun (Tokyo), July 13, 1902. Indeed, The New York Times introduced Shibusawa as the “J. P. Morgan of the Flowery Kingdom” on June 14, 1902.

98 Joseph Heco and James Murdoch, The Narrative of a Japanese; What He Has Seen and the People He Has Met in the Course of the Last Forty Years, vol. 2 (Yokohama, Japan: Yokohama Printing & Publishing Company, 1894), 172.
interpreter during a period of the trial.\textsuperscript{99} Owing to Hikozō’s assistance, the trial ended with Japan’s victory that improved the country’s international recognition as a sovereign nation.

Being an American citizen, Hikozō had to live in the \textit{Yokohama kyoryūchi} (foreign concession).\textsuperscript{100} Although naturalized as an American citizen, Hikozō always wanted his mother country to develop into a modern nation and rise to be a world power. Acknowledging the current state of international affairs, Hikozō insisted that it was important for Japan to treat the Westerners in polite manner in order to maintain Japan’s sovereignty from the imperialists.\textsuperscript{101} In addition, making good use of his fluency in English and Japanese, Hikozō sought to be a cultural bridge between the United States and Japan.

From the cultural point of view, Hikozō’s major contribution was the establishment of the first Japanese newspaper. Known as the “real father of Japanese journalism,” Hikozō played a leading role in revolutionizing the Japanese media in the late Tokugawa to the early Meiji periods.\textsuperscript{102} Shocked at a disparity between the United States and Japan, Hikozō insisted that modernization of the nation required a reform of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Hikozō’s home address was 141 Yokohama Foreign Concession, located in the present-day Chinatown in Yokohama, according to Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai, \textit{Sonotoki Rekishiga Ugoita}, No. 242 Shimbun Tanjō, February 1, 2006.
\item Hsu, “Personality, Race, and Geopolitics in Joseph Heco’s \textit{Narrative of A Japanese},” 291.
\item Harry Emerson Wildes, \textit{The Press and Social Currents in Japan} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927), 12. To a greater or lesser degree, Hikozō inspired the founders of three most circulated newspapers in Japan (\textit{Yomiuri Shimbun}, \textit{Mainichi Shimbun}, and \textit{Asahi Shimbun}).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
public awareness and that the publication of newspaper would facilitate the task. In 1863, Hikozō began to record his remarkable experiences in the United States in his *Hyōryū Ki* (漂流記, “An Account of a Castaway”). Coming from a small fishing village, Hikozō never had a chance to learn how to read and write in Japanese. Therefore, in order to publish his *Hyōryū Ki*, Hikozō needed a help from a well-educated Japanese Kishida Ginkō (岸田 吟香, 1833–1905). While going to Dr. James Curtis Hepburn (1815–1911) for his eye treatment, Kishida became a friend of Hikozō and learned English from Hikozō. Coming to Japan in 1859, Dr. Hepburn was an American missionary and physician who compiled a Japanese-English dictionary, *A Japanese and English Dictionary; with an English and Japanese Index* with Kishida’s assistance. Hepburn popularized the transliteration of Japanese *Hebon-shiki Romaji* (ヘボン式ローマ字, literary “Hepburn Romanization System”) in his third edition of the dictionary published by Maruzen in 1886. According to the *Mainichi Shimbun* on October 29, 1886,

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the number of reservations for the copies of the dictionary reached 18,000.\textsuperscript{107} In addition, Hepburn translated the Bible into Japanese, founded Meiji Gakuin University (明治学院大学, Meiji Gakuin daigaku), and became the first president of the university in 1889.\textsuperscript{108}

In addition, cooperating with Kishida and Homma Kiyoo (本間 清雄, also known as Senzō, 1843–1923), Hikozō published the first Japanese newspaper called Shinbunshi (新聞誌, “Newspaper”) in March 1864 which were all handwritten and given free of charge. In May 1865, Shinbunshi changed its title to Kaigai Shim bun (海外新聞, “Overseas News”). Utilizing the block printing for the first time, Kaigai Shim bun, translated current international news and “local price current for imports and exports” into Japanese.\textsuperscript{109} Simply translating the English-language newspapers obtained from the foreign merchant ships or foreign concessions in Yokohama, the Kaigai Shim bun hardly

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carried news about the Japanese domestic affairs.\footnote{\citet{Huffman97}, 30; De Lange, \textit{A History of Japanese Journalism}, 22.} In short, the \textit{Kaigai Shimbun} was a foreign newspaper printed in Japanese; therefore, it was hard to have a large circulation with such unfamiliar contents. Only a certain group of educated samurai was interested in reading \textit{Kaigai Shimbun}.\footnote{\citet{Kawabe96}, 39.} In fact, Fukuzawa Yukichi, one of the most prominent advocates of English learning, was a regular subscriber of the \textit{Kaigai Shimbun}.

Despite Hikozō’s effort to utilize newspaper as a means of accelerating the process of modernization, not many Japanese were interested in reading the \textit{Kaigai Shimbun}. Due to the insufficient number of subscribers, the \textit{Kaigai Shimbun} operated at a loss. According to the analysis of Van Reed, an old friend of Hikozō, newspapers failed to circulate in Japan because not many Japanese knew about the existence of newspapers, editors pretending to be scholars wrote articles with difficult Chinese characters, and newspaper provided outdated information due to delay in publishing.\footnote{“\textit{Nihon Shimbun no Ganso Hikozō no Na o Anji shita ‘Moshihogusa’ Jogen}” (An Introduction to Moshihogusa, which Implied the Name of the Founder of the Japanese Newspaper, Hikozo), \textit{Yokohama Shinpō Moshihogusa} (Yokohama), April 2, 1968, in Nakayama, ed., \textit{Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen Shi, dai 1-kan, Ishin Daihenkakuki}, 51.} Therefore, the publication of this biweekly newspaper discontinued in 1866, and Hikozō moved to Nagasaki in 1867 for starting his own business.\footnote{\textit{Heco and Murdoch, \textit{The Narrative of a Japanese}}, vol. 2, 53. Lasting for two years with twenty-six issues, \textit{Kaigai Shimbun} had very few regular subscribers. In fact, even in 1875, only one in a thousand Japanese read newspapers regularly, according to \textit{Chōya Shimbun} (Tokyo), March 2, 1875, in Yasumasa Nakayama, ed., \textit{Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen Shi, dai 2-kan, Minron Bokko-ki} (A Meiji Chronicle through Newspaper Sources, Vol. 2, Era of the Rise of People’s Argument) (Tokyo: Meiji Hennen Shi Ryōfukai, 1965), 293.} Although it was short-lived, \textit{Kaigai
Shimbun contributed to broadening intellectual horizons of the elite Japanese to overseas. To some extent, it even stimulated the young Japanese to go to America.\(^\text{115}\)

Furthermore, in the Bakumatsu period (幕末, last days of the Tokugawa Shogunate), Hikozō became a strong advocate of democracy about which he had learned and experienced during his nine-year stay in the United States. Deeply impressed by Hikozō’s ideals of democracy, young Chōshū samurai such as Itō Hirobumi (伊藤博文, 1841–1909) and Kido Takayoshi (木戸孝允, 1833–1877) went to Nagasaki to consult Hikozō “who had as much experience and knowledge of the West as virtually any other Japanese.”\(^\text{116}\) Itō and Kido who would become the key figures of the Meiji Restoration of 1868, sought to learn the government, constitution, and social and political institutions of the United States from Hikozō for the establishment of a Western-modeled government in Japan.\(^\text{117}\) Simultaneously, Hikozō’s old friend, Eugene Van Reed started to supply weapons to the Satsuma-han.\(^\text{118}\)

Believing in American ideals, Hikozō taught the concept of democracy to the young ambitious Japanese who later became founding fathers of modern Japan. Having a high regard for Hikozō because of well acquaintance with a foreign economic system,

\(^{115}\) Kaikoku Hyakunen Kinen Bunka Jigyōkai, Nichibei Bunka Kōshōshi, dai 5-kan: Ijū-ken, 9.

\(^{116}\) Van Sant, Pacific Pioneers, 47.

\(^{117}\) Joanne Fujita, “Joseph Heco Story,” Joseph Heco Society of Hawaii, http://www.honolulufestival.com/eng/seminar05_05.php (Accessed October 31, 2009). Itō Hirobumi was Japan’s first prime minister and also served as fifth, seventh, and tenth prime minister. Plotting with leaders of Satsuma-han, Kido Takayoshi played an important role in overthrowing the Tokugawa Shogunate, moving the capital from Kyoto to Tokyo (former Edo), and the abolition of the han (domains) and the establishment of the ken prefectures (prefectures), haihan-chiken (廃藩置県) in 1871.

\(^{118}\) Kevin C. Murphy, The American Merchant Experience in Nineteenth-Century Japan (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 155; Van Sant, Pacific Pioneers, 47.
Inoue Kaoru (井上馨, 1836–1915) asked Hikozō to work for the Japanese Ministry of Finance in the 1870s. Therefore, Hikozō decided to move from Nagasaki to Tokyo. Consulting his American friend who was a banking expert, Hikozō contributed to the 1872 National Bank Act (国立銀行法), based on the American National Bank system.

Simultaneously, utilizing his great knowledge about the Western culture and fluency in English language, Hikozō rose to be a successful Japanese American businessman. Particularly, Hikozō had a tremendous influence upon the elite Japanese. In fact, inspired by Hikozō’s way of life, some of them went to America for study and later became the pioneers of Japanese immigration to the United States. On December 12, 1897, Hikozō had a heart trouble that ended his life. Upon his death, Jiji Shinpō paid a tribute to memory of Hikozō who had contributed to the prosperity of the nation. Unable to be re-naturalized as a Japanese citizen, Hikozō, as an American citizen, was buried in the Aoyama Reien (青山霊園, Aoyama Municipal Cemetery) in Tokyo that has a designated section for foreigners in Japan.

Considering what Manjirō and Hikozō had accomplished for their country, it is no exaggeration to say that they were the inspirations of the founding fathers of modern Japan. Manjirō and Hikozō were probably the only two people who had a good

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command of English in those days. Not only Japan but also the United States had benefited from the castaway bilinguals who acted as mediators between the governments of Japan and the United States. In addition, they helped the people of two different cultures understand each other and led to the establishment of friendly relations for decades. Evidently, because Hikoṣō and Van Reed became friends while Hikoṣō was in San Francisco and helped Van Reed to arrange a group of people, the first Japanese immigration to Hawaii took place as early as 1868. Although treated as foreigners or foreign spies, Manjirō and Hikoṣō never stopped working for the improvement of Japan. Their spirits inspired the young samurai and intellectuals who played a leading role in the course of modernization.

Meanwhile, one of the well-known members of the Japanese Embassy to the United States in 1860, Fukuzawa Yukichi was a prominent writer, translator, educator, political theorist, and founder of the Keiō Gijuku (慶應義塾) whose numbers of influential publications and public speech promoted travel and immigration to the United States in many aspects.¹²³ Fukuzawa was the most famous advocate of Western liberalism who was the first Japanese to translate the Declaration of Independence and the United States Constitution. Observing and then introducing Western civilization to the Japanese, Fukuzawa played an extremely important role in encouraging the Japan’s overseas development and immigration. Moreover, Fukuzawa was responsible for the rise of Japanese imperialism/nationalism. Therefore, I am going to examine the significance and achievement of Fukuzawa in Chapter VI in detail.

¹²³ Niiya, ed., Japanese American History, 142. Established in October 1858, Keiō Gijuku was later developed into Keiō University in 1918. Located in Mita district in Tokyo, Keiō University was the first private university established in Japan.
Internal Pressure

While dealing with the foreign threat, the Tokugawa Shogunate had simultaneously encountered numerous and devastating domestic problems that would eventually attribute to the collapse of the Shogunate. Since the early nineteenth century, the beginnings of industrialization, the commercialization of agriculture, the growth of inter-regional trade, and the increase of household incomes had created serious social changes in Japan. The Tokugawa Shogunate had instituted the social class system called shinōkōshō (士農工商) with the samurai at the highest; however, a thriving commercial economy had stimulated the rise of wealthy commoners. The “affluent lifestyle and cultural pretensions” of wealthy commoners “challenged the social and political dominance of the samurai.”

Among the four classes, the lower-ranked samurai suffered extreme poverty toward the end of the Tokugawa Shogunate. In order to maintain their feudal domains’ economy, the samurai had to accept a large pay cut as well as confiscation of properties. Some of the samurai engaged in a second job, usually handcraft work, simply to survive. Although considering this kind of work undignified for the samurai, they repaired wooden clogs, umbrellas, household utensils, and lanterns. Some of the

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125 Japanese feudal society was divided into four classes known as shinokoshō; the samurai class as the highest, the peasants as the second (that consisted over 80 percent of the population), the craftsmen as the third, and the merchants as the lowest.


128 Ibid.
impoverished samurai sold things, including swords and armor.\textsuperscript{129} In some extreme cases, the distressed samurai practiced banditry or sold their daughters in order to secure the minimum standard of living.\textsuperscript{130} In addition, samurai families married their daughters to wealthy merchant families to dodge financial problems. The decline of hereditary and feudal privileges became apparent and the samurai’s discontent with the Tokugawa Shogunate grew more extensive and predominant.

Furthermore, severe famines caused by bad weather extending over a long period of time incited numerous peasant uprisings (hyakushō ikki, 百姓一揆) as well as urban riots (uchikowashi, 打ちこわし, literary house-smashing) throughout Japan. For example, in 1866 alone, there were 106 peasant uprisings taking place in rural areas, and urban riots numbered thirty-five.\textsuperscript{131} Suffering from the heavy taxation and rapid price increases, the rural populace including poor peasants, tenant farmers, and agricultural wage earners rose up against tax collectors, moneylenders, and wealthy landowners who had filled their pockets through the exploitation of the poor.\textsuperscript{132} However, their demand for tax reduction, lower rice prices, and the return of their mortgaged property was rejected; therefore, they “burned tax records, pillaged storehouses, ransacked private homes, carried away bags of rice and casks of miso (bean paste), smashed furniture and

\textsuperscript{129} According to the Bushido or the code of warrior, sword was considered inseparable from a samurai’s soul.

\textsuperscript{130} Hane, Modern Japan, 52.


trampled on clothing, and even dug up the family graveyards of those whom they despised the most.”

Eventually, the rioters advocated *yonaoshi* (世直し, literary “world renewal”) through popular violent movements called *yonaoshi ikki* (世直し一揆) for reforming the devastating society. Frequently breaking out in the Tōhoku (東北, literary “North East) and Kantō (関東) regions, the social disorder and popular unrest further contributed to weakening the fundamental political structure of the late Tokugawa Shogunate.

As a result of the greater degree of internal and external pressure, the Tokugawa Shogunate finally determined to end the seclusion policy following the conclusion of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Amity and Friendship in March 1854. However, the Shogunate encountered another difficulty because a powerful *Tairō* (大老, Chief Councilor), Ii Naosuke (井伊直弼, 1815–1860), signed the treaties without obtaining an imperial approval from Emperor Kōmei (孝明天皇, 1831–1867, r. 1846–1867). In consequence, a large-scale political crisis occurred that led Japan into the Bakumatsu period (1853–1867) when a series of major events took place. Immediately, the

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135 Hane, *Premodern Japan*, 199. Kanto is the largest plain and has a high population density in Japan where Tokyo and Yokohama are located.


137 During the reign of Tokugawa Iesada, the Tokugawa Shogunate signed a series of the unequal treaties that included the Treaty of Peace and Amity (also known as Treaty of Kanagawa, March 31, 1854), Anglo-Japanese Friendship Treaty (October 14, 1854), the Treaty of Amity and Commerce (also known as Harris Treaty, July 29, 1858), and Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Amity
signing of treaties without approval incited the anti-foreign movement throughout the country with the slogan, *sonnō jōi* (“revere the emperor and expel the barbarians”).

The daimyo of Mito-han, Tokugawa Nariaki (德川 齋昭, 1800–1860) became an influential advocate of *sonnō jōi* movement and facilitated the rise of the Japanese nationalism. Meanwhile, numbers of *tozama daimyō* (外様大名, nonhereditary feudal lords or “outside daimyo”) criticized the Shogun for not performing his duty as a legitimate ruler of Japan. Traditionally, the duty of Shogun was to subdue barbarians, not to be subdued by barbarians. The sense of humiliation due to the forced opening of Japan diverted into the daimyo’s suspicion and distrust of the Shogunate.

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138 According to Mikiso Hane’s *Premodern Japan: A Historical Survey* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 205–206, the nationalists, consisting scholars of the *Mitogaku* (水戸学, Mito School) and the *Kokugaku* (国学, School of National Learning), began to promote the importance of the emperor. Although they were anti-Western, they did not intend to overthrow the Shogunate at first. However, the Shogunate was afraid of the rise of massive pro-imperial movement that could threaten the Shogunate rule. Aizawa Seishisai (会沢 正志斎, 1781–1863) was one of the prominent nationalist thinkers of the Mito School who advocated the *sonnō jōi* movement in the late Tokugawa period, aiming to restore the emperor to power. Aizawa popularized the term *kokutai* (国体) in his book, *Shinron* (新論, literary “New Proposals”) published in 1825. According to Roy Andrew Miller’s *Japan’s Modern Myth: The Language and Beyond* (New York: Weatherhill, 1982), 93, “*kokutai* meant something still rather vague and ill defined. It was more or less the Japanese ‘nation’s body’ or ‘national structure.’”

139 *The tozama daimyō* were those who had been hostile to the Tokugawa clan before the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate in 1603. They had fought against the Tokugawa forces at the Battle of Sekigahara in 1600. The Battle is widely recognized as the “Realm Divide” which enabled Tokugawa Ieyasu to establish the Tokugawa Shogunate. Regarded as potential enemies to the Tokugawa Shogunate, the *tozama daimyō* had been always prohibited from holding powerful positions within the government. In addition, although they were allowed to retain their domains, numbers of their estates were reduced in size.

In order to establish a national policy for expelling the foreigners, Nariaki argued that the direct involvement of Emperor Kōmei was essential. Nariaki gained tremendous support from tozama daimyō who sought to involve in the central government. However, Ii aimed to reinforce the Shogunate’s centralized power by appointing Tokugawa Iemochi (徳川 家茂, 1846–1866) as a successor and favored to open Japan to the West. Then, Ii carried out the Ansei no Taigoku (安政の大獄, “Ansei Purge”) between the mid-1858 and the end of 1859 for forcibly eliminating the anti-foreign factions and the Hitotsubashi faction that recommended Tokugawa Yoshinobu as a successor.141 Ii’s scheme for restoring the Shogunate’s control shortly ended with his assassination on March 24, 1860 by a group of rōnin from Mito-han except one from Satsuma-han, known as Sakuradamonai no Hen (桜田門外の変, Sakuradamon Incident). Importantly, these assassins were not anti-Shogunate but anti-Ii and his faction.142 However, with his death, the nation deteriorated in confusion and violence and the Shogunate further weakened its authority.

Meanwhile, powerful daimyo including Satsuma, Chōshū, Tosa, and Saga had already realized the superiority of Western military power and the Shogunate’s inability to expel the foreign power by force. Rather than expelling Westerners, they decided to learn how to build up and organize the military and weapons from them and to establish the emperor-centered government with their direct influence on politics. Meanwhile, accepting the Emperor Kōmei’s policy of expelling the Westerners and promising to

141 Yoshida and Sato, eds., Nihon Shisō Taikei 56: Bakumatsu Seiji Ronshū, 72, 119. The Hitotsubashi faction represented the tozama daimyō who were not allies of Tokugawa during the Battle of Sekigahara in 1600 which enabled Tokugawa to unify Japan.

142 Ibid., 119.
close the country within ten years, the Shogunate made a preemptive move to the tozama daimyo. In 1862, the Shogunate arranged a political alliance through the marriage between the Emperor Kōmei’s half-sister, Princess Kazunomiya (和宮親子内親王，1846–1877) and the Shogun Iemochi to achieve Kōbu Gattai (公武合体, literary “Union of Court and Shogunate”), for restoring the declining authority of the Shogunate following the opening of Japan.

The extreme xenophobic Chōshū-han was discontented with this marriage and Chōshū samurai launched an attack on Kyoto in 1864. In response, the Shogunate launched suppressions against Chōshū in 1864 and then in 1866 (長州征伐). Satsuma sided with the Shogunate to suppress Chōshū in 1864; however, Satsuma determined to make a military alliance with Chōshū in March 1866 despite their long history of rivalry because both were unhappy with the way the Shogunate subdued the han. Afterwards, Satsuma and Chōshū steadily prepared for the coming of the second Chōshū suppression. For instance, Satsuma helped Chōshū to purchase foreign-made rifles and weapons. As a consequence of losing a powerful support from the Satsuma-han, the second Chōshū suppression ended in failure. After Iemochi’s death in the second Chōshū suppression, Yoshinobu finally became the fifteenth Tokugawa Shogun in 1866. Eventually, the Chōshū suppression backfired on the Shogunate financially and exposed its declining

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143 Hane, Modern Japan, 80; Yoshida and Sato, eds., Nihon Shisō Taikei 56: Bakumatsu Seiji Ronshū, 170.


military power and leadership.\textsuperscript{146}

Thereafter, having no hope on the Tokugawa Shogunate, the sonnō jōi supporters consisting of Satsuma and Chōshū forces focused on the recovery of national status by strengthening the nation, which eventually led to the replacement of the Tokugawa Shogunate to a new Meiji government. In 1868, the Meiji Restoration was carried out as a result of disruption of the Japanese social system following the opening of Japan. In the same year, the Charter Oath was promulgated that denounced the Japanese traditions and customs and encouraged the adoption of Western culture and practices for the establishment of “a modern nation-state.”\textsuperscript{147}

Significantly, the Meiji Restoration had a tremendous impact on the samurai class regarding their political and social status in the new government. Due to a political process of the Meiji Restoration that abolished the samurai class, a great number of samurai became unemployed. Especially, those han (藩, feudal domains) that had supported the Tokugawa Shogunate to fight against the Imperial force during the Boshin Civil War (戊辰戦争, literary “War of the Year of the Dragon”) found themselves in awkward position.\textsuperscript{148} For example, the honorable Aizu samurai, who were loyal to their


\textsuperscript{148} The Boshin War was small conflicts and political negotiations initially fought between pro- and anti-Shogunate that degenerated to a civil war between the Tokugawa loyalists and the imperial loyalists. Pushed by his remaining supporters, the fifteenth and last Shogun Tokugawa Yoshinobu (徳川 慶喜, 1837–1913) decided to fight; however, his 15,000 forces including Aizu and Kuwana (han of Matsudaira Sadaaki, Katamori’s brother) samurai were quickly defeated at the entrance of Kyoto in January 1868 due to the inferior military units (Battle of Toba-Fushimi, 鳥羽・伏見の戦い). Although Yoshinobu had some French trained forces, majority remained medieval samurai forces. On the other hand, the imperial forces had only 5,000 troops, but their
Shogunate until the very last moment, now became fugitives as a consequence of the change of government.  

Due to its extraordinary loyalty to the Shogunate, Aizu-han (会津藩) became the most severe victim of the Meiji Restoration. In the Bakumatsu period, owing to their extraordinary loyalty to the Shogunate, the ninth Aizu daimyō Matsudaira Katamori (松平 容保, 1836–1893), who was a distant cousin of the Shogun, had been appointed as the newly established Kyoto Shugoshoku (京都守護職, military governor of Kyoto) between 1862 and 1867 in order to maintain the peace and public order in Kyoto. Kyoto Shugoshoku’s main duty was to drive out the anti-foreign Chôshû forces that utilize terrorism to advocate sonnō jōi.  

In order to bolster up the declining authority of the Tokugawa Shogunate, Matsudaira Katamori upheld the policy of Kôbu Gattai, which virtually promoted the closer cooperation of Court and Shogunate. Realizing that the Aizu-han alone could not fulfill the duty, Matsudaira utilized a military unit called Shinsengumi (新選組, literary military was fully modernized with western weapons and trained by the British. In February, Yoshinobu retreated to Edo (江戸, present-day Tokyo), and when the last Tokugawa forces led by Enomoto Takeaki (President of the Republic of Ezo) surrendered in Hokkaido on May 17, 1869, the Shogunate finally determined to open Edo Castle town without any resistance. All the resistance stopped in 1869 and the Tokugawa Shogunate that had lasted more than 260 years finally collapsed. When the emperor moved from Kyoto (京都) to Edo, Council of State announced that Edo was to be renamed Tokyo, literary “eastern capital” and made a new capital of Japan, according to Dajôkan Nisshi 46 (Gazette of the Council of State) (Tokyo), July 1868, in Nakayama, ed., Shim bun Shûsei Meiji Hennen Shi, dai 1-kan, Ishin Daihenkakuki, 151.

149 During the Boshin Civil War, the 30,000 Imperial forces besieged Aizu-Wakamatsu Castle (also known as Tsuruga Castle) and Matsudaira surrendered on November 5, 1868.


151 The Chôshû forces aimed to restore the emperor to the power and to replace the Shogunate with the anti-foreign government under the leadership of the emperor.
“Newly Select League”) between 1863 and 1869 as a special police force in order to suppress the imperial loyalists and extreme anti-foreign forces that continuously committed crimes and violence in Kyoto. Under the protection of Matsudaira, Kondo Isami (近藤 勇, 1834–1868) headed the Shinsengumi, which was a group of swordsmen mostly consisting of the rōnin (浪人, “masterless samurai”) who patrolled the city of Kyoto. Initially organized in a small dōjō (道場, literary “place of the way” where the Japanese train martial arts) in Edo’s Tama Region, the Shinsengumi recruited many rōnin on their way to Kyoto. Matsudaira envisioned that the creation of the Shinsengumi would possibly help “restore Tokugawa control of the imperial institution.” People in Kyoto were afraid of the Shinsengumi because its members exercised their privilege of Kirisute Gomen (切捨御免), a right to cut down commoners if necessary, which was authorized by the Imperial Court on August 21, 1863.

Due to their harsh rule, accompanied with terrors of the Shinsengumi, many han (domains) consequently became hostile to Aizu-han. Especially, the Chōshū-han had an old score to settle with Aizu-han. Therefore, when the imperial forces called the Kan-gun (官軍, mainly consisting of Satsuma and Chōshū forces that made a military alliance in 1866 for the restoration of emperor) gained control in the Boshin Civil War and


established the new government under the 122nd Emperor Meiji (明治天皇, 1852–1912, r. 1968–1912), Aizu-han found itself in serious straits. The new Meiji government treated Aizu-han more cruelly and severely than other han that had been loyal to the Shogunate called the Zoku-gun (賊軍, literary “rebel forces”). Made up of young samurai from Satsuma-han (薩摩藩) and Chōshū-han (長州藩), the new Meiji leaders accused daimyō Matsudaira Katamori and his Aizu-han samurai of being “traitors.”

For the newly established Meiji government, Matsudaira Katamori and Tokugawa Yoshinobu were indeed sworn “enemies of the state”; however, the Meiji leaders decided not to execute them, fearing the consequences. Although Satsuma and Chōshū had initially passed a death sentence to Matsudaira, he was not executed but was sentenced to life imprisonment. After being confined to Myōkokuji (妙国寺, Myokoku Temple) for a month, he was under house arrest and finally pardoned in 1872. The leaders of Satsuma and Chōshū were afraid of massive martyrdom following the execution of Matsudaira or Yoshinobu as well as the unification of defeated daimyo, who had supported the Tokugawa Shogunate, to rebel against the newly established government. The fragile new government sought to avoid any catastrophic events before the establishment of the firm governmental foundation. Under the existing conditions, the Meiji leaders began to

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156 Van Sant, *Pacific Pioneers*, 120. Aizu-han was located in the present-day Fukushima prefecture. Fukushima is located in the Tohoku region on the Honshu (main island).

157 “Matsudaira Katamori Genka ni Shoseraru” (Matsudaira Katamori Received Severe Punishment), *Tokyojō Nisshi* 10 (Gazette of the Tokyo Castle) (Tokyo), December 1868, in Nakayama, ed., *Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen Shi, dai 1-kan, Ishin Daihenkakuki*, 220.

158 Van Sant, *Pacific Pioneers*, 121–122. After released from the house arrest, Matsudaira became a Shinto priest at the shrine called Nikko Toshogu (日光東照宮) which has enshrined the founder and the first Shogun of the Tokugawa Shogunate, Tokugawa Ieyasu (德川家康, 1543–1616). Located in Tochigi prefecture, Nikko Toshogu was built in 1617 and completed in 1636 by Tokugawa Hidetada, a son of Ieyasu.
consider the samurai class as an obstacle and even a threat to Japan’s rapid and effective modernization.

Furthermore, the Conscription Law of 1873, which made the existence of samurai meaningless, appeared to pave the way for the Japanese mass immigration. Then, the peasants who had devoted all their energies to farming and agricultural labor were strongly against the new military obligation imposed on them. Simultaneously, the samurai, losing their traditional military status to the peasantry, were extremely distressed because they had no place to fit in the new system. The samurai class, which had ranked highest in the feudal society for centuries, was severely affected by the political reforms of the Meiji government. According to Harry D. Harootunian’s study published in 1960, the samurai numbered roughly 1,800,000 and there were about 400,000 samurai households at the beginning stage of the Meiji Restoration. In consequence, a great number of samurais consisting of 5 to 6 percent of the entire Japanese population became unemployed.

The Meiji government, depriving the military duty of samurai and passing it to commoners, sought to phase out the feudal stipends called karoku (家禄) which amounted to one-third of the national annual expenditure. For example, karoku amounted to 33.9 percent in 1871, 37.8 percent in 1872, and 35.4 percent in 1873.

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161 Nihon Daigaku, Asaka Kaitaku Kenkyūkai, *Shokusan Kogyo to Chiiki Kaihatsu: Asaka Kaitaku no Kenkyū* (Promotion of Industry and Enterprise and Regional Development:
Therefore, in 1876, the government decided to commutate the feudal stipends for government bonds and eventually to dissolve the samurai class through the program called *Chitsuroku Shobun* (秩禄処分, commutation of feudal stipends). This program saved the government enormous expenditure and reduced its financial burden. The enactment of the Conscription Law and *Chitsuroku Shobun*, which socially and economically shut out the samurai from the new institutions, resulted in “pushing” the distressed samurai to emigrate overseas.

**Wakamatsu Tea and Silk Colony**

Under the circumstances, the first Japanese mass immigration to the mainland United States took place in February of 1869 by some former samurai and their families. Being “political refugees,” these people from Aizu-han were indeed the first to attempt establishing a Japanese agricultural settlement in northern California. After the collapse of the Tokugawa Shogunate, cooperating with John Henry Schnell (1843–?), Aizu-han secretly arranged mass emigration for overcoming the difficulties in the aftermath of the Meiji Restoration. Schnell, a German merchant, was the *oyatoi*

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gaikokujin (お雇い外国人, literary “hired foreigner”) who served the ninth daimyō of Aizu-han, Matsudaira Katamori as a military instructor and weapon procurer, and later married Jou, a daughter of the Aizu-han retainer. Given the Japanese name Hiramatsu Buhei (平松 武兵衛) derived from the inversion of the Chinese characters of the daimyo’s surname (松平), Schnell was a blue-eyed samurai who was allowed to live in the jōka machi (castle town) of Wakamatsu, to hire retainers, and to carry swords.

Schnell and his Japanese family with a group of forty people including samurai, farmers, carpenters, plasterers, and a doctor from Aizu-Wakamatsu and one samurai from Shonai-han named Nishikawa Tomoki (西川 友喜) left Yokohama on April 30 and arrived in San Francisco on May 20, 1869. They took a passage on board the S. S. China owned by the Pacific Mail Steamship Company that had started passenger and mail service from California to Japan as well as to China in 1867. Then, the group left

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165 For the details on the oyatoi gaikokujin, see Chapter III. Aizu-han hired French and Prussian to modernize its military and to develop a silver mine, according to Nichi Nichi Shim bun (Tokyo), April 26, 1868 (old lunar calendar), in Nakayama, ed., Shim bun Shūsei Meiji Hennen Shi, dai 1-kan, Ishin Daihenkakuki, 73.

166 Van Sant, John E. Van Sant, Pacific Pioneers: Japanese Journeys to America and Hawaii, 1850–80 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 123–124. Schnell was Prussian, but he entered Japan as Dutch merchant because Prussia did not have diplomatic relations with Japan then. According to Hiroko Aihara, “Nihonjin hatsu no Nogyō Imindan” (The First Japanese Group of Immigrants), Fukushima Minyū Shim bun (Fukushima Minyu Daily) (Fukushima), January 16, 2007, the name of Schnell’s wife was Oyo, while Van Sant claimed it was Jou.


San Francisco for Sacramento by boat, and then traveled to Placerville by wagons. The group finally arrived at Placerville on June 9, 1869. Financially aided by the Aizu daimyo Matsudaira, Schnell was able to buy 600 acres of land with a house at Gold Hill in Coloma, El Dorado County, immediately after their arrival. Schnell purchased the land and a house for only five-thousand dollars from Charles M. Graner who was a businessman in San Francisco and manager of a hotel in which Schnell had stayed. After the land purchase, Schnell established the first settlement of the Japanese in the mainland United States known as the Wakamatsu Tea and Silk Colony.

Urged by Schnell, the Japanese colonists had brought tea plants, bamboo shoots, 


171 Schnell was supposed to raise $5,000, he failed to pay $4,500 before the deadline and often disputed with Francis Veerkamp who managed the land for Graner.
mulberry trees, and silkworm cocoons to establish a settlement based on agriculture.172

Schnell’s Japanese wife looked after the female workers of the colony.173 Initially, Matsudaira Katamori and his son Kataharu (兼容) were supposed to join the party of Schnell before long; however, it never came off because the people of Aizu-han under the leadership of Kataharu had already migrated from Aizu to Shimokita Hanto (下北半島, literary “Shimokita Peninsula,” located in the northernmost tip of Honshu or mainland) in 1870 as a part of relegation policy, aiming at eradicating clan of Tokugawa influence.174

Initially, the Wakamatsu Tea and Silk Colony seemed quite successful.

According to an article published in the San Francisco Call in 1870 after the Horticultural Fair in San Francisco in June:

“Herr Schnell of the Japanese Colony in Gold Hill, El Dorado County makes a fine display of Japanese plants, grown from imported shrubs and seeds. Amongst his articles are fine healthy tea plants, which were planted on March 14, 1870 last. These plants are about four inches high and are vigorous and healthy. He also exhibited samples of rice plants and a specimen of the Japanese pepper tree.”175

The colony cultivated tea and silk, but it constantly struggled with an insufficient water

172 “Where It All Began: Preserving the First Settlement of Japanese in America,” Nichi Bei Times (Japanese American News) (San Francisco), April 27, 2007; Van Sant, Pacific Pioneers, 124–125. According to the Alta Daily News (San Francisco) of May 27, 1869, the Japanese brought 50,000 three-year-old mulberry trees for the production of silk.


supply, as well as social problems and financial difficulties.\textsuperscript{176} The former samurai from Aizu-han worked diligently and the tea trees grew well at first, yet it ended in failure within a few years due to the shortage of funds, draught, and the outbreak of an epidemic.\textsuperscript{177} In addition, the colonists did not get along well together with Schnell, and many got homesick and steeped in liquor.\textsuperscript{178} All these factors attributed to the failure of the Wakamatsu colony.

In April 1871, Schnell and his family left for Japan promising to raise funds for maintaining the colony; however, he never returned. What was worse, Schnell had stealthily sold the greater part the Wakamatsu Tea and Silk Colony’s estate to the El Dorado County government before leaving for Japan.\textsuperscript{179} The colonists somehow managed to persist for eight more years before finally disbanding in 1879. Tragically, the colonists left no record of their experiences in California and very little is known about the fate of the rest of colonists. Only Okei (おけい, –1871) and Sakurai Matsunosuke (桜井 松之助, –1901) were taken custody of a wealthy Francis Veerkamp family after the disbandment of the colony, while Masumizu Kuninosuke (増水 国之助, –1915) married a black woman named Carrie Wilson and continued to engage in agriculture and also worked as a miner.\textsuperscript{180} Virtually nothing has been heard of the Schnell family since

\textsuperscript{176} Pryor, \textit{Classic Tales in California History}, 39.

\textsuperscript{177} Ibid., 39. The colonists suffered an insufficient water supply largely because of the local gold miners damming up a nearby stream which was the vital supply of water for agriculture, particularly for tea plants and mulberry trees. In addition, 1871 drought further aggravated the problem that Wakamatsu Colony had faced.

\textsuperscript{178} Gaimushō Ryōji Ijūbu, \textit{Waga Kokumin no Kaigai Hatten, Honpen}, 127.

\textsuperscript{179} Pryor, \textit{Classic Tales in California History}, 40.

\textsuperscript{180} Van Sant, \textit{Pacific Pioneers}, 128; Pryor, \textit{Classic Tales in California History}, 40;
its disappearance in 1871. Thereafter, only person who observed Schnell in Genève in
1885 was Kawashima Tadanosuke (川島 忠之助), according to the *Fukushima Minyū
Shimbun*.\(^{181}\) Kawashima was a novelist who translated a French novel *Le tour du monde
en quatre-vingts jours* (Around the World in Eighty Days) published by Jules Verne in
1873.\(^{182}\)

As an agricultural colony, Wakamatsu Tea and Silk Colony was disastrous
failure. It had historical significance like the *Gannen-mono* in Hawaii who left Japan in
1868. As Van Sant points out, it was the first organized mass immigration of the
Japanese to the mainland United States.\(^{183}\) Leaving the country as “political refugees,”
they were true pioneers of the Japanese immigration to the United States in the midst of
the political, social, and economic changes taking place in Japan.

* * * * *

There were several causes identified for the initiation of Japanese mass
emigration to the United States in the second half of the nineteenth century. Arrival of

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\(^{181}\) *Fukushima Minyū Shimbun* (Fukushima Minyu Daily) (Fukushima), January 19, 2007.

\(^{182}\) Ibid.

\(^{183}\) Van Sant, *Pacific Pioneers*, 97; *Fukushima Minyū Shimbun* (Fukushima Minyu Daily)
(Fukushima), January 17, 2007.
Commodore Matthew Perry and subsequent opening of Japan promoted going to overseas for acquiring advanced science and technology. Moreover, Manjirō and Hikozō played an important role in promoting Westernization for strengthening Japan. In addition, information they provided either directly or indirectly motivated the Japanese students to go abroad for studying. Meanwhile, the political revolution that abolished the Shogunate created a greater number of displaced samurai in the new system. Wakamatsu Colony was the first attempt of the samurai to establish themselves in the mainland United States. These samurai were the pioneers of the Japanese immigration to the United States.
CHAPTER III

ROAD TO MASS IMMIGRATION—“PUSHES” AND “PULLS”

The first organized Japanese emigration to Hawaii, taking place in 1868 right after the collapse of the Tokugawa Shogunate, had a significant influence on the course of the development of Japanese in international affairs. The first group of emigrants to Hawaii known as Gannen-mono (元年者, literary “First Year People”) faced problems and newly established Meiji government determined to protect its subjects wherever they were and whatever it might cost. The attitude of the Meiji defined the future development of Japanese maritime policy. Meanwhile, the Japanese demand for emigration continued to grow among the young males who sought to evade draft. At the same time, the labor shortage in Hawaiian plantations and overpopulation problem in Japan facilitated the both governments of Japan and Hawaii to authorize Japanese immigration to Hawaii for labor.

Beginning of the Emigration to Hawaii—Gannen-mono

The first mass Japanese emigration to Hawaii initiated in 1868 when the Tokugawa Shogunate issued 180 passports at the strong request of Eugene M. Van Reed who represented the Hawaiian Kingdom.¹ The first destination was Hawaii because

¹ Yasuo Fujisaki and Koji Yamamoto, Shashin Kaiga Shūsei Nihonjin Imin: Hawai,
while Japan was experiencing social and economic problems such as overpopulation, poverty, and a high rate of unemployment, Hawaii was encountering a shortage of laborers caused by the Europeans arriving with diseases that decimated a large number of the native population.\(^2\) Having no immunity to measles, whooping cough, influenza, smallpox, tuberculosis, and venereal diseases, Hawaii’s native population declined to a serious level as seen in Table 3.1.\(^3\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Index (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1832</td>
<td>130,313</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1836</td>
<td>108,579</td>
<td>83.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>84,165</td>
<td>64.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1853</td>
<td>71,019</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>67,084</td>
<td>51.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1866</td>
<td>58,765</td>
<td>45.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1872</td>
<td>56,896</td>
<td>43.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>57,985</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>44,232</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>34,436</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>31,019</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>29,787</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>26,041</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>23,723</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to the United Japanese Society of Hawaii and James H. Okahata’s *A History of Japanese in Hawaii* (1971), 130,313 people lived in Hawaii in 1832. That was reduced to 58,765 in 1866. As Table 3.1 shows, the native Hawaiian population had sharply decreased within an eighty-year-period. In response to the drastic population decrease, the Hawaiian government had attempted to promote labor immigration to Hawaii. In so doing, the government enacted the Master and Servant Act in 1850 that alleviated the shortage of labor by allowing the contract labor system. The Act enabled the subsequent establishment of the Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society in the same year in order to bring immigrants who would work on the vast sugar plantations. As a result, 180 Chinese laborers arrived in 1852. Then, the Hawaiian government established the Bureau of Immigration in 1864 to encourage further labor migration as well as to increase the population of Hawaii through the assimilation of immigrants to the local population.

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6 Ibid., 389. In 1840, Hawaii adopted a written constitution that prescribed a two house legislature.

7 Ibid., 389.

8 Masaaki Kodama, *Nihon Iminshi Kenkyū Josetsu* (An Introduction to the History of
into the joint venture, the Hawaiian government recruited the number of Chinese people increased to 18,000 by 1884 and over 11,000 Portuguese arrived before 1890. Nevertheless, these labor forces were not sufficient for the operation of the burgeoning sugar industry in Hawaii.

In fact, the Hawaiian government and planters initially sought to attract immigrants either from Europe or from America. However, as Alex Ladenson points out in his article published in 1940, few Europeans and Americans preferred to work in Hawaii for several reasons. First of all, they could not earn much money as plantation laborers, and they knew that they could find better opportunities and jobs in America or Australia. Then, the impoverished immigrants could not afford costly passages to Hawaii. Finally, they were virtually uninformed about the advantage in going to Hawaii. In the circumstances, the Hawaiian government began to consider the recruitment of Japanese laborers as alternative to European and American laborers to alleviate the shortage of agricultural labor.

Then, Robert Crichton Wyllie (1796–1865), foreign minister of Hawaii, asked Eugene M. Van Reed, an experienced American trader in Japan and a close friend of Hikozô, whether the recruitment of Japanese laborers for sugar plantations in Hawaii was possible. After Van Reed gave a positive report to Wyllie, Hawaii’s Bureau of

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10 Ibid., 389–390.

11 Ibid., 390.
Immigration provided him $1,925 for his mission to recruit laborers. In 1865, appointed as the Hawaiian Consul in Kanagawa, Van Reed, with the help of an American minister residing in Japan, General Robert B. Van Valkenburgh, negotiated a treaty with the Tokugawa Shogunate in the late 1866 to the early 1867. After the negotiation, Van Reed succeeded in making an interim friendship agreement with Japan in August 1867. The agreement had no solid provisions other than providing friendship and trade between Hawaii and Japan. The Tokugawa Shogunate did not recognize Van Reed as an official diplomat because he was engaged in commercial activities. Therefore, the Shogunate did not allow Van Reed to sign the treaty based on the shogunal policy. Despite, Van Reed continued to work closely with the Shogunate officials in order to get passports for the emigrants whom he would convey to Hawaii.

Based on the agreement of 1867, Van Reed initiated the first organized emigration on April 25, 1868, recruiting 153 Japanese near Edo and Yokohama, age

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between 13 and 46. Since Van Reed was not fluent in Japanese, he hired a merchant of Yokohama named Kimura Hanbei (木村 半兵衛) as a recruiting agent. Kimura succeeded in recruiting nearly 400 Japanese, including city people and those “who had been picked out of the streets of Yokohama, sick, exhausted, and filthy, and without clothing to cover decency.” According to *A History of Japanese in Hawaii*:

Most of them were unfit for hard labor on the sugar plantations of Hawaii. They were failures in life, rough-and-rowdy adventurers addicted to drink and gambling, quick to get into brawls. These were unemployed down-and-outers or loafers who had drifted to Yokohama at the time of recruitment. Some of them, not being the first-born in families engaged in some kind of business, had been thrown on their own resources, to find work elsewhere, and ready to join any adventure that promised quick returns. They were going to a new world to make a fortune and return to Japan within three years in honor and glory.

Among them were few ex-farmers who sold their land in hope of starting new life in Yokohama. Van Reed hired an American physician named Dr. David J. Lee to choose 180 Japanese who seemed suitable for the sugar plantation labor in Hawaii. Dr. Lee selected young men without skin diseases. There were eighteen men aged between 10 and 19; 102 men aged between 20 and 30; twenty-two men aged between 30 and 40; and

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three men at age 40 or 41.\textsuperscript{22}

In fact, a change of government took place just before the departure of the \textit{Scioto}. Expecting to obtain 350 passports from the newly established Meiji government, Van Reed returned with 180 passports issued by the Tokugawa Shogunate.\textsuperscript{23} Nevertheless, the new government, having no diplomatic relations with Hawaii, refused to issue new passports unless one of Japan’s treaty nations guaranteed the return passages of the laborers at the end of the three-year-contract period.\textsuperscript{24} Then, Van Reed requested $4,000 from the Meiji government, which he had spent for recruiting laborers in compensation for releasing laborers. The new Meiji government, considering emigration nothing better than slavery, denied the validity of Tokugawa passports and restricted the Japanese emigration to Hawaii.\textsuperscript{25} Seeking to improve the national image for repealing unequal treaties with the West, the Japanese government officials were concerned that there would be no way to protect their citizens in case of emergency. In addition, the government did not trust Van Reed at all because he was a weapon broker and previously had closer relations with the Shogunate.\textsuperscript{26}

While negotiating with the Meiji government for an agreement, Van Reed proceeded with the arrangement for the shipping of Japanese laborers to Hawaii. During

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{22} Van Sant, \textit{Pacific Pioneers}, 103–104; Patsy Sumie Saiki, \textit{Japanese Women in Hawaii: The First 100 Years} (Honolulu: Kisaku, 1985), 19.
  \item \textsuperscript{23} Beechert, \textit{Working in Hawaii}, 66; Van Sant, \textit{Pacific Pioneers}, 103.
  \item \textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 104.
  \item \textsuperscript{26} Gaimushō Ryōji Ijūbu, \textit{Waga Kokumin no Kaigai Hatten, Honpen}, 89.
\end{itemize}
the course of negotiation, 170 out of 350 Japanese laborers whom he had secured decided not to go to Hawaii.  

Finally, before obtaining new passports from the Meiji government, Van Reed decided to carry out his original plan to convey the Japanese laborers to the sugar plantations in Hawaii regardless of the governmental prohibition.

In short, contrary to the government’s effort, the poverty in the country in the wake of the Meiji Restoration and its subsequent policies “pushed” the poor and displaced Japanese to go to Hawaii in hope of making money and return home in a short period.

On May 17, the *Scioto* (British vessel of 855 tons) left Yokohama for Hawaii, carrying 147 men and six women, arriving in Honolulu on June 19, 1868. They were called *Gannen-mono* because they left Japan in the first year of the Meiji’s enthronement. Mainly consisting of “samurai, cooks, sake brewers, potters, printers, 

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29 Gaimushō Ryōji Ijūbu (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Consul, Division of Immigration), *Waga Kokumin no Kaigai Hatten: Iju Hyakunen no Ayumi, Honpen* (Overseas Development of the Japanese: the Record of a Hundred Years of Immigration, Main Work) (Tokyo: Gaimushō Ryōji Ijūbu, 1971), 88; Nishimukai, “Transportation of Japanese Emigrants in the Pre-War Period,” 78; Jōji Suzuki, *Nihonjin Dekasegi Imin* (Japanese Emigration of Laborers) (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1992), 12–17. Suzuki argues that the total was 141, including 137 men and 4 women. These women were all married; Tomi (19) was Kintaro’s wife; Tetsu (21) was Ganzaburo’s wife; Koto (22) was Busuke’s wife; Haru (20s and pregnant) was Moshichi’s wife; and Matsu (40) was Tarokichi’s wife, according to the United Japanese Society of Hawaii and Okahata, *A History of Japanese in Hawaii*, 42.

30 Before sending the *Gannen-mono* to Hawaii, Van Reed arranged emigration of 42 Japanese to Guam on April 29, 1868 for a German company, according to Alan Takeo Moriyama, *Imingaisha: Japanese Emigration Companies and Hawaii, 1894–1908* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), 2. Working under three-year contract with salary of four-dollars a month, these Japanese laborers were unpaid and ill treated, and fourteen died. Therefore, the Meiji government brought back the rest of them to Japan in 1871. Since the emigration to Guam ended in failure, it is not generally considered the first Japanese overseas emigration, according to Gaimushō Ryōji Ijūbu, *Waga Kokumin no Kaigai Hatten, Honpen*, 126.
Kozu was buried at sea. Once arrived in Hawaii, the *Gannen-mono* were supposed to work on a three-year contract with salary of four-dollars a month (26 days) for males and three-dollars for female laborers, and food, shelter, medical care as well as round-trip fare were to be paid by the employers.

The Hawaiians gave the *Gannen-mono* hearty welcome upon their arrival at Honolulu. *The Hawaiian Gazette* reported on the *Gannen-mono*:

“At first glance these Japanese looked like good people. They were brimming with vigor and zest. These people from the Empire of Japan did not appear to have visited foreign countries before and strolled through the streets as if they were enjoying the novelty of it all very much…

“In spite of their shabby clothing, they did not appear to be timid in the least. On the whole they created a favorable impression and were greeted warmly by white residents and natives alike. It is hoped that they will turn out to be amiable and useful workers…”

Makino, reporting to Van Reed that the *Gannen-mono* were treated well, described Hawaii as ideal place to live. However, their happy days would not last long once the plantation labor started. Working in the harsh environment for minimum twelve hours a day, there was virtually no distinction between the *Gannen-mono* and slaves.

Particularly, they had hard time communicating with *lunas* (foremen or overseers of plantations, usually Portuguese or Spanish) due to language differences, and


miscommunication often resulted in harsh punishment.\textsuperscript{40} According to a report submitted by Takada and Sekiguchi who visited Hawaii, the \textit{Gannen-mono}’s life in Hawaii, except for a few successful people, was not desirable.\textsuperscript{41} The Meiji government, informed about the terrible mistreatment of the \textit{Gannen-mono} by the planters, had to rescue them in order not to harm Japan’s reputation, and afterwards determined to prohibit emigration strictly for nearly twenty years.

One of the reasons for their failure was that they were mostly ex-samurais and city dwellers who were generally not familiar with labor-intensive agricultural work. In reality, their working conditions were more severe than what Van Reed and Kimura Hanbei had promised earlier. Moreover, most of them could not physically bear the intense heat in Hawaii.\textsuperscript{42}

What upset them most was that they did not get the medical care from employers as they were promised. For example, in Waialua Plantation, sick laborers had to pay for their food and medical care while they could not work.\textsuperscript{43} Due to the lack of sufficient medical care, many Japanese laborers lost their lives. Some discontented Japanese laborers refused to work by pretending to be ill, and then \textit{lunas} frequently abused them by whipping in order to fulfill quota.\textsuperscript{44} Meanwhile, due to a severe depression, one

\textsuperscript{40} United Japanese Society of Hawaii and Okahata, \textit{A History of Japanese in Hawaii}, 50.

\textsuperscript{41} Suzuki, \textit{Nihonjin Dekasegi Imin}, 21.

\textsuperscript{42} United Japanese Society of Hawaii and Okahata, \textit{A History of Japanese in Hawaii}, 49.

\textsuperscript{43} Van Sant, \textit{Pacific Pioneers}, 111.

\textsuperscript{44} Zenichi Kawazoe, \textit{Imin Hyakunen no Nenrin}: “\textit{Ishokujū no Hana Hiraku}” (One Hundred Years of Japanese Immigration) (Honolulu: Imin Hyakunen no Nenrin Kankōkai, 1968), 105.
Japanese laborer committed suicide.  

What was worse, the Japanese laborers could not make enough money with their low wages since the cost of living in Hawaii was too expensive. Therefore, disillusioned with their status quo, the Gannen-mono wished to return to Japan as soon as possible, even before their contracts ended. In response to their subjects’ urgent request for rescue, the new Meiji government needed to take prompt measures. However, they were too busy at the Boshin Civil War to deal with the problems of overseas Japanese who left the country without official permission.

Finally, in September 1869, the Meiji government dispatched the Special Envoy to Hawaii to recall the Japanese citizens. Led by Ueno Kagenori (上野 景範, 1845–1888), a 25-year-old Japanese delegate, the Special Envoy left Yokohama for Hawaii in order to investigate the problems caused by the unauthorized employment of the Japanese arranged by Van Reed. Accompanied by his aide Miwa Hoichi (三輪 輔一), Ueno’s mission was to negotiate the treatment of the Japanese laborers in Hawaii who claimed to

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46 Suzuki, Nihonjin Dekasegi Imin, 21. According to Masayuki Yoshimoto’s “Ueno Kagenori Nikki” (Diary of Kagenori Ueno), Kenkyū Nenpō (The Annual Research Report), no. 11 (1982): 33, Ueno was born into a samurai family in Satsuma-han (present-day Kagoshima prefecture) in Kyushu island. Ueno learned Dutch Studies (蘭学) in Nagasaki for a while, and then switched to study English. From 1864, Ueno taught English at Kaiseijo (開成所, college of Western Studies). In Satsuma-han, Kaiseijo was established to promote the Westernization of military. Dutch Studies means the study of Dutch or of Western sciences through the medium of the Dutch language.

47 “Hawai-to e Shisetsu Saken” (Dispatching An Envoy to Hawaii), Dajōkan Nisshi (Gazette of the Council of State) (Tokyo), September 3, 1869, in Nakayama, ed., Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen Shi, dai 1-kan, Ishin Daihenkakuki, 309.

48 “Chon-mage Zenken Hawaii no Dorei Imin Sukuidasino Shin Shijitsu (Topknot Power, New Historical Fact of Rescuing the Slave-like Immigrants in Hawaii),” Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun, January 9, 1936.
suffer inhumane treatment and violations of labor contracts in the sugar plantations.\textsuperscript{49}

The Foreign Ministry of Japan dispatched Ueno to rescue the fellow countrymen because Ueno was fluent in several foreign languages including English and Chinese.\textsuperscript{50} The Foreign Minister ordered Ueno to accomplish the following:

\begin{quote}
"You are hereby directed to proceed to the Hawaiian Islands on a special mission to bring back the Japanese who had been sent to work in the said Islands by the American, Van Reed…"

"You are being dispatched to Hawaii (also) to investigate the criminality of acts against the Japanese by holding hearings in the Islands; to determine if and how wages and allowances have been paid to the Japanese workers; and also to appoint one of them as manager to confer with government authorities there in all matters pertaining to their welfare."\textsuperscript{51}
\end{quote}

Arriving in Honolulu on December 27, Ueno was ready to take all the \textit{Gannen-mono} with him on the assumption that they were treated like slaves. Ueno made two clear proposals for the resolution to the \textit{Gannen-mono} problems to the Foreign Minister of Hawaii. The first was to send back all Japanese laborers at the Japanese government’s expense. The second was to send back those who were inappropriate for labor in the sugar plantations while the rest of Japanese laborers would fulfill their contracts and then return to Japan at the Hawaiian government’s expenses.\textsuperscript{52} Furthermore, Ueno implied that the resolution to the problems would lead to the establishment of the Japan-Hawaii relations, which the Hawaiian government had longed for.\textsuperscript{53} After the negotiation, the


\textsuperscript{51} Quoted in United Japanese Society of Hawaii and Okahata, \textit{A History of Japanese in Hawaii}, 54.

\textsuperscript{52} Van Sant, \textit{Pacific Pioneers}, 111.

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
minimum wage of the *Gannen-mono* was raised from four dollars a month to fifteen dollars a month. Additionally, the Hawaiian government allowed the Japanese laborers to remain in Hawaii even after their contracts ended. In fact, by the time Ueno arrived, most *dekasegi* laborers appeared to be used to the local living, and only forty people out of 153 returned to Japan with him.⁵⁴ Among the emigrants who decided to stay, some remained in Hawaii, married native Hawaiian women, and became the “true pioneers” of the Japanese American community, or moved to the mainland U.S. for more opportunities. Although Ueno succeeded in solving some problems regarding the treatment of the Japanese laborers, other fundamental problems remained unsolved and plantation’s harsh working conditions continued to distress the *Gannen-mono*.

Nevertheless, contrary to the government’s expectation, considerable numbers of Japanese determined not to return Japan. According to the *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho* (Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy), Tomisaburo, a *Gannen-mono*, represented in December 1871 that sixty *dekasegi* laborers desired to move into the mainland.⁵⁵ After all, forty-six laborers applied for the permission to move to the mainland for acquiring new skills.⁵⁶ Therefore, only twelve or thirteen people desired to return to Japan when their contracts ended.⁵⁷ Encountering different culture and civilization in Hawaii, the

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⁵⁵ Ibid., 453–459.


Gannen-mono actually experienced bunmei kaika (文明開化, “civilization and enlightenment”) earlier than people in Japan did. Like Nakahama Manjirō who studied in New England, the Gannen-mono working in Hawaii for three years acquired English language skills and desired to improve themselves by acquiring skills such as forging, textile, carpentry, dye-work, leatherwork, medical practice, watch making, shipwrighting, seamanship, and rifle production. Therefore, initially aiming to recall the Gannen-mono from Hawaii, the Japanese government came to support their objectives so that they would eventually contribute to national development once they returned to Japan.

Largely due to the efforts of the U.S. Minister to Japan Charles E. De Long, the Kingdom of Hawaii and the Empire of Japan signed the Treaty of Amity and Commerce (日布修好通商条約 nichibei shūkō tsūshō jōyaku) on August 19, 1871, which officially allowed Japanese labor emigration to Hawaii. According to the Article V of the Treaty, “The Japanese Government will place no restrictions whatever upon the employment by Hawaiian subjects of Japanese in any lawful capacity. Japanese in the employ of foreigners may obtain Government passports to go abroad, on application to the Governor of any open port.” Nevertheless, virtually no labor emigration took place...

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58 Gaimushō hensan, Nihon Gaikō Bunsho dai 4-kan (1871), 542–546.


61 Treaty of Amity and Commerce between His Majesty the King, and His Imperial Majesty the Tenno of Japan, August 19, 1871 http://www.hawaiiankingdom.org/treaty_japan_1871.shtml (accessed June 1, 2009); United Japanese Society of Hawaii and Okahata, A History of Japanese in Hawaii, 286.
until 1885 because the Meiji government remained conservative toward sending out Japanese subjects overseas. The government not only required the Hawaiian employers to defray the passages of emigrants but also limited a period of labor contract to one year in October 1872 following the Maria Luz Incident that took place in July. By reducing the contract period from three years to one year, the Japanese government sought to protect its subjects from the slavery-like treatment in the plantations in Hawaii. Then, the Hawaiian employers concluded that it would be unprofitable to bring in Japanese laborers at their expenses for one-year-period of labor.\footnote{Nishimukai, “Transportation of Japanese Emigrants in the Pre-War Period,” 80.}

The Japanese scholars of immigration agree that the Maria Luz Incident played a significant role in putting a brake on the Japanese immigration to Hawaii. To summarize the remarkable event, in July 1872 the diplomatic incident took place between Japan and Peru over the Peruvian cargo ship Maria Luz, carrying more than two hundred Chinese coolies (苦力) who were destined for eight-year labor contract, that arrived at the Port of Yokohama for repairing storm damage.\footnote{Hidekichi Itō, Kotoka no Kanojo no Seikatsu (The Lives of Women under the Red Lamps) (Tokyo: Jitsugyo no Nihon-sha, 1931 and Tokyo: Fuji Shuppan, 1982), 107–132.} Escaping from Maria Luz, a coolie complained how they were taken against their will and inhumanely treated, and asked for the protection of the rest of coolies on the cargo ship.\footnote{Igor R. Saveliev, “Rescuing the Prisoners of the Maria Luz: The Meiji Government and the ‘Coolie Trade,’ 1886–75,” in Turning Points in Japanese History, ed. Bert Edstrom (Richmond: Japan Library, 2002), 75–78.} Then, the acting British consul Robert Grant Watson personally inspected the cargo and found out the first escapee’s queue having been cut off, which demonstrated the actual abuse against coolies had taken
place. According to the letter to the Japanese government on August 3, 1870, Watson asserted that *Maria Luz* was “engaged in the transport of coolies from the coast of China to Peru.” Watson strongly urged the Japanese government to interrogate the Peruvian Captain.

Supported by the United Kingdom and the United States that had already abolished the institution of slavery, the Japanese government decided to take a legal action against Peruvian Captain Ricardo Heriera and the company that owned *Maria Luz*. Governor of Kanagawa, Ōe Taku prosecuted the case. First, Ōe prohibited *Maria Luz* from leaving port of Yokohama, released 231 coolies from the cargo ship, and sent them back to China on September 13, 1872. Then, Ōe tried Captain Heriera and found him guilty; however, he decided not to punish Captain Heriera. Ōe’s decision, based on humanitarianism, was internationally praised by the powerful nations of the West.

In response to the Japanese government taking a firm stand, the Peruvian government censured the human traffic in Japan and protested that Japan’s action was unjust and unacceptable in June 1873. Consequently, the *Maria Luz* Incident developed

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66 Ibid., 415–417.


68 Yamamoto, “Meiji Seifu to ‘Jinken Mondai’: Hawai Dekaseginin Shokan, Nihonjin Shoji Baishu to Maria Luz-go Jiken,” 120.


70 Gaimushō hensan, *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho dai 6-kan* (Documents on Japanese Foreign
into an international problem. The Japanese government, seeking to demonstrate its jurisdiction internationally, could not afford to lose the case. In 1873, as recommended by the U.S. Minister C. E. De Long, Japan and Peru determined to appoint the Russian tsar Alexander II to be an arbitrator. In order to follow the case that would be conducted in English, Ōe sought to hire Hikozō as his interpreter because he did not have a good command of English. On June 13, 1875, the Russian tsar judged in favor of Japan based on humanitarian grounds.

The Meiji Japan then was trying to promote the national prestige and eventually to equalize with the West by repealing unequal treaties. Challenging the extraterritoriality provisions of the unequal treaties, Japan obtained the diplomatic victory over the Maria Luz Incident. This historically significant incident contributed not only to decrease the coolie trade but also to emancipate prostitutes in Japan in October 2, 1872 through the proclamation of Dajōkan Fukoku dai 295-go (政官布告第 295 号, Meiji Council of State’s Ordinance No. 295). It not only emancipated bonded persons but also prohibited buying and selling human beings for any kind of service. Promulgated Policy, vol. 6 (Tokyo: Nihon Gaikō Bunsho Ryōfukai, 1939), 482–495.

71 Joseph Heco and James Murdoch, The Narrative of a Japanese; What He Has Seen and the People He Has Met in the Course of the Last Forty Years, vol. 2 (Yokohama, Japan: Yokohama Printing & Publishing Company, 1894), 172. Since Japan had no diplomatic relations with Peru, the court was to be conducted in English.

72 Yamamoto, “Meiji Seifu to ‘Jinken Mondai’: Hawai Dekaseginin Shokan, Nihonjin Shoji Baishu to Maria Luz-go Jiken,” 121.

73 Lesley Downer, Women of the Pleasure Quarters: The Secret History of the Geisha (New York: Broadway Books, 2001), 97. In order to be righteous and call for justice, it was necessary for the Japanese government to officially prohibit prostitution and provide compulsory education for girls.

74 Dajōkan Fukoku dai 295-go, October 2, 1872; “Jinshin Baibai Kinshi no Rei kudaru” (Promulgation of the Human Buying and Selling Prohibition), Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun.
two months after the closure of the case, the Shōgi Kaihō Rei (娼妓解放令, Ordinance Liberating Prostitute) was more often known as Gyūba Kirihodoki Rei (牛馬きりほどき令, Cattle Release Act) because “it characterized the plight of these women as akin to farm animals being expected to pay off debts.”

In order to upgrade the national prestige, the Meiji leaders could not afford to let the imperial subjects be treated like Chinese coolies or African slaves. Unfortunately, the Ordinance Liberating Prostitutes was not promulgated on humanitarian grounds; therefore, it brought about no social changes to prostitutes after all. Emancipating prostitutes on the pretext that Japan was a civilized nation, the government did not have a concrete policy to protect ex-prostitutes. In fact, many of them, having no families to depend upon, went back to prostitution businesses, this time with a license issued by the government, for sustaining their own lives.

The Japanese government demonstrated its adoption of international laws through the rescue of the Gannen-mono in Hawaii and the Chinese coolies on the Peruvian cargo ship, as Edstrom pointed out in Turning Points in Japanese History. Having jurisdiction over a non-treaty nation’s subject, the Maria Luz Incident helped Japan to

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76 Akemi Kikumura-Yano, Encyclopedia of Japanese Descendants in the Americas: An Illustrated History of the Nikkei (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2002), 32.


“achieve a respected place in the Western state system.” Nevertheless, distressed by solving the problems for the overseas Japanese, the Meiji government further restricted the Japanese emigration to Hawaii. Simultaneously, the Meiji leaders considered it was simply undesirable for modernizing Japan to waste time and energy to deal with issues like the treatment of overseas Japanese emigrants. They feared that the lowly emigrants would ruin Japan’s rising national reputation and place obstacles on Japan’s road to a world power. The government aimed to divert the interests of the *shizoku* (former samurai class) and the impoverished Japanese population from the emigration to Hawaii to the colonization of Hokkaido.\(^79\)

In July 1869, the Meiji government established the *Kaitakushi* (開拓使, “Colonization Board”) in order to alleviate the overpopulation and the massive unemployment problems, especially the displaced *shizoku*\(^80\) who belonged to clans that fought for the Tokugawa Shogunate during the Boshin Civil War (January 1868–May 1869). Siding with the Shogunate, *shizoku* had to live in poverty because the Meiji government confiscated most of their lands and properties. In fact, there were four uprisings by the discontented *shizoku* between 1873 and 1878, especially after the *Taitō Kinshi Rei* (帯刀禁止令, “Prohibition of Carrying a Sword”) in March 1876 that prohibited the *shizoku* to carry swords with them, which was the symbol of the samurai privilege.\(^81\) Significantly, prefectures such as Saga, Kumamoto, Fukuoka, and

\(^79\) Located in the northern part of Japan, Hokkaido is the second largest island of Japan next to Honshu (main island). Importantly, not all the samurai received the rank of *shizoku*; therefore, the majority of the samurai merely became commoners.


\(^81\) Harootunian, “The Economic Rehabilitation of the Samurai in the Early Meiji Period,”
Yamaguchi where the uprisings took place appeared to be the prefectures that sent out the most immigrants. The Meiji government launched a program called shizoku jusan (士族授産, the government aid to samurai) for the first twenty years of Meiji that aimed to “rehabilitate” shizoku into new society by providing them employment and helping them setting up their own business. This program also sought to promote the fukoku kyōhei policy by turning shizoku into a labor force. Therefore, shizoku jusan succeeded in stimulating the nation’s economic development; however, it did not save them from financial difficulties.  

The Dajōkan Nisshi (Gazette of the Council of States) announced as early as July 23, 1869 that the Meiji government began to accept applications for the emigration to Hokkaido (北海道). By August of the year, 1,362 shizoku households applied for the emigration for reestablishing themselves in the undeveloped northern island. However, the emigration was not always voluntary conducted. In fact, the Meiji government coerced many shizoku in the Tohoku region where the Tokugawa loyalists concentrated to colonize Hokkaido. Enomoto Takeaki, a former samurai of the Tokugawa clan who

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led the last Tokugawa resistance to the Imperial Forces during the Boshin Civil War and learned English from Nakahama Manjirō, was the first advocate of the reclamation of Hokkaido (also known as Ezochi). Concerned about the people of the Tokugawa clan after the reduction of its immense property, Enomoto suggested that through the utilization of the extensive land of Hokkaido, the Tokugawa clan could be sustained without causing a financial burden on the new government.\(^{86}\) Sponsored by the Meiji government, the Kaitakushi actively promoted the reclamation and colonization of Hokkaido where virtually only native Ainu people lived.\(^{87}\) Moreover, after the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877,\(^{88}\) the government further concentrated on the colonization venture by annually subsidizing ¥500,000. Since the samurai had the privilege to borrow money from the government, nearly two thousand samurai families emigrated to Hokkaido.\(^{89}\) In the process of colonization of Hokkaido, the emigrants from mainland Japan continued to

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86 As early as 1868, Enomoto attempted to colonize Hokkaido for relieving former Tokugawa supporters. If the government rejected his plan, he was going to appeal to arms. On December 25, 1868, the Tokugawa supporters founded the Republic of Ezo with Enomoto as its President. The Meiji government sent a powerful military forces and put an end to the Republic of Ezo on May 18, 1869, which known as the Battle of Hakodate (箱館戦争) ended the Boshin Civil War, according to Tatsuya Yamamura, *Me kara Uroko no Bakumatsu Ishin: Kurofune Raiko kara Haihan Chiken made Rekishi no Butaiura ga yoku wakaru* (Awakening to the Truth of Bakumatsu Restoration) (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyūjo, 2003), 212–221.

87 Louise Young, *Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 311. Hokkaido was used to be called Ezochi (蝦夷地) which means “land of the Ainu.” Ainu are the native Japanese who were hunter/fisher/gatherer group and worshiped bears.

88 Also known as Seinan Sensō (西南戦争, Southwestern War; fought from January 29 to September 24, 1877). Led by Saigō Takamori (西郷隆盛, 1828–1877), it was a revolt of the Satsuma’s Shimazu clan against the new Meiji government. The former samurai in Satsuma were not satisfied with the direction that the new government was taking. They organized an army to fight against the government. As portrayed in the movie *Last Samurai* (2003), it was a clash between traditional warriors and modernized army consisting of peasantry.

take extensive reclaimed lands of the Ainu by force for facilitating the nation’s economic growth.\(^{90}\)

The colonization of Hokkaido became a model for Japan’s colonial expansionism called *kaigai hatten* (海外発展, literary “overseas development”). In consequence of the influx of Japanese emigrants and numbers of death from disease and starvation, the native Ainu population in Hokkaido constantly decreased. According to Louise Young’s *Japan’s Total Empire* (1998), the Ainu comprised 95 percent of Hokkaido’s total population in 1837. That declined to 22 percent in 1897.\(^{91}\) Especially, before the legalization of labor migration in 1884, the Meiji government had continued to recommend the emigration to Hokkaido rather than overseas emigration for solving the domestic problems and fostering its economy development. As Barbara Rose points out, the government also aimed to facilitate the rapid assimilation of the Ainu into the Japanese population by restraining their language and culture and by forcing them to speak Japanese. Due to the assimilation policy, considerable numbers of Ainu began to wear Japanese clothes, speak Japanese, and volunteered to serve in the war by the early 1895.\(^{92}\) Simultaneously, the government encouraged the development of modern/western farming methods, roads, railroads, and abundant natural resources available in Hokkaido.


\(^{91}\) Young, *Japan’s Total Empire*, 311.

including timber, mineral, coal, and fishing.\textsuperscript{93} As a result, exploited by emigrants from mainland Japan, the Ainu lost their land and were reduced to poverty.\textsuperscript{94} Comparing the Dawes Act of 1887 and the Hokkaido Former Aborigine Protection Act of 1899, Tomita Torao suggests in his article (1989) that what white Americans had done to the Native Americans was nearly identical to what the mainland Japanese had done to the Ainu people regarding the policy of forced assimilation and unfair land distribution.\textsuperscript{95}

Considering a series of policies in the Meiji period, the government was heavily involved in the management of the colonization venture. For example, in order to stimulate the colonization of Hokkaido, the \textit{Kaitakushi} gave subsidies for emigrants. Young illustrates that “Hokkaido became the first venture for the use of emigration as a tool of expansion.”\textsuperscript{96} Additionally, the former Tokugawa loyalist and Meiji statesman, Enomoto Takeaki consistently promoted the development of Hokkaido through diverting the excess labor forces in mainland Japan.\textsuperscript{97}

\textit{Conscription and Draft Evasion}

While the Meiji government struggled to obtain international recognition of Japan’s leadership in Asia, a great number of the Japanese people constantly desired to

\textsuperscript{93} Barbara Rose, \textit{Tsuda Umeko and Women’s Education in Japan} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 10–11.

\textsuperscript{94} “\textquote{Ainu Metsubō no Sakebi}” (Ainu’s Outcry against Downfall), \textit{Kokumin Shimbun} (National News) (Tokyo), January 27, 1895, in Nakayama, ed., \textit{Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen Shi, dai 9-kan, Nisshin Sensō}, 198.


\textsuperscript{96} Young, \textit{Japan’s Total Empire}, 311.

\textsuperscript{97} Enomoto Takeaki also learned English from Nakahama Manjiro (John Mung).
emigrate for many reasons. Besides socioeconomic causes, the Conscription Law of 1873 became another major catalyst for promoting the massive overseas emigration, particularly among the young males who sought to evade the draft. Promulgated on January 10, the Law required all Japanese males at age twenty and over and at least five-feet tall to serve three years in the regular army and four years in the reserves in order to build a modern Japanese military.\(^98\) In addition to the heads of family, heirs, adopted sons, or convicts, those who were physically unfit, handicapped people, government employees, cadets, university students, medical students, and students studying overseas were exempt from the draft.\(^99\) In some cases, men intentionally committed a crime or married into the family of his bride in order to avoid the enlistment.\(^100\)

Moreover, the wealthy families could buy exemptions for their sons by paying ¥270 as *daininryō* (代人料, literary “substitute fee”) to hire someone else in exchange of their sons’ three years of service.\(^101\) This system of exemption called *daininsei* (代人制, “substitute system”) left the enlistment duty for the lower classes, mostly second or third sons of farmers. The government, seeking to raise funds for modernizing its military, allowed the exemption in exchange of money. In those days, some young males extremely feared conscription because it was figuratively called *ketsuzei* (血税, “blood-
tax”) in the Imperial Rescript on Conscription issued on November 28, 1872.\textsuperscript{102}

Borrowing the translation of the Imperial Rescript done by Yasuma Tanaka and Gotarō Ogawa in \textit{Conscription System in Japan} (1921):

Everything in the universe has its tax to pay. The tax a people have to pay is for the national use. A people must then serve their country with a whole heart. The “blood-tax,” so-called among the Western peoples, means their living blood offered to their country. When a country is threatened with dangers, her people must of course suffer from them. Whole hearted service to one’s own country is therefore the basis of preventing calamity…\textsuperscript{103}

Although the government did not mean to collect their living blood, some men misinterpreted that their blood would be sold to foreigners, be used to dye military caps and blankets, or be used to produce red wine.\textsuperscript{104} Therefore, they presumed that they would not be able to return alive once drafted into the military. Such misunderstanding resulted in numbers of riots against the conscription called \textit{ketsuzei ikki} (血税一揆, literary “blood tax” riots). Mainly led by the peasantry as early as March 1873, there were nineteen \textit{ketsuzei ikki}, and all riots except two took place in western Japan just in 1873. The riots in Hōjō-ken (May 26–June 2), Tottori-ken (June 19–23), and Sanuki (June 27–July 6) were the three most devastating riots ever took place in the history of Japan.\textsuperscript{105} Furthermore, the misinterpretation of ketsuzei caused a tragedy in Hyogo prefecture in 1876. A son of a merchant named Umekichi, his wife, and his mother

\textsuperscript{102}“Chōheirei no Shosho” (Imperial Rescript on Conscription), in Yasumasa Nakayama, ed., \textit{Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen Shi, dai 1-kan, Ishin Daihenkakuki}, 519.


\textsuperscript{104}Taiheiyo Sensō Kenkyūkai, “Dainippon Teikoku” ga yoku wakaru hon: 20 punto de rikai suru Meiji Ishin kara Taiheiyo Sensō made (A Book for Understanding the Imperial Japan: 20 points to understand from the Meiji Restoration to the Pacific War) (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyūjo, 2006), 223.

\textsuperscript{105}“ketsuzei ikki,” \textit{Nihon Daihyakka Zensho} (Encyclopedia Nipponica), 1998. CD format.
committed suicide by hanging themselves when Umekichi received the draft notice. His mother and wife tried to persuade his father to buy an exemption for Umekichi; however, he did not allow it. In his desire, Umekichi prefer death rather than having hard time during the military service, and his wife and mother determined to die with him. In 1877, those who escaped and intentionally injured themselves numbered 30,977, according to the annual report of the Japanese Department of War. These cases demonstrated the psychological impact of the conscription on the young males.

In response to a growing number of draft dodgers, the government revised the Conscription Law in 1879, 1883, and 1889 that imposed restrictions on the draft exemption. Meanwhile, the revision in 1879 extended a temporary exemption from the military service to university students and those who lived overseas. Therefore, the young draft dodgers hoped to stay abroad until they turned thirty-seven years old when they became no longer a subject of conscription. As Moriyama pointed out, greater numbers of the heads of families and first sons left for Hawaii as dekasegi laborers and let second sons be the heirs in order to save them from the conscription. In this way, a family could save two sons cleverly. There were approximately 320,000 males subject


107 Rikugunshō (Department of War), Rikugunshō Daini Nenpō (Department of War, Annual Report, Vol. 2) (Tokyo: Rikugunshō, July 1, 1876–June 30, 1877), 38. In order to evade conscription, some even cut off their right index fingers so that they could not pull the trigger.


to enlistment; however, about 287,000 of them skillfully evaded the conscription in 1879. Secretary Fujita Yoshiro (藤田好郎) in the Japanese consulate in San Francisco reported that “there were about 4,000 Japanese residing in the Pacific Coastal regions in the 1880s, and most of them appeared to be draft dodgers who engaged in domestic work and went to school in the daytime.” It indicated that in the 1880s, most Japanese in the West Coast were *dekasegi-shosei* (student laborers).

In order to increase the enlistment, the government restricted the number of exemptions including *daininsei* in 1883. Then, the revision of 1889 deprived all exemptions from conscription except for very limited numbers of temporary exemption. Thereafter, only the disabled people became exempted from enlistment. If a person who was subject to conscription dodged the draft unlawfully, one could be sentenced to less than a year of imprisonment, fined at least three yen, and drafted without exception. Nevertheless, the young men strived to evade the conscription by pretending to be the disabled people or transferring their domiciles to either Hokkaido or Hawaii, 1885–1894,” in *Labor Immigration under Capitalism: Asian Workers in the United States*, eds. Lucie Cheng and Edna Bonacich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 257.


113 Ōe, *Chōheisei*, 84–85.
Okinawa, in which the Conscription Law was not effective until 1896 and 1898 respectively.\textsuperscript{114} Seeking to utilize the young men in Hokkaido and Okinawa for the development of the regions, the Japanese government did not coerced conscription until much later. Meanwhile, traditional Japanese considered that going to an unknown land was more frightening than engaging in a combat in the enemy’s land. Not knowing about the United States, they imagined “giants and cannibalistic tribes inhabited there.”\textsuperscript{115} In general, the conservative Japanese tended to remain in Japan whereas the young enthusiastic Japanese including some yakuza sought overseas emigration to get rich in a short period.

Analyzing the dates and locations of the submission of applications for the temporary exemption, Kodama tried to examines relations between the immigration and the draft evasion. As Kodama argued, the Article 21 of the revision of Conscriptiion Law in 1889 allowed those who studying abroad to be temporary exempt from enlistment up to twenty-six years old and maximum for seven years if they filed an application for temporary exemption.\textsuperscript{116} Stretching the meaning of the Article 21, the Japanese emigrant laborers began to apply for temporary exemption from enlistment. Taking three most immigrant producing prefectures of Hiroshima Fukuoka, and Yamaguchi as examples,

\textsuperscript{114} Ōe, \textit{Chōheisei}, 109. In 1892, Natsume Šōseki (夏目 漱石, 1867–1916), a renowned novelist, was one of those who transferred his domicile from Tokyo to Hokkaido, in which he had never resided, to evade conscription. His pen name “Šōseki” means transfer of registered domicile. When the revision of the Conscription Law was promulgated in 1889, Natsume was a student at Tokyo Imperial University. Nevertheless, the revision no longer allowed the university students to be exempted, according to Atsushi Kawai, \textit{Me kara Uroko no Taiheiyō Sensō} (Awakening to the Truth of the Pacific War) (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyūjo, 2002), 202.


\textsuperscript{116} Kodama, \textit{Nihon Iminshi Kenkyū Josetsu}, 529–530.
the number of applicants for the temporary exemption continued to grow, especially after
the First Sino-Japanese War as shown in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2: Extension of Temporary Exemption from Conscription in
Hiroshima, Fukuoka, and Yamaguchi Prefectures, 1898–1912

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Hiroshima</th>
<th></th>
<th>Fukuoka</th>
<th></th>
<th>Yamaguchi</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Index (%)</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Index (%)</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Index (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>3,062</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2,267</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1,768</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>4,126</td>
<td>134.7</td>
<td>2,858</td>
<td>126.1</td>
<td>2,846</td>
<td>160.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>4,279</td>
<td>139.7</td>
<td>3,227</td>
<td>142.3</td>
<td>3,099</td>
<td>175.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>5,706</td>
<td>186.3</td>
<td>3,538</td>
<td>156.1</td>
<td>4,251</td>
<td>240.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>7,306</td>
<td>238.6</td>
<td>4,239</td>
<td>187.0</td>
<td>5,041</td>
<td>285.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>8,624</td>
<td>281.6</td>
<td>5,104</td>
<td>225.1</td>
<td>5,570</td>
<td>315.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>9,868</td>
<td>322.3</td>
<td>5,393</td>
<td>237.9</td>
<td>6,063</td>
<td>342.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>10,047</td>
<td>328.1</td>
<td>5,538</td>
<td>244.3</td>
<td>6,026</td>
<td>340.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Masaaki Kodama, *Nihon Iminshi Kenkyū Josetsu* (An Introduction to the History of

The applicants reached its peak in 1911 numbering more than three times as many
as the figures recorded in 1898.\(^{117}\) According to Kodama, the impoverished counties in
Hiroshima such as Age, Saeki, and Asa, tended to record higher numbers of the extension
of temporary exemption. These three counties indeed had the largest numbers of
residents living abroad.\(^{118}\) While the upper class Japanese began to feel a sense of duty
toward the conscription by the turn of the century, the sons of the lower-class families
who suffered family deficit felt less sense of duty to the conscription duty, and thus they


\(^{118}\) Ibid., 533–534.
were attracted to America where they could earn significantly higher wages. For the rural families, the remittance and savings of the emigrants were essential for sustaining their lives as well as paying off their debt. According to Takao Kitamura who studied the motivation, working conditions, and marriage and family problems of the Japanese Issei immigrants, Ōta Kyūgo from Fukuoka prefecture was one of those who left the country for evading conscription. In 1916, after taking the physical exam for conscription, Ōta left Japan for Hawaii and worked for one dollar a day in the sugar plantation in Maui where his parents had already worked. In the post-World War I period, sugar plantation laborers earned as much as five to six dollars a day.119

Nevertheless, not all young Japanese left Japan for merely dodging draft. Some left Japan in hope of contributing to the enrichment of the country, particularly after the Sangoku Kanshō (三国干渉, Tripartite Intervention—Russia, France, and Germany forced Japan to return the Liaodong Peninsula in China which Japan gained according to the Treaty of Shimonoseki that ended the First Sino-Japanese War.)120 Significantly, the returning of the Liaodong Peninsula by coercion was a great humiliation and disgrace for Japan, and the Tripartite Intervention resulted in stimulating the sense of duty and nationalism among the Japanese people. It was the burgeoning racial consciousness and nationalism installed from above that mobilized the Japanese toward the accelerated process of fukoku kyōhei and to be the itto-koku. In response to the Tripartite

Intervention, Terao Tōru (寺尾亨, 1859–1925), an intellectual, doctor of law, and


120 Kaikoku Hyakunen Kinen Bunka Jigyōkai, Nichibei Bunka Kōshōshi, dai 5-kan: Ijū-hen, 86.

106
advocate of pan-Asianism, described that “current world is the racial contest.”

Ironically, so-called pan-Asianism that advocated the liberation of Asia from the Western colonial rules unfortunately became propaganda to justify the Japan’s territorial expansion in Asia.

*Labor Demand on Sugar Plantations in Hawaii*

Meanwhile, in Hawaii the production of sugar boosted the Hawaiian economy toward the end of the nineteenth century. According to the report of the U.S. Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce in 1917, Hawaii produced 722 tons of sugar in 1860 and increased to 13,000 tons in 1876, a 1,800 percent increase. Therefore, the Hawaiian government was desperate to secure labor by any means. The signing of the Reciprocity Treaty of 1875 between the Hawaiian Kingdom and the United States that removed duties on sugar further stimulated the sugar industry in Hawaii. The

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121 Tōru Terao, “Nisshin Sensō chū no Ōshū Rekkoku” (European Powers during the Sino-Japanese War), Taiyō 2, no. 7 (April 5, 1896): 11. Terao was one of seven professors at Tokyo Imperial University who called for the war with Russia, according to “Terao Toru,” in Masaaki Ueda, et al., Kodansha Nihon Jinmei Daijiten (Kodansha Japanese Biographical Dictionary) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2001).


production of sugar continued to increase and reached 31,792 tons in 1880.\textsuperscript{124} Table 3.3 illustrates how the production of sugar in Hawaii increased after the Reciprocity Treaty. The Treaty guaranteed a duty-free market for the Hawaiian sugar, and the United States gained special economic privileges in Hawaii.

\textbf{Table 3.3: Production of Sugar in Hawaii, 1860–1885}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1860</th>
<th>1865</th>
<th>1870</th>
<th>1875</th>
<th>1880</th>
<th>1885</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ton</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>7,659</td>
<td>9,392</td>
<td>12,540</td>
<td>31,792</td>
<td>85,695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth Rate Index</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1339.0</td>
<td>1642.0</td>
<td>2192.3</td>
<td>5558.4</td>
<td>149816.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In order to attract emigrants to Hawaii following the booming of the sugar industry, the Legislature of the Hawaiian Kingdom allocated the enormous funds for recruiting laborers from all over the world, including the United States, China, Portugal, Norway, Germany, Italy, India, Malaysia, and Australia. Accordingly, the Legislature decided to spend $100,000 from 1880 to 1882; $500,000 from 1882 to 1884; and $390,000 from 1884 to 1886 for encouraging the labor migration.\textsuperscript{125}

Owing to the Legislature’s eager attempt to recruit laborers, a considerable number of Chinese began to enter Hawaii in the initial stage. As early as 1852, a small


group of Chinese laborers arrived in Hawaii.\textsuperscript{126} The number of Chinese in Hawaii grew from 1,200 in 1866 to 2,000 in 1872, and reached as many as 18,000 by 1884, which comprised over 20 percent of the entire Hawaiian population.\textsuperscript{127} Although these Chinese were great labor force due to their diligence and higher availability at lower wages, they were not always considered beneficial to the Hawaiian industries.\textsuperscript{128} For example, they brought diseases such as smallpox, leprosy, and introduced the smoking of opium into Hawaii.\textsuperscript{129} Particularly, the habit of smoking opium provoked strong antipathy among the Hawaiian people toward the Chinese immigrants. In addition, as soon as their contracts ended, they tended to move to cities and set up businesses. Furthermore, the Hawaiian complained that the Chinese immigrants, forming ethnic community, tended not to assimilate into the local population.\textsuperscript{130} Therefore, the Hawaiians viewed the Chinese laborers posing a threat to the native population in social and economic terms.\textsuperscript{131} These facts inevitably led to a rise of anti-Chinese sentiment in Hawaii and eventually prohibited the entry of the Chinese without passports into Hawaii after 1886.\textsuperscript{132}


\textsuperscript{130} Kodama, \textit{Nihon Inminshi Kenkyū Josetsu}, 4.

\textsuperscript{131} Gaimushō Ryōji Ijūbu, \textit{Waga Kokumin no Kaigai Hatten, Honpen}, 128.

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid.
Therefore, the Hawaiian government, aiming to replace Chinese laborers, was desperate to attract cheap and decent laborers to operate the vast sugar plantations—the core of Hawaiian economy.

The recruitment of the Japanese laborers appeared to be the best solution for the problems that Hawaii had encountered; a shortage of labor and sharp decrease in native population. In fact, there were some decisive reasons for the Hawaiian government to favor the Japanese laborers, according to Kodama’s study. First, it became quite difficult for the Hawaiian government to recruit laborers from China largely due to a strong anti-Chinese sentiment and partly due to the U.S. enactment of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. In 1886, the Hawaiian Cabinet enacted the Chinese Exclusion Act in order to stop the influx of Chinese via the United States, which shut off the planters’ access to Chinese laborers. Second, the Hawaiian government could not afford to recruit more laborers from Portugal. The Hawaiian society favored Portuguese laborers; however, it cost too much to bring Portuguese laborers accompanied by their families. Third, the government had to give up recruiting laborers from Polynesia because of the strong objections from Britain, France, and Germany. Fourth, the government failed to bring laborers from India due to the British colonial regulations and from Indonesia due to the Dutch objection.133

Judging from these limitations, the recruitment of Japanese laborers seemed the only option available for the Hawaiian government to meet the rapidly growing labor demands on sugar plantations. In fact, Japan then was the only country in Asia that was not under the colonial rule. Moreover, bringing laborers from Japan was much cheaper, and they would work honestly for lower wages. Furthermore, the Hawaiian employers,

based on their observation of the *Gannen-mono*, believed that the Japanese would be easily assimilated into the Hawaiian population. In addition, “after years of struggling against strikes and other turbulent factions among the Chinese,” the employers desired to replace the Chinese plantation laborers with the Japanese with relatively low wages.

In 1881, the Hawaiian King David Kalakaua (b. 1838–1891, r. 1874–1891) and his entourage arrived in Tokyo on March 4 during a tour around the world, and entreated Emperor Meiji to send immigrants to Hawaii in order to relieve the shortage of laborers on the sugar plantations. King Kalakaua even offered his niece, Princess Kaiulani (1875–1899) to be a fiancée of a Japan’s Prince Higashifushimi Yoshihito (東伏見宮依仁親王, 1867–1922) for the formation of a royal alliance between the Hawaiian Kingdom and Japan. The following year, the Hawaiian government dispatched John Makini Kapena (1842–1884) as special envoy to Japan to ask the Japanese government permission to carry out the large-scale Japanese labor emigration to Hawaii. The Hawaiian government appointed Kapena because he had been a member of the King’s Cabinet as well as a great governor of Maui. Arriving in Tokyo, Kapena made a speech at a dinner for promoting the closer relationship between the Hawaiian Kingdom and Japan:

> “His Majesty [Kalakaua] believes that the Japanese and Hawaiians spring from one cognate race and this enhances his love for you. He hopes that our people will more and

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136 Ralph Simpson Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, 1874–1893: The Kalakaua Dynasty* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1967), 230. King Kalakaua’s proposal did not turn into reality because Prince Higashifushimi Yoshihito was arranged to marry Kaneko Iwakura, daughter of Tomomi Iwakura (1825–1883) who was the key figure in the Meiji Restoration.

more be brought closer together in a common brotherhood. Hawaii holds out her loving hand and heart to Japan and desires that Your People may come and cast in their lots with ours and repeople our Island Home — with a race which is sent to us by His Imperial Majesty, Your government and people may blend with ours and produce a new and vigorous nation making our land the garden spot of the Eastern Pacific, as your beautiful and glorious county is of the Western.”

During his meeting with Inoue Kaoru, Kapena delivered terms and conditions for Japanese immigration offered by the Hawaiian government. According to the ambassador, the government indicated that the Japanese migrants in Hawaii would be granted the status of citizen, be paid transportation costs, and have no restrictions when making a labor contract. It seemed quite reasonable, but the Japanese government declined the offer due to the previous troublesome experience of the issue of *Gannen-mono*.

Meanwhile in Japan, not only samurais, but also many farmers suffered heavy burdens in the post-Restoration era. The transition from the feudal system to modernization resulted in the devastation of national finances and caused a crisis in the economy. In order to reduce the internal financial pressure, the Meiji government launched the Land Tax Reform in 1873 that conceded the right of private land ownership for the first time and drastically changed the traditional land taxation system. Under the traditional system, farmers paid their taxes in the form of crops based on their actual crop yield. However, according to the Land Tax Reform, taxpayers paid their taxes in

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cash based on the cash value of their land. The Meiji government was able to secure steady tax revenue by obliging landowners to pay the tax fixed at 3 percent of their land value, instead of crop yield. While the government successfully increased revenue for pursuing industrialization, the new radical tax system imposed a heavy burden on the rural population, particularly the rice-growing prefectures.

In order to decrease the national debt and to establish a strong financial base, the government imposed higher land taxes for increasing regular tax revenues. In 1875, 88.3 percent of the revenue came from the land tax, 88.1 percent in 1876, and 83.9 percent in 1877. Consequently, the heavy land taxation resulted in a large number of uprisings by the distressed peasantry against the government that included the Ise Bodo (伊勢暴動, Ise Riot) in 1876. Fearing further serious unrests, the government lowered the 3 percent fixed land tax to 2.5 percent in January 1877. Furthermore, due to the last samurai uprising of Satsuma Rebellion (1877), the total amount of paper money issued in 1881 amounted to over ¥150,000,000, while the national specie reserves were only ¥7,000,000. The overprinting of money caused serious inflation, and the price of rice doubled within five years between 1876 and 1881.

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142 Suzuki, *Nihonjin Dekasegi Imin*, 27.

143 Starting on December 19, 1876, the Ise Riot was a large scale peasant uprising in the Ise province (present-day Mie prefecture), which spread across both Gifu and Aichi prefectures.


The Finance Minister, Matsukata Masayoshi (松方正義, 1835–1924) introduced a financial policy in 1881 called “Matsukata Deflation” (1881–1884). Aiming at withdrawal of inconvertible notes and increase of revenue by imposing higher taxes, the “Matsukata Deflation” drastically dropped the price of rice in a short period. By 1884, the decline had lowered the price of rice below the 1874 level, which undercut farmers’ ability to survive economically. Subsequently, a series of peasant uprisings resulted. Due to the “Matsukata Deflation,” a great number of farmers lost their lands because they failed to pay their land taxes, and thus became unemployed or tenant farmers if possible. As a result, 40 percent of farmers became tenant farmers by 1892. Moreover, in the years between 1884 and 1886, 18.9 percent of the land in Hiroshima was sold. Selling their lands was the only way for them to pay their land taxes. As the farmers continued to sell their lands, a class of large landowners emerged. According to the report of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce in 1888, 55 percent of farmers owned less than eight tan of land, and approximately 2,000,000 farming households owned less than five tan of land. It was said that 70 percent of farmers in Hiroshima, 66 percent in Okayama, 550.

146 Born into a samurai family in Satsuma-han (domain), Matsukata became governor of Hita (present day Oita prefecture) and then came up to Tokyo in 1871 for drafting the Land Tax Reform (1873-1881). Matsukata later served as Prime Minister of Japan from May 1891 to August 1892, and from September 1896 to January 1898 while serving concurrently as Finance Minister. In 1882, Matsukata established the Bank of Japan (日本銀行).


and 61 percent in Yamaguchi were petty farmers in 1888. Meanwhile, in Yamaguchi prefecture, the price of one-koku of salt sharply dropped from ¥1.68 in 1880 to ¥0.91 in 1884, and simultaneously the price of sake dropped from ¥17.13 to ¥14.21.

A great number of businesses that had depended on governmental support folded subsequently. Between the years 1883 and 1890, more than 367,000 peasants lost their lands because they could not pay land taxes. In addition, mechanization of farming resulted in creating excess tenant farmers. Most of the unemployed and the landless went to cities in search of jobs, but they had very slight chances of finding work because Japan at that time was still undergoing the process of industrialization. The rapid increase of impoverished population caused a number of serious social problems. Suffering extreme poverty, some became beggars, and others committed burglary. In order to sustain a minimum standard of living, the poor farming households often sold their daughters to brothels. The Land Tax Reform of 1873 and other programs of industrialization displaced a great number of rural Japanese women who left “home for work almost as commonly as men, and this pattern became increasingly widespread as the Meiji

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149 Tsurutani, *Amerika Seibū Kaitaku to Nihonjin*, 40. 1 tan equals to 0.2451 acres.


government accelerated modern capitalistic development."156 Under the circumstances, overseas emigration attracted both displaced rural men and women who sought to pay off their family debts and hoped to establish themselves in Japan someday.

According to Japanese tradition and later by the Meiji Civil Code, the eldest sons had rights to inherit their houses; however, second or third sons had to find their own ways to make a living. Marrying into a family with only daughters, a practice of becoming muko-yōshi (婿養子, adopted son-in-law), was one of the options they had for establishing their own households. If they were farmers, keeping the land was especially crucial. Therefore, many second or third sons decided to emigrate to survive. These farmers, having nothing to lose, were ready to take any kinds of job to survive. They did not care whether it was in domestic or foreign lands so long as they could get jobs. Clearly, emigration seemed quite attractive to many rural Japanese.

In the devastating situation, before the plan for emigration to Hawaii putting into effect, considerable numbers of rural Japanese determined to migrate to Hokkaido, especially after 1882.157 For instance, following a severe storm and flood damage in 1884, 674 people from Yamaguchi prefectures migrated to Hokkaido in 1894, and 935 people in 1895.158 Kumamoto prefecture also suffered from the natural disaster of 1884 that caused 30 to 40 percent of a crop failure.159 Additionally, there were crop failures in


157 The migration to Hokkaido eventually declined when the recruitment for the kanyaku imin (government-contracted immigration) began in 1885.

158 Kodama, Nihon Iminshi Kenkyū Josetsu, 13.

159 Kumamoto Joshi Daigaku. Meiji no Kumamoto (Kumamoto during Meiji). Kumamoto-ken shiryō Shūsei, 12. Tokyo: Kokusho Kankōkai, 1985; Kodama, Nihon Iminshi
1897, 1902, 1905, and 1910 in Japan.  

Witnessing the devastating aftermath of the “Matsukata Deflation” followed by a serious natural disaster, the Japanese government finally came to realize that emigration was an option that could facilitate the emergence from the post-restoration turbulent period. In April 1884, Curtis P. Iaukea, who was King Kalakaua’s Grand Chamberlain, met with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Count Inoue Kaoru, for further negotiations to send migrants to Hawaii. The terms offered by Iaukea were:

1. The Hawaiian government would pay for transportation costs of farm laborers, domestic servants, and their wives and children. However, the Hawaiian government agent would decide who to migrate.

2. It is not necessary for the migrants to sign contracts before their passage. In addition, they would not have any obligation for signing contracts after arriving in Hawaii. The government would set the wage of immigrants and guarantee jobs at that wage.

3. The government would provide food and shelter for migrants until they could find jobs or make a living.

4. In addition, if the migrants wished, the government would guarantee to find jobs for their wives.

Although Inoue was against concluding a treaty with Hawaii, he expressed no opposition to the terms offered by the Hawaiian government. Inoue envisioned that Japanese mass emigration to Hawaii would stimulate the export of Japanese goods and become a source of foreign exchange. Then, accompanied by Iaukea, Robert Walker Irwin (1844–

Kenkyū Josetsu, 17.

160 Tsurutani, Amerika Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin, 39. According to Tsurutani, damaged from cold weather, Miyagi prefecture’s agricultural output reduced to 20 percent of a normal crop in 1905.


who was the Hawaii’s Consul General in Japan and a close friend of Inoue visited Hawaii and met two Gannen-mono sill residing in Hawaii, Miura Tōkichi (三浦藤吉) and Yoshida Katsuzaburō (吉田勝三郎). After listening to the experiences of Miura and Yoshida, Irwin returned to Japan with 15-year-old Ozawa Itoko (小沢イト子) who was a daughter of a Gannen-mono named Ozawa Kintarō (小沢金太郎) and the second Nisei (second-generation Japanese) born in Hawaii. Convinced by the Hawaiian government’s eagerness to obtain laborers with the help of Irwin (now appointed as Special Commissioner and Special Agent of the Hawaiian Bureau of Immigration), both governments of Japan and Hawaii finally reached an agreement on June 30, 1884.

Indeed, the Meiji government determined to encourage emigration not only as a means of alleviating poverty and poor standard of living in rural areas by providing

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163 According to Japan America Society of Greater Philadelphia, Robert Walker Irwin was born in Copenhagen, Denmark as the third son of William Wallace Irwin (1803–1856) who was a Pennsylvania representative to the U.S. Congress, and Sophia Arabella Bache who was a fourth direct descendant of Benjamin Franklin (1706–1790). The Irwins moved to Philadelphia in 1850. In 1866, Irwin came to Yokohama to work for an American trading firm, Walsh, Hall and Company, and served as a deputy of Pacific Mail Steamship Company. Then, Irwin helped Count Inoue Kaoru start the precursor of the Mitsui Trading Company in 1873. In 1876, during the Philadelphia Centennial Exposition, Irwin arranged a trip to the United States for Inoue and his family, and twenty others. In 1880, Irwin succeeded Harlan P. Lillibridge as Hawaiian consul general at Tokyo. Arranged by his best friend Inoue, Irwin married Takechi Iki (武智イキ), an adopted daughter of a samurai family, in 1882. This marriage is known to be the first mixed marriage in the history of U.S.-Japan relations. In 1883, Irwin became General Manager of Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha (KUK共同運輸会社, Cooperative Transport Company), a shipping company primarily owned by Mitsui and funded by the Japanese government. According to David Shavit’s The United States in Asia: A Historical Dictionary (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 261, Irwin founded the Formosa Sugar Manufacturing Company in 1900, and became a naturalized Japanese citizen.

164 Kaikoku Hyakunen Kinen Bunka Jigyōkai, Nichibei Bunka Kōshōshi, dai 5-kan: Ijūhen, 358. The first Nisei was Itoko’s elder brother, Yōtarō (洋太郎).

165 Ibid., 358–359.
employment but also as a way of securing foreign currency through remittances from
Japanese in Hawaii that could be used for enriching and militarily strengthening the
country. Moreover, the government expected the returnees to bring back the expertise of
modern farming method as well as science and technology that could facilitate the
modernization of the country.\textsuperscript{166} The government, finding emigration beneficial to
Japan’s economic and technological development, finally allowed the labor migration to
Hawaii.\textsuperscript{167}

In consequence, soon after the governments of Japan and the Kingdom of Hawaii
signed an agreement in 1884, the number of migrants to Hokkaido came to decline
sharply. The recruitment for emigration to Hawaii began in 1885. The impoverished
rural Japanese preferred the emigration to Hawaii because their passage was paid by the
employers in the name of the Hawaiian government, and they could earn much higher
wages.

Overpopulation Problem and Kaigai Hatten

Significantly, after the 1890s the Meiji leaders began to view the Japanese
overseas emigration within a context of Japan’s colonial expansion called \textit{kaigai hatten}
“rather than in terms of family economics or personal opportunities.”\textsuperscript{168} Following the
opening of Japan, the influx of Western ideas and values facilitated the development of
“colonialist thought” among the Meiji intellectuals who were sympathizers of Malthusian

\textsuperscript{166} Franklin S. Odo and Kazuko Shinoto, \textit{Zusetsu Hawai Nihonjinshi, 1885–1924} (A

\textsuperscript{167} Gaimushō Ryōji Ijūbu, \textit{Waga Kokumin no Kaigai Hatten, Honpen}, 6.

theory of population. They argued that in order to prevent the coming of the nation’s overpopulation problem as well as to facilitate Japanese “overseas development,” the Japanese should immigrate overseas. Represented in Fukuzawa Yukichi’s editorials in *Jiji Shinpō* (時事新報, “Current Events”), the Meiji intellectuals strongly advocated the imitation of the Western model of colonizing Asian countries. Stimulated by the theory that promoted modernization and imperialism such as “Datsua Nyūō,” the Japanese in the Meiji period began to have a prejudice against Asian countries. Although initiated by the intellectuals, their biased view of Asia eventually spread to all classes of Japanese that would continue until the end of World War II.

Gaining popularity after the 1890s, this “colonialist thought” became basis for the establishment of the *Shokumin Kyōkai* (殖民協会, Colonization Society) by a former Minister of Foreign Affairs and sympathizer of the *shizoku*, Enomoto Takeaki in 1893 that promoted the Japanese labor emigration and settlement. Concerned about the growing population problem in rural Japan, Enomoto advocated the “overseas development of Japanese ‘colonies’ through emigration.” Furthermore, Enomoto argued that the emigration business would boost the shipping industry, promote export,

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169 Named after the British economist Thomas Malthus (1766–1834), Malthusian theory of population asserted that “population would increase at a geometric rate and the food supply at an arithmetic rate,” according to his *An Essay on the Principle of Population* (London, 1789).


and stimulate industry and commerce. In fact, the second president of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha (日本郵船会社, Japan Mail Steamship Company), Yoshikawa Taijirō was a member of the Shokumin Kyōkai. As Kumei Teruko pointed out, by nationalizing the emigration venture, the Shokumin Kyōkai aimed to pursue the policy of fukoku kyōhei through the economic expansion and the reinforcement of military strength. Consequently, “colonialist thought” and the development of shipping industry and overseas routes led to the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War in August 1894 when Japan’s interest in Korea came into conflict with China’s interest. Within a few decades after the Meiji Restoration, adopting Western values and practices, Japan had drastically changed its nature in political, social, and economic arena as well as its cultural values. Seeking to rise to be a world power, the Meiji government had constantly absorbed knowledge of Western weaponry and institutions; therefore, Japan was able to transform from a feudal society into a modern nation.

Simultaneously, the growing problems of overpopulation and unemployment, particularly after the First Sino-Japanese War, resulted in “pushing” numerous rural Japanese for overseas emigration. In fact, the overseas emigration played an important role in alleviating the government’s main concern with such socioeconomic problems.

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174 Gaimushō Ryōji Ijūbu, Waga Kokumin no Kaigai Hatten, Honpen, 6.

175 Kumei, Gaikokujin o Meguru Shakaishi, 30.

176 Ibid.

177 Qing China and Meiji Japan declared war against each other on August 1, 1894, over the control of Korea.

178 According to Naikaku Tōkei-kyoku, Meiji Gonen iko Waga Kuni no Jinko (Japanese Population after 1872), the population of Japan in 1896 was 42,708,264. It was only one-fourth of today’s population in Japan.
that tended to occur in the initial process of modernization. The increase in agricultural output, industrialization, economic development, improvement in standards of living due to the higher income level and public health had contributed to the rapid population growth after the Meiji Restoration. \footnote{Japanese population increased drastically because of a widespread modern medical science and the concept of sanitation among the public that resulted in lowering the mortality rate, according to “Meiji iko no Nihon no Jinkō no Henka” (Change in the Population of Japan since the Meiji Period), in Naikakufu (Cabinet Office), Shōshika Shakai Hakusho, Heisei 16-nen ban (White Paper on the Birthrate-Declining Society, 2004 edition) (Tokyo: Gyōsei, 2004), http://www8.cao.go.jp/shoushi/whitepaper/w-2004/pdf-h/pdf/g1010100.pdf (accessed November 20, 2009).} In 1872, Japanese had a population of 34,800,000. It increased to 46,130,000 in 1904, and finally reached 50,000,000 in 1912. \footnote{Naikaku Tōkei-kyoku, \textit{Meiji Gonen iko Waga Kuni no Jinko} (Japanese Population after 1872) (Tokyo: Tokyo Tōkei Kyōkai, 1930).} In 1936, in less than seventy years after the Meiji Restoration, the population of Japan had doubled, recording 69,250,000.

Notably, the population growth rate between 1872 and 1936 marked on average 1 percent annually. \footnote{“Meiji iko no Nihon no Jinkō no Henka”, in Naikakufu, \textit{Shōshika Shakai Hakusho, Heisei 16-nen ban}; Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter and G. C. Allen, \textit{The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo, 1930–1940: Population, Raw Materials and Industry} (New York: Macmillan Company, 1940), 48.} Table 3.4 shows that the population growth rate marked 1.05 percent in 1884 when the Japanese government lifted a ban on overseas emigration. \footnote{Naikaku Tokei-kyoku (Cabinet Statistical Bureau), \textit{Meiji Gonen iko Waga Kuni no Jinko} (Japanese Population after 1872) (Tokyo: Tokyo Tokei Kyōkai, 1930).} Therefore, it was no exaggeration to say that the Japanese concern on immigration had largely centered on the population problem, which “pushed” considerable numbers of Japanese to leave their country. \footnote{Gaimushō Ryōji Ijūbu, \textit{Waga Kokumin no Kaigai Hatten, Honpen}, 6.}
Table 3.4: Population Estimates of Japan, 1872–1885

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population (1,000)</th>
<th>Population Increase (1,000)</th>
<th>Population Growth Rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Male Female</td>
<td>Total Natural Increase</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1872</td>
<td>34,806 17,666 17,140</td>
<td>– –</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1873</td>
<td>34,985 17,755 17,230</td>
<td>179 174</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>35,154 17,835 17,319</td>
<td>169 167</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>35,316 17,913 17,403</td>
<td>162 245</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>35,555 18,030 17,525</td>
<td>239 323</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1877</td>
<td>35,870 18,187 17,683</td>
<td>315 304</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>36,166 18,327 17,839</td>
<td>296 307</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>36,464 18,472 17,992</td>
<td>298 196</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>36,649 18,559 18,090</td>
<td>185 326</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>36,965 18,712 18,253</td>
<td>316 304</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>37,259 18,854 18,405</td>
<td>294 320</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td>37,569 19,006 18,563</td>
<td>310 409</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>37,962 19,199 18,763</td>
<td>393 360</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>38,313 19,368 18,945</td>
<td>351 241</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Naikaku Tōkei-kyoku (Cabinet Statistical Bureau), Meiji Gonen iko Waga Kuni no Jinko (Japanese Population after 1872) (Tokyo: Tokyo Tōkei Kyōkai, 1930). The table illustrates the estimated population at the beginning of the year, including the Japanese in Okinawa, Ogasawara, Chishima in addition to Japanese in forty-seven prefectures. It also included the soldiers and civilian war workers overseas, but not including foreigners residing in Japan.

The population of Japan has transformed throughout the significant historical events as the Figure 3.1 shows. As an economic and demographic historian Kitō Hiroshi (2002) points out, due to the introduction of rice cultivation in the Yayoi Period (300 BC to 300 AD), the population had constantly increased and by the beginning of the Heian Period, it numbered ten times as many as the Yayoi Period. Next, from the fifteenth century and up until the mid-eighteenth century, the population rapidly increased due to
the development of the market economy. As a result, the population tripled in the first one hundred years of the Tokugawa Period.\textsuperscript{184} According to another economic and demographic historian Hayami Akira and Kitō’s study in 2002, “after 1600 the population of Japan increased by at least 2.6 times, if not 3.9 times over a 120-year period.”\textsuperscript{185}

On the other hand, as Kitō’s study (2000) points out, the population of Japan stagnated during the latter half of the Tokugawa Period. The causes of the stagnation, according to Kitō, were famine, natural disaster, epidemic, late marriage, culling, and abortion.\textsuperscript{186} The number of famines, epidemics, and natural disaster marked as many as seventy times during the last 125 years of the Tokugawa Period.\textsuperscript{187} Meanwhile, a British economist Angus Maddison explained that the low fertility and the improvement in life expectancy caused the stagnation of population growth.\textsuperscript{188} Then, as clearly shown in the Figure 3.1, the Japanese population began to grow at a significant pace from the time of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{184} Hiroshi Kitō, \textit{Kankyō Senshinkoku Edo} (Environmentally Advanced Nation, Edo) (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyūjo, 2002).
\item \textsuperscript{186} Hiroshi Kitō, “Bakumatsu · Meiji Shoki no Jinko Seicho” (Population Growth of Late Tokugawa and Early Meiji Era), \textit{Sophia Economic Review} 28, no. 1 (1981): 61–73; idem, \textit{Jinko kara yomu Nihon no Rekishi} (Interpreting Japanese History from Demographics) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2000). Kitō argues that the population of Japan in the latter half of the Tokugawa Period remained about 30,000,000.
\item \textsuperscript{188} Angus Maddison, \textit{The World Economy}, vol. 1. Development Center Studies (Paris, France: Development Centre of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2006), 41.
\end{itemize}
Meiji Restoration. Significantly, the increase in agricultural production through adopting better equipment and utilizing fertilizer such as phosphates and guano caused the rapid population growth.

**Figure 3.1: Population Change in Japan, 200–2009**


189 “Meiji iko no Nihon no Jinkō no Henka,” *Shōshika Shakai Hakusho, Heisei 16-nen ban*.

Following the Meiji Restoration, the government carried out a series of socioeconomic reforms for modernizing the nation that shifted the center of economy from agricultural sector to industrial sector. Under the policy called shokusan kōgyō (殖産興業, literary “increase production and promote industry) along with fukoku kyōhei, the Meiji government promoted industry, increase in production, and the development of capitalist institution for Japan’s modernization against the Western imperialists. Especially, the Land Tax Reform of 1873 produced a great number of displaced farmers in western Japan. Therefore, due to the influx of migrants from western Japan, eastern Japan experienced a drastic population growth in the early Meiji period, particularly in the regions in which textile, sericulture (raising of silkworms for the production of raw silk), and silk industries flourished. Women’s labor became crucial for the development of the light industry in the late nineteenth century. Accounting for 60 to 90 percent of labor force in textile industry, Japanese women contributed to producing about 60 percent of foreign exchange in addition to 40 percent of the gross national product. According to Hōchi Shimbun on September 27, 1895, Japan’s revenue from the export of raw silk and silk goods amounted to ¥90,000,000. On the other hand, rice-growing regions in western Japan marked the lower population growth. According to Hayami, seven out of

191 Haruzō Tamagawa, Kindai Nihon no Nōsōn to Nōmin (Farm Villages and Farmers in Modern Japan) (Tokyo: Seiji Kōronsha, 1969), 164.
194 “Kiito Kinu-Orimono: Yushutsu Kyusenman-yen” (Export of Law Silk and Silk Goods amounted to ¥90,000,000), Hōchi Shimbun (News) (Tokyo), September 27, 1895, in Nakayama, ed., Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen Shi, dai 9-kan, Nisshin Sensō, 300.
eight provinces that marked over 18 percent population increase between the years 1872 and 1885 were “centers of sericulture” in eastern Japan.195

Japan’s industrialization in the late nineteenth century through the national policy of shokusan kōgyō resulted in demographic transition and the transfer of excess labor forces from the traditional [agricultural] sectors to the modern [industrial] sectors. While eastern Japan could consume more labor forces in manufacturing industry, western Japan that showed strong association with agricultural production could not handle the excess labor forces. It was the major reason why western Japan, southwestern Japan in particular, sent out more immigrants than eastern Japan during the Meiji period.

In order to facilitate the modernization of industry and governmental institutions, the Japanese government encouraged the hiring of foreign experts called oyatoi gaikokujin (hired foreigners) during the Bakumatsu and Meiji periods. The oyatoi gaikokujin, serving as teachers, managers, engineers, technical advisors, administrators, and skilled workers, contributed to establishing “an infrastructure similar to that in the West.”196 John Henry Schnell, a Prussian weapon broker, instructor, and the founder of the Wakamatsu Tea and Silk Colony, was an example of the oyatoi gaikokujin who served for the Aizu-han to strengthen its troops during the Bakumatsu period towards the Boshin Civil War.

Working for the Japanese government and the prefectural governments, the oyatoi gaikokujin played leading roles in initiating new industries essential for accelerating the process of fukoku kyōhei such as cotton spinning, “railroad, telegraph, iron shipbuilding,


armory, mint and coalmining.” In order to secure the centralization of administrative power, the Japanese government promulgated the *Dajōkan Fukoku dai 22-gō* (Meiji Council of State’s Ordinance No. 22) in August 1868, requiring the prefectural governments to get permission from the Foreign Office for the employment of the *oyatoi gaikokujin*. The newly established government feared certain prefectures might become too powerful to keep them under its control. According to the *Shimbun Zasshi*, there were 214 *oyatoi gaikokujin* hired by the government in April 1872, including:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prussian</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malayan</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danish</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In general, the Asian *oyatoi gaikokujin* received lower wages than the Western *oyatoi gaikokujin*. At its peak in 1875, the *oyatoi gaikokujin* employed by the Japanese government numbered as many as 527.

The *oyatoi gaikokujin* played a crucial role in the modernization of political and economic institutions, industry, and art of Japan. Therefore, they received considerably higher salaries compared with that of ordinary Japanese people. While the *oyatoi gaikokujin* earned minimum ¥100 to ¥300 per month, a Japanese commoner earned

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199 “Oyatoi Gaijin no kazu” (The Number of Hired Foreigners), *Shimbun Zasshi* 38, April 1872, in *Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen Shi*, dai 1-kan, Ishin Daihenkakuki, 450.

around ten yen on average in those days.201 One of the most renowned oyatoi gaikokujin, Guido Herman Fridolin Verbeck (1830–1898) who was a Dutch missionary and a principal of the Daigaku Nankō (大学南校, precursor of the Tokyo University) received a monthly salary of ¥600.202 The government spent indeed one-third of annual expenditure for hiring foreign experts.203 For instance, in 1872 alone the Japanese government paid the total $534,493 to the oyatoi gaikokujin.204 In short, the Meiji Japan could carry out the rapid industrialization because the government actively hired a great number of highly paid oyatoi gaikokujin who facilitated the transfer of advanced technology to Japan. When the private enterprises such as Mitsubishi began to hire the oyatoi gaikokujin, the process of industrialization further accelerated contributing to achieve fukoku kyōhei. Meanwhile, the government sought to replace the expensive oyatoi gaikokujin with the Japanese staff once they learned enough knowledge of advanced techniques essential for the nation’s rapid modernization. Rather than spending enormous sum of foreign currency for the payment of oyatoi gaikokujin, the government

201 In the early Meiji period, the conversion of dollar to yen was one dollar equaled to one yen.


203 Sekai Bunkasha, Bunmei Kaika no Jidai (Era of Civilization and Enlightenment) (Tokyo: Sekai Bunkasha, 1977), 77. Having knowledge of Japanese language and various studies, Verbeck first taught English in Nagasaki, and then he was offered a position at Daigaku Nankō (Kaisei Gakkō), according to “Furubekki… Kaisei Gakkō Oyatoi to naru” (Verbeck was Hired at Kaisei School), Ochikochi Shimbun (Far and Near News) (Tokyo), March 23, 1869, in Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen Shi, dai 1-kan, Ishin Daihenkakuki, 254.

204 “Oyatoi Gaijin no kazu” (The Number of Hired Foreigners), Shimbun Zasshi 38, April 1872, in Nakayama, ed., Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen Shi, dai 1-kan, Ishin Daihenkakuki, 450.
sought to invest more on the development of national ventures. Therefore, in the early Meiji period, numbers of government-sponsored students who came from good families went to Europe or the United States (East Coast) to learn Western science and technology. Between 1868 and 1871, 350 students went overseas; about 150 of them were funded by the governmental agencies; nearly 120 of them were funded by the domains; and the rest of them went at their own expense. The Meiji intellectuals who had studied abroad came to play an important role in backing up the government’s ultimate goal by publishing guidebooks to go to America. These influential and enlightening publications effectively encouraged the young nationalist shizoku who had a strong interest in learning to study abroad while working.

* * * * *

In the first and second years of Meiji, some groups of Japanese left Japan—the Gannen-mono for contract labor, and the Wakamatsu Colony for establishing an agricultural colony of “political refugees” from Aizu. Yet, no emigration ventures brought desirable result. Then, the Japanese government attempted to divert the former Tokugawa supporters and excess labor forces into Hokkaido’s colonization venture. In the early Meiji period, a number of socioeconomic factors attributed to the beginning of Japanese overseas emigration. In the process of modernization, the population of Japan

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grew rapidly, and intellectuals of the time afraid of the coming of overpopulation problem enthusiastically called for the *kaigai hatten*. In addition, the enactment of the Conscription Law of 1873 played a significant role in motivating the young Japanese for overseas emigration that exempted them from draft.

Meanwhile, the Meiji government spent tremendous money for hiring the *oyatoi gaikokujin* (foreign experts and engineers) for accelerating the modernization process to join the *itto-koku*. Nevertheless, the salaries for the *oyatoi gaikokujin* became a heavy financial burden on the government, and the government determined to replace them by raising domestic experts and engineers by sending them abroad for studying the Western expertise. In order to maximize the effect, the Meiji leaders began to implant national consciousness through the creation of the emperor-centered states. The Meiji government focused on the national policy of *fukoku kyōhei* in order to repeal the “unequal treaties” with the Western countries, and Japan’s victory over the *Maria Luz* Incident significantly improved its international status and reputation.

On the other hand, the government, concerned about emigrants hurting the reputation of Japan, suspended the Japanese overseas emigration primarily to protect national prestige, not to protect emigrants. However, as the Hawaiian Kingdom’s request for the Japanese emigration intensified as well as the “Matsukata Deflation” deteriorated the lives of the peasantry in rural areas, the Meiji government had no other choice but to allow overseas emigration in order to reduce the chance of uprising by the discontented *shizoku* and farmers. The government was not strong enough to suppress all uprisings without negative impacts. Therefore, the lifting a ban on overseas emigration, was indeed the government’s countermeasure against the social and political unrest within the
country. At this point, the government played an important role in “pushing” the Japanese to leave country.
CHAPTER IV

EARLY JAPANESE IMMIGRATION TO HAWAII

This chapter examines the early Japanese immigration to Hawaii and illustrates how the immigrant community has transformed from the one consisting of temporary laborers to the one consisting of permanent residents. Japanese immigration to Hawaii is divided into four periods. The initial period which the government was responsible for the conduct is called 

\[kanyaku \ imin \ jidai\] (政府約移民時代, Government-Contracted Immigration Period 1885–1894). The second period in which the Japanese government passed the immigration venture to the private companies is called 

\[shiyaku \ imin \ jidai\] (私約移民時代, Self-Contracted Immigration Period 1894–1900). The third period is called 

\[jiyū \ imin \ jidai\] (自由移民時代, Free Immigration Period 1900–1907) in which the contract labor was prohibited due to the U.S. annexation of Hawaii. During this period, many immigrants transmigrated to mainland United States. The fourth period is called 

\[yobiyose \ imin \ jidai\] (呼び寄せ移民時代, Summoned Immigration Period 1908–1924)

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1 “kan 官” means government; “yaku 約” means contract; “imin 移民” means immigration or immigrants; and “jidai 時代” means period in Japanese.

2 “shi” means self or private and “yaku” means contract in Japanese.

3 “jiyū” means free in Japanese.

4 “yobiyose” means to summon in Japanese.
in which the governments of the United States and Japan signed the Gentlemen’s Agreement that restricted Japanese labor immigration while allowing family unification. In less than forty years after the arrival of first group of *kanyaku imin*, approximately 43 percent of Hawaii’s entire population was ethnic Japanese in 1920.\(^5\) This chapter also explores the intention of Japanese government for encouraging overseas emigration as well as sociocultural significance of the Japanese emigration to Hawaii and the United States.

*Kanyaku Imin Jidai (1885–1894)*

In 1885, the Japanese government legalized emigration under the unavoidable state of affairs. To summarize the major circumstances, the relationship between Japan and Hawaii had grown closer when Count Inoue Kaoru became Japan’s first Minister of Foreign Affairs and Robert W. Irwin became Hawaii’s Consul General in Japan.\(^6\) Then, as a demand for labor migration continued to increase, the governmental order of a period of labor contract to one year could no longer match the current conditions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs came to consider the labor contract period could be extended as long as the rights and safety of Japanese laborers were guaranteed.\(^7\) Finally, the severe depression caused by the “Matsukata Deflation” produced a massive unemployment both in urban and rural areas of Japan. Subsequently to the severe socioeconomic devastation,

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\(^7\) Ibid., 10.
the *jiyū minken undō* (自由民権運動, “Freedom and People’s Rights Movement”) intensified in the late 1870s and the early 1880s. It was the first political and social movement by the Japanese that demanded democratic government in Japan. Initially led by the *shizoku* and soon developed into popular movement, it sought the establishment of the national assembly and the written constitution. Especially, the *shizoku* in Tohoku region (former Tokugawa loyalists) felt suppressed after the Boshin Civil War because most of the important governmental positions had been taken by their enemy clans such as the former samurai of Satsuma, Chōshū, Tosa, and Hizen. Afraid of the growing glass-roots movement to be a possible threat to the authority of central government, the Meiji leaders seriously began to consider overseas emigration as an alternative option to suppress the movement. Although the Meiji leaders tended to hesitate sending the Japanese overseas, they came to conclude that nothing was more important than the establishment of strong centralized government for pursuing the *fukoku kyōhei* program.

Appointed as the Special Commissioner and Special Agent of the Hawaiian

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8 Jiyū minken undo was initiated by Itagaki Taisuke in 1873 when the Meiji government was divided over the issue of military invasion of Korea. While Itagaki Taisuke and Gotō Shōjirō (Tosa samurais) and Saigō Takamori (Satsuma) demanded military invasion of Korea in order to prevent the possible uprisings of *shizoku*, Okubo Toshimichi (Satsuma), Kido Takayoshi (Chōshū) and Iwakura Tomomi (court noble) opposed the invasion because they gave priority to the establishment of the domestic politics. Then, resigning from his post, Itagaki presented a petition to the government in 1874 that demanded the establishment of national assembly.


10 Kaikoku Hyakunen Kinen Bunka Jigyōkai, *Nichibei Bunka Kōshōshi, dai 5-kan: Ijūhen* (History of Japanese-American Cultural Relations: Immigration) (Tokyo: Yōyōsha, 1955), 88. For instance, in the first twenty-one years of Meiji government, there were eleven ministers from Satsuma, eight from Chōshū, seven from Tosa, and five from Hizen, three from the rest. In addition, there were seven vice-ministers in Satsuma, eleven from Chōshū, two from Tosa and Hizen, and ten from the rest.

Bureau of Immigration in 1884 due to his long business experience in Japan, Robert W. Irwin played a leading role in recruiting and sending the government-contracted laborers to Hawaii. Eager to secure as many Japanese laborers as possible, the Hawaiian government allowed Irwin a commission of five dollars on each male emigrant brought into Hawaii.\footnote{Brian Niiya, ed., \textit{Japanese American History: An A-to-Z Reference from 1868 to the Present} (New York: Facts on File, 1993), 179.} Thus, Irwin was able to make an enormous profit out of the semiofficial immigration business. Initially, the number of people admitted to the contracted emigration was 600; however, there were over 28,000 applications that reflected terrible domestic situations at that time.\footnote{Hawai Nihonjin Iminshi Kankō Iinkai, ed., \textit{Hawai Nihonjin Iminshi} (A History of Japanese Immigrants in Hawaii) (Honolulu: Hawaii Nikkeijin Rengō Kyōkai, 1964), 99; Gaimushō Ryōji Ijūbu (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Consul, Division of Immigration), \textit{Waga Kokumin no Kaigai Hatten: Iju Hyakunen no Ayumi, Honpen} (Overseas Development of the Japanese: the Record of a Hundred Years of Immigration, Main Work) (Tokyo: Gaimushō Ryōji Ijūbu, 1971), 55; Yujin Yaguchi, \textit{Hawai no Rekishi to Bunka: Higeki to Hokori no Mozaiku no nakade} (History and Culture of Hawaii) (Tokyo: Chuo Kōron Shinsha, 2002), 30–32.} It meant the competition to be a kanyaku imin was almost 50 to 1. The flood of applicants caused Irwin to increase the number of emigrants to take to 945 people for the first passage.\footnote{Jōji Suzuki, \textit{Nihonjin Dekasegi Imin} (Japanese Emigration of Laborers) (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1992), 54.} However, Irwin had no idea who to recruit for labor in Hawaii. Therefore, Irwin decided to consult his friend Inoue Kaoru whom he had helped the establishment of the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha (三井物産会社, Mitsui Trading Company) in 1876.

Being an advisor to the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha afterwards, Irwin had established a closer tie with Inoue. Therefore, Irwin asked Inoue and Masuda Takashi (益田 孝, 1848–1938, the first president of the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha) from which prefectures to recruit laborers. Inoue and Masuda recommended laborers from Yamaguchi and Hiroshima.
prefectures in southwest Japan since they considered people of Yamaguchi and Hiroshima with agricultural background “most suitable for emigration.”\textsuperscript{15} Partly due to Inoue himself coming from Yamaguchi prefecture and being aware of serious socioeconomic problems there, about half of the first ship for Hawaii (420 people) was filled with people from Yamaguchi prefecture.\textsuperscript{16} They also recommended Hiroshima prefecture because the rural population there was suffering massive unemployment caused by the rapid industrialization. According to Masuda’s knowledge, people from Hiroshima were believed to be moderate, based on the Hiroshima-han’s (feudal domain) Confucius scholars during the Tokugawa Shogunate.\textsuperscript{17} Evidently, the Mitsui Trading Company had actively participated in the initial phase of the immigration business.\textsuperscript{18}

The rapid industrialization and the development of right industry, producing excess labor forces in agricultural areas, “pushed” rural Japanese to emigrate overseas for better opportunities. Traditionally since the Tokugawa period, cotton was the most important cash crop in Hiroshima and the spinning of cotton yarn and the weaving of cotton cloth were important income sources for rural households. For instance, Hiroshima produced 11.1 percent of all cotton commodities in 1877; however, the development of cotton industry in the cities deprived the rural population of their


\textsuperscript{17} Kodama, \textit{Nihon Iminshi Kenkyū Josetsu}, 46.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 42.
supplementary income after 1883.\textsuperscript{19} In 1878, the Meiji government established two cotton-spinning mills—one in Aichi prefecture and the other in Hiroshima prefecture. These cotton-spinning mills, equipped with modern spinning machines imported from Manchester, stimulated the rapid growth of private cotton mills throughout the country. Subsequently, the Japan’s output of cotton products had continued to grow, and finally in 1897 export of cotton products surpassed import levels.\textsuperscript{20} Although the cotton industry initially relied on the domestic raw cotton, it soon shifted to the foreign raw cotton as the industry developed.\textsuperscript{21} Moreover, the large spinning mills constructed near big cities with superior infrastructure for facilitating the cotton imports became the center of cotton industry.\textsuperscript{22} The Osaka Spinning Mill was the first successful modern factory as a result. In consequence of the growth of modern spinning mills and cotton imports, the area of cotton cultivation sharply decreased in Hiroshima between the years of 1879 and 1910. In 1879, Hiroshima cultivated 1,307,145 \textit{tan} for cotton and marked 1,313,930 \textit{tan} in 1882 that shrunk to 907,847 \textit{tan} in 1883. Then, as clearly shown in Table 4.1, it further reduced to 57,821 \textit{tan} in 1884, which meant the area of cotton cultivation was only 4.4 percent of the 1879 figure.\textsuperscript{23}


\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 410–411. The large factories imported raw cotton from India, China, and the United States. Initially, some factories were built in rural areas to recruit a large number of workers for large-scale operation.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 411.

\textsuperscript{23} 1884 was the year when the Japanese government lifted a ban on overseas emigration after negotiations with the Kingdom of Hawaii that sought to bring Japanese laborers in numbers.
Table 4.1: Change in the Area of Cotton Cultivation in Hiroshima, 1879–1910

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Areas of Cultivation (tan*)</th>
<th>Index (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>1,307,145</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>57,821</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>51,264</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>30,524</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>18,743</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>10,175</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1,548</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*1 tan equals to 0.2451 acres.


Under the circumstances, the first organized government-contracted immigrants called kanyaku imin left Nagaura (near Yokosuka) on January 28 and arrived at Honolulu on February 8, 1885. The City of Tokio transported a group of 945 people, including 676 men, 159 women, and 110 children, accompanied by Irwin. Built by John Roach & Sons for the Pacific Mail Steamship Company in 1874, the City of Tokio and its sister ship City of Peking (5,000 tons each) were the largest iron steamships built in the United States when completed. These two innovative steamships drastically reduced the travel

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24 Kaikoku Hyakunen Kinen Bunka Jigyōkai, Nichibei Bunka Kōshōshi, dai 5-kan: Ijū-hen, 359; Edward K. Strong, The Second Generation Japanese Problem (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1934), 37. The passengers were quarantined for a week to be vaccinated against smallpox that was prevalent in Kanto area.


26 Leonard Alexander Swann, John Roach, Maritime Entrepreneur (New York: Arno Press, 1980), 81. The largest iron steamship in the world then was the Great Eastern built in...
time across the Pacific from twenty-two days to sixteen days.\textsuperscript{27} Upon the arrival of the first \textit{kanyaku imin}, Hawaiian King Kalakaua gave them a warm welcome. Meanwhile Hawaiians welcomed them with \textit{hula dance}. In return for their warm reception, the Japanese emigrants performed \textit{sumō} (相撲 Japanese wrestling), \textit{kendō} (剣道 Japanese fencing), and \textit{buyō} (舞踊 Japanese dancing).\textsuperscript{28}

After landing at Honolulu, the Japanese emigrants were temporarily placed in an immigration detention center and then transported to various sugar plantations. Accustomed to the way of Japanese, Irwin advised the planters what to care for obtaining maximum efforts from the Japanese emigrants.\textsuperscript{29} Irwin described that Japanese would work overtime without a pay if the planters treated them kindly. As long as the planters remained kind to them, no supervisor or \textit{luna} (foremen) would be necessary. If the planters showed their affection toward the children of the Japanese, they would be faithful to the planters. Furthermore, Irwin recommended the planters to provide five gallons of hot water daily so that the emigrants could make themselves clean.\textsuperscript{30} Despite the friendly welcome, things went wrong in a short time because the planters neglected Irwin’s detailed advice on the treatment of Japanese.

Contrary to the terms offered by Iaukea a year ago, the first group of the \textit{kanyaku


\textsuperscript{28} Kaikoku Hyakunen Kinen Bunka Jigyōkai, \textit{Nichibei Bunka Kōshōshi, dai 5-kan: Ijūhen}, 360.

\textsuperscript{29} Irwin’s wife, Takechi Iki, was a retainer’s adopted daughter. Iki was seventeen when she got married.

\textsuperscript{30} Gaimushō Ryōji Ijūbu, \textit{Waga Kokumin no Kaigai Hatten, Honpen}, 128–129.
imen was severely mistreated. In fact, some kanyaku imin had no agricultural background and they were not suitable for labor in Hawaii from the outset. In addition to the violation of contract by the planters, communication problems, and Hawaii’s intense heat attributed to the outbreak of small strikes in the plantations. In 1885, Ōtsuki Kōnosuke (大槻 幸之助) and fifteen others went on strike in the Papaiko plantation in Hilo. Some of the distressed kanyaku imin canceled their contract and returned home or others went Honolulu without a specific plan. Therefore, the first kanyaku imin gave the planters a lot of trouble. In fact, some of the first kanyaku imin brought bad customs such as drinking and gambling into Hawaii that before long came to affect the development of the Japanese immigrant community. Being rebellious due to the mistreatment, they came to neglect the Japanese governmental requirement of regular remittances and savings.

Meanwhile in the Paia plantation on Maui, five kanyaku imin died after suffering from physical violence and disease in 1885. In response to the death of the Japanese laborers, Special Commissioner Inoue Katsunosuke (井上 勝之助, 1861–1929) who was the son of Inoue Kaoru left for Hawaii in June 1885 with the second group of 988 kanyaku imin, including 930 men, thirty-four women, and fourteen children. Inoue

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32 Ibid., 361.


sought to make an intensive investigation into the actual working environment in Hawaii’s sugar plantations. Then, based on his findings, Inoue demanded the Hawaiian officials to protect the Japanese who were working on the sugar plantations from future abuse. His effort resulted in stimulating the conclusion of the Immigration Convention (布哇渡航條約, hawai tokō jōyaku) consisting of eleven articles between the governments of Japan and the Hawaiian Kingdom signed by Inoue Kaoru and Robert W. Irwin on January 28, 1886.

The Immigration Convention had a great effect on motivating significant numbers of rural Japanese to leave their hometowns for Hawaii. The convention limited boarding and entrance of immigrants to the ports of Yokohama and Honolulu only. According to the convention, the Hawaiian government guaranteed to treat the Japanese citizens fairly under three-year contracts with a salary of nine dollars a month for males and six dollars for female laborers. The provisions of the convention included that:

All migrants were to be subject to the approval of the Kanagawa prefectural governor and free steerage passage was to be guaranteed. Robert W. Irwin was designated as Special Agent of the Hawaii Bureau of Immigration. The Hawaiian government was to provide inspectors, interpreters and doctors for the welfare of the laborers. The convention even provided the Japanese immigrants the rights of suffrage and naturalization. These provisions were to retroactively apply to all earlier shipments of Japanese laborers as

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38 Odo and Shinoto, Zusetsu Hawai Nihonjinshi, 22.

39 Suzuki, Nihonjin Dekasegi Imin, 52. In addition to their salary, men received six dollars and women received four dollars allowance if they provided their own food.
Meanwhile, the Immigration Convention failed to appease the Japanese in Hawaii, and the rebellions continued. Moreover, “frustration led the immigrants into lives of dissipation and gambling.” Thereafter, the number of Japanese arrested for gambling increased. For instance, the police officers captured eight Japanese for gambling and took them to the police station on June 5, 1887. By 1890, the leading Japanese emigrants started urging the Japanese Consul to expel those who could lower the “dignity of their race” by their habit of drinking and gambling. However, arrests of Japanese for gambling frequently took place. In 1894, a judge fined two-hundred dollars each for a number of Japanese who were gambling in Kona in February. Since judge demanded unreasonable fines, the press reported that “[t]his is not justice; it is robbery under the forms of justice.” The fine for gambling was usually around five to ten dollars.

Although recognizing that the kanyaku imin were dissatisfied with their working conditions, the Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru desired to continue the kanyaku imin for the development of the nation. According to a Japanese historian Imaizumi Genkichi:

“Foreign Minister Inouye and his supporters were very hopeful of the future role of emigration as a new phase of Japan’s overseas development. It was also crucial time for Inouye in that he was doing everything possible to consummate a treaty revision with the Western nations to abolish the extraterritorial rights they enjoyed in Japan. And it was face-losing as well as disadvantageous to have the Japanese indulge in loose living and gambling and conduct themselves in a disgraceful manner in Hawaii.

“Inouye, an expert on finances, had hoped for the acquisition of foreign currency...

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42 *The Daily Herald* (Honolulu), June 6, 1887.

43 *The Daily Bulletin* (Honolulu), June 20, 1890.

through emigration. He calculated that an estimated 12 million yen (6 million in currency plus purchase of Japanese commodities) sent home annually by 100,000 emigrants in the Pacific would be equivalent to 5% interest on a 250 million yen loan. This would certainly be a boom to Japan’s hard pressed economy. He had therefore arranged for compulsory savings by the emigrants…

“Inouye was also desirous of injecting a new atmosphere in the farming villages by improving their irregular working habits. He also envisioned that Japan’s policy in the Pacific would be impeded should Hawaii ever become a territory of the United States. His far-reaching plan harbored the idea that it would be to Japan’s advantage to place Hawaii under her influences as soon as possible. And he was convinced that Taro Ando, renowned as the most brilliant diplomat in Japan, was the person to carry out this important role.45

Utilizing the government-level contracts, Inoue expected a positive economic effect from overseas emigration. Nevertheless, the haole46 rebels overthrew King Kalakaua in June 1887 and made King revise the Hawaiian Constitution, and article 62 specifically granted suffrage to only Caucasian men of twenty years or over who were able to read and write Hawaiian, English, or other European language.47 The so-called Bayonet Convention of 1887 repealed most of the provisions of the Immigration Convention including the rights of suffrage and naturalization.48

Afraid of the growing Japanese influence in Hawaii, the provisional government revised the Immigration Convention in September abolishing citizenship for Japanese emigrants and no longer providing passage, inspectors, translators, and doctors for the

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Japanese laborers.\(^{49}\) Afterwards, the Japanese emigrants had to pay back seventy-five dollars for their passage fees, which the planters used to pay for them in the name of the Hawaiian government. Therefore, the planters subtracted three dollars from each of their monthly salary for two years. In addition, the Hawaiian Board of Immigration collected additional money from Japanese laborers to pay the salary of immigration officers, interpreters, and doctors.\(^{50}\) Moreover, the Hawaiian planters strategically segregated laborers by their ethnicities to prevent organized strikes, and distinguished the wages depending on their ethnicities.

The following Table 4.2 illustrates the average monthly wages of plantation laborers in Hawaii based on their nationalities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Skilled Labor ($)</th>
<th>Contract labor ($)</th>
<th>Day Labor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiian</td>
<td>54.67</td>
<td>18.58</td>
<td>20.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td>94.42</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>17.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>90.30</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>18.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>47.42</td>
<td>19.54</td>
<td>22.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>38.27</td>
<td>17.61</td>
<td>17.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Japanese</strong></td>
<td><strong>41.17</strong></td>
<td><strong>15.58</strong></td>
<td><strong>18.84</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polynesian</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>15.82</td>
<td>18.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>75.50</td>
<td>17.02</td>
<td>35.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>$ 63.11</strong></td>
<td><strong>$ 17.74</strong></td>
<td><strong>$ 21.03</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{50}\) According to *Yamato Shimbun* (Yamato Daily) on April 23–June 19, 1913, each emigrant had to pay back seventy-five dollars (equivalent to ¥150); however, the actual passage fare that the Nippon Yusen Kaisha charged was on average twenty-five yen. It means the emigrants paid six times as much as they needed to pay.
According to the average wages of plantation laborers based on the *Report of the General Superintendent of the Census, 1890*, the Japanese skilled-, contract-, and day-laborers (women) received the lowest wages, and the Japanese earned less than average in all types of labor.\(^{51}\) Regardless of earning the lowest, their salary was further reduced from fifteen dollars a month in 1887 to $12.50 a month in 1891.\(^{52}\) In addition, when they were sick and absent from work, they got neither pay nor food. Despite the Hawaii’s racially motivated insult, the Japan’s then Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru neglected it and took no action. It was the next Foreign Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu who tried to negotiate with the Hawaiian government for regaining suffrage of the Japanese laborers in Hawaii.\(^{53}\) Although the *kanyaku imin* was supposed to be under governmental protection, they gradually lost their privilege in Hawaii after the *haole* rebels gaining control over Hawaii.

Despite the reduction of salary, the Japanese immigrants still earned much more than their countrymen in Japan did. For example, in 1889, their deposit reached over $25,121,\(^{54}\) and their remittance to Japan amounted to nearly $300,000 to in 1891, which

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\(^{52}\) Odo and Shinoto, *Zusetsu Hawaii Nihonjinshi*, 23.


\(^{54}\) Ibid., 619.
further stimulated Japanese emigration to Hawai‘i. Although the majority of the Japanese labored diligently, some did not fulfill their contract. According to 2,325 cases in the district court of Hilo between 1853 and 1903 recorded by Merry, all defendants of violations of work obligations were Japanese in 1893. In addition, Japanese comprised 26 percent of entire drug and alcohol defendants. In terms of gambling, Japanese made up of 85 percent of defendants. Notwithstanding, Governor of Hiroshima Nabeshima Miki, in hope of obtaining foreign currency, further urged the emigrants from Hiroshima to behave decently as subjects of Japan, keep the terms of contract with the employers, never fight, never gamble, control drinking, and always save money and remit it to home.

Although generally called imin (移民, immigrants), those who left Japan before 1894 were not settlers because they planned to go back to Japan when they made enough money after toiling three years on foreign soil. Therefore, the ratio of male emigrants was significantly greater than that of female emigrants among the kanyaku imin.

According to Yoshida’s article in Takushoku Ronsō (Debate over Colonization), the percentage of male emigrants to Hawaii was 83 percent in 1885; 73 percent in 1886; 80 percent in 1887; 87 percent in 1888; 90 percent in 1889; 93 percent in 1890; 95 percent in 1891; 97 percent in 1892; 98 percent in 1893; 100 percent in 1894.

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percent in 1887; 82 percent in 1888; 82 percent in 1889; 81 percent in 1890; 73 percent in 1891; and 87 percent in 1892. For the first eight years of the kanyaku imin jidai, the Japanese male emigrants numbered on average 80 percent of the entire Japanese laborers.

Those *dekasegi* laborers always had three things in common; *toshu kūken* (徒手空拳, being penniless), *ikkaku senkin* (一攫千金, “dream of striking it rich overnight”), and *kin’i kikyō* (錦衣帰郷, returning home wealthy). Yuji Ichioka, a prominent Japanese American historian and the author of *Issei: The World of the First Generation Japanese Immigrants, 1885–1924* (1988) argues that these characteristics made the early Japanese immigrants distinctive from the majority of European immigrants who came to settle permanently in America.

During the *kanyaku imin jidai* (1885–1894), 29,069 Japanese emigrated to Hawaii, transported in twenty-six ships as seen in Table 4.3. According to *Nihon Jinmin Hawai-koku e Dekasegi Ikken* (A Case of Japanese Emigration to Hawaii) recorded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 38.2 percent of all *kanyaku imin* came from Hiroshima; 35.8 percent from Yamaguchi; 14.6 percent from Kumamoto; and 7.5 percent

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62. Hawai Nihonjin Inimshi Kankō linkai, ed., *Hawai Nihonjin Iminishi*, 99–100; Gaimushō Ryōji Ijūbu, *Waga Kokumin no Kaigai Hatten: Iju Hyakunen no Ayumi, Shiryōhen*, 620; Kodama, *Nihon Iminishi Kenkyū Josetsu*, 138–140; Odo and Shinoto, *Zusetsu Hawai Nihonjinshi*, 22. The first governmental document stresses that the total number of *kanyaku imin* was 29,069; however, the report of Honolulu Consul General in December 1897 claims that the number was 28,995, according to Gaimushō hensan, *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho dai 35-kan* (Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, vol. 35 [1902]) (Tokyo: Nihon Gaikō Bunsho Ryōfukai, 1957), 828–831. Meanwhile, Gaimushō’s *Nihon Jinmin Hawai-koku e Dekasegi Ikken* (A Case of Japanese Emigration to Hawaii) reported the number of kanyaku imin to be 29,084.
from Fukuoka. The sum of these four prefectures amounted to 96.1 percent.\textsuperscript{63}

Table 4.3: Prefectures that Sent Out Immigrants to Hawaii, 1885–1894

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Prefecture</th>
<th>1885</th>
<th>1886</th>
<th>1887</th>
<th>1888</th>
<th>1889</th>
<th>1890</th>
<th>1891</th>
<th>1892</th>
<th>1893</th>
<th>1894</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hiroshima</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>1,647</td>
<td>1,919</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>1,941</td>
<td>1,021</td>
<td>1,578</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>11,122</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yamaguchi</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>1,611</td>
<td>1,919</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>2,228</td>
<td>703</td>
<td>1,271</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>10,424</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kumamoto</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>2,476</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>4,247</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fukuoka</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,297</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,180</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Niigata</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kanagawa</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chiba</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shiga</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Okayama</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wakayama</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,934</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>1,446</td>
<td>3,286</td>
<td>4,072</td>
<td>2,736</td>
<td>6,723</td>
<td>2,340</td>
<td>4,146</td>
<td>1,524</td>
<td>29,084</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As Masaaki Kodama pointed out in Nihon Iminshi Kenkyū Josetsu (1992), prefectures sending out the emigrants varied until 1887; however, those became concentrated on several prefectures after 1888.\textsuperscript{64} It directly related to the undergoing socioeconomic conditions in the rural areas.

The Hawaiian planters favored people from Hiroshima and Yamaguchi

\textsuperscript{63} Gaimushō, Nihon Jinmin Hawai-koku e Dekasegi Ikken (A Case of Japanese Emigration to Hawaii); Kodama, Nihon Iminshi Kenkyū Josetsu, 25.

\textsuperscript{64} Kodama, Nihon Iminshi Kenkyū Josetsu, 46.
prefectures particularly because they were hard workers and easily assimilated into the local population. These laborers from Hiroshima and Yamaguchi also reported back the advantage of *dekasegi* and encouraged their families and friends in Japan to work in Hawaii. In addition, as Kodama pointed out, it was much easier and convenient for the government to recruit emigrants from certain prefectures in terms of communication methods.  

Unlike today, there were very limited numbers of communication methods in those days.

Working in the sugar plantations ten hours a day (twelve hours for sugar factory labor) and twenty-six days a month, the *kanyaku imin* could earn fifteen dollars (equivalent to thirty yen) a month. Therefore, it was practically possible for those who toiled for three years to save ¥400 to ¥500 (equivalent to $200 to $250). At that time, a Japanese farmer typically earned eleven to twelve sen a day, carpenter earned fifteen sen, and mason earned seventeen to eighteen sen, so on average one could make four yen (equivalent to two dollars) a month. In general, those *kanyaku imin* could earn as much as five times more money than that of people working in Japan, which resulted in attracting many poor Japanese to Hawaii. In Wakayama, one of the immigrant-producing prefectures located in the southwestern Japan, *kanyaku imin*’s monthly salary

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66 According to the foreign exchange rate of that time, one yen was equivalent to fifty cents.


was equivalent to a tenant farmer’s annual salary.69

Attracted to the higher wage, immigration applicants continued to grow that “pushed” the nation’s steamship companies such as the Nippon Yusen Kaisha and the Tōyō Kisen Kaisha to establish regular trans-Pacific lines. In short, the more immigration took place, the more the nation’s maritime industry developed encouraged by the expansion of commercial activities. As Table 4.4 shows, the amount of remittance by the Japanese emigrants continued to grow as the number of Japanese in Hawaii increased. The Japanese emigrants doubled the amount of remittance between 1889 and 1893 and nearly tripled by 1894.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Remittance ($)</th>
<th>Increase Rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>159,709.30</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>233,960.20</td>
<td>116.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>298,425.55</td>
<td>186.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>338,456.45</td>
<td>211.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>319,476.17</td>
<td>200.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>459,978.71</td>
<td>288.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Once their contracts ended, the Japanese in Hawaii could change jobs freely. Therefore, skilled workers such as carpenters and blacksmiths could earn higher wages,

and translators and engineers made between thirty and seventy dollars a month.\textsuperscript{70} Others became tenant farmers or small business owners. Their standard of living improved considerably since they had worked hard. As a result, the number of emigrants returning to Japan began to decrease gradually. One of the causes for the \textit{kanyaku imin}’s success was that the Hawaiian government paid for their round trip passages, which was equivalent to the \textit{kanyaku imin}’s four-month worth of salary.\textsuperscript{71} The passage fare was extremely expensive then. For instance, it required a man eighty-nine yen to go to America (equivalent to fifteen-month’s salary) and sixty-five yen to Hawaii (eleven-month’s salary).\textsuperscript{72} The semiofficial Nippon Yusen Kaisha (Japan Mail Steamship Company) was responsible for the most times of the transportation of the \textit{kanyaku imin} to Hawaii.\textsuperscript{73}

Meanwhile, Table 4.5 illustrates how the plantation labor was severe even under the governmental protection. A great number of the \textit{kanyaku imin} died because of overworking, accidents, as well as illness.\textsuperscript{74} Significantly, due to the primitive living conditions in addition to overworking, the early \textit{kanyaku imin} had recorded higher death rate than the later ones in general. For instance, 19.5 percent of the 14th \textit{kanyaku imin} had lost their lives.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{70} Suzuki, \textit{Nihonjin Dekasegi Imin}, 60.
\item \textsuperscript{71} One-way trip cost about thirty dollars, and the \textit{kanyaku imin}’s monthly salary was fifteen dollars.
\item \textsuperscript{72} Nishimukai, “Transportation of Japanese Emigrants in the Pre-War Period,” 106–107.
\item \textsuperscript{73} “Japanese Coolies for Hawaii: A Treaty which Will Furnish Planters with Good Workmen,” \textit{The New York Times}, May 19, 1891.
\item \textsuperscript{74} Yasuo Wakatsuki and Jōji Suzuki, \textit{Kaigai Iju Seisaku Shiron} (Historical Survey of Emigration Policies) (Tokyo: Fukumura Shuppan, 1975), 57–73.
\end{itemize}
### Table 4.5: Report on the *Kanyaku Imin* to Hawaii, 1885–1894

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ships</th>
<th>Date of Arrival</th>
<th>Passengers (no. of female)</th>
<th>Return</th>
<th>Return Rate (%)</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
<th>Death Rate (%)</th>
<th>Move out</th>
<th>Stay</th>
<th>Stay Rate (%)</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
<th>Death Rate (%)</th>
<th>Return</th>
<th>Return Rate (%)</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
<th>Death Rate (%)</th>
<th>Move out</th>
<th>Stay</th>
<th>Stay Rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2/8/1885</td>
<td>834 (158)</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>6/17/1885</td>
<td>974 (35)</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>2/14/1886</td>
<td>923 (230)</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>12/10/1887</td>
<td>1,441 (288)</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>6/1/1888</td>
<td>1,063 (198)</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th</td>
<td>11/14/1888</td>
<td>1,081 (203)</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th</td>
<td>12/26/1888</td>
<td>1,143 (203)</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>31.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>8th</td>
<td>3/2/1889</td>
<td>957 (137)</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>30.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>9th</td>
<td>10/1/1889</td>
<td>997 (198)</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>38.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>10th</td>
<td>11/21/1889</td>
<td>1,050 (208)</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>39.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>11th</td>
<td>1/9/1890</td>
<td>1,064 (200)</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>39.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>12th</td>
<td>4/2/1890</td>
<td>1,071 (212)</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>41.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>13th</td>
<td>5/22/1890</td>
<td>1,068 (190)</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>14th</td>
<td>6/17/1890</td>
<td>596 (134)</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>40.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>15th</td>
<td>3/11/1891</td>
<td>1,093 (310)</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>50.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>16th</td>
<td>3/30/1891</td>
<td>1,081 (281)</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>50.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>17th</td>
<td>4/28/1891</td>
<td>1,091 (290)</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>49.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>18th</td>
<td>5/29/1891</td>
<td>1,488 (385)</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>50.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>19th</td>
<td>6/18/1891</td>
<td>1,101 (286)</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>55.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>20th</td>
<td>1/9/1892</td>
<td>1,098 (0)</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>47.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>21st</td>
<td>6/25/1892</td>
<td>1,124 (234)</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>57.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>22nd</td>
<td>11/28/1892</td>
<td>988 (191)</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>50.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>23rd</td>
<td>3/6/1893</td>
<td>733 (150)</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th</td>
<td>6/6/1893*</td>
<td>1,771 (361)</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th</td>
<td>10/9/1893*</td>
<td>1,642 (331)</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,025</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th</td>
<td>6/15/1894*</td>
<td>1,524 (327)</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1,237</td>
<td>81.2</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>28,996</td>
<td>13,861</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>2,034</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>13,231</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Gender Ratio:** Male: 23,256 Female: 5,740 Gender Ratio: Male: 80.2% / Female: 19.8%

The average death rate of the 1st to 14th kanyaku imin was 9.9 percent while that of the 15th to 26th was 5.7 percent. Nevertheless, toward the end of the kanyaku imin period, the numbers of returnees had gradually declined as the death rate dropped due to the slight improvement of the working conditions.

The kanyaku imin ended when the treaty between Japan and the Kingdom of Hawaii expired in 1894 with the establishment of the Republic of Hawaii led by a son of Protestant missionaries from New England, Sanford Ballard Dole (1844–1926) as its president through the Hawaiian Revolution (1893–1894). 75 With the support of the vast sugar plantation owners consisting of people of European or American origins, Dole successfully overthrew the Hawaiian Queen Liliuokalani (1838–1917, r. 1891–1893) and declared the independence of the Republic on July 4, 1894. Afterwards, the Republic of Hawaii began preparing for the annexation of Hawaii to the United States. 76 In fact, the Japanese emigrants, claiming that they had right to vote according to the Immigration


Convention, attempted to regain suffrage. Nevertheless, it ended in failure when the Hawaiian government recommended that they go back to Japan.

Being *dekasegi* laborers, while some could manage to save enough money, others could not save as much as they had planned. In reality, exploited by the planters who often violated contracts and by the inspector-in-chief of Japanese Immigrants, Nakayama Jōji (中山譲治, 1839–1911), it was almost impossible to return home with enough money within the three-year contract period. According to the minutes of the Hawaiian Board of Immigration, Nakayama initially received a monthly salary of $100 that rose to $250 a month and finally $6,000 a year, which was collected from the laborers’ salary. In general, those who achieved their initial goal of accumulating wealth went back to Japan, while those who failed to do so tended to stay in Hawaii since they got used to the lifestyle in Hawaii or moved to the mainland United States for better opportunities.

Meanwhile, some young laborers preferred not to go back to Japan in order to dodge the draft. In addition, Japan then was undergoing severe inflation that decreased the value of money; therefore, afraid of losing their hard-earned money, they hesitated to go back to Japan even after their contracts ended. As a result, 61 percent of *kanyaku imin* determined to stay in Hawaii while 39 percent returned to Japan after the three-year

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77 “Japan’s Demand on Hawaii: Claiming the Treaty Right of Exercising There,” *Worcester Morning Daily Spy* (Massachusetts), May 23, 1894.


contract period. According to the Bureau of Immigration’s report in 1894, there were about 20,200 Japanese living in Hawaii, and only 8,502 of those were contracted laborers. Accordingly, the Japanese laborers numbered nearly 13,231, accounting for 60 percent of all laborers in Hawaiian sugar plantations.

The Japanese government’s view on the emigration to Hawaii began to change after the New York Times described the Japanese emigrants as “Japanese coolies” in reaction to the influx of the Japanese laborers in Hawaii. Undergoing the rapid modernization with the national slogans such as “fukoku kyōhei” and “Datum Nyūō,” Japan then sought to differentiate itself from other Asian countries by declaring its cultural supremacy. By the time, the leaders of Japan became more interested in expanding its influence over Asia and determined to withdraw its active involvement in the venture of Japanese emigration to Hawaii.

*Shiyaku Imin Jidai (1894–1900)*

The Hawaiian Revolution of 1893, which the republic (mainly consisting of wealthy white planters) overthrew the pro-Japanese Hawaiian Kingdom, permanently changed the course of the development of Japanese immigration pattern. This social

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upheaval eventually resulted in the annulment of the Immigration Convention because the new ruling class feared the continuously growing Japanese population and its influence in Hawaii. The Honolulu Gazette reported that it would be dangerous to populate Hawaii only with Japanese. In March 1894, aiming at reducing the numbers of impoverished and undesirable Japanese immigrants to Hawaii, the provisional government established a law that required all Japanese non-contract laborers to present fifty dollars of *misege* (見せ金, literary “show money”) before entry.

Meanwhile, due to the troublesome and complicated immigration process along with the strong demand from the emigration companies, the Japanese government determined to pass down the management of immigration business to the private emigration companies through the enactment of the *Imin Hogo Kisoku* (移民保護規則, Emigrant Protection Ordinance) on April 12, 1894. Afterwards, acting as the agents of the Japanese laborers, the emigration companies took over the tasks previously performed by the government including the recruitment and transportation of laborers and finding jobs for them. They also lent *misege* if asked by the emigrants. On June 29, 1894, managed by Ogura Shōkai founded by Ogura Kō (小倉幸), a merchant in Osaka, *Aikoku Maru* 愛国丸 arrived at Honolulu conveying the first group of the shiyaku *imin*.

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86 Honolulu Gazette (Honolulu), December 6, 1892, quoted in Kaikoku Hyakunen Kinen Bunka Jigyōkai, Nichibei Bunka Kōshōshi, dai 5-kan: Ijū-hen, 389.


consisting of 150 Japanese after the enactment of the *Imin Hogo Kisoku*.\(^90\) In fact, before
the enactment of the *Imin Hogo Kisoku*, Ogura Shōkai had sent out 254 Japanese by
*Aikoku Maru* that left Kobe and arrived at Hawaii on March 28, 1894. These Japanese
worked under a contract with salary of sixteen to eighteen dollars a month that was higher than
that of the *kanyaku imin*.\(^91\) It also indicated that the *shiyaku imin* had begun before the
end of the *kanyaku imin*.

The outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War in August 1894 further facilitated the
transfer of the emigration business because the government had to give warfare the
highest priority.\(^92\) Meanwhile, the end of the war and the subsequent influx of repatriated
soldiers created an excess labor force in a small economy. Acutely realizing the job
market being saturated, numbers of repatriated soldiers and the existing unemployed
sought emigration to make a living. In fact, the annual remittance from the Japanese
laborers in Hawaii during the *kanyaku imin jidai* had amounted to ¥2,000,000 that
stimulated a large number of Japanese to seek emigration.\(^93\) For instance, 9,195 Japanese

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\(^90\) Kaikoku Hyakunen Kinen Bunka Jigyōkai, *Nichibei Bunka Köshōshi, dai 5-kan: Ijū-
hen*, 365. Managed by the emigration agency of Ogura Kō, the Japanese laborers left for Hawaii
commanded by a Japanese captain Furukawa Yoichi. Furukawa was the first Japanese captain
who carried out the ocean navigation, and *Aikoku Maru* was the first “*shagaisen*” (ships not
owned by the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, Tōyō Kisen Kaisha, and Osaka Shōsen Kaisha) that engaged
in sending out emigrants, according to *Jiji Shinpō* (Tokyo), May 17–22, 1931; Nishimukai,
“Transportation of Japanese Emigrants in the Pre-War Period,” 84.

\(^91\) Kojiro Iida, “Meiji Chūki Osaka Shōnin ni yoru Imin Assengyō: Ogura Shōkai oyobi
Nanyū Shōsha ni yoru Sōsōki Hawai Imin no baai” (Japanese Emigration Agency by the
Merchants of Osaka at the Middle of Meiji Era: The Case of Emigrants to Hawaii by Ogura
Trading Company and Nan-Yu Trading Company), *Shakai to Chiiki* (Journal of Region and
Society) 1 (February 1999): 61.

\(^92\) Gaimushō Ryōji Ijūbu, *Waga Kokumin no Kaigai Hatten, Honpen*, 91.

\(^93\) Kaikoku Hyakunen Kinen Bunka Jigyōkai, *Nichibei Bunka Köshōshi, dai 5-kan: Ijū-
hen*, 365.
had left for Hawaii between 1895 and 1896.⁹⁴ Then, taking advantage of the high
demands for overseas emigration, the emigration companies frequently engaged in
fraudulent practices to make an enormous profit. It was the period which numbers of the
Japanese prostitutes entered Hawaii with the help of emigration companies. As a
countermeasure against such frauds, the government, revising the *Imin Hogo Kisoku*,
enacted the *Imin Hogo-ho* (移民保護法, Emigrant Protection Act) in April 1896 that
imposed legal controls on the practices of the emigration companies and agents for
protecting the “interests of emigrants.”⁹⁵

This period between the summer of 1894 and June 1900 in which the emigration
companies were responsible for sending out emigrants is known as the *shiyaku imin
jidai*.⁹⁶ During the *shiyaku imin jidai*, about 40,000 Japanese emigrated to Hawaii.⁹⁷

Although the emigration companies took over the tasks previously carried out by the
government, the Japanese emigrants had remained under the minimal governmental
protection/supervision. Therefore, this period, sought to protect emigrants from the
exploitation of emigration companies and breach of contracts by employers, and to
ensure that the Japanese emigrants to be treated equally with European counterparts, is
also known as the *hogo jidai* (保護時代, literary “protective period”) in the history of

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⁹⁴ Republic of Hawaii, Bureau of Customs, *Annual Report of the Collector General of
Customs to the Minister of Finance, 1895* (Honolulu: Robert Grieve, Printer, 209 Merchant
Street, 1896), 20.

Descendants in the Americas*, ed. Akemi Kikumura-Yano, 68.

⁹⁶ Kaikoku Hyakunen Kinen Bunka Jigyōkai, *Nichibei Bunka Kōshōshi, dai 5-kan: Ijū-
hen*, 364–365.

⁹⁷ Gaimushō Ryōji Ijūbu, *Waga Kokumin no Kaigai Hatten, Honpen*, 132; Kihara,
*Hawaii Nipponjin Shi*, 12.
Japanese immigration.\textsuperscript{98}

It is important to note that during the \textit{hogo jidai}, the government did not actively urge the Japanese overseas emigration.\textsuperscript{99} As a newly established nation-state, the Meiji leaders needed to gain world recognition by demonstrating Japan as a country capable of protecting its subjects. For example, the Japanese government dispatched a protective cruiser \textit{Naniwa} 浪速 twice to Honolulu following the outbreak of the Hawaiian Revolution (1893–1894) in order to protect 22,000 Japanese laborers in Hawaii.\textsuperscript{100} Arrived on February 23, 1893, Captain Togo Heihachiro who later became known as a hero of the Russo-Japanese War commanded \textit{Naniwa}\textsuperscript{101} made a statement that:

\begin{quote}
“Now that we have laid anchor in Honolulu, you will have to consider this ship an extension of our country. Be careful in your actions as your every move will reflect on the honor of our nation. Should occasion arise, we must be prepared to act decisively and with courage as befitting our nation’s warriors.”\textsuperscript{102}
\end{quote}

Later in the same year, the government dispatched \textit{Naniwa} to Honolulu in order to protect its subjects in case of the Hawaiian royalists raising a riot on the anniversary of the Hawaiian Revolution. Then, the Provisional Government asked Captain Togo to fire

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{98} Gaimushō Ryōji Ijūbu, \textit{Waga Kokumin no Kaigai Hatten, Honpen}, 91–92.

\textsuperscript{99} Ibid.


\end{flushright}
cannons for commemorating the anniversary; however, Togo rejected the request and
British and American warships followed his precedent. Togo’s decision impressed the
Japanese living in Hawaii and stirred up their national pride. Therefore, the many
Japanese couples named their babies born in Hawaii either “Naniwa” or “Togo.”

Again commanded by Togo, Naniwa left Yokohama for Hawaii in May 1897
when the Republic of Hawaii refused 713 out of 902 or nearly 80 percent of all Japanese
immigrants’ entry into Hawaii based on the Act of 1894 that required jiyū imin (free
immigrants) to show possession of misegane of fifty dollars in order to gain admission to
the country. The reason for the denial was that the Hawaiian Bureau of Immigration
viewed their misegane as irrational and acknowledged the Japanese as contract laborers
although they claimed themselves to be free immigrants. More specifically, 550 out of
670 Japanese on board Shinshū Maru 神州丸 and 163 out of 232 Japanese on board
Sakura Maru 佐倉丸 were denied their entry upon arrival at Honolulu on February 27
and March 20 respectively. A few days after Sakura Maru, Kinai Maru 滋内丸


104 Imin Hogo Kyōkai, Kaigai Dekasegi Annai, 35–36; Kaikoku Hyakunen Kinen Bunka
Jigyōkai, Nichibei Bunka Kōshōshi, dai 5-kan: Ijū-hen, 373–734. In fact, arriving at Honolulu on
November 10, 1896, 93 free laborers on board Tōyō Maru (東洋丸) who were sent by the Nippon
Imin Kaisha (Japan Immigration Company) were denied entry because the quarantine officer
considered their possession of $50 irrational. Of whom, 41 of free laborers “admitted that the
money they possessed had been furnished by someone on the Tōyō Maru, and that they were to
return the amount as soon as they were allowed to leave the station,” according to the Hawaiian
Gazette (Honolulu), November 17, 1896. This incident was tried in the Supreme Court in Hawaii
and the Chief Justice Judd ruled in favor of the 47 free laborers and allowed their landing on
Hawaii, according to the Hawaiian Gazette (Honolulu), November 24, 1896.

105 Gaimushō Ryōji Ijūbu, Waga Kokumin no Kaigai Hatten, Honpen, 92; Gaimushō
hensan, Nihon Gaikō Bunsho dai 30-kan (Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, vol. 30 [1897])
document, the number of Japanese immigrants who were on board was 665; of whom, 460
arrived at Honolulu with 682 Japanese emigrants, and 549 of them were denied entry as well. A series of the denial by the Hawaiian Bureau of Immigration caused a tension between Japan and Hawaii, and Japanese free immigration to Hawaii was suspended temporarily.

After returning to Japan, *Shinshū Maru*’s ship owner Kishimoto Gohei turned in a report to the Foreign Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu on May 10, 1897, regarding the loss caused by the denial of entry of the Japanese emigrants. Kishimoto petitioned the government to take measure so that he would receive compensation from the Hawaiian government for his loss. Meanwhile, as shown in Table 4.6, the denied Japanese emigrants from Hiroshima prefecture carefully estimated the average damage of 313 individuals from Hiroshima on *Shinshu Maru* sent by the Kaigai Tokō Kabushiki Kaisha (海外渡航株式会社 Overseas Company) and Kobe Tokō Gōshi Kaisha (神戸渡航合資会社 Kobe Immigration Company). On April 13, the representatives of the denied Japanese from Hiroshima prefecture demanded ¥312.76 for each person. Subsequently, on May 17, the representatives of the denied Japanese from Yamaguchi prefecture who


109 Ibid., 744. Only twenty-two Japanese sent by the Kobe Tokō Kaisha were allowed to enter Hawaii, according to Kaikoku Hyakunen Kinen Bunka Jigyōkai, *Nichibei Bunka Kōshōshi, dai 5-kan: Ijū-hen*, 373.
were on *Kinai Maru* petitioned for the compensation of ¥236.64 per person. In response to the petitions of the Japanese citizens for compensation, by sending Commissioner Akiyama on *Naniwa* and promoting Consul General Shimamura Hisashi to Minister, the Japanese government tried to solve the problem diplomatically.

### Table 4.6: Estimates of Loss of Each Immigrant on *Shinshu Maru*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Articles</th>
<th>Amount (¥)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fees for filing an application for immigration (¥0.50 x 24 days)</td>
<td>12.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The loss due to sales of properties at a 30 percent lower than current price for raising the cost for going to America</td>
<td>81.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase of clothes and other necessities necessary for immigration and fumigation fee</td>
<td>35.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost to invite relatives and friends before departure</td>
<td>35.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel expenses, passport fee, passage, commission, vaccination, and quarantine fee</td>
<td>55.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenses during one’s stay in Kobe for seventeen days</td>
<td>13.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending money while on board</td>
<td>5.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return passage fee and spending money</td>
<td>11.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenses during one’s stay in Kobe after return voyage (hotel charges and spending money x 10 days)</td>
<td>8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage for 87 days from the departure to return home (¥0.60 per day)</td>
<td>52.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation expenses from Kobe to home village</td>
<td>4.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenses for sending their representatives to Tokyo for petitioning a compensation from the Hawaiian government</td>
<td>30.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>312.76</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Meanwhile, the Hawaiian government sought to compromise with Japan before its official annexation to the United States. After a year and two months of negotiation with Hawaii through the arbitration of the U.S. government, the Japanese government obtained $75,000 as compensation. Consequently, these incidents resulted in accelerating the U.S. annexation of Hawaii because the provisional government was afraid of the “Japanization of Hawaii.” Meanwhile, according to Hilary Conroy the Japanese government did not intend the Japanese immigration to Hawaii to be a part of the nation’s expansion policy. Giving priority to the protection of its citizens and its national reputation, the Japanese government had no intention to colonize Hawaii, which would endanger friendly U.S.-Japan relations.

Contrary to the governmental policy, numbers of Japanese intellectuals and some government officials enthusiastically called for the Japan’s “peaceful expansion. However, the Japanese government dared not to take any action against the U.S. annexation of Hawaii because it considered the maintenance of a good U.S.-Japan relations were far more crucial for securing Japan’s status among the world powers.

Nevertheless, motivated by the increasing enthusiastic publications on how to go

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to America as well as news of how Japanese immigrants achieved great success in
foreign lands continuously encouraged the rural Japanese to go to Hawaii and the United
States in search of gold or a job.\footnote{Yosaburo Yoshida, “Sources and Causes of Japanese Emigration,” \textit{Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science} 34, no. 4 (September 1909): 163–164.} In 1899, the number of Japanese emigrants drastically increased in response to the U.S. annexation of Hawaii in 1898.\footnote{The Organic Act signed in 1900 by U.S. President William McKinley (1843–1901) made Hawaii a U.S. territory.} They expected that when Hawaii became a territory of the United States before long, the U.S. government would restrict immigration of contracted laborers.\footnote{Gaimushō Ryōji Ijūbu, \textit{Waga Kokumin no Kaigai Hatten, Honpen}, 55. In addition to Hawaii and the United States, 1,726 Japanese immigrated to Canada, and 790 to Peru in 1899.} As a result, in 1899 alone, Japan sent out total 31,354 Japanese overseas, including 22,973 to Hawaii and 3,140 to the United States.\footnote{Ibid, 93.} According to the U.S. Census of 1900, the Japanese population numbered 61,111, becoming the largest race in Hawaii as shown in Figure 4.1.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{population_hawaii_1900.png}
\caption{Population in Hawaii, 1900}
\end{figure}
In 1900, the total population of Hawaii was 154,001, which included 29,799 native Hawaiians, 7,857 partly Hawaiians, 28,819 Caucasians, 25,767 Chinese, and 233 Blacks and 415 other races. This meant that 39.7 percent of Hawaii’s total population was the Japanese.  

As Table 4.7 shows, during the shiyaku imin jidai (1899–1903), the Japanese government issued a majority of passports to people living in Hiroshima, Kumamoto, and Yamaguchi prefectures because acreage of farmland per capita in these prefectures was too small to subsist. Clearly, the Japanese government issued a great number of passports to the Japanese in the southwestern prefectures who were living under severe poverty due to a series of famine and a serious agricultural depression caused by the “Matsukata Deflation” (1881–1884) that threw large numbers of people out of work. In rural areas particularly, the peasantry were deeply in debt and barely had food to sustain their lives; therefore, those who were desperate to earn money in a short-term preferred emigration to Hawaii in which they expected to earn ten times more wages.

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122 Suzuki, *Nihonjin dekasegi Imin*, 4. During the Meiji, Taisho, and early Showa period, about 800,000 Japanese left for Asia, Oceania, North and South America, and Caribbean as temporary workers.
Table 4.7: Passports Issued by the Japanese Government from 1899 to 1903

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prefecture</th>
<th>Passports Issued</th>
<th>Rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hiroshima</td>
<td>21,871</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumamoto</td>
<td>12,149</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamaguchi</td>
<td>11,219</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukuoka</td>
<td>7,698</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niigata</td>
<td>6,698</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wakayama</td>
<td>3,750</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagasaki</td>
<td>3,548</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyogo</td>
<td>3,532</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okayama</td>
<td>2,176</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miyagi</td>
<td>1,613</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukushima</td>
<td>1,613</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ehime</td>
<td>948</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aichi</td>
<td>767</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukui</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiga</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saga</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of prefectures (27)</td>
<td>5,041</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>84,576</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In addition, the influx of repatriated soldiers into a small market after the First Sino-Japanese War further aggravated the conditions. Certainly, cities with industries could absorb increasing excess labor force; however, rural areas had no capacity of providing jobs for them.

Simultaneously, during the *shiyaku imin jidai*, five major emigration companies in conjunction with the Keihin Ginkō (京浜銀行 Keihin Bank) came to monopolize the
immigration business to Hawaii and made a tremendous amount of profit by committing a various kind of fraud.\textsuperscript{123} Since the emigration companies had played leading roles in facilitating not only overseas emigration but also the development of the nation’s maritime industry by conveying thousands of Japanese laborers, I will examine these companies in detail in Chapter V.

The plantation life of the early Japanese immigrant laborers in Hawaii appeared to be filled with disillusionment because the reality. In order to relieve their sorrows, they sang ‘hole-hole’ bushi (“a name derived from combining the Hawaiian hole-hole (the work of stripping dried cane leaves) with the Japanese bushi (“tune”).\textsuperscript{124} Gary Okihiro describes hole-hole bushi in the Cane Fires as “The music of the songs generally came from Japanese folksongs; the words were the spontaneous feelings and thoughts of workers engaged in plantation labor. Indeed, many hole-hole bushi were composed by women and reflected their experiences and point of view.”\textsuperscript{125} For sustaining their life in Hawaii, the Japanese women worked in the sugar plantations as did men while performing domestic services such as cooking and cleaning for bachelor laborers.\textsuperscript{126} Despite performing the same or more tasks than men did, they received lower wages. According to Article 3 of the terms of labor immigration contract submitted by Ogura Shōkai in 1894, the plantation owners promised to pay monthly salary of $12.50 for each

\textsuperscript{123} Niiya, ed., \textit{Japanese American History}, 192. See Chapter III for the details of Emigration Companies.


\textsuperscript{125} Okihiro, \textit{Cane Fires}, 29.

\textsuperscript{126} Himilce Novas, Lan Cao, and Rosemary Silvia, \textit{Everything You Need to Know about Asian American History} (New York: Plume, 2004), 95.
male laborer and $7.50 for each female laborer. \textsuperscript{127} The Japanese women received five dollars less than men did. Meanwhile if a woman could not labor, fifty-five cents per day were subtracted from her salary and if a man could not, thirty-three cents. \textsuperscript{128} It was the period in which “men even sold their wives for money.” \textsuperscript{129} Many versions of hole-hole bushi exist, and the following song was one of the most famous hole-hole bushi translated by Eileen Tamura:

\begin{verbatim}
Send us money, send us money!
Is the usual note from home.
But how can I do it
In this plight?

Two contract periods have gone by.
We are still here.
Destined to become fertilizer
For sugarcane.

My husband cuts the cane stalks.
And I strip their leaves.
With sweat and tears we both work
For our means.

Shall I go to America?
Or shall I go home to Japan?
I’m lost in thoughts
Here in Hawaii.

If I work at hole hole
All I’ll earn in 35 cents.
If I sleep with a Chinaman
I’ll make $1.00!

Tomorrow is Sunday.
Come and visit me.
My husband will be out watering the fields.
I’ll be alone.\textsuperscript{130}
\end{verbatim}


\textsuperscript{128} Gaimushō Ryōji Ijūbu, \textit{Waga Kokumin no Kaigai Hatten, Honpen}, 132.


\textsuperscript{130} Eileen Tamura, \textit{Americanization, Acculturation, and Ethnic Identity: The Nisei
The lyric of the *hole-hole bushi* delineates how much the Japanese immigrant women had hard time because they had to do extra work in addition to working in the plantation to sustain their life. It also illustrates their consideration for going to America or returning home rather than staying in Hawaii.

Contrary to the *kanyaku imin* who were under the maximal governmental protection and sponsorship, the *shiyaku imin* had to endure harsher working conditions due to the abolishment of the Japan-Hawaii Immigration Convention of 1886 that had protected the Japanese emigrants from abuses. According to *A History of Japanese in Hawaii*, numerous plantation workers had died of endemic, at least two to three laborers daily at the newly started Waipahu plantation.\(^{131}\) In addition, once emigration companies took over the immigration venture, the quality of laborers was not always as appropriate as the *kanyaku imin* whom the Japanese government was responsible for the recruitment of decent laborers. During the *shiyaku imin jidai*, not only the impoverished Japanese but also a large number of hoodlums and the *yakuza* (Japanese gambler or gangster) entered Hawaii in hope of *ikkaku senkin* (striking it rich overnight). In consequence, troubles relating to gambling, drinking, and prostitution drastically increased among the Japanese immigrant community in Hawaii, mainly composed of young bachelors.\(^{132}\) In fact, as Consul General Andō Tarō (安藤太郎, 1846–1924) indicated, these “social evils” had


existed since the *kanyaku inmin jidai.* According to Andō’s report on April 12, 1886:

The inadequate identification procedures followed in handling emigrants have brought about consequences embarrassing to Japan… Some emigrants-to-be have been ‘selling’ their names to others desirous of coming to Hawaii. This does not involve too many complications in the case of males… however, such is not the case with women, many of whom are forced to turn to prostitution to make a living.¹³⁴

Nevertheless, these social problems aggravated during the *shiyaku inmin jidai* due to the entry of inappropriate and undesirable laborers into Hawaii that included a considerable number of the *yakuza,* hoodlums, and prostitutes.

By 1900, dominated by the *yakuza,* downtown Honolulu became a dangerous place in which drinking, gambling, fighting, extortion, violence, including killing and wounding, were rampant.¹³⁵ As early as 1898, the *Pacific Commercial Advertiser* reported criminal activities of the *yakuza* that thirty-three *yakuza* (twenty-two from one gang and eleven from the other gang) were captured by wounding and hospitalizing three Japanese men. However, with the help of gangs, they were bailed out in no time.¹³⁶

According to the Report of the Governor of the Territory of Hawaii, there were total 9,967 arrests in Hawaii in 1900, and Japanese, Chinese, and Hawaiian made up 7,480, mostly charged with gambling, illegal liquor selling, and drunkenness.¹³⁷ The following Table 4.8 illustrates the population of Japanese, Chinese, and Hawaiians in

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¹³⁶ “Police Arrest Members of Two Rival Japanese Gangs,” *Pacific Commercial Advertiser* (Honolulu), June 6, 1898.

1900 excluding Japanese and Chinese born in Hawaii, and the number of arrests relating to gambling, illegal liquor selling, and drunkenness with rates. Comparing three types of arrests, one would easily notice that arrests relating to gambling amounted to a large portion among the Japanese and Chinese immigrants. The arrests of Japanese numbered 2,945, of which 1,138 or 38.7 percent was arrests for gambling. Meanwhile, about 70 percent of all Chinese arrests was for gambling.

Table 4.8: Arrests of Japanese, Chinese, and Hawaiian, 1900

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>1900 Census</th>
<th>Arrests</th>
<th>(%)</th>
<th>Gambling</th>
<th>(%)</th>
<th>Illegal Liquor</th>
<th>(%)</th>
<th>Drunkenness</th>
<th>(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>56,234</td>
<td>2,945</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>1,138</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>27,741</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>1,618</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiian</td>
<td>29,799</td>
<td>2,235</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


To be more specific, on the Island of Kauai alone, there were 865 arrests, of which Chinese and Japanese plantation laborers were the majority charged with gambling and illegal sale of liquor in 1900.\(^{138}\) In addition, there were 29 Americans, 77 Puerto Ricans, 35 Portuguese, and 14 others arrested for gambling. In terms of arrests for illegal liquor selling, there were 9 Americans, 6 Puerto Ricans, 20 Portuguese, and 6 others. Simultaneously, there were 343 Americans, 40 Puerto Ricans, 96 Portuguese and 293 others who were arrested for drunkenness.\(^{139}\) Consequently, the more the Japanese

\(^{138}\) The Honolulu Republican, May 25, 1901.

\(^{139}\) Hawaii, Governor, Report of the Governor of the Territory of Hawaii to the Secretary of the Interior, 1903, 8.
bachelor emigrants entered Hawaii, the more the number of offenses increased in the years before the prevalence of practice of “picture marriage” as shown in Table 4.9.

Table 4.9: Offenses by Japanese in Hawaii, 1900–1928

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japanese Offenses</th>
<th>Total Offenses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>1,480</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>2,083</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>1,988</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>1,951</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>2,360</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>2,799</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>2,323</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>2,538</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>1,635</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>2,240</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>1,563</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to the U.S. Census of 1900 and 1910, Japanese in Hawaii numbered 61,111 (39.7% of total population of Hawaii) and 79,675 (41.5% of total population of Hawaii) respectively. Regarding the percentage of the Japanese population in Hawaii, the crime rate of Japanese was lower than the average. Significantly, the crime rate gradually began to decline after 1920.

Within a section of Chinatown, a red-light district called Makutsu (魔窟, literary “devil’s den”) existed. Located in the corner of Pauahi, Maunakea, and King Streets along River in Honolulu, “delinquency and shameless misconducts constantly took place” in the Makutsu and the Hawaiian polices tended to overlook the crimes within the Makutsu and never exercised strict control over the activities as long as they stayed in the district. Consisting of pimps and gamblers, the yakuza organized the Hinode Club (日の出クラブ, “Rising Sun Club”), the Yamato Club (大和クラブ, “Yamato Club”), and the Gikyō Club (義侠クラブ, “Chivalry Club”) that controlled prostitution business, drinking, and gambling, and made an enormous profit. A considerable number of the Japanese emigrants moved to Honolulu after the end of three-year labor contract. While many got decent jobs with higher wages such as carpenters, gardeners, shopkeepers, and restaurant owners, some entered underworld.

Having their own newspapers such as Hinode Shimbun (日の出新聞, “Sunrise Newspaper”), the yakuza was a tightly organized crime group with financial power that could easily shut down any forces that aimed to obstruct their activities. In fact, initiated by the Theodore Richards, there was a movement to get rid of the pimps and

141 Kaikoku Hyakunen Kinen Bunka Jigyōkai, Nichibei Bunka Kōshōshi, dai 5-kan: Ijūhen, 589–590. Meanwhile, it was not Yamato Club but Isshin Club (一心, whole heart), according to Ryūkichi Kihara, Hawaii Nipponjin Shi (History of the Japanese People in Hawaii) (Tokyo: Bunseisha, 1935), 505–506. “Yamato” is the original country name of Japan. Considering it inappropriate, the Hawaiian Cabinet sought to change the name of Pauahi Street. Pauahi was a princess of Hawaiian Kingdom; therefore, her name should not be the street name on which the headquarters of Japanese prostitutes located, according to the report of The Independent (Honolulu), June 2, 1899.


prostitutes from downtown Honolulu in the early 1896 although it ended in failure, according to Reverend Takie Okumura (1865–1951), a Christian Minister on Oahu.\footnote{144} Along with the development of the *yakuza*, the *Makutsu* became a dangerous corner where traffic in human beings was officially carried out. Therefore, the period between 1892 and 1900 came to be known as the “*Ankoku Jidai*” (暗黒時代, literary “dark age”).\footnote{145} It was a significant period in which the Japanese immigrants wavered whether they should permanently reside in Hawaii, return to Japan, or move to the mainland United States.\footnote{146}

Two of the most important income sources for the *yakuza* were gambling and prostitution. In general, the club members traveled to plantation camps on paydays and held all-night gambling sessions and squeezed out the hard-earned money of laborers. Controlled by the *yakuza*, a number of prostitutes accompanied the club members and practiced prostitution. For example, on Saturday, March 17, 1900, the Hawaiian police officers arrested eight Japanese working in the Paauhau plantation for gambling. Then, three of them, after bailing themselves out, sought money to bail out the rest. On the other hand, while they were detained, the Japanese plantation laborers stood together for rescuing their fellows. “Between 100 and 200 Japanese, armed with cane knives and clubs, forced the police to free the prisoners and to return the bail money” as well as


\footnote{146} Ibid., 374.
money on the gambling mat. A similar riot took place at Ewa plantation in 1904 when the Hawaiian police force consisting of five officers arrested about fifteen Japanese who were gambling in a house inside the camp. When the police were about to leave the house, a gang of 200 Japanese came up against and threw stones at them. Since the police were unarmed, they came again to arrest the Japanese who involved in the riot.

There were approximately two hundred professional gamblers and three hundred prostitutes in Hawaii, and most of them engaging in the prostitution business against their will. Reverend Okumura claimed that about three hundred pimps depended their live on the earnings of prostitutes. Shockingly, for the most part, pimps were the actual husbands of the prostitutes. In other words, husbands made their wives prostitutes for their own profit. This kind of business practice, which husband being a pimp and wife being a prostitute, had never taken place in any part of Japan. In a bachelor-based immigrant society, prostitution appeared to be one of the most profitable businesses.

Examining the wages and price of the time, the prostitution was indeed a profitable and promising business. According to the wage comparison of 1899 listed in A History of Japanese in Hawaii, plantation contract laborer made fifteen dollars a month; free laborer made twenty-six dollar a month, salaried worker made over eighteen dollar a

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147 “Japanese Mob Forces Surrender of Prisoners: Hawaiian Officers Compelled to Free Men Whom They had Arrested for Gambling,” San Francisco Call, April 6, 1900.

148 “Rioting Japanese at Ewa Plantation,” The Hawaiian Gazette (Honolulu), November 18, 1904.


month; carpenter, mason, and ironsmith made about fifty-two dollars a month; maid made eight to twelve dollars a month; and store clerk made twenty to fifty dollars a month if working for American companies, and seven to thirty dollars if working for Japanese companies. As a reference, in 1899, a pound of sugar cost four cents; a quart of milk cost ten cents; Hawaiian beef cost ten cents per pound and American beef cost sixty cents per pound; a handful of fish cost twenty-five cents; renting a cottage cost five to one hundred dollars a month; dinner at restaurant cost twenty-five cents; one-night stay at hotel cost one to five dollars; and set of working clothes cost one dollar and fifty cents. Meanwhile, a typical prostitute earned four to five dollars a night (charging fifty cents to a dollar per customer), and some popular prostitutes could earn twenty dollars a night. Therefore, prosperous prostitutes could save as much as two hundred dollars a month, equivalent to 13 months’ worth of a contract laborer’s salary. Therefore, when Reverend Okumura tried to persuade a prostitute to quit such shady business to live a decent life, she told him; “Doesn’t a big, healthy man on the sugar plantation get only $14 a month? I’m far better off, for in this work I can save up and send back $200 a month to my home in Japan. Am I not a real patriot who enriches our country?”

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153 Ibid., 154–155.


155 Takie Okumura, *Seventy Years of Divine Blessings* (Kyoto: Naigai Publishing Co., 1940), 22. In order to restore the image of Japan, community leaders such as Reverend Okumura risked his life to eradicate the yakuza’s illegal business saying that “I had to do something in order to prevent my country’s honor, and safeguard the trust and confidence of American people in my fellow country,” *Kodomo no Tame ni*, eds. Ogawa and Grant, 63.
Meanwhile, the community leaders made efforts to restore the image of Japan. For example, Reverend Okumura risked his life to eradicate the yakuza’s illegal business saying that “I had to do something in order to preserve my country’s honor, and safeguard the trust and confidence of American people in my fellow countrymen.”

Mostly managed by the yakuza, the widespread prostitution became a major social problem during the shiyaku imin jidai that would eventually develop into the nationwide anti-Japanese movement. As the number of the Japanese emigrants grew in Hawaii, so did the prostitutes as shown in Table 4.10.

Table 4.10: Prostitutes in Honolulu by Nationality, Dec. 1898–Dec. 1899

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>1898</th>
<th>1899</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Rate (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiian</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partly Hawaiian</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>73.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to Henry E. Cooper (1857–1929) who was a lawyer and served as the Attorney General of Hawaii from March 1899 to June 1900, the number of registered

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156 Okumura, “Drive against the Gangsters,” in Kodomo no Tame ni, eds. Ogawa and Grant, 63.
prostitutes in Honolulu strikingly increased within a year between 1898 and 1899, from 157 to 269 prostitutes.

As Table 4.10 illustrates, the Japanese prostitutes accounted for 73 percent of all prostitutes in Honolulu in 1898 and 84 percent in 1899 respectively. In response to the growing demand on prostitution, wife selling became a common practice among the Japanese immigrants in Hawaii. Some gambling-addicted husbands sold their wives in order to pay off their debts.\(^{157}\) As early as 1892, the sheriff of the Island of Hawaii E. G. Hitchcock who later became Circuit Court judge, reported that the practice of wife-selling and mistress-selling was “more or less prevalent on this island.”\(^{158}\) Chief Inspector Nakamura was responsible for initiating the infamous wife-selling practice by forcing men with wives to deposit fifty dollars as her return passage. However, sometimes disillusioned with her husband, wife had ran away with another man who, and in that case, husband demanded wife’s new husband to pay fifty dollars, which he had deposited with the immigration official for her return passage.\(^{159}\) Therefore, initially the wife’s market price was fifty dollars until some sought to make a profit from selling a wife at $100 to $200. The price went up to $1,000 when procurers purchased these wives to make them work in brothels.\(^{160}\)

On January 20, 1900, the Hawaiian government set a fire on the house with a

\(^{157}\) Tamura, Americanization, Acculturation, and Ethnic Identity, 13.


\(^{160}\) Ibid.
bubonic plague patient for the eradication of the bubonic plague. However, fanned by the strong wind, the flames spread in all directions, burning down the streets of Maunakea, River, Smith, and Beretania to the ground including a densely build-up area of the Japanese. The fire devastated both Chinese and Japanese quarters that produced nearly 6,000 homeless, of which 3,500 were Japanese.\textsuperscript{161} According to a report of the chairman of the Japanese society, Dr. Katsunuma, total 3,380 Japanese residents of the district were quarantined, including 138 children and 150 adults from some other districts who happened to be there at the time of fire.\textsuperscript{162} Losing warehouses during the fire, businesses such as Ozaki Shōten and Asada Shōten suffered a great loss. The government required all the victims of fire to remain in the detention centers set up in Kawaihao Church, old armory, and Kakaako and Kalihi districts until April 1, 1900.\textsuperscript{163} The yakuza were not exception, and the \textit{Pacific Commercial Advertiser} headlined “Tough Japanese Gangs at Kalihi Detention Camp Have Been Reduced to Submission.”\textsuperscript{164} Meanwhile, fifty-four newly-arrived Japanese emigrants, having no place to stay due to the outbreak of fire, slept in the open and then moved to a Japanese school for a temporary shelter.\textsuperscript{165} In

\textsuperscript{161} United Japanese Society of Hawaii and Okahata, \textit{A History of Japanese in Hawaii}, 156.

\textsuperscript{162} “Two More Case of Plague, More Selections of Chinatown Quarantined,” \textit{Pacific Commercial Advertiser} (Honolulu), January 3, 1900.


\textsuperscript{164} “Tough Japanese Gangs at Kalihi Detention Camp Have Been Reduced to Submission,” \textit{Pacific Commercial Advertiser} (Honolulu), February 13, 1900.

response to a big fire producing numerous Japanese homeless and destroying 176 establishments, the Japanese community installed the Japanese Emergency Committee that played a crucial role in obtaining $333,730.10 compensation from the government after a series of negotiations.\(^{166}\)

In fact, the fire in Honolulu downtown had some socially positive aspects for the development of the Japanese community by destroying the *Makutsu*. Losing its headquarters, some *yakuza* determined to quit the underworld and returned to decent works, others moved to other islands. In May 1900, taking advantage of a state of confusion, the Hawaiian authorities tried to arrest thirty *yakuza*, charging them with “disturbance of the peace” and instigation of “gambling and drunkenness.” Nevertheless, the Hawaiian authority could not arrest any *yakuza* because no Japanese would testify against them.\(^{167}\) In response to the widespread crimes of the *yakuza*, L. A. Andrews, a sheriff of the Island of Hawaii criticized in 1901 that “the Japanese secret society, which levy blackmail on their own countrymen” posed a threat to the development of the peaceful Hawaiian community. Andrew also indicated that it would be quite difficult “to get information or evidence to convict… because the Japanese are afraid to give evidence, and they well may be, for it is almost as good as a ticket to the next world to openly turn informer on any doing of their organization, as would be necessary in living

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\(^{167}\) “Republic of Hawaii vs. Higuchi et al,” microfilm no. 2789, Criminal Division, Circuit Court, Hawaii, quoted in Hori, “Japanese Prostitution in Hawaii during the Immigration Period,” 120.
In the wake of fire, another red-light district called Iwilei located near the Chinatown flourished. Although the 1900 fire burnt down the Makutsu, prostitution was never eradicated in Honolulu. While some prostitutes reformd themselves, others went back to the prostitution business. According to a missionary W. K. Azbill’s investigation, a Japanese named Yoshiwara operated the dormitories accommodating about two hundred rooms in Iwilei used for “evil purpose.” Declaring it “all too shameful,” Reverend Azbill observed that the patrons were “mostly Chinese and Europeans” as well as Japanese and “during the hours which the authorities have set apart for the evil business, crowds gather about the main entrance [of the dormitories], many of whom are the husbands of the women whom they have carried there to prostitute, or the owners of the prostitutes who are there to be bargained off to any comers to the sink of iniquity.”

Urged by Azbill, the two reporters of the Honolulu Republican made a visit to the place and found out that there were 214 rooms in the dormitories enclosed by 10-feet-high fence; of which 162 women currently occupied these rooms about 10 x 20 feet with a rent of fifteen dollars per month. Other than fourteen French, all occupants were Japanese and they had to be older than sixteen years old. While the cost of the buildings should not be more than $5,000, the owners of the immoral dormitories earned $2,430 dollars (162 women x $15) monthly. The Honolulu Republican warned the public “the


statement of the Rev. W. K. Azbill… gives but faint idea of the terrible evils of this hell hole of iniquity that damns the social and official life of this city.” A policemen on the watch for vice described that there were as many white patrons as Chinese and Japanese in Honolulu, and “some of the best citizens of the town” were among them. In reaction to the prevalence of such immoral business, the devout Christian women of Honolulu called for eradicating social evils that disrupted family life, virtue, and honor of all households.  

In December 1900, a Japanese prostitute in Iwilei named Tome was assaulted by a pimp and hospitalized, and then the Attorney General Dole ordered the court to arrest her for her own safety as well as to make her testify against the pimp. In 1901, approximately 200 prostitutes, most of them Japanese, worked at brothels in Iwilei, and the Hawaiians blamed the decline in “public and private morality” on these women. They succeeded in the segregation of prostitutes in a part of Iwilei in 1904. Although the Makutsu no longer existed, the number of Japanese prostitutes increased and recorded 913 in 1910. When the “picture brides” began entering Hawaii in a great number after 1907, the bachelor-based immigrant society transformed to a stable community that gradually solved social problems relating to prostitution.

The practice of wife selling became more popular practice as a means to obtaining wives because it was faster and cheaper than bringing “picture brides” from their

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170 The Honolulu Republican, August 25, 1900.


In 1904, three Japanese men, charged with the sales of a wife at $225, were arrested. In fact, the *Hawaii Shinpō* described the “wife selling” practice as a method to bring Japanese women into Hawaii by intentionally arranging marriages for getting around the immigration law. Meanwhile, in 1905, the *Pacific Commercial Advertiser* reported that three Japanese men named Honda, Okata, and Kudo were in custody because Kudo helped Honda to sell his wife to Okata for $68.05.

Importantly, the majority of the Japanese emigrants in Hawaii worked hard and saved money as Foreign Minister Inoue had envisioned. Nevertheless, because of the activities of the *yakuza* and the presence of prostitutes, the image of Japan as a whole was at risk. The emergence of “Ankoku Jidai” brought down the reputation of the Japanese and threatened not only the Japanese community but also the Hawaiian public. Significantly, the number of the *yakuza* was far less than the diligent Japanese laborers in Hawaii; however, the *yakuza*’s illegal operations began to irritate the Hawaiian public. In response, the Hawaiian government came to seriously consider wiping out the social evils from the Iwilei, especially after receiving attention from the mainland’s newspapers. Simultaneously, it incited the rise of anti-Japanese feeling among the leading class of Hawaii similar to what happened to the Chinese immigrants a few decades ago. Hori argues that California no longer appreciated the entry of the Japanese for fear of the

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174 “Three Japanese were Arrested and Charged with Selling a wife for $225,” *Pacific Commercial Advertiser* (Honolulu), September 2, 1904.


176 “PCA Reports Another Case of ‘Selling a Japanese Wife’,,” *Pacific Commercial Advertiser* (Honolulu), July 19, 1905.
prevalence of Japanese working in prostitution. Particularly, after Japan’s victory of the First Sino-Japanese War, anti-Japanese sentiment in the Pacific Coast developed and subsequently a series of legislation passed that restricted the further Japanese immigration to Hawaii and the United States. In reaction to the increasing presence of the Japanese in the Pacific Coast and the passage of the Lodge Bill that required immigrants literacy test, Republican Senator George C. Perkins of California suggested imposing a ten-dollar tax on Japanese immigrants arguing that “another danger menaced the coast, for the Japanese ‘Yankees of Asia’ were coming in great numbers.”

Widespread Japanese exclusion resulted in changing the trend of the Japanese immigration. For example, the first Japanese mass immigration to Peru took place in 1899 carrying 790 the Japanese men and women, and to Brazil in 1908. Meanwhile, not many Japanese immigrated to Canada despite wages in Canada being close to that of the United States. In addition, due to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (日英同盟) in 1902, it was not difficult for Japanese to immigrate to Canada. According to Imin Hogo Kyōkai (Association to Protect Emigrants), the Japanese hesitated to immigrate to Canada because the Canadian government required English language ability, of which the

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178 Gaimushō Ryōji Ijūbu, Waga Kokumin no Kaigai Hatten, Honpen, 94.
180 Gaimushō Ryōji Ijūbu, Waga Kokumin no Kaigai Hatten, Honpen, 93–94.
Japanese emigrants were afraid.  

\textit{Jiyū Imin Jidai (1900–1907)}

In 1900, the U.S. government’s prohibition on the contract-labor immigration known as 1885 Contract Labor Law became effective in Hawaii and influenced the pattern of the Japanese overseas immigration. Simultaneously, on August 2, the Japanese Foreign Ministry restricted the labor immigration by ceasing to issue passports to those who sought to leave for America. Indeed, the prohibition of the contract-labor immigration increased the demand for laborers among the planters that resulted in a wage increase. In 1902, the restriction was slightly relaxed, and the rural Japanese paid their own passages, found their own jobs and established residence in Hawaii. The years between 1900 and 1907 is called the \textit{jiyū imin jidai} (free immigration period). In this period, facilitated by the U.S. annexation of Hawaii, many Japanese who sought better-paid jobs could emigrate to the United States by entering Hawaii first. In Hawaii, the Japanese plantation laborers earned eighteen dollars a month on average; whereas engaging in railroad, mining, and agricultural labor, one could earn about forty dollars in the United States. The difference motivated many Japanese to come to the United States after 1900.

During the \textit{jiyū imin jidai}, the Japanese who emigrated to the United States had to

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pay for their own passages, so did those to Hawaii after 1900. In 1897, it cost eighty-nine yen to go the West Coast and sixty-five yen to Hawaii.\footnote{Nishimukai, “Transportation of Japanese Emigrants in the Pre-War Period,” 107; Tamura, \textit{Americanization, Acculturation, and Ethnic Identity}, 10.} In Japan, daily workers earned eighteen sen and carpenter twenty-five sen. Assuming that an average daily wage at twenty sen, it required fifteen months’ worth of salary to go to the United States and eleven months’ to Hawaii. As Nishimukai points out, compared with the wage of the time, the passage fare was extremely high. Therefore, it became heavy burden on the impoverished Japanese households. In some cases, the parents of emigrants mortgaged their houses to procure the passage fare for their sons. Obviously, the bottom of the class structure could not manage to raise the money for emigration.\footnote{Ibid.}

As Table 4.11 illustrates, despite the restriction on the entry of contract laborers, the number of Japanese emigrants had constantly grown until the signing of the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907–1908

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Number of Japanese Emigrants Entering Hawaii, 1901–1907}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
\hline
Year & Number of Emigrants \\
\hline
1901 & 3,136 \\
1902 & 14,490 \\
1903 & 9,901 \\
1904 & 9,443 \\
1905 & 10,813 \\
1906 & 25,752 \\
1907 & 14,397 \\
Total & 87,932 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}
The increase in the number of Japanese emigrants to Hawaii was proportional to growth of the emigration companies, which made undue profits by exploiting the emigrants (See Chapter VII).

One of the most insulting incidents took place in 1901 at the port of entry that came to unite the Japanese immigrants to protest against the racial discrimination. Upon the arrival, every immigrant had to have a physical examination. On July 25, four Japanese women arriving at Honolulu by *America Maru* (亜米利加丸, owned by Tōyō Kisen Kaisha) were stripped for the inspection of bubonic plague. Regardless of being first- or second-class passengers, Japanese women were required to take off their clothes for the inspection while white passengers were exempted from the inspection for the most time.  

According to Ito’s account;

> When two girl students, along with Mrs. Saburō Okabe of the Japanese Consular Staff, and her maid, arrived in Honolulu, they were undressed by a male Inspector Koffa—“a mean and unnecessary method.” Though the Consulate General in Hawaii was reluctant to take action, nevertheless the Japanese in Hawaii became indignant. They organized a Japanese-American Conference and sent a protest message to the then-President of the United States. As a result the United States government reorganized the staff, removed Inspector Koffa, and began using women as inspectors.

One of the insulted Japanese women named Imai Tameko (今井為子, age 27) strongly demanded the Japanese Vice Consul Okabe to protest against Cofer’s (Koffa) action to

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the Hawaiian government, arguing “it is your duty to protect the helpless countrymen.”

According to Imai’s affidavit, “First, [the inspector] checked crotch, armpits, abdominal region, and then carefully examined breasts. Lastly, he checked the genital area…."

In response to the insulting conduct by the inspector, the Japanese leaders in Hawaii formed the *Hawai Nihonjinkai* (布哇日本人会, Japanese Association of Hawaii) for protecting the rights of immigrants since Okabe was not going to take a legal action against the insult on the Japanese women. Due to the effort of the *Hawai Nihonjinkai*, the Governor of Hawaii removed Cofer from the president of the Board of Health.

After the dissolution of the *Hawai Nihonjinkai*, leaders of the Japanese in Hawaii formed the *Chūō Nihonjinkai*.

Nevertheless, even after the replacement of the inspector, racial discriminatory practices continued. A daughter of a farmer, Fuyo Nishiyori, who sailed to Honolulu by *Shinano Maru* (信濃丸, owned by Nippon Yusen Kaisha), recalled that the inspector told her not to come too close to him because she smelled bad. She was very angry at “being

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190 Ibid., 298.


treated like a dirty pig.”194 In 1905, aiming to carry out more radical social reform, the *Kakushin Dōshikai*, formed by members who were discontented with the *Chūō Nihonjinkai* neglecting to take appropriate measures, fought for the interest of the plantation laborers.195 When the *Kakushin Dōshikai* successfully replaced Saitō Miki and halted the operation of the notorious Keihin Ginkō and emigration companies, it dispersed in 1906.196

Regardless of the restrictions on immigration, the number of Japanese immigrants in Hawaii and the United States kept growing before 1907. According to the record of the Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, between August of 1901 and 1907, in all 87,932 Japanese entered Hawaii, and 38,036 of them transmigrated to the mainland United States between 1902 and 1907.197 In fact, beginning as early as 1888, the numbers of Japanese in Hawaii who had transmigrated to the United States reached 56,018 by 1905 and 75,146 in 1906.198 Although the most Japanese who went to the United States were earnest *dekasēgi* laborers, they were “uneducated rustics, poorly dressed due to low wages, pitiful in behavior and lifestyle, and not assimilated into American culture.”199 The *San Francisco Chronicle*, reporting “The Japanese Invasion: The Problem of the Hour,”

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198 Ibid., 134–135.

began a campaign to exclude Japanese from the West Coast. In the course of the passage of a resolution against unrestricted immigration, the California Legislature considered the Japanese “undesirable immigrants because of their poverty and habits” who “cannot become citizens” and “show no desire to assimilate with the American people.” Therefore, the government should adopt measures against the Japanese immigration “as it did against Chinese immigration, because the Japanese coolie is as deadly a competitor against the American laborer as the Chinese.” The critics of Japanese declared that “He (Japanese) dresses in American garb, but he is as alien in his thoughts, his religion and his methods of life as the Chinese.” According to the critics, Japanese students attended the Christian Sunday schools not for religious cause but for learning English. Consequently, the influx of such kind of Japanese laborers incited the Japanese exclusion movement in San Francisco characterized by the segregation of the Japanese schoolchildren in 1906. This incident had more critical consequences on the course of the development of the U.S.-Japan diplomatic relations than previously thought.

Meanwhile, the Japanese laborers in the sugar plantations stood together and went on strikes in order to protest the violation of contracts as well as to request improvement in their treatment. Taking place in May 1904, the strike in the Waipahu Estate in Oahu mobilized thirteen hundred Japanese who demanded the discharge of the notorious head luna, Patterson. According to an interpreter who was at the plantation, despite the plantation had prohibited “lotteries and gambling, luna Patterson has conducted lotteries

202 Ibid.
of various kinds for his personal benefit, and in the event that Japanese laborers did not participate in them they were discharged on various pretexts.” In addition, Patterson prohibited any outsider to come into the plantation to sell goods, the plantation laborers had to buy goods only offered by the plantation. 203 When Patterson resigned, the Japanese strikers returned to work on May 5. This strike lasted for only four days.

In general, the Japanese immigrants before 1907 were mostly single men with eighth-grade education and farming background, whose purpose was to accumulate wealth and return home to live comfortably. 204 Initially, over 90 percent of those who left Japan were dekasegi-nin (出稼ぎ人 emigrant or sojourn laborer) who did not intend to reside in the United States permanently. 205 In the first place, the Japanese government had restricted the period of labor contract to three years and expected them to return home with foreign currency and advanced farming techniques that could facilitate the nation’s industrialization. 206 Since the Japanese were aliens “ineligible to citizenship,” the Japanese emigrants kept their Japanese way of life although they had lived in America for more than decades. 207 They had it in mind to return home someday.

203 “Japanese on a Serious Strike: Sixteen Hundred on Waipahu Estate,” The Hawaiian Gazette (Honolulu), May 4, 1904.


205 Suzuki, Nihonjin Dekasegi Imin, 13.


207 The Naturalization Act of 1790. Revised in 1795, the Naturalization Act restricted citizenship to “free white persons” who had resided in the United States for five years and renounced their allegiance to their native country. In addition, the Naturalization Act of 1870 restricted citizenship to “white persons and persons of African descent” which prohibited Asians
Therefore, the years between 1885 and 1907 or the period between the beginnings of the *kanyaku imin* to the end of *jiyū imin* is known as the *dekasegi imin jidai* (出稼移民時代, temporary emigrant period).  

**Yobiyose Imin Jidai (1908–1924)**

As the Japanese mass immigration to the United States continued either directly from Japan or by way of Hawaii, the Japanese exclusion movement among the working class further intensified, and there were indications that it would develop into a nationwide sentiment. Ordered by the San Francisco Board of Education on October 11, 1906, the segregation of Japanese schoolchildren from the public schools after the 1906 earthquake well characterized the rise of a serious anti-Japanese sentiment in the West Coast region in which the majority of Japanese immigrants resided. The Board’s decision for segregation attributed to the anti-Japanese agitators who argued that it was inappropriate to educate American children with Japanese and made negative propaganda against Japanese. In fact, there were only ninety-three students, of whom only twelve were over seventeen years old, spread over twenty-three schools.  

The Japanese parents, arguing the racially insulting treatment of the Board of Education as a “violation

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208 Kaikoku Hyakunen Kinen Bunka Jigyōkai, *Nichibei Bunka Kōshōshi, dai 5-kan: Ijū-hen*, 588. Arriving in 1868, the first group of the Japanese mass immigration called the *Gannen-mono* hardly laid the foundations of the Japanese community in Hawaii because most of them returned to Japan or transmigrated to the United States.

of the U.S.-Japan treaty,” did not send their children to the designated oriental school.\textsuperscript{210} The Japanese Consul General in San Francisco Ueno Suesaburō (上野季三郎, 1864–1933) immediately protested against the Board of Education by indicating three points: First, it not only deprives the Japanese schoolchildren of educational opportunity but also causes them trouble attending a designated school because they were scattering over forty-two square miles of San Francisco. Second, the decision is regarded as an act of insult by declaring the Japanese as inferior race and it brings disgrace on the Japanese subjects. Third, in a city of the United States that advocates liberty, San Francisco citizens would not intend to publicize such narrow-minded restriction on education on the children of a friendly nation.\textsuperscript{211}

As a temporary relief to the problem, the U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt, authorizing the Executive Order No. 589 on March 14, 1907, banned the further migration of Japanese laborers from Hawaii, Mexico, and Canada into the United States.\textsuperscript{212} In return, the Japanese schoolchildren were allowed to attend the American public schools. Meanwhile, in response to the act, the Japanese residents in Hawaii sent a telegram on February 19 for petitioning the Japanese government to protest against the Immigration Act of 1907.\textsuperscript{213} Subsequently, numbers of emigration companies and agents

\textsuperscript{210} Kaikoku Hyakunen Kinen Bunka Jigyōkai, *Nichibe Bunka Kōshōshi, dai 5-kan: Ijū-hen*, 113.

\textsuperscript{211} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{212} Executive Order No. 589, March 14, 1907. This order became ineffective when President Harry Truman authorized Executive Order 10009, October 18, 1948. Executive Order No. 589 is known as *Tenkō Kinshi-rei* (転航禁止令) in Japan.

went out of business when the labor immigration to the United States ended.\textsuperscript{214}

The period between the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907–1908 and the Immigration Act of 1924 is known as the \textit{yobiyose imin jidai}. Under the agreement, Japan agreed not to issue passports valid for the continental United States to laborers. On the other hand, the United States allowed Japan to issue passports for the United States to “laborers who have already been in America and to the parents, wives, and children of laborers already resident there.”\textsuperscript{215} During this period, only those who were returning to America or were summoned by their relatives already residing in America were allowed to enter the country. As a result, 62,277 Japanese entered Hawaii as the \textit{yobiyose imin}. That included 26,506 males, 30,633 females, and 5,138 children.\textsuperscript{216} Subsequently, the Gentlemen’s Agreement facilitated the Japanese male emigrants to form families by calling their wives and brides and to establish permanent settlement in Hawaii or the United States. According to the statistics of the United States Immigration Department, 14,276 Japanese “picture brides” immigrated to Hawaii between the years 1907 and 1923.\textsuperscript{217} Significantly, sharing the similar tradition and practices based on Confucianism, 951 Korean “picture brides” entered Hawaii in the same period. While the Japanese and Korean emigrants preferred to marry women of the same nationality, Chinese immigrants married native Hawaiians because virtually no Chinese women were allowed to enter

\textsuperscript{214} Niiya, ed., \textit{Japanese American History}, 38.


\textsuperscript{216} Kimura, \textit{Issei: Japanese Immigrants in Hawaii}, 142.

\textsuperscript{217} United Japanese Society of Hawaii and Okahata, \textit{A History of Japanese in Hawaii}, 165–166. In Hawaii, the Japanese practiced the “picture marriage” until the Immigration Act of 1924 became effective on July 1, 1924, while the Japanese in the mainland stopped the practice in 1920, according to Kimura, \textit{Issei: Japanese Immigrants in Hawaii}, 1943.

The influx of the Japanese “picture brides” alleviated the imbalanced gender ratio of Japanese males to females from 4 to 1 in the 1890s to 3 to 2 by 1920.\footnote{Franklin S. Odo and Kazuko Shinoto, \textit{A Pictorial History of the Japanese in Hawaii, 1885–1924} (Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1985), 75.} The system of “picture marriage” gradually transformed the Japanese immigrant society from bachelor-based \textit{dekas\=e}gi laborers to permanent residents with wives and children.\footnote{Takaki, \textit{Pau Hana: Plantation Life and Labor in Hawaii}, 124.} They were “unconsciously Americanized to the point where they no longer desired to return to Japan permanently.”\footnote{United Japanese Society of Hawaii and Okahata, \textit{A History of Japanese in Hawaii,} 166.} While residing in Hawaii for years, they came to favor life in Hawaii more than their life in Japan based on feudalistic customs and traditions. Those who had children were likely to settle in Hawaii, and many of them moved to cities and established their own businesses.

In the course of Americanization and the development of the Japanese community in Hawaii, the Japanese, calling for equality, carried out large-scale and well-organized plantation strikes in 1909 and 1920. In the Oahu strike of 1909 that involved all major plantations and lasted for four months, the Japanese leaders petitioned the planters to raise wages and to abolish the wage system based on the ethnicity of the laborers.\footnote{Takaki, \textit{Pau Hana}, 153.153.} Supported by the Japanese press in Hawaii, the Japanese strikers argued they needed higher wages to support their families and to provide better housing. It involved 7,000
Japanese plantation laborers and their families. The prices of food and clothing in Hawaii had increased by 25 percent between 1905 and 1908 while their wage remained the same at eighteen dollars a month. Therefore, the strikers demanded to raise wages to $22.50 or 25 percent increase in order to sustain the minimum standard of living. After a raise, consuming the fine rice and soy sauce imported from Japan, their quality of food improved by 1912. Meanwhile, in the strike of 1920 that eventually involved 8,300 plantation laborers (77 percent of labor force), Japanese in cooperation with Filipino laborers demanded higher wages. Due to the Issei’s efforts to establish the permanent settlement and the development of Japanese community in Hawaii, by 1920, the number of Japanese increased to 42 percent or 109,000 out of a total Hawaiian population of 256,000.

**Issei in Hawaii—Cultural Identity**

Culturally connected to Japan to a large degree, many Japanese immigrants were proud to be Japanese subjects, and they preferred to pursue the traditional Japanese way of life. In terms of cultural values and practices, the early Japanese community in Hawaii was not so distinct from a small community in Japan. Significantly, coming to Hawaii as

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225 “Hawai no Nihonjin: Ueno Soryoji-dan” (Japanese in Hawaii, according to Consul General Ueno), *Chuo Shimbun* (Central News) (Tokyo), June 6, 1912.


temporary laborers, they had no intention or need to be a part of Hawaiian community. Rather than assimilating into the Hawaiian population, the Japanese immigrants formed their own ethnic enclave and isolated themselves from the other ethnic groups due to the nature of plantation life. Forming numbers of *kenjinkai* (県人会, Prefectural Club) mainly consisting of *Issei*, the Japanese in Hawaii further distinguished themselves by drawing members who came from the same prefecture in Japan. The mission of the *kenjinkai* was primarily aiding new immigrants from Japan, helping them find jobs, forming consumer cooperatives, and financially stimulated the establishment of private businesses.\(^{228}\) The *kenjinkai* even promoted the marriage between the persons from the same prefecture. In fact, the *kenjinkai* were both socially and economically crucial associations for the development of the Japanese immigrant community in America.\(^{229}\)

In 1892, Reverend Takie Okumura established *Nihongo Shogakko* (Japanese Elementary School), the first Japanese language school in Honolulu. Meanwhile, Fukuda Seiji founded the first Japanese language school named *Nihongo Gakkō* (日本語学校, Japanese Language School) in Maui in 1895.\(^{230}\) The educational policy and curriculum of the *Nihongo Gakkō* was initially nothing different from that of schools in rural Japan.\(^{231}\) The school aimed to educate the Nisei (second-generation Japanese) to be

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Japanese subjects. Since the Issei (first-generation Japanese) did not intend to stay in Hawaii permanently, they wanted their children to learn the Japanese way, values, and discipline. Under the school regulations proposed by Reverend Okumura in 1896, the Nihongo Gakkō was to educate schoolchildren in Japanese style and to educate them reading, writing, and composition based on the textbook approved by the Japanese Ministry of Education. On the Japanese national holidays, the Japanese schoolchildren went to the Nihongo Gakkō that held a ceremony to worship emperor’s portrait, to sing kimigayo (君が代, national anthem), and to read the Imperial Rescript on Education aloud, instead of attending the public school. It was merely an “extension of the Japanese national education into Hawaii.”

The Japanese immigrant leaders in Hawaii concerned that many Nisei children, raised by uneducated parents in the undesirable learning environment, needed adjustment to be decent Japanese subjects by teaching them proper Japanese language and wholesome “Japanese spirit.” In fact, the planters initially supported the Nihongo Gakkō by providing a building site and maintenance fee; however, after 1907 many Americans came to think it was inappropriate to teach the Nisei loyalty and patriotism toward Japan. Revised for several times, the new Japanese textbook finally completed in 1937 emphasized educating the Nisei to be loyal American citizens.

As the number of Japanese working in Hawaii increased during the shiyaku imin jidai, missionary work became more active. The Japanese immigrants brought not only

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233 Ibid., 440.

234 Ibid., 440–441.
Buddhism but also Shinto into Hawaii. Established as early as 1897 with two priests from the headquarters in Kyoto, the Japanese Buddhist missionaries began to propagate the *Nishi Hongwanji* (*Jōdo Shin-shu*, a sect popular in southern Japan).\(^{235}\) A year later, the first Shinto shrine, *Yamato Jinja* (大和神社) was built in Hilo, where the Japanese plantation laborers were concentrated. Especially after the “picture marriage” began, the Shinto shrines provided wedding ceremonies, *hatsu mairi* (the newborn’s first visit to Shinto shrine for blessing) service, and amulets. In addition, the shrines offered place for leisure such as *sumo* (Japanese wrestling) matches and *go* (a strategy game similar to Chinese chess) tournaments.\(^{236}\)

In fact, before the arrival of a Buddhist and Shinto priest, Miyama Kan’ichi (美山貫一, 1847–1936), the first Japanese-speaking evangelist of the Methodist Episcopal Church, came to Hawaii and engaged in missionary work. Cooperating with Consul General Andō Tarō and inspector-in-chief of Japanese Immigrants Nakayama Jōji, Miyama organized the Mutual Assistance Society (precursor of the Japanese Benevolent Society) in 1887. The Hawaiian press praised Miyama as “a man of rare natural abilities, of intense personal devotedness…. he had come to be a power for righteousness among the increasing numbers of his countrymen” in Hawaii.\(^{237}\) Japanese churches were


established in Hilo in 1888, and then in Nuuanu and Honomu in 1894. \(^\text{238}\) Although Miyama succeeded in converting Consul General Andō to Christianity, his sermons and the Christian doctrines failed to attract the Japanese laborers in Hawaiian plantations, mainly consisting of people from Hiroshima and Yamaguchi in which Buddhism flourished. \(^\text{239}\) Andō, quitting drinking and smoking, founded the Issei’s temperance society known as Japanese Blue Ribbon League for eradicating evils of drinking and gambling. Christianizing his wife and consulate stuffs, Andō was a great supporter of Miyama. \(^\text{240}\) Christianity did not thrive among Issei because it “could not overcome the cultural and religious barriers posed by the unstable, amoral nature of the plantation community and the entrenched Buddhist beliefs and customs of the Issei.” \(^\text{241}\)

By 1908, the Japanese community supported as many as thirty-three temples and shrines in addition to twenty-six churches. \(^\text{242}\) In 1915, a year after Japan entered World War I, *Maui Jinja* (馬嘜神社) was built which was the first Shinto shrine in Maui. As Inoue argues, the prospectus of the construction of *Maui Jinja* stated the Japanese in Hawaii as the “subjects of the empire of Japan” and encouraged the Japanese immigrants...


\(^{239}\) Ibid., 435.


\(^{241}\) Ogawa and Grant, *Kodomo no Tame ni*, 48.

to preserve their “Japanese spirit.”

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A great number of Japanese had immigrated to Hawaii since the beginning of the kanyaku imin jidai to the end of the yobiyose imin jidai through the enactment of the Immigration Act of 1924. Nearly 30,000 Japanese entered Hawaii during the kanyaku imin jidai between 1885 and 1894. Then, during the shiyaku imin and jiyū imin jidai between 1895 and 1908, roughly 100,000 Japanese landed on Hawaii, and during the yobiyose imin jidai between 1908 and 1924, approximately 60,000 Japanese entered Hawaii. According to the record of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, about 190,000 Japanese arrived in Hawaii between 1885 (the year the first kanyaku imin left Japan for Hawaii) and 1924 (when the Japanese immigration to the United States was banned). Of all, about 100,000 Japanese settled in Hawaii; nearly 40,000 moved to the mainland U.S., and roughly 60,000 returned to Japan.

Initially, they came to Hawaii as dekasegi laborers in order to accumulate wealth and return home to live a better life. Sponsored by the government, the kanyaku imin could make enormous remittance to Japan and their achievement paved the way for the


244 Gaimushō Ryōji Ijūbu, Waga Kokumin no Kaigai Hatten, Honpen, 57–58.

245 Ibid., 58.

246 Sōen Yamashita, Nihon Hawaii Kōryū-shi (History of Relations between Japan and Hawaii) (Tokyo: Daito Shuppansha, 1943); Gaimushō Ryōji Ijūbu, Waga Kokumin no Kaigai Hatten, Honpen, 58.
mass emigration to Hawaii thereafter. It is important to note that as clearly stated by the Japanese Foreign Minister, the government came to promote the Japanese overseas emigration as a means of obtaining foreign currency, which was crucial in the course of Japan’s rapid modernization. Therefore, not only socioeconomic conditions but also the national policies “pushed” the Japanese to immigrate to Hawaii. By the time of the First Sino-Japanese War and Russo-Japanese War, considerable numbers of draft dodgers and hoodlums entered Hawaii in addition to dekasegi laborers. Unlike the kanyaku imin who were under governmental protection and supervision, the shiyaku imin and jiyū imin had to start with huge debts because they depended on the services of the greedy emigration companies to go to Hawaii.

Consequently, social evils such as drinking, gambling, and prostitution thrived in the bachelor-based immigrant community often referred to a “bachelor society,” in which the yakuza had significant influence. Significantly, Japan’s victories over China and Russia bolstered the nationalism and made the Japanese emigrants further keep cultural ties with Japan. Although not intending to settle permanently, in order to live as the subjects of the Japanese Empire, they had built numbers of Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines in addition to Christian churches on the islands of Hawaii. Because of their strong cultural ties to Japan as well as their growing population in Hawaii, the newspapers headlined such as “The Japanese Are Taking Possession of Hawaii: The Little Brown Men of Nippon Are Overrunning the Islands—Place Becoming Orientalized Instead of Americanized” and reported that “Yellow Peril” was no longer a myth in

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247 Arranged by Enomoto Takeaki as a part of the kaigai hatten, the first organized Japanese immigration to Mexico took place in May 1897 for establishing a coffee plantation, according to Danial M. Masterson and Sayaka Funada-Classen, *The Japanese in Latin America* (Urbana; Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 27–28.
As Iga Mamoru interpreted, Japanese’ preservation of culture and tradition obstructed their process of assimilation into American way to a large degree. Unlike the mainland United States, the anti-Japanese sentiment in Hawaii never developed into a large-scale movement because Japanese immigrants by then played an important role in the growth of Hawaiian economy. Moreover, they were too many to be excluded in Hawaii.

Finally, after the end of labor immigration, the Japanese women arrived at Hawaii as “picture brides” and played a significant role in developing the Japanese communities through the establishment of families. The Japanese laborers’ demand to summon wives acted as a catalyst for the immigration of Japanese women in numbers. After years of living in Hawaii, the Japanese immigrants gradually came to think Hawaii as their “home,” especially, once they had children. It was natural for the Japanese in Hawaii to determine to settle permanently because Hawaii, receiving immigrants from many countries, offered multicultural ground, which the Japanese were culturally important component although the ruling class remained the white planters. Japanese immigrants, accounting for nearly 70 percent of plantation labor at its peak, were indispensable for the expansion of sugar industry as well as for the development of Hawaii as a territory of

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251 “Number and Nationality of All Laborers on Hawaiian Sugar Plantation, Jan. 1, 1894,” Biennial Report of the President of the Bureau of Immigration, 1894, Table A; Kihara, Hawaii Nipponjin Shi, 189–199; Conroy, The Japanese Frontier in Hawaii, 85.
As Table 4.12 illustrates, the Japanese laborers played a crucial role in the development of the sugar industry in Hawaii especially after the late nineteenth century. Obviously, the growth of sugar industry in Hawaii was indebted to the toil of Japanese emigrants.

**Table 4.12: Hawaii’s Sugar Output and Japanese Laborers, 1890–1933**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sugar Production</th>
<th>Laborers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Output (ton)</td>
<td>Increase (ton)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>129,899</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>153,342</td>
<td>+ 23,443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>360,038</td>
<td>+ 206,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>426,428</td>
<td>+ 66,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>646,445</td>
<td>+ 220,017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>776,072</td>
<td>+ 129,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>1,035,548</td>
<td>+ 259,476</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As much as the Japanese sought to make money for the welfare of their families and the nation, the planters in Hawaii sought cheap and effective labor force for accumulating their wealth. The socioeconomic conditions in Japan and Hawaii created an environment which facilitated the Japanese mass immigration to Hawaii.
CHAPTER V

DEVELOPMENT OF THE MARITIME INDUSTRY

This chapter examines the inseparable relationship between the growth of Japanese maritime industry and overseas emigration. Pursuing modernization of military, the Meiji government put weight on the strengthening of the Imperial Japanese Navy to join the world powers. The government cooperation with Mitsubishi was one of the major factors that facilitated Japan’s rapid modernization. Meanwhile, by assisting the Japanese government, Mitsubishi (and later Nippon Yusen Kaisha) grew in size and came to dominate various industries in Meiji Japan. The extensive government subsidies for navigation and shipbuilding encouraged the huge expansion of maritime industry. In that process, transportation of emigrants in great numbers stimulated not only passenger service but also freight across the Pacific. This chapter attempts to demonstrate that Japanese overseas emigration was indeed a byproduct of Japanese modernization policy that focused on controlling the sea.

The Rise of Mitsubishi

The founder of Mitsubishi, Iwasaki Yatarō once said, “Development of the shipping will make Japan affluent.”¹ Known as a seishō (政商, businessman with

¹ Shinya Gaku, Bakumatsu Ishin Eiketsutachi no libun: Sakamoto Ryōma kara Sagara
political affiliations), Yatarō promoted the Meiji policy of *fukoku kyōhei* and the development of industries by utilizing his tremendous financial power. The cooperation of the Japanese government and Mitsubishi significantly influenced the course of the development of Japan in many aspects. Beginning in the Taiwan Expedition of 1874, where Yatarō showed his patriotism, the government and Mitsubishi had mutually supported each other’s interests. The growth of shipping industry was in proportion to the growth of commerce and overseas emigration. Once the *kanyaku imin* began in 1885 after the governments of Japan and the Kingdom of Hawaii signed an agreement in 1884, the Japanese government actively stimulated the development of the nation’s shipping industry, and Mitsubishi (and the Nippon Yūsen Kaisha) was designed to benefit from the deal. Subsequently, the large-scale Japanese overseas emigration not only produced enormous profit but also contributed to making Japan one of the dominant maritime powers in the world. Furthermore, Mitsubishi played a significant role in the rise of capitalism in Japan through the development of shipping industry at first. The rise of modern Japan was deeply related to the growth of Mitsubishi which facilitated the establishment of the national prestige among the world powers. Examining the Japanese overseas emigration

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*Sozo made* (Stating Heroes’ Side of Story in the Late Tokugawa to the Meiji Restoration: From Sakamoto Ryoma to Sagara Sozo) (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyūjo, 2009), 66.

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2 In 1885, due to a severe price war between the Yūbin Kisen Mitsubishi Kaisha and the Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha, the Japanese government merged two companies and created the Nippon Yūsen Kaisha. In 1893, the Nippon Yūsen Kaisha became the Nippon Yūsen Kabushiki Kaisha, a joint-stock company.
that intertwined with the Japanese government policies, the emigration could be interpreted as a byproduct of the rapid industrialization and modernization for the establishment of a nation-state.

Briefly, Iwasaki Yatarō was a powerful entrepreneur who was a student of Nakahama Manjirō (a castaway who had contributed to the modernization of Japan) as well as Yoshida Tōyō (a reformer of Tosa-han who advocated the opening of Japan).³ Born into a peasant family in Tosa-han in 1834, Yatarō had a quite humble life in his childhood, and he was sick of being poor.⁴ Financially supported by his relatives, Yatarō could attend school and learn Chinese ethics and classics. Considering the samurai title would be crucial for his success, when Yatarō became twenty years old, he bought a title of a lower-class samurai called gōshi (郷士) with the help of his relatives. With a title of samurai, he was able to go to Edo as an attendant of daimyo.⁵ Although after the assassination of Yoshida, Yatarō followed his teacher’s view that Japan needed to promote industries, shipping, and international trade in order to survive the economic competition among the world powers.⁶

Yatarō wisely took advantage of a series of political events in the early Meiji


⁴ Iwasaki family was previously samurai family; however, suffering poverty, his great-grandfather sold their gōshi samurai status and became jige rōnin (former lower-ranked rural masterless samurai), according to William D. Wray, Mitsubishi and the N.Y. K., 1870–1914: Business Strategy in the Japanese Shipping Industry (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 21.


⁶ Wray, Mitsubishi and the N.Y. K., 21.
period and accumulated great assets by dominating the shipping industry. After the
dissolution of the Kaientai developing from the Kameyamashachu organized by
Sakamoto Ryōma in which Yatarō served as an accountant, the Tosa-han appointed
Yatarō to be a superintendent of the shipping firm Tsukumo Shōkai (九十九商会,
Tsukumo Trading Company) in October 1870. Then, informed by his close friend and a
member of the House of Councilors Gotō Shōjirō (後藤 象二郎, 1838–1897) that the
government would exchange domain scrip with new national currency (yen) in 1871,
Yatarō made an enormous profit by buying up 100,000 ryō (両, gold coin) worth of
nearly valueless scrip and exchanging them with the new currency.7 After the Meiji
government carried out haihan-chiken in 1871 (廃藩置県, abolition of the han [domains]
and the establishment of the ken [prefectures] under the centralized government), the
Tsukumo Shōkai transformed from a “domain enterprise” to a “private company.”
Thereafter, Yatarō became the owner of the Tsukumo Shōkai and renamed it the
Mitsubishi Shōkai (三菱商会, Mitsubishi Trading Company) in 1873.8 The Mitsubishi
Shōkai engaged in the maritime transportation and trading business that eventually
developed into the leading Mitsubishi zaibatsu (財閥, business conglomerates) in Japan.9
Mitsubishi means “three diamonds,” which became a company emblem derived from

7 It was clearly an act of insider-trading conducted by Gotō and Iwasaki. They
established a family connection when Yatarō’s younger brother, Yanosuke had married Gotō
Sanae (後藤早苗), Gotō Shōjirō’s eldest daughter in 1874.

8 Wray, Mitsubishi and the N.Y. K., 23–25.

9 Shoryo Kawada and John Manjiro, Drifting Toward the Southeast: The Story of Five
Japanese Castaways told in 1852 by John Manjiro, Illustrated by Kawada Shoryo and John
Manjiro, trans. Junya Nagakuni and Junji Kitadai (New Bedford, MA: Spinner Publishing Inc,
2003), 130.
Tosa-han’s three-leaf crest and Iwasaki family’s three-stacked rhombuses.  

Gaining extraordinary credit with the government, the Taiwan Expedition (台灣出兵) was the turning point in the future of Mitsubishi. Although Yatarō was often known as a notorious businessman, he gave priority to the official business rather than his own interests in time of the national emergency. In 1874, the Home Minister Ōkubo Toshimichi (大久保利通, 1830–1878) and the Finance Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu (大隈重信, 1838–1922) initially planned to utilize the British and American steamships for transporting the Japanese troops and war supplies for the Taiwan Expedition. However, both countries, interpreting the Taiwan Expedition as a dispute between Japan and China, declared their neutrality. After unsuccessful attempt to utilize foreign steamships, recommended by Gotō, Ōkuma asked Mitsubishi Shōkai to help the government for transferring troops, weapons, and food to Taiwan during the punitive Taiwan Expedition because the semiofficial enterprise, the Yūbin Jōkisen Kaisha (郵便蒸気船会社, Japan National Mail Steamship Company), had also turned down Ōkubo and Ōkuma’s request. The board of directors of the Yūbin Jōkisen Kaisha considered the mission “too

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12 Tateishi, Iwasaki Yatarō: Kokka no Yuji ni saishite Shiri o kaerimizu, 210–211.

13 The Yūbin Jōkisen Kaisha was supported by the Chōshū faction headed by Kido Takayoshi (木戸孝允, 1833–1877) and Inoue Kaoru who opposed to the Taiwan Expedition, according to Pernille Rudlin, The History of Mitsubishi Corporation in London: 1915 to Present Day (London: Routledge, 2000), 19.
dangerous and less profitable.”¹⁴ They were indeed afraid of losing their customers to the Mitsubishi Shōkai while helping the government’s campaign. On the other hand, Yatarō willingly agreed to Ōkuma’s request and promised to utilize all Mitsubishi ships for the campaign.¹⁵ Therefore, the Mitsubishi Shōkai could keep thirteen ships owned by the government at the end of expedition.¹⁶ In addition, the Mitsubishi Shōkai secured government subsides of ¥250,000 annually for the next fifteen years in exchange for the promise to serve the country in time of emergency. Trusted by the Ōkubo-Ōkuma line of the government, the Mitsubishi Shōkai took over the facilities, including eighteen ships and workers, following the collapse of the Yūbin Jōkisen Kaisha, and moved its headquarters from Osaka to Tokyo in April 1874.¹⁷

Learning from the danger of relying on foreign freights during the Taiwan Expedition, the Japanese government realized that Japan needed to develop its own

¹⁴ Tateishi, Iwasaki Yatarō: Kokka no Yuji ni saishite Shiri o kaerimizu, 209–212; Mark Weston, Giants of Japan: The Lives of Japan’s Most Influential Men and Women (New York: Kodansha International, 2002), 16. In 1871, 54 shipwrecked Ryukyu people were killed by aboriginal headhunters of Taiwan near the coast of Taiwan. Then, the Meiji government sent over 3,000 troops to punish them. It was the first deployment of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy overseas. As a result, Qing China had to pay the indemnity of ¥500,000 and to recognize Japan’s authority over Ryukyu Island. It was a political operation rather than a military operation, according to Louis-Frederic and Kathe Roth, Japan Encyclopedia (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2002), 837. The Taiwan Expedition indicated a step toward Japan’s colonization of Taiwan.


shipping and navigation. In exchange for the annual subsidy of ¥15,000, Mitsubishi established the Mitsubishi Nautical School in November 1875 to train Japanese navigation officers and seamen. Thereafter, utilizing the government subsidy and profit from the Mitsubishi mining sector, the Mitsubishi Shōkai established the Yokohama-Shanghai route in February 1875 to meet the government’s demand for importing raw cotton. As the government envisaged, the company rose to be a high competitor of the predominant Pacific Mail Steamship Company (U.S.) and the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company (British). The Mitsubishi Shōkai changed the name of company to the Mitsubishi Kisen Kaisha (三菱汽船会社, Mitsubishi Steamship Company) in May, and to Yūbin Kisen Mitsubishi Kaisha (郵便汽船三菱会社, Mitsubishi Mail Steamship Company) in September 1875.

By drastically lowering the passage and freight rates, the Mitsubishi drove the Pacific Mail Steamship Company in 1875 and the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company in 1876 out of the profitable Shanghai route and succeeded in monopolizing the coastal trade.

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18 Tateishi, Iwasaki Yatarō: Kokka no Yuji ni saishite Shiri o kaerimizu, 218.


20 Leaving Yokohama, the ships went to Shanghai via Kobe, Bakan (Shimonoseki), and Nagasaki.


23 Tsuboya, Meiji Rekishi, 213.
Company, Mitsubishi reduced both passenger and freight rates by 25 percent to 33 percent with the government subsidy. *Akebono* newspaper listed first-class passage, steerage, and freight rates of both the Pacific Mail Steamship Company and Mitsubishi Shōkai as of February 1, 1875.  

**Table 5.1: Passenger & Freight of P.M.S.S. and Mitsubishi by Comparison, 1875**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Routes</th>
<th>P.M.S.S.</th>
<th>Mitsubishi</th>
<th>Discount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yokohama-Kobe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-class passage</td>
<td>$10</td>
<td>$7.50</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steerage</td>
<td>$5</td>
<td>$3.50</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freight (per ton)</td>
<td>$1.50</td>
<td>$1</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yokohama-Nagasaki</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-class passage</td>
<td>$15</td>
<td>$10</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steerage</td>
<td>$7</td>
<td>$5</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yokohama-Songhai</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-class passage</td>
<td>$30</td>
<td>$20</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steerage</td>
<td>$10</td>
<td>$7.50</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freight (per ton)</td>
<td>$3</td>
<td>$2</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Then, in order to compete with the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, Mitsubishi not only lowered the passage and freight rates but also pressured

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the government to force “Japanese passengers entering or leaving Japan on foreign ships to have a government pass or face arrest” so that Japanese would use Mitsubishi’s service.25

Table 5.2: Mitsubishi’s New Passenger and Freight, 1876 (¥1 = $1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Routes</th>
<th>First-class</th>
<th>Steerage</th>
<th>Freight (per ton)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yokohama-Kobe</td>
<td>¥4</td>
<td>¥1.5</td>
<td>¥0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yokohama-Nagasaki</td>
<td>¥10</td>
<td>¥2.5</td>
<td>¥0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yokohama-Shanghai</td>
<td>¥15</td>
<td>¥3</td>
<td>¥1.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun reported that “Under such extraordinary low passage, it is foolish not to take ship…. I am going to sail from Shimonoseki to Shanghai for a report on the exposition.”26 The report indicated that going abroad became affordable and it was no longer a privilege of the elite.

Without Yatarō’s strong dedication, it was impossible to defeat the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company—a powerful British enterprise. Mitsubishi survived the critical moment by firing sixteen employees including the oyatoi gaikokujin,


26 “Mitsubishi no Unchin O-nesage” (Mitsubishi’s Huge Cut in the Fare), Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun, March 26, 1876, in Nakayama, ed., Shimbun Shüsei Meiji Hennen Shi, dai 2-kan, Minron Bokko-ki, 506.
reducing Yatarō’s salary by half and the company directors’ salaries by one-third.\(^{27}\) Yatarō stressed that the Japanese company must regain the coastal trade otherwise the government’s effort for revising the “unequal treaties” with the Western countries would come to nothing. Receiving a great support from the government, Yatarō argued that Mitsubishi was the company responsible for the promotion of the “prestige of the Japanese Empire.”\(^{28}\) On July 14, 1876, the \textit{Yūbin Hōchi Shimbun} proudly reported the Mitsubishi’s victory over the British navigation company as “a happy event takes place for the Japanese people” and indicated “Japanese Empire is facing an opportunity to expand its navigation rights.”\(^{29}\) Mitsubishi’s defeat of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company significantly promoted national prestige and after July 10, 1877, the Meiji government required all Japanese merchant ships regardless of their size to sail under the national flag.\(^{30}\)

Once again, Yatarō came to distinguish himself as an able entrepreneur by his wise decision-making during the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877. Suspending its regular services, Mitsubishi utilized thirty-eight ships for transferring troops and war supplies for

\(^{27}\) Tateishi, \textit{Iwasaki Yatarō: Kokka no Yuji ni saishite Shiri o kaerimizu}, 241.

\(^{28}\) Wray, \textit{Mitsubishi and the N.Y. K.}, 89–90.


the government and made a profit of ¥1,200,000.\(^{31}\) Taking advantage of the Satsuma Rebellion that gave the company access to $810,000 loan from the government, the Yūbin Kisen Mitsubishi Kaisha bought four steamers and warehouses of the Shanghai line of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company.\(^{32}\) Additionally, Mitsubishi would buy another seven steamers from the Great Britain and made a tremendous profit by monopolizing overseas routes.\(^{33}\)

By this time, Mitsubishi had established mutual relations with the government in the course of modernization. While Mitsubishi required the government subsidies to expand its business, the government also required Mitsubishi’s services for its interests. Through the enormous government subsidies for the military transportation during the Taiwan Expedition of 1874 and the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877, the Yūbin Kisen Mitsubishi Kaisha came to dominate the nation’s shipping industry within a short period, and the company came to own sixty-one ships (total 35,467 ton), or 73 percent of all ships in Japan.\(^{34}\) According to the Ministry of Communications, there were 210 steamships with gross tonnage of 664,760 in 1880, and Mitsubishi owned thirty-seven of

\(^{31}\) Tateishi, *Iwasaki Yatarō: Kokka no Yuji ni saishite Shiri o kaerimizu*, 291. If converted into the current money, ¥1,200,000 of 1877 is equivalent to ¥40,000,000,000.

\(^{32}\) Tsuboya, *Meiji Rekishi*, 214; Wray, *Mitsubishi and the N.Y. K.*, 84–86. These four steamers were *Golden Age* (renamed *Hiroshima Maru* 廣島丸), *Costa Rica* (renamed *Genkai Maru* 玄海丸), *Nevada* (renamed *Saikyō Maru* 西京丸), and *Oregonian* (renamed *Nagoya Maru* 名護屋丸).


them with gross tonnage of 41,162. Accordingly, as shown in Table 5.3, Mitsubishi shipping industry created 64.2 percent of the company’s total revenue in 1879, which increased to 68.0 percent in 1880.

Table 5.3: Profits of Mitsubishi Shōkai, 1879–1885 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Shipping</th>
<th>Subunits</th>
<th>Takashima Coal Mine</th>
<th>Government Subsidies</th>
<th>Total (%)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>124.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>111.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>91.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>101.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>108.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>165.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>91.6</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>140.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Due to the uncategorized profits or deficits, the index marks above or below 100%.


In addition, seeking to open more overseas routes, Yatarō tried to establish a transpacific line to Canada with a Canadian government subsidy in 1879; however, his plan had to be called off when the severe competition with the Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha began in 1882.

Simultaneously, the government subsidies enabled the Mitsubishi to diversify into

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copper and coal mining, banking, and shipbuilding.\textsuperscript{38} For example, Mitsubishi bought Yoshioka Copper Mine (吉岡銅山) in Okayama prefecture for ¥10,000 in 1873 and Takashima Coal Mine (高島鉱山) in 1881.\textsuperscript{39} Strongly urged by his friend and educator, Fukuzawa Yukichi, his pupil and Mitsubishi employee, Shōda Heigorō (荘田 平五郎, 1847–1922),\textsuperscript{40} and Yanosuke, Yatarō finally determined to purchase the promising Takashima Coal Mine so that Gotō who was Yatarō’s old friend and Yanosuke’s father-in-law would be free from a huge debt.\textsuperscript{41} In fact, the vise-president of Mitsubishi, Yanosuke had served concurrently as the president of Sōraisha (蓬来社), Gotō’s company, since 1876.\textsuperscript{42} Finally, Takashima Coal Mine was transferred to Mitsubishi when Mitsubishi paid Gotō’s debt, amounted to ¥900,000, to Jardine, Matheson &

\textsuperscript{38} Tsuboya, \textit{Meiji Rekishi}, 216.

\textsuperscript{39} Wray, \textit{Mitsubishi and the N.Y. K.}, 29, 41, 118–119.

\textsuperscript{40} Recruited by Iwasaki Yatarō, Shōda was a leading figure of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu. Shōda played an important role in diversifying Mitsubishi into many areas including mining and shipbuilding. He also drafted a “code of guidelines for operations, employee rights and job descriptions, and lines of command,” and it was crucial for the establishment of Mitsubishi as a well-structured corporation that could handle government contracts. In fact, the government contacts became “indispensable” to the growth of the company, according to “Stories of Some Prominent Figures ‘Heigorō Shōda,’” Mitsubishi.com, http://www.mitsubishi.com/e/history/ series/heigoro/index.html (accessed December 6, 2009).

\textsuperscript{41} Gotō paid the Japanese government ¥550,000 to get Takashima Coal Mine in 1874 and established Sōraisha (蓬来社). Gotō was indeed Yanosuke’s father-in-law because his eldest daughter Sanae and Yanosuke married in the fall of 1874. Mitsubishi paid $200,000 in order to take over the mine, according to Masaaki Kobayashi, “Gotō Shōjirō yori Baishū iyo no Mitsubishi Takashima Tankō” (Mitsubishi’s Control of the Takashima Coal Mine, which was purchased from Gotō Shōjirō), \textit{Kanto Gakuin Daigaku Keizai-kei} (Quarterly Journal of Economics), no. 215 (April 2003): 75; Tateishi, \textit{Iwasaki Yatarō: Kokka no Yuji ni saishite Shiri o kaerimizu}, 294–295.

\textsuperscript{42} “Iwasaki ga Sōraisha Shachō ni” (Iwasaki became the President of Sōraisha), \textit{Tokyo Akebono Shim bun} (Tokyo), May 3, 1876, in in Yasumasa Nakayama, ed., \textit{Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen Shi, dai 2-kan, Minron Bokko-ki}, 525–526.
Company. Since then, Mitsubishi exploited cheap labor and made an enormous profit from the mine, sufficient its shipping business during the fierce competition with the rival company. One of the main causes of Mitsubishi’s success was that the government permitted Mitsubishi to use convicts as mineworkers, which saved the company a tremendous expenditure. Moreover, in June 1884, Mitsubishi began the management of the state-operated Nagasaki Shipyard, in which Mitsubishi hired numbers of the Dutch engineers as the oyatoi gaikokujin and assigned them to utilize advanced technology for the development of shipping industry. As a result, Mitsubishi built the nation’s first iron steamship Yūgao Maru (夕顔丸) in 1885. In April 1887, Iwasaki Yanosuke petitioned for the ownership of the shipyard and the government disposed of the Shipyard for ¥459,000 in June 1887, renamed the Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard.

One of the characteristics of Mitsubishi was that Yatarō, inspired by Fukuzawa Yukichi, actively employed talented persons with high education, especially those who graduated from Keiō Gijuku and Tokyo University. For example, Fukuzawa introduced

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43 Tateishi, Iwasaki Yatarō: Kokka no Yuji ni saishite Shiri o kaerimizu, 292–295. Tateishi argues that ¥900,000 in those days is equivalent to nearly ¥30,000,000,000 at present.

44 Takashima Coal Mine had produced the most coal in Japan over ten years, according to Mikio Sumiya, Nihon Sekitan Sangyo Bunseki (An Analysis of the Japanese Coal-mining Industry) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1968), 131.

45 Wray, Mitsubishi and the N.Y. K., 29.


47 “Nagasaki Zōsenjo” (Nagasaki Shipyard), Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., http://www.mhi.co.jp/nsmw/introduction/history/archive/shiryou2.html (accessed November 12, 2009). Stimulated by the arrival of the “black ships,” the Tokugawa Shogunate started building the shipyard with the assistance of the Dutch engineers in 1857, which was completed in 1861.

numbers of his prominent pupils from Keiō Gijuku to Mitsubishi in the formative years of the company. Importantly, many of them had studied abroad or traveled abroad previously; otherwise, Mitsubishi sent them abroad for studying. The following table shows the Keiō Gijuku and Tokyo University graduates who contributed to consolidating the foundations of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu.

Table 5.4: Mitsubishi Directors Graduated from Keiō Gijuku & Tokyo University

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Position in 1885</th>
<th>Final Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asada Masafumi (1854–1912)</td>
<td>1874</td>
<td>Accountant, main office</td>
<td>Director, N.Y.K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shōda Heigorō * (1847–1922)</td>
<td>1875</td>
<td>General Manager, main office</td>
<td>Top executive, Mitsubishi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoshikawa Taijirō (1852–1895)</td>
<td>1878</td>
<td>Manager, Kobe branch</td>
<td>2nd President, N.Y.K. (1894–1895)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asabuki Eiji (1849–1918)</td>
<td>1878</td>
<td>Executive, Mitsubishi (<del>1880) Off. Official, Mitsui Bank (1892</del>)</td>
<td>President, Ōji Paper Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toyokawa Ryōhei (1852–1920)</td>
<td>1879</td>
<td>President, 119th National Bank (1889~)</td>
<td>Administrator, Mitsubishi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamamoto Tatsuo (1856–1947)</td>
<td>1883</td>
<td>Assistant manager, Yokohama branch</td>
<td>5th Governor, Bank of Japan (1898–1903)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iwanaga Shōichi * (1852–1913)</td>
<td>1885</td>
<td>Manager, Kochi branch</td>
<td>Director, N.Y.K.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Position in 1885</th>
<th>Final Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kondō Renpei * (1848–1921)</td>
<td>1872</td>
<td>Manager, Yokohama branch</td>
<td>3rd President, N.Y.K. (1895–1921)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasegawa Yoshinosuke* (1856–1912)</td>
<td>1880</td>
<td>Chief, Yoshioka Copper Mine</td>
<td>Investigative Committee, Yawata Steelworks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suenobu Michinari* (1855–1932)</td>
<td>1880</td>
<td>Manager, Tosa local office</td>
<td>President, Tokyo Kaijō Maritime Insurance Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nanbu Kyūgo * (1855–1928)</td>
<td>1881</td>
<td>Chief, Takashima Coal Mine</td>
<td>Administrator, Mitsubishi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogawa Zenkichi * (1856–1919)</td>
<td>1885</td>
<td>Assistant manager, Kobe branch</td>
<td>Director, N.Y.K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katō Takaaki * (1860–1926)</td>
<td>1885</td>
<td>Assistant manager, Kobe branch</td>
<td>24th Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = experience in studying abroad or traveling abroad.

Hunter (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 76.

Although Yatarō himself had never received Western education, he realized based on his experience that the introduction of Western knowledge would be crucial for his company to achieve a great success. In 1880, Mitsubishi established the Mitsubishi Money Exchange House; however, it had to be closed down during the “Matsukata Deflation.” Nevertheless, in 1885 Mitsubishi managed to start the banking business by merging the 119th and 149th National Banks in which Mitsubishi had all stocks. Afterwards, the Yūbin Kisen Mitsubishi Kaisha took over the management of the bank. In 1893, due to the Commercial Law, the Yūbin Kisen Mitsubishi Kaisha changed the name to Mitsubishi Gōshi Kaisha (三菱合資会社), and all executives and employees of the 119th National Bank became employees of the Mitsubishi thereafter. Capitalized at ¥1,000,000, the Mitsubishi Gōshi Kaisha officially established the Mitsubishi Gōshi Kaisha Ginkō-bu (三菱合資会社銀行部, Banking Department of the Mitsubishi


The Establishment of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha

The monopoly of the shipping business by Mitsubishi became difficult when powerful supporters of Mitsubishi disappeared from the government office. First, Ōkubo Toshimichi, commanding the Imperial Army against Satsuma during the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877, was assassinated in 1878 by the Satsuma samurai who regarded Ōkubo as a traitor. Then, Ōkuma Shigenobu fell from power in 1881 because of his confrontation with the Satsuma-Chōshū faction over the issues such as the establishment of constitution, national assembly, foreign loans, and illegal disposal of property of the Kaitakushi (Colonization Board). Ōkuma was a sympathizer of the jiyyū minken undō. Therefore, the Ōkuma faction with the support of Keio Gijuku intellectuals conflicted with the Itō and Inoue faction, and the latter expelled the Ōkuma faction from the government. While Ōkuma supported a British-style constitutional government, Itō and Inoue sought the establishment of the German-style constitutional monarchy. Itō considered it necessary to place the emperor as the center of the state for promoting the establishment of the modern nation-state with a strong sense of nationalism. The 1881 Political Crisis called Meiji jūyonen no seihen (明治十四年の政変, “Political Change of the Fourteenth Year of Meiji”) negatively affected Mitsubishi because it indicated a shift from the pro-Mitsubishi to anti-Mitsubishi government.  

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53 Ōkubo was a former Satsuma Samurai, however, during the Satsuma Rebellion he commanded the Imperial Army to defeat the Satsuma samurai led by Saigō Takamori, Ōkubo’s
Yatarō, establishing close connections with Ōkuma, had to deal with numbers of difficulties coming unexpectedly afterwards. The Satsuma-Chōshū faction of the government and the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha (三井物産, Mitsui Trading Company, established in 1876 backed by the powerful Chōshū politicians such as Inoue Kaoru and Shibusawa Eiichi), challenged Mitsubishi by setting up the semiofficial shipping company Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha (K.U.K. 共同運輸会社, Cooperative Transport Company) in July 1882 in order to interrupt “Mitsubishi’s increasing neglect of shipping in favor of outside investments, mostly in mining.” The Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha was “an amalgam of trading firms, local shipping enterprises, and government investment” in order to counter the Yūbin Kisen Mitsubishi Kaisha’s diversification of business. After all, it was a competition between the later zaibatsu of Mitsubishi and Mitsui. In reaction to the emergence of a mighty competitor consisting of anti-Mitsubishi groups, the Yūbin Kisen Mitsubishi Kaisha began a fierce price war that lasted for two years and nine months.

As a result of the price war, both shipping companies charged almost nothing for old friend. The defeated Satsuma samurai were resentful about Ōkubo being a traitor, and Shimada Ichiro from Kaga-han and six others assassinated Ōkubo on May 14, 1878.


shipping. As shown in Table 5.3 (p. 214), the shipping sector of the Mitsubishi had made a considerable profit from shipping between 1879 and 1882; however, it came to operate at a loss between 1883 and 1885 due to the severe competition with the Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha. To attract more customers, Mitsubishi reduced the certain freight rates by 90 percent. 56 For example, the steerage freight between Yokohama and Kobe was lowered from 5 yen and 50 sen to merely 55 sen. 57 Moreover, in order to attract more customers, Mitsubishi served a big sponge cake with Mitsubishi mark to passengers as a souvenir. 58 Simultaneously, the Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha not only lowered the freight but also increased the amount of rebates. 59 It seemed almost impossible for Mitsubishi to put the semiofficial Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha in financial difficulties; however, Yatarō never withdrew from the competition. In order to compete with such a giant, Mitsubishi shut down unprofitable services to Ryukyu and Hong Kong, closed down the Mitsubishi Money Exchange House (established in 1880), and sold off superannuated ships. 60 Additionally, Mitsubishi had to shut down the Mitsubishi Commercial School (三菱商業学校, Mitsubishi shōgyō gakkō) in the time of “Matsukata Deflation” to curtail expenditure. 61 The Yūbin Kisen Mitsubishi Kaisha survived the intense competition by

56 Weston, Giants of Japan, 17.
57 Gaku, Bakumatsu Ishin Eiketsutachi no Iibun, 56.
60 Gaku, Bakumatsu Ishin Eiketsutachi no Iibun, 56.
61 “Iwasaki Yatarō Monogatari: vol. 15 Shōsen Gakkō, Shōgyō Gakkō” (Story of Iwasaki
utilizing the profit produced in the mining sector. As shown in Table 5.3 (p. 214), in 1881, 15.0 percent of total profits of Mitsubishi came from Takashima Coal Mine; 31.7 percent in 1882; 54.6 percent in 1883; 87.0 percent in 1884; and 91.6 percent in 1885.62

Over two years of Mitsubishi and Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha’s die-hard competition resulted in drastically lowering shipping and passage fees. Used to struggling against adverse circumstances from his childhood, Yatarō was not going to give up no matter how the shipping sector of Mitsubishi operated at a loss. As was expected, because of the excessive competition, both enterprises were about to become bankrupt and the nation’s shipping industry was in great danger.63 Indeed, their rivalry even led to a collision when ships of two companies left port on the same day at the same time using the same sea route.64

Meanwhile, Yatarō contributed to the rise of nationalism in Japan. Instead of looking to his own interests, Yatarō always gave priority to the official businesses based on the national policy of fukoku kyōhei. Yatarō clearly had it in mind that achieving the

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Yatarō: vol. 15, Nautical School, Commercial School), Mitsubishi.com, http://www.mitsubishi.com/j/history/series/yataro/yataro15.html (accessed January 4, 2010). In 1878, encouraged by a teacher of Keiō Gijuku, Morishita Iwakusu (森下岩楠, 1852–1917), Iwasaki Yatarō established a business school named the Mitsubishi Commercial School in Kanda, Tokyo at the expense of Mitsubishi. Most teachers of the school were consisted of Keiō Gijuku graduates (pupils of Fukuzawa Yukichi). Yatarō’s eldest son, Hisaya was the first student of the school while attending Keiō Gijuku. The Mitsubishi Commercial School taught English, economics, arithmetic, bookkeeping, mathematics, Chinese classics, composition, history, and geography. The school was closed down in 1884 due to the “Matsukata Deflation.”

62 Hatate, Nihon no Zaibatsu to Mitsubishi, 28–29; Wray, Mitsubishi and the N.Y. K., 121, 189.


goals of state was more important that making his own profits.\textsuperscript{65} In order to keep the Westerners from monopolizing the Japanese coastal shipping, Yatarō finally began to consider the merger inevitable and thereafter started preparing for that day. For securing the dominance of Mitsubishi over the Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha after the merger, Yatarō, the shrewd businessman, had secretly bought the stocks of the Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha in large quantities when he was informed about the Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha marked a deficit of ¥25,000 in 1884.\textsuperscript{66} However, two days after the first talks with the government and the Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha, Yatarō, at the age of fifty, died of stomach cancer on February 7, 1885. After the death of Yatarō, the vice-president and his younger brother, Iwasaki Yanosuke (岩崎 弥之助, 1851–1908) succeeded as the president of the Mitsubishi Kaisha on February 16, 1885.\textsuperscript{67}

In September of 1885, under the pressure of necessity, the Japanese government merged the Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha and the Yūbin Kisen Mitsubishi Kaisha, and created a joint-stock company called the Nippon Yūsen Kaisha (日本郵船会社, Japan Mail Shipping Line) in order to prevent further excessive competition between two enterprises.\textsuperscript{68} Minister of Agriculture and Commerce Saigō Tsugumichi (西郷 従道, 1840–1914) was the driving force behind the merger.\textsuperscript{65}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{65}Tateishi, Iwasaki Yatarō: Kokka no Yuji ni saishite Shiri o kaerimizu, 215.
  \item \textsuperscript{68}The Nippon Yūsen Kaisha was initially a semiofficial company; however, it became a private enterprise with enormous Mitsubishi influence due to the Commercial Code of July 1893. Due to the Commercial Code, the company was renamed Nippon Yūsen Kabushiki Kaisha.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
1843–1902) who was a younger brother of Saigō Katamori was responsible for the adjustment.  

Subsequently, the second president of the Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha, Morioka Masafumi (森岡 昌純, 1834–1898) was appointed as the first president of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha in October.  

Following the establishment of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, Mitsubishi under the second and resourceful president Iwasaki Yanosuke decided to diversify the company’s interests “from the sea to the land” such as mining, shipbuilding, banking, financing, trading, insurance, and real estate.

Capitalized at ¥11,000,000, of which Mitsubishi invested ¥5,000,000 (for 100,000 stocks) and the Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha invested ¥6,000,000 (for 120,000 stocks), the Nippon Yusen Kaisha became the largest joint-stock company in Japan.  

Although the Nippon Yusen Kaisha had total 220,000 stocks, Mitsubishi had 100,000 stocks (equivalent to 45.5 percent), the government had 52,000 stocks (23.6 percent), and the

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70 “Nippon Yūsen Kaisha: Shachō Riji no Ninmei” (Nippon Yūsen Kaisha: Appointment of President and Committee), Chōya Shimbun (Tokyo), October 1, 1885, in Nakayama, ed., Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen Shi, dai 6-kan, Oka Seiji-ki, 163.


72 “Mitsubishi to Kyōdō Unyu to Gappei shite Nippon Yūsen Kaisha Sōritsu saru: Shihon sōgaku wa 11,000,000 yen” (The Merger of Mitsubishi and Kyōdō Unyu creating Nippon Yūsen Kaisha: the Total Investment Amounted ¥11,000,000), Yūbin Höchi Shimbun (Postal News) (Tokyo), September 17, 1885, in Nakayama, ed., Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen Shi, dai 6-kan, Oka Seiji-ki, 155. For the establishment of the Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha, the government invested ¥2,600,000 while the rest of companies invested ¥3,400,000.

73 Sadao Matsuyoshi and Yoshio Ando, Nihon Yūsō Shi (A History of Japanese Transportation) (Tokyo: Nihon Hyōronsha, 1971), 401; Suzuki, Nihonshi Kawaraban, 208. According to “Iwasaki Yanosuke Monogatari: vol. 4 Nippon Yūsen no Tanjō,” many stockholders of the Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha were Mitsubishi-related persons. Therefore, although renamed, the Nippon Yūsen Kaisha was in fact under the control of Mitsubishi.
rest of Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha had 68,000 stocks (30.9 percent). Significantly, since the majority of Mitsubishi stocks were concentrated on the Iwasaki family, Mitsubishi became the largest stockholder of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha and came to dominate the company and its management.\textsuperscript{74} According to William D. Wray’s study, the largest stockholder of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha in 1887 was Yatarō’s eldest son Hisaya who owned 16.6 percent of total; the second largest was the Imperial Household Ministry owning 14.2 percent; the third was Yanosuke owning 9.1 percent; and the fourth was the Finance Ministry owning 6.3 percent.\textsuperscript{75} Therefore, it was a nominal merger and more appropriate to describe as Mitsubishi merged the Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha into the Yūbin Kisen Mitsubishi Kaisha and created the Nippon Yūsen Kaisha.

Significantly, the excessive competition of the Yūbin Kisen Mitsubishi Kaisha and the Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha greatly contributed to the rapid growth of the Japanese emigration to Hawaii in the late 1880s.\textsuperscript{76} Among the twenty-six shipments of the \textit{kanyaku imin}, the Nippon Yūsen Kaisha carried out twenty-four times, conveying 27,189 Japanese laborers to Hawaii.\textsuperscript{77} Of all, \textit{Yamashiro Maru} entered service for twelve times, carrying 13,121 Japanese to Hawaii.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{74} Hisashi Masaki, \textit{Nihon no Kabushikigaisha Kinyū} (Japanese Joint-Stock Companies, Financial Business) (Kyoto: Minerva Shobō, 1973), 44.


\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 263.


\textsuperscript{78} \textit{Yamashiro Maru}, built by Armstrong, Mitchell & Company for the Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha, was transferred to the Nippon Yūsen Kaisha in 1885 due to the merger.
Table 5.5: Transportation of the *Kanyaku Imin* from 1885 to 1894

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ships</th>
<th>Date of Arrival</th>
<th>Name of Ship</th>
<th>Owner of Ship (country of origin)</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
<th>Number of Emigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2/8/1885</td>
<td>City of Tokio</td>
<td>P.M.S.S. (US)</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>6/17/1885</td>
<td>Yamashiro Maru</td>
<td>K.U.K.* (Japan)</td>
<td>2,527</td>
<td>988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>2/14/1886</td>
<td>City of Peking</td>
<td>P.M.S.S. (US)</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>12/10/1887</td>
<td>Wakaura Maru</td>
<td>N.Y.K. (Japan)</td>
<td>2,115</td>
<td>1,447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>6/1/1888</td>
<td>Takasago Maru</td>
<td>N.Y.K. (Japan)</td>
<td>2,121</td>
<td>1,063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th</td>
<td>11/14/1888</td>
<td>Takasago Maru</td>
<td>N.Y.K. (Japan)</td>
<td>2,121</td>
<td>1,081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th</td>
<td>12/26/1888</td>
<td>Takasago Maru</td>
<td>N.Y.K. (Japan)</td>
<td>2,121</td>
<td>1,143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th</td>
<td>3/2/1889</td>
<td>Ōmi Maru</td>
<td>N.Y.K. (Japan)</td>
<td>2,473</td>
<td>957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th</td>
<td>10/1/1889</td>
<td>Yamashiro Maru</td>
<td>N.Y.K. (Japan)</td>
<td>2,527</td>
<td>997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th</td>
<td>11/21/1889</td>
<td>Yamashiro Maru</td>
<td>N.Y.K. (Japan)</td>
<td>2,527</td>
<td>1,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th</td>
<td>1/9/1890</td>
<td>Yamashiro Maru</td>
<td>N.Y.K. (Japan)</td>
<td>2,527</td>
<td>1,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th</td>
<td>4/2/1890</td>
<td>Yamashiro Maru</td>
<td>N.Y.K. (Japan)</td>
<td>2,527</td>
<td>1,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th</td>
<td>5/22/1890</td>
<td>Yamashiro Maru</td>
<td>N.Y.K. (Japan)</td>
<td>2,527</td>
<td>1,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th</td>
<td>6/17/1890</td>
<td>Sagami Maru</td>
<td>N.Y.K. (Japan)</td>
<td>1,885</td>
<td>596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th</td>
<td>3/11/1891</td>
<td>Yamashiro Maru</td>
<td>N.Y.K. (Japan)</td>
<td>2,527</td>
<td>1,093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th</td>
<td>3/30/1891</td>
<td>Ōmi Maru</td>
<td>N.Y.K. (Japan)</td>
<td>2,473</td>
<td>1,081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th</td>
<td>4/28/1891</td>
<td>Yamashiro Maru</td>
<td>N.Y.K. (Japan)</td>
<td>2,527</td>
<td>1,091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th</td>
<td>5/29/1891</td>
<td>Yamashiro Maru</td>
<td>N.Y.K. (Japan)</td>
<td>2,527</td>
<td>1,488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th</td>
<td>6/18/1891</td>
<td>Miike Maru</td>
<td>N.Y.K. (Japan)</td>
<td>3,308</td>
<td>1,101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th</td>
<td>1/9/1892</td>
<td>Yamashiro Maru</td>
<td>N.Y.K. (Japan)</td>
<td>2,527</td>
<td>1,098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st</td>
<td>6/25/1892</td>
<td>Yamashiro Maru</td>
<td>N.Y.K. (Japan)</td>
<td>2,527</td>
<td>1,124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22nd</td>
<td>11/28/1892</td>
<td>Yamashiro Maru</td>
<td>N.Y.K. (Japan)</td>
<td>2,527</td>
<td>989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd</td>
<td>3/6/1893</td>
<td>Miike Maru</td>
<td>N.Y.K. (Japan)</td>
<td>3,308</td>
<td>729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th</td>
<td>6/6/1893*</td>
<td>Miike Maru</td>
<td>N.Y.K. (Japan)</td>
<td>3,308</td>
<td>1,757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th</td>
<td>10/9/1893*</td>
<td>Miike Maru</td>
<td>N.Y.K. (Japan)</td>
<td>3,308</td>
<td>1,631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th</td>
<td>6/15/1894*</td>
<td>Miike Maru</td>
<td>N.Y.K. (Japan)</td>
<td>3,308</td>
<td>1,491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27,198</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By Japanese ships = 27,198  
By foreign ships = 1,871  
29,069

* K.U.K. = Kyōdō Unyu Kaisha (merged with Yūbin Kisen Mitsubishi Kaisha on September 29, 1885 and became the Nippon Yusen Kaisha); P.M.S.S. = Pacific Mail Steamship Company;
N.Y.K. = Nippon Yūsen Kaisha


In fact, those ships utilized for transporting the *kanyaku imin* were all foreign-made because the shipyards in Japan did not have technology to build such large ships. For instance, while a foreign ship was capable of carrying about 2,000 gross tons on average, a domestic ship merely carried 250 gross tons in 1896.\(^79\) In order to stimulate the development of maritime industry and the promotion of the private shipbuilding, the Japanese government\(^80\) promulgated the *Kōkai Shōrei Hō* (航海奨励法, Navigation Promotion Law) and *Zōsen Shōrei Hō* (造船奨励法, Shipbuilding Promotion Law) on March 24, 1896.\(^81\) The *Kōkai Shōrei Hō* aimed to encourage the establishment of long-distance routes by subsidizing 25 sen per mile of voyage for iron and steel ships of less than fifteen years old, and over 1,000 gross tons with a speed of minimum ten nautical miles per hour.\(^82\) Meanwhile, the *Zōsen Shōrei Hō* aimed to facilitate the development of shipbuilding industry by subsidizing twelve yen per ton for building iron and steel ships

\(^79\) Tomohei Chida and Peter N. Davies, *The Japanese Shipping and Shipbuilding Industries: A History of Their Modern Growth* (London: Athlone, 1990), 214. The number of the domestic ships exceeded the foreign ships in the course of World War I.

\(^80\) The Japanese government was led by the 2nd Ito Cabinet, and Matsukata Masayoshi remained the Finance Minister.

\(^81\) “Kōkai Shōrei Hō kōfu” (Promulgation of Navigation Promotion Law) and “Zosen Shōrei Ho kōfu” (Promulgation of Shipbuilding Promotion Law), *Kanpō* (The Official Gazette), March 24, 1894, in Nakayama, ed., *Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen Shi, dai 9-kan, Nisshin Sensō*, 387.

of 700 to 1,000 gross tons; twenty yen per ton for ships over 1,000 gross tons. The government also provided subsidy of extra five yen per horsepower if these ships were powered by the engines made in Japan.  

Utilizing the profit made by monopolizing the shipment of the kanyaku imin, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha continued to expand its shipping business in the 1890s. First, following the emergence of the cotton-spinning industry, demand for the imported raw cotton increased, resulting in the establishment of a regular service between Kobe and Bombay in November 1893. Significantly, due to the First Sino-Japanese War, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha mostly withdrew from the transportation of emigrants overseas because the company, giving priority to the nation, mobilized its big ships for the war efforts. Then, after the First Sino-Japanese War, receiving enormous indemnity from China based on the Shimonoseki jōyaku (下関条約, Treaty of Shimonoseki), the Japanese government assisted the Nippon Yusen Kaisha that had earnestly supported the

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83 “Zōsen Shōrei Hō kōfu” (Promulgation of Shipbuilding Promotion Law), Kanpō (The Official Gazette), March 24, 1894, in Nakayama, ed., Shim bun Shūsei Meiji Hennen Shi, dai 9-kan, Nisshin Sensō, 387.


86 Treaty of Shimonoseki, April 17, 1895. Signed between Japan and Qing China, the treaty ended the First Sino-Japanese War. Japan was to receive 200,000,000 taels as indemnity in three years, which was equivalent to four years of the state budget. Forcing China to pay the indemnity with the British pound, Japan established the gold standard by converting the British pound to gold. From 1897 to 1917, two yen was equal to one dollar.
nation’s war effort by purveying the company’s ships. Afterwards, allowed to retain the government’s fourteen ships for a nominal fee, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha came to dominate the nation’s shipping industry. The gross tonnage of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha grew to 64,000 in 1894. Nevertheless, as *Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun* reported, the gross tonnage of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha reached 150,000 tons in 1895, entering its name in the world’s biggest shipping companies. As Japan’s trade expanding more than double in the years after the First Sino-Japanese War, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha established regular lines to Europe (Yokohama-London) in March, the United States (Seattle) in August, and Australia in October 1896, in addition to lines to China and Siberia. The establishment of the long-distance lines consequently stimulated the production of domestic large ships at the Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard. Simultaneously, the increase in trade greatly contributed to the nation’s capitalistic development that enabled the establishment of regular long-distance overseas routes and new steamship companies, according to Tatematsu.

As the nation’s maritime transportation developed through the enactment of the *Kōkai Shōrei Hō* and *Zōsen Shōrei Hō* in March 1896 as well as the creation of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha that transported majority of the *kanyaku imin*, demand for the

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90 Tatematsu, “Nihon Shihon Shugi Kakuritsuki no Mitsubishi Zaibatsu,” 94.
overseas emigration continuously grew and numbers of publications on emigration circulated by the 1880s.\(^{91}\) According to William D. Wray, considerable numbers of intellectuals supported the Japanese emigration to Hawaii as a stepping-stone to Japan’s further expansion to Latin America and Australia.\(^{92}\) Pro-Mitsubishi politicians such as Ōishi Masami (大石正已, 1855–1935) from Tosa analyzed the “relation between shipping, emigration, and the expansion of Japanese trade” and argued that the Meiji government should support the “peaceful emigration of Japanese overseas.”\(^{93}\) As Wray points out, the promotion on the Japanese emigration remained “semiofficial” during the Meiji Period.\(^{94}\) Unlike the emigration to Hokkaido that encouraged permanent settlement, emigration to Hawaii and the United States was completely different in nature because it was not for permanent settlement. As the Foreign Minister Inoue stated, it was primarily to obtain foreign currency for the national development and advanced farming technology for the development of the rural areas as well as to make a profit from trade.\(^{95}\)

The number of Japanese immigrants to the mainland United States increased when the direct route to Seattle became available. In 1896, largely owning to the Kōkai Shōrei Hō and Zōsen Shōrei Hō, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha established a regular service

\(^{91}\) See Chapter VII for details on publications that promoted overseas emigration.

\(^{92}\) Wray, *Mitsubishi and the N.Y. K.*, 263.


to Seattle when the Great Northern Railway offered Japan “to provide a docking area in Seattle and transportation for Japanese goods to the eastern United States.” The Nippon Yusen Kaisha provided a service per month, utilizing three steamships of *Miike Maru*, *Yamaguchi Maru*, and *Kinshū Maru*. According to *Kokumin Shimbun*, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha would charge ¥240 for the first-class passage, 70 percent discount for the second-class passage, and only ¥80 for the steerage class. In 1900, the gross carrying capacity of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha’s steamships reached 200,000 tons, and the company employed 1,200 officers with 3,500 sailors. The third president of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, Kondo Renpei (近藤 廉平, 1848–1921) advocated “a commercial compact” with the United States to “control the trade of China.” In 1901, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha increased the number of services to once every two weeks, utilizing six steamships of *Shinano Maru*, *Kaga Maru*, *Iyo Maru*, *Kinshū Maru*, *Tosa Maru*, and *Ryojun Maru*.

Significantly, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha’s Ōno Natataro (大野 鉈太郎) became the first Japanese captain who navigated *Ryojun Maru* to Seattle in June 1901. In 1907–1908, five steamships of *Shinano Maru*, *Kaga Maru*, *Iyo Maru*, *Aki Maru*, and *Tango Maru* engaged in the service. All ships except *Shinano Maru* were built at the Mitsubishi

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98 “Comes to Study American Trade,” *San Francisco Call*, May 6, 1900.

Nagasaki Shipyard.\textsuperscript{100} In addition, the Tōyō Kisen Kaisha (東洋汽船会社, Oriental Steamship Company), a shipping company founded by Asano Sōichiro (浅野 総一郎, 1848–1930) in July 1896, came to contribute to the development of the nation’s shipping industry by establishing a San Francisco line in 1898 in cooperation with the Western Pacific Railroad Company.\textsuperscript{101} The Tōyō Kisen Kaisha utilized three large-class steamships; S.S. Hong Kong Maru (香港丸, 6,064 gross tons), S.S. Nippon Maru (日本丸, 6,048 gross tons), and S.S. America Maru (亜米利加丸, 6,210 gross tons).\textsuperscript{102} The Kaigai Dekasegi Annai, a guidebook to America, depicted the steamships of the Tōyō Kisen as “palaces floating on the ocean.”\textsuperscript{103} Considering the growing anti-Japanese sentiment in California, Asano’s decision to establish the San Francisco line seemed a risky attempt; however, Asano, like the most Japanese of the time, had never imagined that Japan would be a subject of exclusionism.\textsuperscript{104} Meanwhile, founded in 1884, the Osaka Shōsen Kaisha (大阪
商船会社, Osaka Mercantile Steamship Company) began a service between Hong Kong and Tacoma in July 1906 in cooperation with Chicago, Milwaukee & Puget Sound Railroad Company. Simultaneously, these laws not only promoted the emergence of new shipping companies but also encouraged the Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard to improve the performance of their ships to compete with the Western ships. In addition, the government subsidized the new service for importing raw cotton directly from the United States.

Indeed, during the early shiyaku imin jidai (self-contracted immigration period, 1894–1900), the emigration companies depended on the foreign shipping companies such as the Pacific Mail Steamship Company (P.M.S.S.) and the Occidental and Oriental Steamship Company (O&O) to convey the emigrants because the Nippon Yusen Kaisha was busy serving for the nation. However, after the Kōkai Shōrei Hō and Zōsen Shōrei Hō brought into effect, the Tōyō Kisen Kaisha which had right to call at the port of Honolulu based on an agreement with P.M.S.S. and O&O in addition to owners of shagaisen (ships not owned by N.Y.K., T.K.K. or O.S.K.) played important roles in transporting emigrants to Hawaii. Compared to shasen (ships owned by N.Y.K., T.K.K. and O.S.K.), shagaisen had relatively small capacity (about 1,500 to 3,770 tons); however, they conveyed as many emigrants as the shasen. As the domestic shipping companies grew, the dependence on the foreign shipping companies gradually decreased.


106 “Broke with the Pacific Mail,” San Francisco Call, August 7, 1896.

The prohibition of the contract-labor immigration in June 1900 had affected the development of the Japanese shipping companies. Before resuming the transportation of emigrants, the Japanese government had to impose a series of restrictions in order to prevent the rise of anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States and to limit the number of emigrants by shutting down the *shagaisen*.

In 1901, the transportation of emigrants resumed; however, the restriction on the number of emigrants obstructed the development of shipping companies. Moreover, the government granted the right to convey emigrants to only those shipping companies that had established a regular line for two years that excluded the *shagaisen* from the emigration business. As a result, the *shasen*, in particular the Tōyō Kisen Kaisha and foreign companies such as P.M.S.S. and O&O dominated the shipping of emigrants during the *jiyū imin jidai* (1900–1907). In all, the Tōyō Kisen Kaisha, utilizing its three big steamships (all ships over 6,000 gross tons), made total eighty-four shipments of the free immigrants to Hawaii between June 1900 and 1907. Although being the only domestic company eligible for the shipment of emigrants, the Tōyō Kisen Kaisha was not able to dominate the business due to the restriction on the numbers of emigrants to be sent every month. In 1902, the Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō (小村壽太郎, 1855–1911), seeking to mitigate the anti-Japanese sentiment in Hawaii, further reduced the number of the immigrants sent by each

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109 Ibid., 160. The *shagaisen* were allowed to transport emigrants after July 1, 1906.

110 Ibid., 158–159. According to Nishimukai, *S.S. Hong Kong Maru* conveyed emigrants to Hawaii for 25 times; *S.S. Nippon Maru*, 28 times; and *S.S. America Maru*, 31 times.
emigration company from fifty to thirty monthly.\textsuperscript{111}

At the same time, the Tōyō Kisen Kaisha had to compete with P.M.S.S. that began to utilize bigger and faster ships (\textit{S.S. Siberia} and \textit{S.S. Korea}, both over 18,000 tons with speed of 18 knots and accommodation for 300 first-class passages)\textsuperscript{112}, and the competition seemed disadvantageous to the Tōyō Kisen Kaisha was able to secure the decent numbers of passengers. Nishimukai explains that the Japanese passengers preferred to use the Tōyō Kisen Kaisha because “the company had been receiving the national support.” Therefore, although the P.S.M.M. offered better services, the Japanese people preferred to use the Tōyō Kisen Kaisha’s service, and surprisingly the number of Japanese passengers of the Tōyō Kisen Kaisha’s ships exceeded the passengers of both P.M.S.S. and O&O combined.\textsuperscript{113} The result indicated that the Meiji government’s implantation of “nationalism” through the promulgation of the Imperial Rescript on Education (1890) was finally infiltrated into the Japanese mind.\textsuperscript{114} The Japanese passengers gave priority to the nation’s development rather than to their personal gain or interests, and the Tōyō Kisen Kaisha, taking advantage of “nationalism,” succeeded in securing enough Japanese passengers on the competitive route. Meanwhile, in other

\textsuperscript{111} “Hawai Imin, mata Seigen” (Restriction on Immigration to Hawaii again), \textit{Jiji Shinpō} (Tokyo), April 18, 1902, in Nakayama, ed., \textit{Shimbun Shōsei Meiji Hennen Shi, dai 11-kan, Hokushin Jihen}, 405. Graduated from Harvard Law School in 1878, Komura played an important role in repealing the “unconditional treaties” signed with the Western countries during the late Tokugawa Period.


\textsuperscript{114} Promulgated on October 30, 1890, the Imperial Rescript on Education promoted the rejection of the Western values in favor of the Japanese traditional values.
words, this institutionalized nationalism made the Japanese choose inferior services offered by the Tōyō Kisen Kaisha.

During the Russo-Japanese War, most shasen were utilized for the nation’s war effort, and the Tōyō Kisen Kaisha’s Hong Kong Maru and Nippon Maru were not exception; consequently, the number of emigrants conveyed by the Tōyō Kisen Kaisha decreased. Simultaneously, the Nippon Yosen Kaisha suffered a great loss from the war due to the requisition of all ships except nine with total tonnage of 13,594 and the suspension of overseas lines. It took the company for years to recover to the 1895 profit level that marked the highest. In fact, the Tōyō Bōeki Kaisha (Oriental Trading Company) in Seattle, a leading labor contractor and import-export company that relied on the Nippon Yosen Kaisha’s trans-pacific service suffered financial difficulties. When the government allowed the conveyance of emigrants in July 1906, the shagaisen resumed their services. However, the Immigration Act of 1907 and the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907–1908 that restricted the entry of labor immigrants significantly affected the course of the development of Japanese shipping industry.

While the Tōyō Kisen Kaisha and the Osaka Shōsen Kaisha became more competitive during the jiyyū imin jidai, the Nippon Yosen Kaisha under strong influence of Mitsubishi continued to dominate the nation’s merchant shipping throughout the prewar era. Particularly, in response to the Gentlemen’s Agreement that decreased the number of immigrants, the Nippon Yosen Kaisha determined to focus more on freight

115 Wray, Mitsubishi and the N.Y. K., 373–374.


117 Nishimukai, “Senzen no Imin Yusō to Waga Kuni no Kaiunngyō · Horon: Tokuni Hawai Imin Yusō ni Kanren site,” 159–161.
rather than on the transportation of emigrants. In September 1907, the Japanese firms including the Mitsui Company determined to utilize the Japanese vessels to carry freight due to the “unsatisfactory treatment” and “unfavorable attitude of foreign vessels.” Placing confidence in the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, the Japanese firms boycotted the freight of the foreign steamship companies. As a result, the freight of the foreign vessels decreased rapidly whereas the cargoes carried by the Nippon Yusen Kaisha drastically increased.  

Meanwhile, the Tōyō Kisen Kaisha introduced two large passenger liners for San Francisco line in 1908, the very year the Gentlemen’s Agreement was signed, which Japan agreed not to issue passports for the United States to laborers.  

When the transportation of immigrants took place actively, three shasen sent out total 7,000 to 8,000 Japanese annually to the United States; however, the number of passengers reduced to 3,866 in 1920 and 3,393 in 1921.  

The Immigration Act of 1924 that completely shut down the Japanese immigration to the United States further put the shasen into severe trouble. According to Osaka Asahi Shimbun, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha lost about 70 percent of passengers, transporting only 206 first-class passengers and 339 steerage passengers between July 1924 and June 1925. The Tōyō Kisen Kaisha lost about half of passengers. Meanwhile, the Osaka Shōsen Kaisha marked a sixty-percent decrease in the first half of the year 1925 compared with the same period of the previous year, and

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118 “Japanese Boycott All Foreign Steamships,” The Hawaiian Gazette, September 3, 1907.

119 Yamada, Fune ni Miru Nihonjin Iminshi, 41.

120 “Hokubei imin no Gentai: Rainen no Ko-keiki o Yosō suru Funegaisha” (Decline in Immigration to the North America: Steamship Companies Expecting Prosperity Next Year), Osaka Asahi Shimbun, December 23, 1921.
transported 105 first-class passengers and 443 steerage passengers.¹²¹ In 1926, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha merged the Tōyō Kisen Kaisha’s trans-pacific operations including San Francisco line that suffered a business depression due to the enactment of the Immigration Act of 1924.¹²²

The prosperity of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha contributed to the expansion of Mitsubishi zaibatsu that successfully established its predominance over various sectors, including shipping, shipbuilding, insurance, and heavy industry. Especially after the revision of the Kōkai Shōrei Hō (Navigation Promotion Law) and Zōsen Shōrei Hō (Shipbuilding Promotion Law) in 1900, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha’s purchase of large ships from Mitsubishi facilitated the diversification of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu.¹²³ The Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard built 64.1 percent of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha’s total tonnage of 200,897.¹²⁴ Utilizing a profit from sales of ships, Mitsubishi began to invest in metal mining, which came to produce as much as 38.2 percent of the company’s operation profits, if combined with coal mining, 55.2 percent, between 1894 and 1913.¹²⁵

Furthermore, Mitsubishi’s predominance was attainable through the propagation of its influence over the government. To take an instance, the Finance Minister and the founder of the Bank of Japan, Matsukata Masayoshi, strongly recommended Kawada

¹²¹ “Hokubei Kōro no Konjuku: Iminhō no Isshūnen o Mukaete; Fune Kaisha to Kankeisha wa Shiku-hakku” (Situations of the Trans-Pacific Line: A Year After the Enactment of the Immigration Act; Shipping Companies and Related Business in Great Trouble), Osaka Asahi Shim bun, July 1, 1925.

¹²² Yamada, Fune ni Miru Nihonjin Iminshi, 59.

¹²³ Wray, Mitsubishi and the N.Y. K., 291. The Nippon Yusen Kaisha used to buy large ships from the British companies.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 458.

Koichirō (川田 小一郎, 1836–1896) to be the third Governor of the Bank of Japan.\(^{126}\) Kawada had worked under Iwasaki Yatarō since the time of Tsukumo Shōkai, and had established a strong connection with Mitsubishi. In fact, when the government decided to subsidize the Nippon Yusen Kaisha for the establishment of the long-distance overseas routes, Kawada was serving as the third Governor of the Bank of Japan whose position had significant influence on the decision of the national economic policy. Appointed by Prime Minister Matsukata Masayoshi, Iwasaki Yanosuke, a younger brother of Iwasaki Yatarō, became the fourth Governor of the Bank of Japan succeeding Kawada who passed away on November 7, 1896.\(^{127}\) Iwasaki family and Matsukata family was related by marriage because Yanosuke’s eldest daughter Shigeko (繁子) had married Matsukata’s second son Shōsaku (松方 正作). The fifth Governor of the Bank of Japan, Yamamoto Tatsuo (山本 達雄, 1856–1947) had a close connection with Mitsubishi as well. Yamamoto worked for the Yūbin Kisen Mitsubishi Kaisha as an assistant manager of Yokohama branch after attending Keiō Gijuku and Mitsubishi Commercial School. Later appointed by Prime Minister Saionji Kinmochi (西園寺 公望, 1849–1940), Yamamoto served as the Finance Minister during the second Saionji cabinet.\(^{128}\)

Iwasaki family had utilized a marriage of convenience for maintaining power.

For example, Yatarō’s eldest daughter married Katō Takaaki (加藤 高明, 1860–1926)


and third daughter married Shidehara Kijūrō (幣原 喜重郎, 1872–1951), and both Katō and Shidehara later became Prime Ministers of Japan. In addition to establishing family connections with politicians, Iwasaki and Fukuzawa family had maintained closer relations through the marriage between Iwasaki Yatarō’s granddaughter Ayako and Fukuzawa Yukichi’s grandson Kenji. Furthermore, Yatarō’s another granddaughter Tokiko married Keizō, a grandson of the great financier Shibusawa Eiichi, who was the sixteenth Governor of the Bank of Japan and Finance Minister for Shidehara Cabinet. The family tree of Iwasaki Yatarō illustrates how Mitsubishi successfully established closer relations with the key figures in the Japanese government through marriage of convenience.

As shown in the family tree of Iwasaki Yatarō, it clearly indicated closer connections between the Japanese government and the Mitsubishi zaibatsu and illustrated excuses for the government to support Mitsubishi.

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129 44th Prime Minister Shidehara Kijūrō was Shibusawa Keizō’s uncle-in-law. Shibusawa Keizō was a grandson of Shibusawa Eiichi who was known as the “father of Japanese capitalism.”

Figure 5.2: Iwasaki Yatarō’s Family Tree
Iwasaki Yajirō (1808–1873): jige rōnin (former lower-ranked rural masterless samurai) of Tosa-han (present Kochi Prefecture).

Iwasaki Yatarō (1835–1885): founder and the first president of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu.

Iwasaki Yanosuke (1851–1908): Yatarō’s younger brother, 2nd president of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu, 4th president of Bank of Japan, his wife Sanae was Gotō’s eldest daughter.

Gotō Shōjirō (1838–1897): Communications Minister (Kuroda, Yamagata, and Matsukata Cabinets), Agriculture and Commerce Minister (2nd Itō Cabinet), advocate of jiyū minken undō (Freedom and People’s Rights Movement).


Katō Takaaki (1860–1926): diplomat, Foreign Minister (4th Itō, 1st Saionji, 3rd Katsura, and 2nd Ōkuma Cabinets), president of Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun, 24th Prime Minister, his wife Haruji was Yatarō’s eldest daughter.

Kiuchi Jūshirō (1866–1925): vice-Minister of Home Affairs, vice-Minister of Agriculture, member of the House of Peers, governor of Kyoto, his wife Isoji was Yatarō’s second daughter.

Shidehara Kijūrō (1872–1951): Foreign Minister (Katō, Wakatsuki, Hamaguchi Cabinets), 44th Prime Minister, his wife Masako was Yatarō’s third daughter.

Iwasaki Koyata (1879–1945): Yanosuke’s eldest son, 4th president of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu.

Matsukata Šōsaku: Matsukata Masayoshi’s second son, his wife Shigeko was Yanosuke’s eldest daughter.


Fukuzawa Kenji: Fukuzawa Yukichi’s grandson, diplomat, his wife Ayako was Hisaya’s daughter.

Shibusawa Keizō (1896–1963): Shibusawa Eiichi’s grandson, 16th president of Bank of Japan, Finance Minister (Shidehara Cabinet), his wife Tokiko was Yatarō’s granddaughter.

Tracing the development of maritime industry and commerce in Japan, it became clear that the nation’s modernization process accompanied the growth of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu. Japan then focused on achieving fukoku kyōhei to catch up the West, the Meiji leaders realized that nationalism as well as industrialization was essential for building a strong centralized nation-state. In the circumstances, Iwasaki Yatarō had always demonstrated his strong sense of nationalism in time of emergency declaring “Kuni atteno Mitsubishi” (The nation is; therefore, Mitsubishi is). Therefore, Yatarō was one of the key figures who implanted the sense of nationalism into the Japanese people in the fledging nation-state. Since the establishment of the company, successive presidents of Mitsubishi continued the policy of growing together with the state, and demonstrated their dedication to the nation’s achievement. Mitsubishi demonstrated that without abandoning Japan’s national identity and patriotism, the adoption of Western technology and practice was possible that was inevitable for the survival of Japan.

As examined earlier, although it could seriously risk his company’s management, Iwasaki willingly supported the causes of the government during the Taiwan Expedition.

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132 Ibid., 41–42. In 1890, strongly requested by the Foreign Minister Matsukata Masayoshi who sought to sell it to a single buyer, Yanosuke (second president of Mitsubishi) bought the Marunouchi land in Tokyo for ¥1,280,000 and constructed the office center for Mitsubishi zaibatsu, which became the present Marunouchi District. The price of the land was two to three times more than the market value, which was equivalent to the three-year budget of the City of Tokyo, according to “Iwasaki Yanosuke Monogatari: vol. 9 Marunouchi shūtoku no ketsudan” (Story of Iwasaki Yanosuke: vol. 9 Decision to Acquire Marunouchi), Mitsubishi.com, http://www.mitsubishi.com/j/history/series/yanosuke/yanosuke09.html (accessed January 10, 2010).
and the Satsuma Rebellion, and paved the way for the rise of nationalism in the formative phase of modern Japan. In addition, replying the government disposal of thirteen ships to Mitsubishi at a nominal fee after the Taiwan Expedition, Iwasaki decided to pay ¥300,000 by yearly installments over a period of fifty years although he had no obligation to do so.\(^{133}\) Yatarō’s enormous monetary contribution drastically relieved the government exhausted from two campaigns in four years. In many terms, the Meiji government was indebted to Mitsubishi; therefore, it was natural for the government (except Chōshū faction) to pass laws that would be advantageous to Mitsubishi. In the Meiji period, the growth of Mitsubishi was indeed the barometer of the national prestige. In the circumstance, the Japanese maritime industry under the leadership of Mitsubishi expanded and the growing demand for overseas emigration resulted in the establishment of new long-distance lines. The transportation of the *kanyaku imin* between 1886 and 1894 became a landmark in the history of Japanese maritime industry that paved the way for the massive emigration. Meanwhile, reviewing the Mitsubishi’s strategy for the expansion of business, Kobayashi Masaaki regarded Mitsubishi as “the large private enterprise in Japan which adroitly utilized the ‘nationalism’ of the government.”\(^{134}\) Although some scholars such as Kobayashi viewed Mitsubishi exploited the government, it is an undeniable fact that Mitsubishi played an indispensable role in the Japanese expansionism and significantly influenced the direction that the Meiji government was taking. Therefore, regarding the contribution of Mitsubishi in the Meiji period, Yatarō’s

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\(^{133}\) Tateishi, *Iwasaki Yatarō: Kokka no Yuji ni saishite Shiri o kaerimizu*, 296.

phrase “Kuni atteno Mitsubishi” (The nation is; therefore, Mitsubishi is)\textsuperscript{135} could be interchangeable with “Mitsubishi atteno Kuni” (Mitsubishi is; therefore, the nation is) in many aspects. Significantly, as much as the nation benefitted from Mitsubishi, Mitsubishi took advantage of the government and steadily increased its company assets.

CHAPTER VI
IMMIGRATION MOTIVATORS

This chapter seeks to illustrate the influence of Meiji intellectuals and publications that motivated various classes of Japanese to go to America. The first half of the chapter deals with the pro-western intellectuals of the Meiji period. Publishing numbers of books on the West, the intellectuals stimulated the elite class to go to America for studying so that they would learn Western science and technology, which was essential for pursuing Japan’s rapid modernization. Relying on the power of writing, the Meiji government sought to achieve fukoku kyōhei by actively adopting and then modifying the Western models. Meanwhile, the rise of nationalism following the First Sino-Japanese War brought about a change in immigration pattern in the 1890s as well as a change in attitude toward other Asian countries. The latter half of the chapter deals with guidebooks that appealed to the mass for emigration to America.

Focusing on the role played by prominent educators, such as Fukuzawa Yukichi and Muto Sanji, I will try to demonstrate how the Meiji intellectuals and their publications either directly or indirectly encouraged the Japanese emigration to the United States. Then, examining the contents of guidebooks, I will analyze the reasons for the emergence of mass emigration/immigration to the United States in the early twentieth century.
Fukuzawa Yukichi—an advocate of Western liberalism for the rise of nationalism

Fukuzawa Yukichi was one of the most significant intellectuals in the nineteenth century Japan who advocated opening trade. Following Fukuzawa’s manner, influential politicians such as Okuma Shigenobu and Ito Hirobumi promoted foreign trade. Japan’s trade with the United States expanded with the emergence of entrepreneurs such as Iwasaki Yatarō and Shibusawa Eiichi.\(^1\) Visiting the United States in 1860 as a member of the first Japanese mission to the United States, Fukuzawa Yukichi played a crucial role in promoting Western civilization and motivating young Japanese to go to America. Without Fukuzawa’s powerful publications that introduced things of the West, the Japanese overseas emigration would probably take place much later.

Although Fukuzawa is regarded as the most prominent educator and writer in modern Japan, he had a quite humble start. Born in Osaka on January 10, 1835, Fukuzawa was the second son of a lower-ranked samurai of the Okudaira Clan (奧平氏) of Nakatsu-han (中津藩) in Kyushu.\(^2\) Serving as an accountant of the clan, Fukuzawa’s

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father, Hyakusuke (百助) was a talented scholar of Chinese classics; however, he had
never been promoted under the strict class hierarchy system of the Tokugawa Japan.
Hyakusuke died when Fukuzawa was only three years old, and Fukuzawa family moved
back to Nakatsu-han and thereafter lived in poverty. The impoverished Fukuzawa family
could not afford to send Fukuzawa to school and Fukuzawa himself had no interest in
learning during his childhood.³ In fact, Fukuzawa’s dream was “to be the richest man in
Japan and to spend as much money” as he wished.⁴ Despite passing way over schooling
age, Fukuzawa determined to go to school. In order to earn extra money for going to
school, young Fukuzawa even had side jobs such as repairing sandals.⁵ At the age of
fourteen, Fukuzawa was finally able to attend a school of Dutch Studies (蘭学) that
taught western science and ideas.

In February 1854, pushed by his elder brother, nineteen-year-old Fukuzawa
willingly left for Nagasaki to learn the Dutch language and gunnery in order to be a
Western weaponry specialist. Simultaneously, while attending school in Nagasaki,
Fukuzawa was designated to serve Iki, a son of Okudaira Clan’s chancellor who went
there for the same purpose. In contrast to Iki, Fukuzawa was a quick learner and a bright
student. Thus, Iki came to resent Fukuzawa being the top student in the school.⁶ In order
to avoid a conflict with Iki, Fukuzawa decided to leave Nagasaki. By the time,

³ Miyamori, *A Life of Mr. Yukichi Fukuzawa*, 9.

⁴ Ibid.


Fukuzawa’s resentment toward the feudal system grew further due to the strict class hierarchy system that barred him from getting promotion, and the inequality that prevented him from demonstrating his talent and skill. By then, Fukuzawa swore vengeance against the unjust feudal system existed in Japan.⁷ Although planning to continue his study in Edo, Fukuzawa, persuaded by his brother, decided to stayed in Osaka for learning Dutch language and medicine at the Tekijuku school (適塾) run by Ogata Kōan (緒方洪庵, 1810–1863), a doctor and Dutch scholar. Fukuzawa studied under the guidance of Ogata for three years.⁸

Fukuzawa’s career as an educator began when he was twenty-three years old. In 1858, appointed as a Dutch language teacher for the Nakatsu-han’s young samurai at its headquarters, Fukuzawa moved to Edo and established a school. Provided by the Nakatsu-han, his small apartment located in Teppozu (鉄砲洲) in the Tsukuji district became a school known as the Keiō Gijuku (慶應義塾).⁹ Initially, the number of students attending the school was around fifty, but it had increased to eighty by 1867. Teppozu was designated to be a foreign settlement; therefore, the Tokugawa Shogunate relocated his school to Shinsenza (新銭座) in Shiba in 1867.

In 1859, in order to test his Dutch language skill, Fukuzawa traveled to the newly opened port of Yokohama where foreign settlement were located according to terms of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce signed in 1858.¹⁰ Fukuzawa was surprised that no

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⁹ Miyamori, *A Life of Mr. Yukichi Fukuzawa*, 69–70.

¹⁰ Ibid., 25.
foreigners in Yokohama understood Dutch and that most of them communicated in English. Fukuzawa was deeply disappointed when he found out his years of intensive study of reading Dutch books appeared to be worthless. In fact, Fukuzawa soon figured out that English was the language used in the port city. Thereafter, Fukuzawa concentrated his energies on studying English by himself. Fukuzawa had to use a Dutch-English dictionary because he could not find either a good English teacher or an English-Japanese dictionary at any stores in Yokohama or Edo. In fact, there was no English-Japanese dictionary or English studying materials available in Japan at that time. In this circumstance, Fukuzawa volunteered to go to the United States in 1860 and Europe in 1862 respectively.

Fukuzawa’s trip to the United States in 1860 completely changed the way Fukuzawa thought. Informed about the Tokugawa Shogunate sending the Kanrin Maru to escort the U.S.S. Powhatan with Japanese ambassadors to San Francisco, Fukuzawa volunteered to accompany the first Japanese diplomatic mission to the United States in 1860 as an attendant of Admiral Kimura Yoshitake (木村 嘉毅, 1830–1901). In order to get Kimura’s permission, Fukuzawa asked a Dutch scholar and physician, Dr. Katsuragawa, who was a close relative of Kimura, to write a letter of introduction for...

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13 Miyamori, A Life of Mr. Yukichi Fukuzawa, 31. According to The New York Times on April 28, 1860, U.S.S. Powhatan was the ship in which Japan and the United States signed the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, also known as Harris Treaty.
him. After obtaining the letter, Fukuzawa directly went to Kimura’s house and asked Kimura to take him as a servant. Since many of Kimura’s servants hesitated to go abroad, Fukuzawa’s offer was immediately taken.

While in San Francisco, Fukuzawa, following Manjirō’s advice, bought a copy of Webster’s Dictionary that would be the first English dictionary imported into Japan. Fukuzawa also bought a Chinese-English dictionary from a Chinese merchant. The dictionary, *Kaei Tsūgo* (華英通語, literary “Chinese-English Conversation Book”), had been published by a Chinese author, Tzu-ch’ing (子卿), in 1855.

Fukuzawa also made a visit to the William Shew’s “daguerreian gallery” to take a photograph of himself. Right before taking a photograph, Fukuzawa saw an American girl in the studio. She was found out to be a daughter of Shew named Theodora Alice and was fifteen years old then. When Fukuzawa suggested her to take a picture together, Theodora Alice willingly accepted his offer.

Figure 6.2
Fukuzawa Yukichi with Theodora Alice Shew in San Francisco, 1860
Source: Fukuzawa Memorial Center for Modern Japanese Studies, Keiō University, Tokyo, Japan

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and stood next to him. In addition to the Webster’s Dictionary, Fukuzawa brought back a photograph of himself with Theodora Alice, which he had always treasured and made a display of.

The first Japanese diplomatic mission to the United States had a significant influence on the development of Fukuzawa’s philosophy, Keiō Gijuku’s educational principles, as well as the concept of “civilization.” It also influenced the course of the development of Meiji Japan that became inclined toward setting the American system as its model. Thereafter, the Japanese government extensively promoted the adoption of practices and institutions based on American model, including “education, agriculture, mining, finance, jurisprudence, or diplomacy.”

In his Autobiography, Fukuzawa repeatedly described how American hosts were hospitable to the Japanese visitors. For example, the U.S. government paid for the delegates’ hotel expenses, repaired the Kanrin Maru free of charge, and sent five crews from Captain Brooke’s U.S.S. Fenimore Cooper to assist the homeward voyage of the Kanrin Maru. Chitoshi Yanaga argues in his article that “American hospitality and kindness left an indelible impression on the minds of the proud and sensitive Japanese, causing them in later years to turn to the Americans

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for guidance and assistance in the development of their nation.”

Returning home on November 9, 1860, Fukuzawa was officially employed as an interpreter of the Tokugawa Shogunate for translating official papers and diplomatic documents. Simultaneously, Fukuzawa, consulting the Webster’s Dictionary that he had brought back from America, continued to teach himself English as well as began to teach English at his school in place of Dutch. Finding the dictionary very valuable, Fukuzawa contentedly wrote down his feeling before leaving San Francisco for Japan in his Autobiography; “Once I had secured this valuable work, I felt no disappointment on leaving the new world and returning home again.”

In the same year, Fukuzawa published the first English-Japanese dictionary called Zōtei Kaei Tsūgo (増訂華英通語, literally “Enlarged and Revised Chinese-English Conversation Book”), which was indeed a translation of original Kaei Tsūgo “with additional Japanese phonetic denotation of English pronunciation.” Consisting of two volumes, the Zōtei Kaei Tsūgo mostly dealt with English vocabulary and idioms. By

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25 Miyamori, A Life of Mr. Yukichi Fukuzawa, 69.


then, English became the most important foreign language.

In 1862, again Fukuzawa was a member of the first Japanese diplomatic mission to Europe as a translator, traveling through France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Prussia, Russia, and Portugal. Deeply impressed with the western institutions during the missions, Fukuzawa became extremely critical of the Tokugawa Shogunate and the customs, ideas, and beliefs of the feudal system at large. Then, enlightening western science, technology, and liberal thought, Fukuzawa started publishing *Seiyō Jijō* (西洋事情, “Conditions in the West”) to present the Western lifestyle and institutions. *Seiyō Jijō* was composed of three influential volumes published in 1866, and its sequels in 1868 and 1870. In other words, *Seiyō Jijō* was an “introductory book” describing the current state of affairs as well as history of the Western countries. Iwasaki Yatarō, founder of Mitsubishi who came to admire Fukuzawa, was indeed a reader of *Seiyō Jijō*. Published in 1866, the first volume of *Seiyō Jijō* mainly introduced his discoveries in the West with his own interpretation of Western civilization in fine detail including:

- the forms of government, methods of taxation, national debts, postal systems, paper money, firms, foreign intercourse, military system, literature and the arts, schools, libraries, newspapers, hospitals, poor-houses, asylums for mutes and for the blind, lunatic asylums, kindergartens, museums, exhibitions, steam engines, steamships, railways, telegraphs, and gas-lights… it contains much historical information about the

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governments, armies, navies and finances of the chief Western countries.\textsuperscript{32}

In addition, Fukuzawa introduced the way Western women lived, which was completely different from that of Japanese women of the Tokugawa period. Living under the strict Confucian society dominated by men, many literate Japanese women including some future “picture brides” came to dream of living in the Western countries.

Furthermore, Fukuzawa was the first Japanese to translate the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution into Japanese, which he introduced in \textit{Seiyō Jijō}.\textsuperscript{33} Particularly, the phrase of the Declaration of Independence reading, “all men are created equal,” moved Fukuzawa who had been always humiliated because of his hereditary status as a lower-rank samurai. Fukuzawa’s translation of the Declaration of Independence eventually incited the \textit{jiyū minken undō} (“Freedom and People’s Rights Movement”) in the late 1870s and the early 1880s, initially among the \textit{shizoku} who felt antipathy to the new Meiji government. This political and social movement also aimed to repeal the unequal treaties with the Western countries as well as to reduce the power of the central government for promoting a “true form” of democracy in Japan.\textsuperscript{34} In the 1880s, the \textit{jiyū minken undō} infiltrated into rural areas when the Land Tax Reform was brought into effect. This popular movement resulted in facilitating the establishment of the Meiji Constitution in 1889 and the Diet in 1890.

Simultaneously, by translating many foreign publications, Fukuzawa gave an access to Western science, history, culture, art, as well as thought to the Japanese

\begin{footnotes}
\item[32] Miyamori, \textit{A Life of Mr. Yukichi Fukuzawa}, 90.
\end{footnotes}
public.35 Haga Tōru who is a scholar of comparative literature argues that the access to the Western literature fostered to fill both “cultural” and “psychological” gap between Japan and the Western countries.36 Fukuzawa was indeed not the first Japanese to write about what he saw in America. As I discussed, two famous castaways, Nakahama Manjirō (John Mung) and Hamada Hikoz (Joseph Heco) had already introduced America to Japan before Fukuzawa. However, the Japanese regard Fukuzawa as “the first person to comprehensively and systematically introduced western civilization, both of the United States and Europe, to the Japanese general public.”37 As Chitoshi Yanaga argues, Seiyō Jijō was exceedingly significant because it was the first volume published by a Japanese person who actually went to America and Europe and saw them with his own eyes.38 Widely read by the general public, Seiyō Jijō stimulated the Japanese people to carry out drastic national reform based on the “principles of Western civilization.”39

Read by all classes of literate Japanese, Seiyō Jijō became a bestseller because Fukuzawa clearly and straightforwardly described the political, economic, and cultural institutions of the West.40 Unlike the previous writers who targeted certain groups of


39 Miyamori, A Life of Mr. Yukichi Fukuzawa, 87.

40 “Fukuzawa Yukichi,” Encyclopedia Britannica, 2009. According to Tomohiro Yakuwa’s “Kinse Shakai to Shikiji” (Literacy in Tokugawa Japan), Kyoikugaku Kenkyū
educated people, Fukuzawa’s writings were readable and did not require higher educational background to understand his arguments. Asataro Miyamori explains the strength of Fukuzawa’s writing style in *A Life of Mr. Yukichi Fukuzawa* (1902):

> Unlike most of his contemporaries, he wrote for the people in general and not chiefly for students and for the upper classes. Such being his purpose, he created a style of his own which is singularly adapted to people of every class. It combines in a most striking manner great lucidity and extreme simplicity…. In consequence of its simplicity and clearness, its vigor and directness, its ease and charm, its imagery and elegance, the “Fukuzawa style” or “Mita style” is justly famed throughout the Empire. Mr. Fukuzawa may therefore be truly designated the greatest Japanese writer of his time.

Particularly, portraying America as a “land of opportunity,” *Seiyō Jijō* greatly contributed to increasing the popularity of America among the Japanese public.42

The more Fukuzawa knew America, the more he was impressed by the way American practiced democracy. In 1867, Fukuzawa once again visited the United States this time as an official interpreter of the Tokugawa Shogunate that planned to buy a warship from the American government. After returning from the United States, Fukuzawa published *Seiyō Tabi Annai* (西洋旅案内, “A Travel Guide to the West”) in 1867 consisting of two volumes, which was the first guidebook for travel.43 In *Seiyō Tabi Annai*, Fukuzawa described how not to be embarrassed while traveling in the West

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43 Fukuzawa’s *Seiyō Tabi Annai* was illegally reprinted and sold as *Seiyō Jijō Kōhen* (A Sequel to Seiyō Jijō) by somebody, according to *Chugai Shimbun* (Domestic and Foreign News) on April 10, 1868, in Yasumasa Nakayama, ed., *Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen Shi, dai 1-kan, Ishin Daihenkakuki* (A Meiji Chronicle through Newspaper Sources, Vol. 1, Era Restoration and Reform) (Tokyo: Meiji Hennen Shi Ryōfukai, 1965), 35.
including the proper way of using the western-style bathroom.\textsuperscript{44} Observing the basic behavior of both American and European passengers of an ocean liner, Fukuzawa found no intrinsic differences between the Japanese and the Westerners.\textsuperscript{45} Introducing liberal thought as well as the lifestyle of the West, these publications on the West further motivated the young Japanese to travel and immigrate to America.\textsuperscript{46}

Fukuzawa became one of the first advocates of the Japanese immigration to the United States. Fukuzawa actually financed the establishment of an agricultural colony in Calaveras County in northern California.\textsuperscript{47} In June 1887, on the advice of Fukuzawa, Inoue Kakugoro (井上 角五郎, 1860–1938), one of his most trusted pupils, took more than thirty people mainly from Hiroshima to California as agricultural laborers.\textsuperscript{48} After purchasing land in Sierra Nevada, they built a house and bought farming tools for reclaiming land. Afterwards, some of the colonists worked for the neighboring railroad


\textsuperscript{45} Fukuzawa, \textit{Seiyō Tabi Annai}, vol. 1 (A Travel Guide to the West), 44–45.


\textsuperscript{47} Yuji Ichioka, \textit{The Issei: The World of the First Generation Japanese Immigrants, 1885–1924} (New York: The Free Press, 1988), 9–10. In the summer of 1887, led by Inoue Katsugorō, a group of thirty Japanese came to San Francisco. Financially supported by Fukuzawa, they purchased twenty acres of land in Calaveras County to make an attempt to establish an agricultural colony; however, they abandoned this venture within a short period of time.

company while others went to San Francisco or Sacramento for getting jobs.\(^49\) In the 1880s, there were some shosei in the mainland United States; however, the Japanese laborers numbered very few. While staying in California until 1888, Inoue wrote for \textit{Jiji Shinpō} (Current Events) about his experiences in America that further motivated the young readers of \textit{Jiji Shinpō} to seek immigration.\(^50\)

Fukuzawa devoted his energy to educating the young Japanese who would be the future leaders of modern Japan. In order to enlighten his pupils, Fukuzawa brought back various kinds of English books for them during the second diplomatic mission to the United States. In the late 1860s, Fukuzawa began to teach economics at Keiō Gijuku, and produced numbers of prominent politicians, journalists, and businessmen.\(^51\) In the \textit{Bakumatsu} period, it was not safe at all to be pro-Western or to advocate Westernization of the nation before the anti-foreigners’ eyes. Resenting the Western influence in Japan, anti-foreign samurai mercilessly killed anyone who seemed to be pro-Western. Especially because Fukuzawa pointed out the weakness of the Tokugawa Shogunate and encouraged learning from the Westerners, a group of anti-foreign samurai made several attempts to kill him and those who embraced Western ideals before the Meiji Restoration.\(^52\)

These advocates of Westernization frequently faced such life-threatening

\(^{49}\) Gaimushō Ryōji Ijūbu, \textit{Waga Kokumin no Kaigai Hatten, Honpen}, 134.


experiences in the post-restoration era as well. For example, a famous Confucian scholar of Higo Province (肥後国, present-day Kumamoto prefecture), Yokoi Shōnan (横井 小楠, 1809–1869), was assassinated in 1869 by anti-foreign samurai who misunderstood him of being pro-Western and possibly Christian. Ömura Masujirō (大村 益次郎, 1824–1869), who was a Japanese military leader and developed a Western-style army in the Chōshū-han, was assassinated in the same year by two samurai who were patrons of sonnō jōi movement.

However, once the new Meiji government was established in 1868, Fukuzawa was able to improve his position in society as one of the most influential and respected intellectuals who contributed to the foundation of modern Japan. Discovering his stupendous talent, the Meiji government tried to install Fukuzawa in a governmental post. Nevertheless, Fukuzawa preferred to stay out of the bureaucracy in order to focus on writing and educating the youth. Fukuzawa indeed condemned the Meiji government for ruling the country by force just like the Shogunate.

In the decades following the opening of Japan and a subsequent encounter with the Western civilization, Fukuzawa and other Meiji intellectuals facilitated the widespread of bunmei kaika (文明開化, “civilization and enlightenment”) for the establishment of new social order, public education, conscription, and women’s rights.

Emerging in the late nineteenth century, bunmei kaika stimulated the adoption of foreign

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53 Van Sant, *Pacific Pioneers*, 50. Yokoi initially called for “rich nation, strong army” as han’s policy; however, the new Meiji government adopted his idea as national policy that made Yokoi look pro-West, according to Van Sant.

culture and subsequently influenced the way the Japanese people lived and thought.\textsuperscript{55}

In terms of the change in food culture, Kanagaki Robun (仮名垣 魯文, 1829–1894), a writer of humorous fiction, stated in Aguranabe (1871; trans. The Beefeater, 1956) that through eating beef, Japan was “steadily becoming a truly civilized country.”\textsuperscript{56}

Furthermore, newspaper articles reported that in foreigners’ opinion, “the Japanese people are intelligent and skillful but they are impatient because they do not eat meat.” Therefore, in order to meet western expectations, the Japanese tried to adopt the new meat-eating habit, and sukiyaki (Japanese-style beef stew) became a symbol of bunmei kaika.\textsuperscript{57} As beef-eating became popular among the general public, 800 cattle were consumed monthly in Kobe, 600 in Yokohama, 500 in Tokyo, 300 in Osaka and Nagoya, and 100 to 200 in the rest of prefectures according to Yūbin Hōchi Shimbun.\textsuperscript{58}

Encouraged by an active and radical Westernizer Mori Arinori (森 有礼, 1847–1889) at the start, renowned Meiji intellectuals including Fukuzawa Yukichi established

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{55} For instance, Japanese food culture had changed due to bunmei kaika. During the feudal Japan, many Japanese practiced Buddhism that taught meat of four-footed animals was unclean. However, the Meiji intellectuals including Fukuzawa Yukichi encouraged the Japanese to eat beef. Moreover, the Japanese people began to wear the Western clothes, shoes, and hairstyles and to construct the Western-style buildings such as Rokumeikan (鹿鳴館, literary “Deer Cry Pavilion” built in 1883) proposed by Inoue Kaoru. Rokumeikan became a symbol of bunmei kaika and used to entertain foreign guests. Utilizing the Rokumeikan, Inoue sought to renegotiate the “unequal treaties” with the Western countries by demonstrating that Japan was now a modernized nation.


\textsuperscript{57} Toru Suzuki, Nihonshi Kawaraban: Rekishi Jiken o Tettei Kensho! (Reports on Japanese History: Through Examination of Historical Incidents!) (Tokyo: Sanshusha, 2006), 190. The first sukiyaki restaurant, Isekuma opened in Yokohama in 1862.

\end{footnotesize}
the *Meirokusha* (明六社, “Meiji Six Society”) in June 1873. The founding members of the *Meirokusha* included; Mori Arinori, Fukuzawa Yukichi, Nakamura Masanao, Nishimura Shigeki, Tsuda Mamichi, Kato Hiroyuki, Mitsukuri Rinsho, Mitsukuri Shūhei, Sugi Kōji, and Nishi Amane. Founded in the sixth year of Meiji, they named the society *Meirokusha*—“*Mei*” indicates Meiji, “*roku*” indicates six, and “*sha*” indicates society. The primary mission of the *Meirokusha* was the promotion of *bunmei kaika* through the introduction and popularization of the concepts of Western civilization to Japan. As Sandra T. W. Davis points out in *Intellectual Change and Political Development in Early Modern Japan* (1980), the *Meirokusha* also encouraged the “advancement of learning and the establishment of new norms of morality.” Most importantly, the members of *Meirokusha* believed firmly that not only *fukoku kyōhei* (enrich the nation and strengthen the military) but also *bunmei kaika* was essential for the survival of Japan as an independent nation in the face of Western imperialism in Asia.

In March 1874, the *Meirokusha* published its own journal named *Meiroku Zasshi* (明六雑誌, “Journal of the Japanese Enlightenment”), which sold 3,200 copies in the

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59 Takaaki Inuzuka, *Wakaki Mori Arinori: Higashi to Nishino Hazama de* (Young Mori Arinori: between East and West) (Tokyo: Hatsubai Seiunsha, 1983), 259. Mori was the first Japanese ambassador to the United States (1871–1873). Appointed as Minister of Education by Ito Hirobumi (the first prime minister of Japan), Mori called for extremely radical reforms that included the renunciation of the Japanese writing in favor of the Latin alphabet. On February 11, 1889, the day the Meiji Constitution was promulgated, Mori was stabbed by Nishino Buntaro, a 23-year-old ultranationalist. Mori died the next day due to a serious loss of blood.

60 The members of *Meirokusha* usually had experience in going to or studying abroad and tended to have background in traditional Confucian teachings as well as modern Western philosophies. The *Meirokusha* became inactive when the Meiji government imposed restrictions on freedom of speech as well as freedom of press in 1875.

first year.⁶² *Meiroku Zasshi* dealt with various issues such as women’s rights, philosophy, freedom of religion, social and economic problems, commerce as well as politics. Publishing forty-three issues, *Meiroku Zasshi* only lasted for less than two years because the government, afraid of the popular movement, tightened the control over the press in 1875. In addition, the development of Confucian and Western philosophy factions within the *Meirokusha* led to the discontinuance of their publication. While the Confucian faction defined “morality” as the real strength of the Western countries, the Western philosophy faction defined “rationality” as the real strength of the Western countries.⁶³ According to Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi’s *Modern Japanese Thought* (1998), in order to appease factionalism, Nishimura Shigeki (西村 茂樹, 1828–1902) suggested “a water-down Confucianism” for building “a new morality for modern Japan” derived from “the basic Confucian spirit and updating it with appropriate maxims from Western philosophy” in his *Nihon Dōtoku-ron* (日本道德論, “A Thesis on Japanese Moral Principles”) published in 1886.⁶⁴

While popularizing the Western concept of freedom and rights, Fukuzawa began to place significant emphasis on the equality and on the education issue. Through a wide circulation of his influential works including pamphlets, textbooks, editorials, articles, books, and public speech, Fukuzawa had constantly emphasized that “the adoption of

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utilitarian, rational, scientific, and technological aspects of Western civilization” was essential to be strong and independent as well as to become a “fully civilized” nation like the United States and Western European countries. According to a prominent Japanese historian, Mikiso Hane, about 7.5 million copies of his publications had circulated in Japan between 1860 and 1893. Professor Nishikawa Shunsaku at Keio University illustrates in his 1993 article that “independence” summarizes Fukuzawa’s main argument:

[H]e believed that personal and national independence was the real foundation of modern society in the West. In order to achieve this self-independence, Fukuzawa advocated Western, or practical and scientific learning, instead of the traditional studies of the Chinese classics. The more educated the people became, the better their national independence could be asserted, with a corresponding increase in public virtue and social morality.

In the 1870s, Fukuzawa produced numbers of widely-read works. Between the years 1872 and 1876, Fukuzawa published Gakumon no Susume (学問ノススメ, “An Encouragement of Learning”) consisting of seventeen volumes. In the beginning of his first chapter, he proclaimed: “It is said that heaven does not create one man above or beneath another man. This means that when men are born from heaven they all are equal. There is no innate distinction between high and low” and differences in education causes distinctions among them. Condemning the Japanese traditional school curriculum as

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65 Fukuzawa, Seiyō Jijō (Conditions in the West); Hane, Modern Japan, 113–114.
66 Hane, Modern Japan, 114
impractical, Fukuzawa placed an emphasis on the Western subjects which were previously less valued than the Chinese and Japanese Learning in Japan. These subjects included practical learning such as letter writing, accounting, abacus, and measurement, and new fields of study such as geography, physics, history, economics, and ethics.\(^{69}\)

Significantly, Fukuzawa was not sympathetic to the poor people at all. Without examining the causes for the poverty, Fukuzawa declared that there was nothing more miserable and hateful than the illiterate people in the world and that they were poor because they were ignorant. Fukuzawa considered being ignorant as the most shameful thing. Therefore, Fukuzawa preached that people had to learn to be good citizens, and “there is a good government over good citizens” and “there is a harsh government over ignorant citizens.” According to Fukuzawa, learning was the key to the improvement of society.\(^{70}\)

Meanwhile, in the volume eight of *Gakumon no Susume* published in 1874, Fukuzawa denounced the concubine system, which had been practiced in Japan for centuries, as “unhealthy custom.”\(^{71}\) Fukuzawa, believing that the concubine system would transform the Japanese family into “an inhumane institution where reciprocity and ethical responsibility were forgotten,” advocated monogamy.\(^{72}\)


\(^{69}\) Fukuzawa, *An Encouragement of Learning*, 1–6.


members of the *Meirokusha* such as Mori Arinori and Nakamura Masanao (中村 正直, 1832–1891) acknowledged that the ill treatment of women in society kept Japan backward. In order to accelerate the process of modernization, they began to call for the equal rights of men and women as well as the improvement of women’s status in the family.\(^\text{73}\) To begin with, they suggested the abolition of the concubine system which they considered “inhumane and immoral” for the modern society.\(^\text{74}\) They all agreed that the concubine system was barbaric and “uncivilized” if judging from the Westerners’ standpoint derived from Christian values. Moreover, Fukuzawa insisted that the existence of concubine system would cause a disadvantage in the course of the revision of “unequal treaties” with the West, in which monogamy was traditionally practiced.

Then, debating from a people’s point of view, Fukuzawa’s *Bunmeiron no Gairyaku* (文明論之概略, “An Outline of a Theory of Civilization”) was published in 1875, which further emphasized that “the attainment of civilization—which he identifies as the progress of man’s knowledge and virtue—was of the greatest importance to any country.”\(^\text{75}\) Clearly, Fukuzawa played a crucial role in initiating the “age of Westernism” in Japan through promoting *bunmei kaika*.\(^\text{76}\) Meanwhile, Fukuzawa Japan in the 1880s became known as the peak of the *bunmei kaika* era, which encouraged Westernization through imitating the West without abandoning the Japanese traditions and cultural

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\(^\text{74}\) Sharon L. Sievers, *Flowers in Salt: The Beginnings of Feminist Consciousness in Modern Japan* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983), 18. Educated in Great Britain, both Mori Arinori and Nakamura Masanao were Christians and deeply inspired by Western civilization.


Emerging in the process of modernization, this ideology called *Wakan Yōsai* (和魂洋才, literary “Japanese Soul and Western Skill”) had a significant influence on the industrialization of Japan. In reaction to Westernization/modernization, what Harumi Befu called the “samuraiization” took place, which meant the application of practices and values of the samurai class to all classes of Japanese. Especially, the “samuraiization” of the Japanese family affected the women of all classes negatively. Furthermore, strongly supported by the elite *shizoku* “who led the country, a warrior-caste ideal of duty to superiors,” the “samuraiization of society” became a major element of the “national ideology” in the Meiji Period. Without exception, Fukuzawa produced numbers of his works within this context.

In the early 1880s, Fukuzawa found his way into a newspaper venture. In 1882, encouraged by his pupils including his nephew Nakamigawa Hikojirō (中上川彦次郎), Fukuzawa established *Jiji Shinpō* (時事新報, “Current Events”), a major newspaper. Living by the editorial office of the Keiō Gijuku Publishing Company, Fukuzawa

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devoted himself to writing newspaper editorials that aimed at promoting individual rights and democratic ideals. Fukuzawa published most of his writings in *Jiji Shinpō* afterward. Accordingly, *Jiji Shinpō* came to serve as the advocate for the reform by producing many journalists and liberal politicians.

Generally considered as the most influential intellectual of the time, Fukuzawa consistently emphasized equal opportunity and stressed that radical changes in Japanese attitude and education were necessary for Japan’s progress. Fukuzawa’s teaching and his over one hundred publications definitely paved the way for the young Japanese to go to America for liberty and independence. Meanwhile, as a modernizer Fukuzawa had been distressed with the old system based on Confucianism and sought the new system based on Western ideas and values. In this circumstance, Fukuzawa advocated “*Datsua Nyūō*” (脱亜入欧, literally “leave Asia and join the West”) or commonly known as “*Datsua-ron*” (脱亜論, “On Leaving Asia”) in his *Jiji Shinpō* editorial on March 16, 1885.82 Fukuzawa arguing that

> We do not have time to wait for the enlightenment of our neighbors so that we can work together toward the development of Asia. It is better for us to leave the ranks of Asian nations and cast our lot with civilized nations of the West. As for the way of dealing with China and Korea, no special treatment is necessary just because they happen to be our neighbors. We simply follow the manner of the Westerners in knowing how to treat them. Any person who cherishes a bad friend cannot escape his bad notoriety. We simply erase from our minds our bad friends in Asia.83

Fukuzawa urged to eliminate the Chinese and Korean influences on Japanese that defended tradition. Fukuzawa believed firmly that the pursuit of “*Datsua-ron*” was

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essential to Japan’s advancement of civilization.\textsuperscript{84}

Fukuzawa’s “\emph{Datsua-ron}” completely changed the course of the development of modern Japan and the nature of the Japanese people at large. “\emph{Datsua-ron}” resulted in encouraging the rise of Japanese nationalism and imperialist expansionism as well as justified Japan’s subsequent colonization of Asian countries. Feeling contempt for Japan’s neighbors as “hopelessly backward,” Fukuzawa urged the Japanese to cut cultural ties with China and Korea, declaring that “those with bad companions cannot avoid bad reputations.”\textsuperscript{85} Moreover, categorizing Japan as not a part of Asia, Fukuzawa asserted that Japan should deal with China and Korea exactly as the Westerners did.\textsuperscript{86} In his 1882 writing, Fukuzawa stated that “one object of my life is to extend Japan’s national power… Even if the government be autocratic in name and form, I shall be satisfied with it if it is strong enough to strengthen the country.”\textsuperscript{87} Switching his priority to the people’s right to the build-up of the nation, he clearly contradicted his earlier statements on liberalism. Fukuzawa, utilizing his distinguished writing skill, was responsible for giving birth to the Japanese imperialism in the 1890s.\textsuperscript{88}

Meanwhile, Fukuzawa came to support the national policy of \emph{fukoku kyōhei} and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{85} \textit{The New York Times}, November 19, 2005.
\item \textsuperscript{87} Yukichi Fukuzawa, “The Kyuhanjo of Fukuzawa Yukichi” (Early Life of Yukichi Fukuzawa), trans. Carmen Blacker, \textit{Monument Nipponica} 9, no. 1/2 (1953): 304–329.
\item \textsuperscript{88} As a result of the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), China became the first target of the Japanese expansionism.
\end{itemize}
national polity called *kokutai* (国体), declaring that the Westernization was only a means to achieve *fukoku kyōhei*. In the afterwards of *The Autobiography of Yukichi Fukuzawa*, Albert Craig translated Fukuzawa's interpretation of *kokutai*:

“At this time the duty of the Japanese is solely the preservation of their national polity. By the preservation of their national polity I mean not losing their political independence. In order not to lose political independence, the intellectual powers of the people must be advanced. This includes a great many items. But for intellectual development the first step that must be taken is to sweep away attachments to old customs and take in the spirit of civilization current in the West. If the attachment to yin, yang, and the five elements is not swept away, science cannot be adopted…. Western civilization will enable us to consolidate our polity and at the same time increase the luster of our imperial line.”

Fukuzawa had raised and dispatched a great number of his pupils to intellectual, business, and political circles who distinguished themselves as leaders of modern Japan. As an influential educator, Fukuzawa significantly contributed to the emergence of nationalism and preservation of national identity. Fukuzawa argued that it was essential to create a strong nation that would receive the respect of the Western countries by producing educated masses rather than by military power. In his later years, Fukuzawa came to conclude that expansionism or imperialism was not an answer to equalize with the West. Emphasizing “internationalism and civilization,” Fukuzawa promoted a “liberal nationalism” as a countermeasure against “authoritarianism” and “conservative nationalism” that sought to “reinvent the nation along traditional cultural lines and away from the internationalism of the Meiji state.”

Compared to today’s liberals, Fukuzawa’s views on education, class system,

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politics, and women’s rights were rather conservative. However, living through the era of feudalism, the majority of Meiji people regarded Fukuzawa as unorthodox and astonishingly progressive in every aspect. Others regarded Fukuzawa as “plain wrong” according to their standards derived from Confucian values and teaching. Although Fukuzawa never suggested the revision of the law, he was indeed one of the earliest and most influential advocates of women’s rights. As Joyce Irene Ackroyd points out in Women in Feudal Japan (1959), up until the early Meiji period, a husband could divorce his wife by writing a note called mikudarihan (三 下り半, literary “three and a half lines”) which reflected his intention to divorce. Meanwhile the law did not allow a wife to divorce her husband. Fukuzawa argued that the improvement of women’s status by liberating them from traditional values and practices of Japan would facilitate a creation of so-called civilized nation. In his article entitled “Fukuzawa Yukichi and Women’s Rights,” Hane introduces Fukuzawa’s 1870 writing that illustrate his views on the gender relations:

“The great foundation of human relations consists of husband and wife. The relationship between husband and wife emerged before that of parents and children or brothers and sisters. From the beginning of time when Heaven created human beings there has been an equal number of men and women. Many million years have passed but this ratio of one man to one woman has not changed. Whether a person is a man or a woman he or she counts for only one between Heaven and Earth. There is no justification for making distinctions of superior and inferior.”

Significantly, Fukuzawa contributed to change the way the Japanese women thought of themselves as an individual. Published in 1885, another Fukuzawa’s important book, entitled *Nihon Fujin-ron, Kōhen* (日本婦人論．後編, “On Japanese Womanhood, Part II”), further advocated the improvement of women’s treatment in the family and the abolishment of the customary-practiced concubine system that would be critical in stimulating the Japanese women to prepare for their independence and liberation. In addition, Fukuzawa censured the male-centric Japanese society that treated women like “instruments” and portrayed women’s role as child bearers.

According to Fukuzawa’s *Nihon Fujin-ron*:

> From this attitude stems the saying so often heard that the womb is a “borrowed” thing. The meaning of this saying is that a child which is born into this world is its father’s child and not its mother’s—the rice that grew this year is born from the seed that was sworn last year and the soil has no relation to it.  

Fukuzawa advocated the change in kinship relations would improve the status of women in Japan. Arguing that men and women were equal except their reproductive organs, and that women should also have a right to own their property like men, Fukuzawa’s theory of womanhood eventually paved a way for women’s liberation movements in the late 1960s and 1970s after which Japan had undergone rapid economic development and

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urbanization in the post-World War II era.\textsuperscript{99}

Fukuzawa directly called attention to the Japanese women in order to make a change. Seeking as many women to read his \textit{Nihon Fujin-ron} as possible, Fukuzawa purposely wrote the book in such plain Japanese using \textit{hiragana} so that everyone could easily read.\textsuperscript{100} As a result, Fukuzawa’s \textit{Nihon Fujin-ron} first inspired the educated Japanese women who sought women’s liberation from Japan’s old customs based on Confucianism. Fukuzawa condemned Confucian teachings in Japan as the root of evil.\textsuperscript{101}

Excerpting certain teachings on the behavior of women, which was translated by male interpreters, Fukuzawa asserted that women’s rights could not be achieved under the current Confucian society. Fukuzawa argued that these restrictions derived from Confucianism prevented Japan’s “advancement of civilization.” Nevertheless, as the \textit{jiyū minken undō} declining with the enactment of the Meiji Constitution in 1889 and the Imperial Rescript on Education in 1890, and the outbreak of the Fist Sino-Japanese War (1894–95), Fukuzawa’s writings began to place more emphasis on the nationalistic elements rather than liberalism modeled after the Western culture and practices.

Advocating \textit{fujin kaihō} (婦人解放, “women’s liberation”), Fukuzawa initially supported the \textit{jiyū minken undo} to a considerable degree; however, he became moderate


\textsuperscript{100} Fukuzawa, \textit{Nihon Fujin-ron, Kōhen}, 5. It was not unusual that women could not read or write because the education of women was not valued. Therefore, Fukuzawa used \textit{hiragana} (round-shaped) syllable. Developed from Chinese letters, \textit{hiragana} was initially used by only women while \textit{katakana} (angular-shaped) was used by only men since the Heian Period (794–1192). Gradually, \textit{hiragana} became a popular writing while scholars remained to use Chinese letter and \textit{katakana}.

\textsuperscript{101} Fukuzawa, \textit{Nihon Fujin-ron, Kōhen}, 12.
by the 1890s.\textsuperscript{102} For instance, staying outside the government, Fukuzawa never became a radical political activist. As Sharon L. Sievers points out in her \textit{Flowers in Salt} (1983), neither Fukuzawa nor Mori offered legal solutions to problems regarding treatment of women in the family.\textsuperscript{103} It is important to understand that the Meiji intellectuals, imitating the Western institutions, aimed at improving the women’s rights for promoting the nation’s reputation, not for the success of women. Simultaneously, the Meiji intellectuals encouraged the education of women not for the sake of their success but for providing them knowledge and skills to be \textit{ryōsai kenbo} (良妻賢母, “Good Wives and Wise Mothers”) so that they had ability to raise children to be proper Japanese subjects. For Japan’s imperialism and expansionism, the government actively indoctrinated the \textit{ryōsai kenbo} ideology that would produce wives who were efficient and subservient, and mothers who were capable of raising their children to be patriotic and loyal subjects of Japan.\textsuperscript{104} On March 16, 1875, Nakamura Masanao expressed that proper mothering was crucial for the creation of a strong nation:

\begin{quote}
We must inevitably have fine mothers if we want effectively to advance the people to the area of enlightenment and to alter their customs and conditions for the good. If the mothers are superb, they can have superb children, and Japan can become a splendid country in later generations. We can have people trained in religious and moral education as well as in the sciences and arts whose intellects are advanced, whose minds are elevated, and whose conduct is high. Not having had adequate prenatal educational nourishment, I am at middle age unable sufficiently to realize my ambitions, only sadly languishing in shabby quarters [Japan] and envying the enlightenment of Europe and America. I have a deep irrepressible desire that later generations shall be ready by fine mothers.\textsuperscript{105}
\end{quote}

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\textsuperscript{103} Sievers, \textit{Flowers in Salt}, 20.
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Adopted as “a new prescription for Japanese womanhood” by the Ministry of Education after the First Sino-Japanese War, the ryōsai kenbo ideology defined the roles which women of the imperial Japan should play in their families. Forcing the Japanese women to be ryōsai kenbo, the Meiji government set up strict gender roles and women’s social status through the enactment of the Meiji Civil Code in 1898. On that basis, Fukuzawa argued that in a male-dominated society, in which women had to depend on men due to lack of property rights, it was useless to educate women as much as men because they would not go beyond the domestic sphere after all. It was the reason Fukuzawa’s daughter had only received the minimum education designed for the samurai’s daughter. Only difference between his daughter and other samurai’s daughters was that she had learned English.

Meanwhile, Fukuzawa, widely known as a liberal and a champion of women’s equality, showed no interest in improving the status of prostitutes, geisha, or concubines. Fukuzawa’s debate on women targeted only women from middle and upper class, not women from lower class. Especially, Fukuzawa was furious with prostitutes for their sale of sex. Disrespecting prostitution as “a necessary evil,” Fukuzawa even advocated the export of the Japanese prostitutes overseas as a solution to the overpopulation

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problem in Japan. In *Jiji Shinpō* on January 18, 1896, Fukuzawa came up with three reasons to encourage overseas emigration of the Japanese prostitutes. First, following the development of overseas Japanese and immigration business, prostitutes were necessary to pleasure men who went overseas without accompanying their families. Second, they were necessary to comfort the Japanese army and soldiers stationed overseas. Third, overseas emigration would facilitate the prostitutes to accumulate wealth, to remit money to their families in Japan, and to build a fine house. As Amanuma points out, Fukuzawa clearly looked down on both immigrants and prostitutes, while recognizing their necessity. Giving priority to the development of the nation, Fukuzawa thought the mass emigration of the Japanese prostitutes would contribute to alleviate the social problems existing in the Japanese immigrant communities as well as help them economically independent. Particularly, Fukuzawa encouraged the British immigration model for promoting Japan’s national prestige.

Consequently, Fukuzawa’s argument was interpreted as a recommendation for the overseas removal of underprivileged/illiterate Japanese to overseas. In those days, the poor people who emigrated overseas were called *kimin* (棄民, literary “abandoned people”) because Japan’s domestic problems “pushed” them out of the country. Indeed, these *kimin* were nothing but a nuisance for the Meiji government. On the other hand,

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109 Amanuma, “Fukuzawa Yukichi no Imin-kan: Sono Josei-kan to kanren sasenagara,” 1. According to Naikaku Tōkei-kyoku, *Meiji Gonen iko Waga Kuni no Jinko* (Japanese Population after 1872), the population of Japan was 42,708,264 in 1896, which was equal to one fourth of current population.


111 Amanuma, “Fukuzawa Yukichi no Imin-kan,” 11–12.
exploiting the labor of *kimin*, the Meiji leaders and intellectuals aimed at national aggrandizement, and thus emigration became but in part a moneymaking tool that provided foreign currencies.

Although known as an advocate of Westernization, Fukuzawa became more nationalistic in nature toward his later years. He encouraged the Japanese residing overseas to preserve Japanese culture, traditions, and lifestyle.\(^{112}\) Moreover, he urged the Japanese immigrants to live as if they were living in Japan by speaking Japanese, practicing Japanese religion, building Shinto shrines and Buddhist temples, and celebrating Japanese festivals.\(^{113}\) As Amanuma illustrates, Fukuzawa simply regarded the overseas colonies as an extension of Japan. Therefore, it was partly Fukuzawa’s fault that many *Issei* immigrants did not try to assimilate into the American society.\(^{114}\)

Importantly, Fukuzawa called for the promotion of the Japanese maritime industry for stimulating the transportation of the Japanese emigrants. In order to send as many emigrants as possible, Fukuzawa argued, the Japanese domestic shipping services were more preferable than depending on the foreign services. Fukuzawa also insisted that the establishment of regular long-distance lines were urgent and that the passage of the emigrants should be free of charge.\(^{115}\) In a sense, Fukuzawa envisioned that immigration would be beneficial to the nation through the stimulation of commercial

\(^{112}\) Amanuma, “Fukuzawa Yukichi no Imin-kan,” 13.


\(^{114}\) Amanuma, “Fukuzawa Yukichi no Imin-kan,” 13.

activity. Protection of immigrants by the Japanese government, according to Fukuzawa, was a long-term investment for the further economic development and prosperity of Japan. Obviously, it implied that Fukuzawa’s meaning of the governmental protection of immigrants was not based on humanitarian grounds. Therefore, Fukuzawa intended to promote the Japanese emigration for the sake of the national prestige, not for the wellbeing of the each immigrant. Despite looking down immigrants and prostitutes, Fukuzawa demanded them to contribute to the national cause meanwhile motivating them to gain social status and economic powers to be independent.

Whether Fukuzawa was liberal or conservative, it was true that he inspired the young Japanese women to go to America by encouraging them to gain economic power and like the Western women, to be independent for the creation of “civilized” society. An article in the guide for going to America described the United States as “Joson Danhi no Kuni (女尊男卑の国),” a country that put women above men. In fact, a number of Japanese male immigrants and the shosei perceived the American society the same way. Accordingly, the Japanese woman of upper- and middle-classes who tended to have higher education background considered immigration to the United States as a

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118 Amanuma, “Fukuzawa Yukichi no Imin-kan,” 8.


means to escape from the male-centered/feudalistic Japanese society. On the other hand, the lower-class Japanese women including prostitutes determined to go to America for their survival or helping their families in Japan. Especially after the Gentlemen’s Agreement which prohibited the labor immigration, the Japanese women, attracted to the United States for either social or economic reasons, became “picture brides” in order to be admitted into the United States, sometimes through the practice called *kari fūfu* (temporary spouse). In other words, desire for liberty “pushed” the elite women and desire for survival “pushed” the impoverished women out of the country.

*Tsuda Umeko* (津田 梅子, 1864–1929)

While Fukuzawa called for the education of women for producing *ryōsai kenbo*, Tsuda Umeko “aimed at providing Japanese women with professional, academic training and helping them develop all-round personalities.” She was an educator and the founder of the *Joshi Eigaku Juku* (女子英学塾, Women’s English School, present Tsuda College) in Tokyo who openly supported the education as a means to achieve women’s independence. She was one of the first Japanese women who came to the United States for studying over a decade sponsored by the Japanese government that aimed to promote the national image in the wake of *Mara Luz* incident, which brought

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international attention.

Born in Tokyo in 1864, Umeko was the second daughter of the Shogun’s retainer and an agricultural scientist, Tsuda Sen (津田 仙, 1837–1908) who converted to Christianity. Although little known compared with Fukuzawa, Tsuda, learning English from an English doctor in Yokohama, was also an official interpreter of the Tokugawa Shogunate. According to Torikai Kumiko, Tsuda was actually a better translator than Fukuzawa. Tsuda was also a member of the second Japanese diplomatic mission to the United States in 1867.\(^{124}\)

Tsuda Umeko was one of the first Japanese women to study abroad. She was one of five girls whom the Hokkaido Kaitakushi (Colonization Board) selected for their program for promoting women’s education. They were between the age of nine and sixteen, including a girl from Aizu-han named Yamakawa Sutematsu (山川捨松) at age twelve.\(^{125}\) Umeko, known for her high intelligence, left for San Francisco by the Pacific Mail Steamship Company’s S.S. America (4,554 ton) on December 23, 1871 with the Iwakura Mission as a government-sponsored student when she was only seven years and

\(^{124}\) Kumiko Torikai, *Voices of the Invisible Presence: Diplomatic Interpreters in Post-World War II Japan* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2009), 31. Unlike Fukuzawa who advocated the modernization of Japan through strengthening military according to the theory of “*Datsua Nyūō*” (leave Asia and join the West), Tsuda suggested the enrichment of country through introducing Christianity and modern farming.

eleven months old.\textsuperscript{126} Umeko received both primary and secondary education, learned the concept of independence, and converted to Christianity while she lived with Mr. Lanman (secretary of the Japanese legation) and Mrs. Lanman in the outskirts of Washington, D.C., Georgetown for eleven years.\textsuperscript{127} In 1882, at the age of seventeen, she returned to Japan, and recommended by Ito Hirobumi, she started teaching at the Kazoku Jogakkō (華族女学校, literary “Peers’ School for Girls”).\textsuperscript{128}

However, she realized before long that the school’s objectives of raising girls to be submissive wives were quite different from her teaching principles. In fact, Umeko experience a “culture shock” when she observed how badly the Japanese women were treated. Although the Meiji restoration had abolished feudalism in Japan, the society was still based on feudal values; therefore, women remained submissive to men. After resigning from the Kazoku Jogakko, she went to Philadelphia in 1889 to attend Bryn Mawr College to study biology.\textsuperscript{129} Upon her return in 1892, Umeko taught at both

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{129} Duke, \textit{The History of Modern Japanese Education}, 109–111.
\end{itemize}
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Kazoku Jogakko and the Higher Normal School for Women. Enacting the Koto Jogakko Rei after the victory at the First Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese began to emphasize women’s education. Allowed to resign her official post at the Kazoku Jogakko on July 27, 1900, Umeko established an English school for Japanese women. The school named Joshi Eigaku Juku became today’s Tsuda College. Known as the “pioneer of higher education for women,” Tsuda focused on education that emphasized individuality and the teaching of English.

Actually staying in the United States and studying for more than ten years, Umeko’s view on the women’s education was quite different from that of Fukuzawa Yukichi who merely visited the United States and Europe and had no experience in studying abroad. Hara argued that “through Tsuda Umeko a new Western wave was introduced to innovate Japanese higher education for women.” Placing value on women’s individuality, her teaching philosophy separated from ryōsai kenbo ideology that deemphasized individuality. Tsuda Umeko remained unmarried in her lifetime.

In addition to Tsuda Umeko, being an active participant of the Popular Rights Movement and later becoming a socialist, Fukuda Hideko (福田英子, 1865–1927) was a pioneer of women’s liberation movement in Japan. Publishing an influential feminist newspaper, Sekai Fujin (世界婦人, “Women of the World”) in 1907, Fukuda sought to

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133 Hara, “Challenges to Education for Girls and Women in Modern Japan,” 98.
improve the women’s status and gaining political participation through promoting education and economic independence.¹³⁴

Therefore, introduction of the Western ideas and way of life by the intellectual women stimulated the elite Japanese women who were discontent with the domination of men over women to leave Japan by becoming “picture brides” in order to be eligible for the immigration to the United States.¹³⁵ Since the mass immigration of Japanese women was crucial for the formation of Japanese communities in the United States as well as in Hawaii, I will examine the significance of “picture brides” and the system of “picture marriage” in the later chapter.

*Mutō Sanji* (武藤 山治, 1867–1834)

One of Fukuzawa’s pupils, Mutō Sanji further promoted the Japanese immigration to the United States in his *Beikoku Ijū Ron* (米国移住論, On Immigration to America) published in 1887. Deeply impressed by the great success of the 104,000 Chinese immigrants in California who earned ¥27,040,000 in 1884, Mutō wrote *Beikoku Iju Ron* to motivate the Japanese for overseas emigration.¹³⁶ Emphasizing that “Americans were fond of the Japanese,” Mutō argued that the Japanese would achieve a

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¹³⁵ The U.S. government had banned the immigration of single Japanese women to the United States. Therefore, women had to be officially married before the entry.

greater success if they immigrated to the United States.\textsuperscript{137} Giving examples of problems in Ireland and Russia caused by the excess population, Mutō advocated the establishment of emigration companies for sending out the poor laborers to the United States in order to maintain a social order.\textsuperscript{138} Mutō suggested the emigration should be the semiofficial venture like Britain that facilitated the export of the poor to the United States.\textsuperscript{139} Mutō insisted that instead of being \textit{dekasegi-nin} (temporary laborers) forever, the Japanese should assimilate into the America society, own lands, and permanently settle in there.\textsuperscript{140}

Born in Aichi prefecture in 1867 and raised in Kaizu-gun in present-day Gifu prefecture, Mutō was a son of a wealthy village headman. Encouraged by his father, who was enlightened by Fukuzawa Yukichi after reading \textit{Seiyō Jijō}, Mutō went to Tokyo and first attended the \textit{Wadajuku} (和田塾, Wada School) operated by Wada Yoshirō (和田義郎, 1840–1892), a pupil of Fukuzawa. Mutō then entered the Keiō Gijuku, studied under Fukuzawa, and graduated in 1884.\textsuperscript{141} Mutō turned out to be a victim of the “Matsukata

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{137} Mutō, “Beikoku Ijū Ron,” in \textit{Mutō Sanji Zenshū}, vol. 1, 280.
\item \textsuperscript{138} Ibid., 285–292; Kumei, \textit{Gaikokujin o Meguru Shakaishi}, 29.
\item \textsuperscript{139} Mutō, “Beikoku Ijū Ron,” in \textit{Mutō Sanji Zenshū}, vol. 1, 288, 292.
\item \textsuperscript{140} Kumei, \textit{Gaikokujin o Meguru Shakaishi}, 29; Hisashi Tsurutani, \textit{Amerika Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin} (The Opening of the American West and the Japanese) (Tokyo: Nihon Hōsō Shuppan Kyōkai, 1997), 53.
\item \textsuperscript{141} Mutō, “Watakushi no Minoue Banashi” (My Life Story), in \textit{Mutō Sanji Zenshū}, vol. 1, 13.
\end{itemize}
Deflation” as well that economically devastated farmers and landlords. Since he was young, he had dreamed of studying literature in Cambridge University in England; therefore, his father had saved money for his educational expenses. However, his relative, who borrowed money from Mutō’s father was bankrupted by the “Matsukata Deflation” and could no longer pay him back. Mutō had to give up going to England for study.

In 1885, going aboard the City of Tokio with the first group of kanyaku imin, Mutō went to San Francisco to study at the age of nineteen. According to Nichibei Shimbun, Fukuzawa urged Mutō to go to the United States to be a pioneer of the development of the Japanese. Mutō was not a government-sponsored student; therefore, he consequently became a dekasegi-shosei or “school-boy” who covered his own tuition and living expense in the states for three years. Indeed, Mutō worked in a cigarette factory and worked as a waiter at the dormitory of the University of the Pacific in San Jose, California, while attending school. In addition, requested by Takashima Kinji of Ōkura-kumi who opened a store in San Francisco to extend the market of Kikkoman’s soy sauce, Mutō quit school and actively helped the marketing of soy sauce. Temporary hiring Americans, Mutō modified soy sauce by mixing vinegar and red pepper and created the Western-style sauce named Mikado Sauce (literary “Emperor’s

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142 Mutō, “Watakushi no Minoue Banashi” (My Life Story), in Mutō Sanji Zenshū, vol. 1, 5. According to Mutō, about 238,000 farmers and landlords lost their lands due to the Matsukata Deflation (1881–1884).

143 Ibid.


145 Nichibei Shimbun (San Francisco), October 5, 1930, quoted in Kumei, Gaikokujin o Meguru Shakaishi, 59–60.

Sauce”). Since American employees approved the taste, Mutō began to sell the Mikado Sauce in a triangle-shaped Japanese ceramic for thirty-five cents. At first, the sales of Mikado Sauce prospered because Americans favored the ceramic. However, the Mikado Sauce never won popular among the American consumers. Therefore, Mutō closed down the store and went back to Japan after three years of residence in the United States.  

In 1887, based on his experiences as a “school-boy” in the United States, Mutō published _Beikoku Ijū Ron_ to encourage the Japanese immigration to the United States referring to the achievement of Chinese immigrants who engaged in railroad construction, reclamation, mining, agriculture, fruits farms, manufacturing industry, domestic work, and labor in the United States. Written by a person who actually lived there, Mutō’s _Beikoku Ijū Ron_ encouraged the poor and the unemployed as well as students to embark on a new life in the United States. Mutō informed his readers that the American families treated their domestic servants nicely, asked things politely, and never spoke in an authoritative tone. For the rural Japanese devastated by the “Matsukata Deflation,” emigration to the United States appeared to be an attractive option for making money. Mutō later encouraged that due to a shortage of laborers in developing California following the Gold Rush, one could earn three to five dollars a week and at the same time, one could go to school during the daytime. In addition, room and board was included. Muto insisted that Japanese “school-boys” were in high demand because housemaids

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would not work for cheap wages.150

Meanwhile, recruited by Fukuzawa’s nephew, Nakamigawa Hikojirō, Mutō worked for the Mitsui Bank and helped its financial reform in 1893. Then, Mutō began working for the Mitsui’s subsidiary, Kanegafuchi Spinning Company (precursor of Kanebō) in 1894, and became its president in 1921. According to Richard Mitchell, Kanegafuchi Spinning Company “paid the highest wages, provided the best working conditions, and gave the most extensive benefits in the nation.”151 Simultaneously, Mutō became a member of Diet in 1924. After he resigned as the president of Kanebō in 1930, Mutō served as the president of Jiji Shinpō in 1932, a newspaper company founded by Fukuzawa Yukichi in 1882.152 On March 9, 1934, two weeks after Mutō launched a campaign against the corruption of the business and political circles, Mutō was shot by an assassin named Fukushima Shinkichi, who was forty-one years old and jobless. Fukushima killed himself immediately after he shot Mutō and his secretary.153

In the late Tokugawa to early Meiji period, it was extremely dangerous to be pro-Western. Those who were advocates of Westernization and suspected to be pro-western feared the assassination attempt by the anti-foreign samurai. Japan’s ultra-nationalism emerged in reaction to Meiji government’s adoption of Western culture and practices and the forced Westernization measures that posed a threat to the preservation of national

150 Kumei, Gaikokujin o Meguru Shakaishi, 62–63.
153 “Bōkan ni Sogekisare Mutō Sanji-shi Jūshō Hannin sonobade Jisatsu” (Assaulted by a thug, Mutō is seriously injured, Culprit killed himself), Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, March 10, 1934.
identity. However, the anti-foreign sentiment and countermeasures against the Western imperialism significantly contributed to the formation of national polity and the rise of nationalism in all classes of Japanese. In the early Meiji Japan, national polity and nationalism played an important role in the establishment of the centralized state. Mutō was successful in motivating the youth that Japanese laborers would achieve a great success in America and that would eventually contribute to the development of the nation. The young Japanese, being nationalistic after the victory over the Sino-Japanese War, came to believe working in America and sending money to Japan as an act of patriotism. The rapid modernization of the nation actually required not only drastic socioeconomic changes but also enormous capital for buying the advanced machinery and weaponry and for mobilizing the massive labor force. Therefore, the Meiji intellectuals appealed to the youth who had strong will to study while working as servants or laborers.

Publications for Guide to Go to America

Contrary to the Meiji intellectuals such as Fukuzawa, Tsuda, and Muto who published works for the educated or elite readers, many guidebooks for going to America circulated for all classes of Japanese, including the uneducated masses. Between 1883 and 1911, at least twenty-four guidebooks for going to America were published in Japan. Kada Sadaichi was the first to write the guidebook, *Yubei Jiji* (News on Going to America), published in 1883.¹⁵⁴ A great number of such guidebooks circulated between 1883 and 1911, and especially between 1902 and 1906 when the Japanese immigration

¹⁵⁴ Kumei, *Gaikokujin o Meguru Shakaishi*, 32.
reached its peak. Guidebooks published during the years include:

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td>Sadaichi Kada</td>
<td>Yubei Jiji</td>
<td>(News on Going to America)</td>
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<td>1885</td>
<td>Tomita &amp; Owada</td>
<td>Beikokuyuki Hitori Annai</td>
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<td>1886</td>
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<td>1887</td>
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<td>1887</td>
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<td>1887</td>
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<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>Sen Katayama</td>
<td>Tobei Annai</td>
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<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>Shoansei</td>
<td>Tobei no Shiori</td>
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<td>1901</td>
<td>Hyodayu Shimanuki</td>
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<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>Sen Katayama</td>
<td>Zoku Tobei Annai</td>
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<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>Eitaro Iijima</td>
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<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>Kenjiro Watanabe</td>
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<td>Shiro Watanabe</td>
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<td>1903</td>
<td>Iozo Ishizuka</td>
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<td>(A Current Guide to America)</td>
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<td>1903</td>
<td>Tsuruzaburo Shimizu</td>
<td>Beikoku Rôdô Benran</td>
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<td>1903</td>
<td>Daïjiro Yoshimura</td>
<td>Tobei Seigyô no Tebiki</td>
<td>(Guide to Training in America)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>Shuko Akihiro, ed.</td>
<td>Kaigai Kugaku Annai</td>
<td>(How a Poor Student Can Go Abroad)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>Torasaburo Amano</td>
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<td>1904</td>
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<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>Hyodayu Shimanuki</td>
<td>Saikin Tobei Saku</td>
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<td>1906</td>
<td>Sen Katayama</td>
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<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>Kitzawa &amp; Narizawa</td>
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<td>1906</td>
<td>Goichi Yamane</td>
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<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>Hyodayu Shimanuki</td>
<td>Shin Tobei Hô</td>
<td>(New Methods of Going to America)</td>
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These guidebooks stimulated the Japanese for overseas emigration by providing practical information such as how to deal with emigration companies, how much to pay emigration companies, what to be careful on board, how to get passport, pass medical inspection, and avoid illegal agencies, and so on. They published tales of successful Japanese people in America. Providing information on the overseas situations, these guidebooks played an important role in motivating the rural Japanese to emigrate overseas.

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A leading Japanese Christian socialist who spent thirteen years in the United States between 1884 and 1896, Katayama Sen (片山 潛, 1859–1933) continuously promoted the overseas emigration because he believed both emigration and a labor movement would contribute to the improvement of society and the standards of living.\textsuperscript{157} Like Fukuzawa Yukichi, Katayama encouraged the Japanese to be ambitious like the British, an island nation that sent out numerous immigrants who succeeded in the new world. Born in 1859 in Okayama, Katayama went to America in 1884, took job as “school-boy” (student laborer), and obtained theology degree from Yale University in 1894.\textsuperscript{158} After returning to Japan in 1896, Katayama, utilizing his experiences in the United States, published a small pamphlet called \textit{Tobei Annai} (渡米案内, Guide to America) in 1901,\textsuperscript{159} which sold 2,000 copies in a week and became a best-seller of the time. Seeking to bolster the Japanese nationalism, \textit{Tobei Annai} advocated the creation of strong sovereign nation in Asia through promoting industries and trade. A prominent writer of Japanese history, Duus Masayo translated a part of \textit{Tobei Annai} that represented Katayama’s argument: “It is my deepest belief that our fellow Japanese who depart their country and brave the vast wild ocean to enter another land, engage in business abroad, and make themselves economically viable are the most loyal to the Emperor and patriotic among our countrymen.”\textsuperscript{160}

\textsuperscript{157} Kumei, \textit{Gaikokujin o Meguru Shakaishi}, 33–34; Tsurutani, \textit{Amerika Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin}, 84.


\textsuperscript{159} Sen Katayama, \textit{Tobei Annai} (Guide for Going to America) (Tokyo: Rōdō Shimbunsha, 1901).

\textsuperscript{160} Sen Katayama, quoted in Masayo Duus, \textit{The Japanese Conspiracy: The Oahu Sugar
Katayama established the Tobei Kyōkai (渡米協会, Association for the America-Bound) in 1902 to encourage Japanese youth to go to America for better opportunities.\textsuperscript{161} In 1905, the Tobei Kyōkai started publishing a monthly magazine, \textit{Tobei Zasshi} (渡米雑誌, America-Bound Magazine) that answered the questions from the readers for facilitate the overseas emigration.\textsuperscript{162} As the income from the sales of guidebooks and magazine made the Tobei Kyōkai profitable, a fellow socialist named Matsuzaki Genkichi criticized Katayama as being a “\textit{Tobei-ya}” (渡米屋, “American travel agent”).\textsuperscript{163}

Although established for helping the youth to go to the United States for studying, it appeared to be a profitable business because Katayama could earn at least three to four yen per member. However, compared to the fraudulent practices of emigration companies, the Tobei Kyōkai provided more assistance and helped them find jobs. In 1904, Katayama once again went to America and purchased 160 acres of land in Texas to promote the Japanese immigration and to produce rice; however, his venture ended in failure, and he went back to Japan in 1907.\textsuperscript{164} It is important to notes as Duus pointed out that Katayama promoted emigration “within the bounds of a nationalist argument” and

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\textsuperscript{161} Hyman Kublin, \textit{Asian Revolutionary: The Life of Sen Katayama} (Princeton University Press, 1964). Katayama was a Christian Socialist inspired by the social gospel. He founded the first modern settlement house, Kingsley Hall in Japan, took part in the organization of labor union and the Shakaishugi Kenkyūkai (Society for the Study of Socialism), was an editor of the trade union paper, according to Masayo Duus’s \textit{The Japanese Conspiracy: The Oahu Sugar Strike of 1920} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 21.

\textsuperscript{162} Kumei, \textit{Gaikokujin o Meguru Shakaishi}, 34; Tsurutani, \textit{Amerika Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin}, 55. \textit{Tobei Zasshi} was sold at 10 sen 5 rin, equivalent to five cents.

\textsuperscript{163} Tsurutani, \textit{Amerika Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin}, 87. Matsuzaki resided in the United States for six years and he worked for the Tobei Kyōkai; however, he became disgusted with Katayama’s utilitarianism, which was away from socialism.

expected them to return home.\textsuperscript{165}

Published by Imin Hogo Kyōkai (移民保護協会, Association to Protect Emigrants), \textit{Kaigai Dekasegi Annai (海外出稼案内, A Guide to Working Abroad)}, unlike traditional guidebooks, targeted those readers who were seriously thinking about emigrating to the United States by providing information on how to work overseas and how to avoid fraudulent practices of emigration companies.\textsuperscript{166} Therefore, it reported the real conditions in foreign countries, including Hawaiī, the U.S., Canada, Peru, Korea, Siberia, and the Philippines, and instructed them exactly what to do to obtain passports.\textsuperscript{167} Consisting of ten chapters, \textit{Kaigai Dekasegi Annai} outlined what had to be done to emigrate. That included advice about how to get a passport, how to get help from the emigration companies, what to avoid, what to do upon arrival, and how to get jobs overseas. It introduced the Japanese labor contractors operating on the West Coast:

San Francisco, CA  Baba Tamakichi  
Komai Kichizō  
Kuranaga Shuzaburō (Southern Pacific Railroad)  
Tamura Tokunosuke (Santa Fe Railway)  

Sacramento, CA  Nihonjin Kangyōsha (later Nichibei Kangyōsha)  
Ryoten Ujiya  

Fresno, CA  Wakamatsu Tsukamoto Matsutarō  

Portland, OR  Ban Shinzaburō (Oregon Railway and Navigation Co.)  

Tacoma, WA  Kumamoto Jimusho (Southern Pacific Railroad)  
Hiroshima-ya (railroad construction in Idaho, Montana)  

Seattle, WA  Tōyō Bōeki Kaisha  
Tōyō Ryokan\textsuperscript{168}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{165} Duus, \textit{The Japanese Conspiracy}, 21–22.

\textsuperscript{166} Ichioka, et al., \textit{A Buried Past}, 45.

\textsuperscript{167} Imin Hogo Kyōkai (Association to Protect Emigrants), \textit{Kaigai Dekasegi Annai (A Guide to Working Abroad)} (Tokyo: Naigai Shuppan Kyōkai, 1902), 7–8.

\textsuperscript{168} Ibid., 97–98.
\end{footnotesize}
Moreover, *Kaigai Dekasegi Annai* instructed readers on what to wear and what to take with them. For example, it advised the emigrants (1) to wear decent clothes in order not to be mistaken for laborers; (2) to wear derby hat or soft hat and to avoid brown hat because only rustics and the aged wear brown; (3) to take a couple of Japanese-style summer clothes; (4) to carry blankets and a pillow; (5) to take general goods such as a washbowl, teapot, pitcher, cup, Japanese sandals, towel, handkerchief, toothpick, soap, memo paper, pen, ink, letter paper, thread, needle, pocketknife, razor, whetstone, and so on; (6) to take food such as confectionery and canned beef and canned food; (7) to use a firm canvas suitcase. For securing the passage, it also gave examples of the typical interrogation by the shipping companies and warned the emigrants not to answer the purpose of going to America contracted labor or the passage paid by Americans. It declared, “If one does not hesitate labor, one can make a living.”

*Kaigai Dekasegi Annai* illustrated that in 1901, the Japanese laborers in the United States under the contract of Tōyō Bōeki remitted $432,000 to Japan. More specifically speaking, $100,000 were remitted to Hiroshima; $80,000 to Wakayama; $70,000 to Okayama; $68,000 to Kumamoto and $124,000 to the rest of prefectures. To the eyes of emigrants, the information on the *Kaigai Dekasegi Annai* seemed to confirm that America was a *takara no yama* (mountain of treasure) for laborers. Without a doubt, these publications motivated the young Japanese to emigrate for making

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170 Ibid., 11–12.
171 Ibid., 14.
According to Itō Kazuo, there was a strange guidebook for going America published in 1907. Written by Umeda Matajirō, *Zaibei no Kugakusei oyobi Rōdōsha* (在米の苦学生および労働者, “Japanese Working Students and Laborers in the United States”) passively encouraged gambling as a way of earning its school and living expenses.

One of the first figures who strongly advocated the Japanese overseas expansion was Pastor Shimanuki Hyōdayū (島貫 兵太夫, 1866–1913), the founder and the president of the Japanese Christian organization, the Nippon Rikkokai (日本力行会, Japan Endeavor Society founded in 1897), initially founded to assist the poor students in Tokyo area. Born in Miyagi prefecture, Shimanuki was a son of a samurai of the Sendai-han. Shimanuki became an elementary school teacher in 1882, and after converting Christianity, he entered the Sendai Religious School in 1886. Then, as a man of religion, he engaged in social work and sought a way for the poor to improve their standard of living. Shimanuki himself traveled to the United States during the winter of 1897–1898 to observe whether jobs were available, wages higher, and studying while working was doable. Shimazaki concluded that working students should go to the United States. Then, the Rikkokai began to educate the members in essential “business skills

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and cooking” as well as American lifestyle. In addition, the Rikkokai published a popular guidebook called *Tobei Annai* (渡米案内, “Guide to America”) in 1901. In all, Rikkokai published three guidebooks for going to America, and one published in 1904 was an innovative style—question and answer format—with a ticket for asking question. The Rikkokai also began to publish a monthly magazine, *Tobei Shinpō* (渡米新報, “America-Bound News”) in June 1906, sold at 15 sen.

Largely owing to Shimanuki and the Nippon Rikkokai’s effort, many young Japanese were motivated to emigrate. Unlike greedy emigration companies, the Nippon Rikkokai had no intention of making an enormous profit by sending emigrants. Advocating the importance of Japanese overseas development called *kaigai hatten*, Shimanuki encouraged the youth (both working students and emigrants) to go overseas. Following *Tobei Annai*, *Saishin Tobei Saku* (最新渡米策, “Up-to-Date Policy for Going to America”) was published in 1904, sold at 35 sen. Then, *Shin Tobeihō* (新渡米法, “The New Way to Go to America”) was published in 1911 at the price of 85 sen.

Circulation of such guidebooks that tended to glorify the labor in the United States resulted in the increase in number of emigrants. In reaction to the influx of Japanese emigrants into the United States, the rise of anti-Japanese sentiment was

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180 Tsurutani, *Amerika Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin*, 55.
182 Ibid., 29. One sen was equal to 1/100 of a yen, and one yen was equal US fifty cents, according to the conversion rate of the time.
inevitable especially among the labor class in the West Coast who believed the Japanese immigrants were taking their jobs. However, the emigration-motivating intellectuals such as Katayama and Shimanuki did not consider racial discrimination as a serious problem. Katayama even misinformed the emigrants that “American laborers are welcoming Japanese laborers” and “it is the best time to go to America, so don’t miss the chance.” Although some American laborers wanted the exclusion of Japanese, Katayama’s propaganda “pushed” the Japanese to emigrate to the United States. Simultaneously, Shimanuki was optimistic that only a small group of Americans attempted to exclude the Japanese immigrants, he believed. The majority of Americans would welcome the Japanese. Indeed, as Kumei pointed out most emigration promoters commonly shared Shimanuki’s view that if the Japanese emigrants were decent, they would not be excluded in America. Japan’s victory over the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) had a tremendous psychological effect on the formation of a sense of Japanese supremacy over other Asian countries. Identifying themselves as subjects of the itto-koku (一等国, literary “first-rank nation”), the Japanese found no reason to be treated like citizens of “nito-koku” (“second-class nation”) or “santo-koku” (“third-class nation”). Clearly, they did not interpret the Japanese exclusion as a racially motivated movement. Instead of criticizing the exclusionists, they blamed the Japanese emigrants for being treated badly.

Significantly, as discussed earlier, one of the major goals of the Meiji leaders was the establishment of the strong central government in order to resist the Western

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183 Quoted in Kumei, Gaikokujin o Meguru Shakaishi, 38.

184 Kumei, Gaikokujin o Meguru Shakaishi, 38.
imperialism and then to carry out *kaigai hatten* for the territorial expansion. In order to mobilize the citizens for the state affairs, the Meiji leaders had promoted the rise of Japanese national consciousness. Through the promulgation of Imperial Rescript on Education in 1890, the Meiji government had made efforts to unite the Japanese people through the establishment of the emperor-centered state. According to Jansen, while the Charter Oath in 1868 promoted the Westernization of the nation, the Imperial Rescript on Education was anti-foreign in nature in order “to create internal solidarity among the people by maintaining a common national morality and a consciousness of that morality as stemming from shared origins in Japan’s past.” In other words, the Imperial Rescript on Education enabled the rise of institutionalized nationalism in Meiji Japan by rejecting the Western values.

By the time of the outbreak of a racially motivated incident, not only the U.S. government but also the Japanese government sought to restrict the Japanese immigration to the United States in order to maintain the national prestige. Without exception, the Japanese in America including draft dodgers supported the war effort as subjects of the empire of Japan. During the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), they promptly reported on the military situation as well as collected contributions for relief funds and the war bereaved in Japan. Their contributions totaled ¥24,500, and the applications for public bonds amounted to ¥140,000. Partly collected by a leading labor contractor in Utah, Hashimoto Daigoro, the Japanese in Utah, mostly laborers, had sent as much as $10,000 to the charitable organizations in Japan. In addition, as the *Salt Lake Herald* reported on

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February 5, 1905:

Besides this sum considerable money has been sent direct to Japan to be credited to the governmental fund established by the emperor. Fathers and brothers who are here have sent from month to month every dollar not necessary to the existence of themselves and their families while their male and even female relatives whom they left in Japan have been fighting their way across Manchuria. The earnestness with which they have faced the pressing needs of their country is apparent in the way they have denied themselves everything but the humblest livelihood in order to give all they could to the relief funds…

When the first call for reserves was made last September by the emperor, a wave of patriotism swept through the Japanese settlers in this state and twenty-two Japs immediately enlisted and joined a number of their countrymen at San Francisco who had also decided to fight for their country.187

After the defeat of Russia, Japanese nationalism reached its one of the prewar climaxes, and the Japanese naturally came to identify Japan with other Western powers. Therefore, the Japanese government could not overlook the “unjust [racial] discrimination” against the Japanese subjects taken by the San Francisco Board of Education.188

Contrary to the expectation of the Japanese, the Japan’s victory over Russia further stimulated the “Yellow Peril” scare among the Western nations because it was the first time in the modern history that non-western country defeated western country. Although Japan had carried out the modernization policies and imitated the Western model in order to join the West, the Western countries differentiated Japan from the Western civilization. It was a great irony because the West forced Japan to modernize; however, it started bashing Japan once Japan established herself as a powerful modern nation. Mori Ōgai (森 鷗外, 1862–1922), a leading novelist and army surgeon, put the Western perception of Japan this way: *Kataba Oka, Makeba Yaban* (勝たば黃禍, 負け

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187 “Local Japanese Send Money to Aid Country’s Cause,” The Salt Lake Herald (Salt Lake City), February 5, 1905.

188 Kumei, *Gaikokujin o Meguru Shakaishi*, 110.
ば野蛮, “Win the war [against Russia], And Japan will be denounced as a Yellow Peril. Lose it, And she will be branded a barbaric land.”)\textsuperscript{189}

Propagating “Yellow Peril” scare, Westerners often expressed their fear of Japanese expansion after the Russo-Japanese War. Evidently, an editorial in \textit{The Times} on September 6, 1905 declared that “the rise of a nation whose civilization contains many elements which differ profoundly from those that go to make up the civilization of the West must exercise a new and powerful influence on the mind of the West as well as on the mind of East.”\textsuperscript{190} In reaction to the “Yellow Peril” scare, the Meiji leaders, afraid of ruining the relations with the Western countries, preferred not to protest loudly and at the same time to prevent the rise of anti-Western sentiment within Japan.\textsuperscript{191}

There was another irony that Japan advocated “Asia for the Asiatics” while emphasizing the Japanese superiority to other Asians. Therefore, “Yellow Peril” idea gave an impulse to the nationalistic reaction, and eventually implanted a concept of the \textit{Dai Tōa Kyōeiken} (大東亜共栄圏, “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere”) during World War II. According to Iikura Akira, Mori Ōgai censured the idea of “Yellow Peril,” but he was more furious about the West regarding Japan the same level as other yellow races because many Japanese then believed they were distinct from other Asians and considered Japan more powerful country than China. In other words, the Japanese, expressing their national pride, had a racially biased view against other Asian


\textsuperscript{190} “The Peace,” \textit{The Times} (London), September 6, 1905.

countries. Indeed, not all intellectuals thought like Mori Ōgai did. For example, a famous novelist, Natsume Sōseki insisted that “Chinese are more honorable citizens than Japanese are…. Prudent Japanese should be proud to be called Chinese rather than to be called Japanese. Give some consideration that how long Japan was indebted to China.” Unfortunately, the slogan “Asia for the Asiatics” merely facilitated the Japanese colonialism in Asia.

The enthusiasm about going to America cooled down after the signing of the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907–1908 that put an end to the Japanese labor migration to the United States. Afterwards, the intellectuals promoted the mass immigration of Japanese women for the development of the Japanese immigrant community in the United States during the *yobiyose imin jidai* (1908–1924). They aimed to stabilize the immigrant community undermined by social evils such as gambling, drinking, and prostitution, by marriage and establishing families.

As a solution to social problems caused by poverty in Japan, the Nippon Rikkokai continuously attempted to send out the young Japanese emigrants to the United States even after the signing of the Gentlemen’s Agreement. Those who wished to go to America continued to increase, and some of them did not hesitate to enter the United States illegally. Since the Rikkokai promoted the illegal immigration, it was called

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“Mikko-kai” (密航会, literary “stowaway society.”) Following the death of Shimanuki in 1913, Nagata Shigeshi (永田稠, 1881–1973) became the second president of the Nippon Rikkokai after six years and eight months of residence in the United States. Nagata made every effort to rescue emigrants from the greedy imin-yado (emigration Inns) that sought to get all the money of emigrants in league with doctors and clerks.

Then, Nagata, complying with enthusiastic request from the youth, established a “stowaway training school” in the town of Misaki, Kanagawa prefecture in 1924. At the “stowaway training school,” the Japanese practiced swimming four kilometers to the shore with their clothes and shoes wrapped in oiled paper on their heads. Nagata described the mission of the school:

“It was a scheme that aimed at preparing men to jump off a boat and swim to shore. A fellow who came from Shinshu, Nagano Prefecture, had never swam before in the ocean, but after our hard training program he was able to swim the 2.5 miles easily. In order not to be eaten by sharks, we swam with 13 or 14 feet of bleached cotton trailing out behind each one of us. At first we went naked so that we could swim easily. In a week we made remarkable progress.”

Despite the intensive training under the direction of the Rikkokai, not all of them succeeded in entering the United States safely due to various reasons. There was a tragic story about one of the first trainees. Nagata continued:

“One member of the first group trained here, Keisaku Suzuki, left for North America on a boat headed for Seattle via Tacoma. At Puget Sound the shores are very near to each other. Mr. Suzuki jumped into the water soon after the boat left Tacoma port, judging


197 Tsurutani, Amerika Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin, 80.


200 Quoted in Ito, Isset, 83.
that he could easily make it to shore. However, the place he chose to jump was too close to the cargo space, and he was caught in the screw. His body was chopped to pieces and he was of course killed instantly. He was about 21 or 22, I presume, a youth who came from Shizuoka Prefecture.”

After this horrible accident, Nagata considered ending the preparatory training program but the enthusiasm of the young Japanese pushed Nagata to continue the training school. As a result, numbers of Japanese young men attempted to stow away thereafter; some succeeded but others did not. According to an executive of Rikkokai, the society had sent as many as 7,000 Japanese emigrants to the United States.

In those days, the United States began to control the illegal immigration more strictly, and stowaways, possessing no passport, could be in a deep trouble, including deportation. Therefore, stowaways had to live cautiously in order not to be caught by the authority. Like in Hawaii, not all Japanese in the United States were successful in making money, and some committed an act of treachery. For instance, some Issei reported these stowaways in exchange for reward of twenty-five dollars per fugitive. Suffering from the lowly immigrant life, they informed on the very compatriots for money. Otherwise, turning into hoodlums, they blackmailed the stowaways into paying them for keeping quiet. Meanwhile, the penalty for assisting stowaways into the United States was harsh after the enactment of the Immigration Act of 1917. According to Ito’s Issei:

One who helps or hides smugglers-in will be subject to “a fine of $2,000 plus up to 5 years imprisonment…” and that was the penalty per hideaway, as provided for in Article 8 of the Immigration Act of 1917. Also, according to Article 18 of the new Immigration

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201 Quoted in Ito, Issei, 83.
202 Tsurutani, Amerika Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin, 81–82.
203 Ibid., 83.
204 Itō, Hokubei Hyakunenzakura, 110.
Act of 1924, if one transported immigrants illegally he was fined $10,000 per immigrant plus the boat fee from the port of departure in the U.S. to the port of arrival in Japan, to be paid to the Chief Customs Officer at the port of arrival. According to Article 20 of the same act, in case a crewman jumped ship, the captain and all responsible personnel were fined $1,000 per ship-jumper. Moreover, if the boat failed to take the appropriate measures to prevent ship-jumping in the manner prescribed by the Immigration Office, the captain and all responsible personnel were fined as much as $1,000, and never less than $200, or suffered imprisonment up to one year, or both. 205

Otherwise, entering the United States as tourist groups, some Japanese attempted group smuggling-in. 206

Although it was not only risky but also expensive, the Japanese who failed legal immigration attempted illegal immigration. Consequently, the influx of dekasegi laborers through legal and illegal immigration incited the anti-Japanese sentiment in California. The number of Japanese in the United States increased from 2,039 in 1890 to nearly 24,000 in 1900, or over 11 fold in a decade. 207 The emigration motivators and numbers of guidebooks for going to America that exaggerated the merit of dekasegi were largely responsible for this social phenomenon. Dreaming of becoming rich in a short period, the Japanese emigrants entered the United States as legal immigrants, trans-migrants from Hawaii, Mexico or Canada, or illegal immigrants during the jiyū imin jidai (1900–1907).

In addition to the guidebooks and exaggerated adverts of emigration companies, there were other causes that motivated the Japanese for going to America. The letters from the Japanese laborers in Hawaii and the United States significantly influenced the Japanese to work abroad. Sometimes their success stories were over exaggerated, but

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205 Quoted in Ito, Issei, 77.

206 Itō, Hokubei Hyakunenzakura, 112.

they were based on the fact that they could earn more money in America than in Japan. For example, Murayama pointed out that Ehime prefecture sent out two to three times more emigrants than its neighboring prefectures because of a successful pioneer immigrant named Nishii Hisahachi (西井久八). Leaving for the United States around 1880, Nishii worked in the Port Blakeley Sawmill, and then worked as a dishwasher before promoted to a cook in a hotel. Making use of his cooking skill, Nishii opened a restaurant in Seattle in 1884 that was the first business established by Japanese in the Pacific Northwest. “In addition to eight restaurants, Nishii extended his business to laundry, hotel, and a ranch in the suburb of Tacoma by the mid-1900s.” When Nishii returned home in 1889, he brought back many emigrants to the United States and helped them to establish their business. Thereafter, a greater number of Japanese from Ehime prefecture emigrated to the United States. Nishii donated money for the fellow Japanese emigrants as well as for the Ehime prefecture. However, Nishii determined to go back to Japan after the enactment of the Immigration Act.

* * * * *

Backed by the government that aimed to modernize the country and to catch up with the West, the Japanese elite and intellectuals were the core of emigration motivators.

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Through the influential publications and information from families and friends overseas, the Japanese immigration pattern shifted its nature in the 1890s from study-based to labor-based. Significantly, utilizing the rise of nationalism in the wake of the First Sino-Japanese War, many intellectuals including Katayama Sen emphasized emigration as an act of patriotism. Publishing numbers of influential works, Fukuzawa Yukichi was a powerful agent for motivating overseas emigration for *bunmei kaika*, and then for *fukoku kyōhei*. Meanwhile, Fukuzawa shifted his stance in the 1880s and began to emphasize nationalistic elements. The Japanese prejudice against China and Korea and the rise of the Japanese imperialism largely attributed to the ideology of Fukuzawa, namely, *Datsua-ron*.

Simultaneously, the Japanese intellectual women influenced the educated Japanese girls and women to become “picture brides” to gain the rights to enter the United States for their individuality. Nevertheless, numbers of publications for going to America in the turn of the century deemed to play a leading role in promoting the overseas emigration, especially to the United States. The guidebooks instructing the emigrants what to do and advising relieved their fear for going to a foreign country thousands of miles away from home. In other words, the intellectuals and their activities “pushed” many Japanese to go to America. Since the craze for going to America became higher than ever, some did not hesitate to utilize illegal method in order to enter the United States. Then, the high demand on emigration gave birth to the emergence of the emigration companies, illegal emigration agents, as well as inns and doctors who took advantage of the craze for going to America. The next chapter discusses these emigration-related businesses.
CHAPTER VII

EMIGRATION COMPANIES AND LABOR CONTRACTORS

As the demand for emigration continuously increased, various emigration businesses emerged. The emigration companies and agents in addition to shipping industry played a key role in enabling the mass transportation of emigrants to Hawaii. After the prohibition on the contract-labor immigration due to the 1885 Contract Labor Law, the labor contractors or “bosses” came to dominate the supply of Japanese laborers in the mainland United States. This chapter examines the way the emigration businesses and labor contractors exploited the Japanese emigrants in Japan and the United States.

Emigration Companies to Hawaii

Following the end of kanyaku imin in 1894 due to the Hawaiian Revolution, which overthrew the Hawaiian monarchy in 1893, a great number of emigration companies emerged all over the country. Fukuzawa Yukichi’s pupil, Mutō Sanji who had studied at Pacific University (1885–1887), was the first businessman to advocate the establishment of the emigration company for facilitating the transportation of lower-class laborers to America.¹ The emigration companies were to take over the duties and tasks previously performed by the government during the kanyaku imin jidai (1885–1894) such

as arranging transportation and finding jobs for the Japanese emigrants. Indeed, the emigration companies helped the Japanese to emigrate to all over the world including Hawaii, the United States, Canada, Peru, Brazil, Mexico, Philippines, Korea, and Siberia from the last decade of the nineteenth century. Simultaneously, with the help of emigration companies, many Japanese entered Hawaii as contract laborers, where the demand for labor was exceedingly high.

A great number of emigration companies established after the end of the *kanyaku imin*, especially concentrated on years between 1896 and 1903, in which 80 percent of emigration companies established as seen in Table 7.1. Before 1900, there were only fourteen emigration companies; however, by 1901–1902, at least twenty-eight such companies existed in twelve prefectures. They were located in Hiroshima, Kumamoto, Yamaguchi, Kochi, Wakayama, Okayama, Kobe, Tokyo, Yokohama, Chiba, Fukushima, and Sendai where the demand for emigration was higher than the rest of prefectures. There were seven such companies in Hiroshima and four in Kumamoto, which explains why these two prefectures sent out a large number of emigrants in this period. In 1903, the number of the emigration companies reached as many as thirty-six (including nine in

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2 Kenji Kimura, “Meiji chū kōki ni okeru Imingaisha no Setsuritsu Shutai” (Major Establishment of the Emigration Companies during mid- to late-Meiji Period), *Kingendaishi Kenkyūkai Kaihō* 31 (1997), quoted in Kojiro Iida, “Meiji Chūki Osaka o Honkyo tosuru Imin Kaisha: Omotoshite Nihon Imin Gōshi Kaisha no baai” (Japanese Emigration Companies Located in Osaka at the Middle of Meiji Era: Mainly the Case of Japan Emigration Company), *Shakai to Chiiki* (Journal of Region and Society) 2 (October 1999): 69. In order to establish an emigration company, a person(s) had to get permission from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by way of the Governor of a prefecture in which the business office would be located. In addition, one had to provide detail information on the business office, capital, term of business, places to be sent, types of immigration, estimates of emigrants, method of emigration recruitment, as well as emigrants’ personal records and property, according to Kodama, “Imingaisha no Jittai,” 468–469.

Hiroshima), capitalized at ¥20,000 to ¥1,000,000.

Table 7.1: Number of Emigration Companies by Prefecture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prefecture</th>
<th>Number of Emigration Companies or Agencies</th>
<th>1891–1900</th>
<th>1901–02</th>
<th>1903</th>
<th>1905</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hiroshima</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumamoto</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yokohama</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kobe</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamaguchi</td>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sendai</td>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kochi</td>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wakayama</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okayama</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiba</td>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukushima</td>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
<td><strong>36</strong></td>
<td><strong>29</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the short period, the emigration companies sent out more than 57,000 Japanese to Hawaii by 1907. Therefore, as Kodama declared, the shiyaku imin jidai (self-contracted immigration period, 1894–1900) was the “golden age” of the emigration to

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Hawaii. As the number of immigrants decreased after the signing of the Gentlemen’s Agreement, the emigration business started declining. The majority of the emigration companies either closed down or merged and only nine such companies still were engaged in business by 1909. In 1917, there were two such companies left after mergers. In November 1920, merging the Morioka Shōkai (森岡商会, Morioka Trading Firm), the Kaigai Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha (海外興業株式会社, “Overseas Development Company”) was the only emigration company existed in Japan.

Until the signing of the Gentlemen’s Agreement, the majority of Japanese emigrants went to America with the help of emigration companies. For instance, in the wake of the First Sino-Japanese War, these companies sent out 72 percent or 22,515 out of 31,354 emigrants in 1899, and after the Russo-Japanese War, they sent out 86 percent or 31,241 out of 36,124 emigrants in 1906. According to Oshimoto, between 1898 and 1907, the 140,955 Japanese emigrated overseas through the emigration companies whereas only 47,560 emigrated without the help of emigration companies. That indicated nearly 75 percent of the Japanese emigrated overseas through the emigration companies. The ratio went down to about 34 percent in the years between 1908 and 1918.

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7 Naomasa Oshimoto, “Imingaisha to Funegaisha: Imin Yusō ni kansuru Keiyaku nado no Shiryo” (Immigration Companies and Shipping Companies: Materials relating to the Contract of the Transportation of Emigrants), Iju Kenkyū (Studies on Immigration), no. 18 (1981): 76.


9 Ibid., 461.

10 Oshimoto, “Imingaisha to Funegaisha: Imin Yusō ni kansuru Keiyaku nado no Shiryo,” 75–76.
recruiting more emigrants, most emigration companies dispatched agencies or set up branch offices in Hiroshima since it sent out the potential emigrants. For example, there were at least 128 agencies and branch offices in Hiroshima and 43,940 Hiroshima people emigrated overseas between 1899 and 1910.\(^\text{11}\)

In fact, an emigration company existed before the *shiyaku imin jidai*. The founder of Shūeisha Publishing Office, Sakuma Teiichi (佐久間 貞一, 1846–1898), and the second president of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, Yoshikawa Taijirō (吉川 泰二郎, 1852–1895), established the nation’s first emigration company, the Nippon Yoshisa Imin Kaisha (日本吉佐移民会社), in Tokyo on December 7, 1891.\(^\text{12}\) A former employee of Mitsubishi, Yoshikawa aimed to expand the overseas routes through encouraging immigration. Recruiting applicants for emigration, the company provided works abroad depending on the demands of each overseas country.\(^\text{13}\) According to Yuji Ichioka, the Nippon Yoshisa Imin Kaisha was the first venture that made a profit out of sending emigrants overseas.\(^\text{14}\)

\(^{11}\) Kodama, “Imingaisha no Jittai,” 469–470.


The Nippon Yoshisa Imin Kaisha was indeed a nominal company because the entire business operation was managed by the Nippon Yusen Kaisha. Naturally, the Nippon Yoshisa Imin Kaisha utilized the services of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha for conveying the Japanese immigrants.\(^\text{15}\) In other words, the emigrants had no choice of their shipping companies because the Nippon Yoshisa Imin Kaisha forced the emigrants to use the service of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha.\(^\text{16}\) Therefore, the Nippon Yoshisa Imin Kaisha functioned as the “Emigration Department of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha.”\(^\text{17}\) As the demand for emigration increased following the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–95) that caused the influx of thousands of demobilized soldiers into the job market, the number of emigration companies continued to increase and their business flourished.\(^\text{18}\) Accordingly, the mass transportation of emigrants facilitated the development of maritime industry and encouraged Japan’s commercial activity as Yoshikawa envisioned.

During the *shiyaku imin jidai*, the Japanese emigrants clearly became the commodities of the emigration companies in collusion with politicians. In 1896, *Imin Hogo Ho* (Emigrant Protection Law) was enacted for protecting emigrants; however, it turned out to restrict emigration by imposing strict financial requirements for emigrants. Meanwhile, the law required the emigration companies to get a business license from the


\(^{16}\) Kodama, “Imingaisha no Jittai,” 476.

\(^{17}\) Yamada, *Fune ni Miru Nihonjin Iminshi*, 46.

prefecture administration and to deposit ¥10,000 for safeguarding emigrants against nonfulfillment of terms of contract. Kimura Kenji, an expert on the Japanese immigration study, categorized the founders of emigration companies into four groups. According to Kimura’s analysis, they were either persons related to zaibatsu; businessmen (non-zaibatsu related); local men of high repute; or members of a political party. Meanwhile, a prominent immigration historian, Kodama Masaaki pointed out three characteristics of emigration companies: (1) the involvement of members of the House of Councilors and prefectural assembly in the management of companies, (2) the central role in the management of companies played by the wealthy persons who were in the locations of emigration companies, and (3) the management of companies through co-investment of politicians and wealthy persons.

The five major emigration companies monopolized the Japanese immigration to Hawaii. They were Hiroshima Kaigai Tokō Kabushiki Kaisha (Overseas Company), Tokyo Imin Gōshi Kaisha (Tokyo Immigration Company), Morioka Shōkai (Morioka Immigration Agency), Nihon Imin Gōshi Kaisha (Japan Immigration Company), and Kumamoto Imin Gōshi Kaisha (Kumamoto Immigration Company).

In order to stimulate their business, Kaigai Tokō Kabushiki Kaisha, Morioka Shōkai, and Kumamoto Imin Gōshi Kaisha established their branches in Honolulu in

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1896 and then set up the Honolulu branch of the Keihin Ginkō in 1897. The Bank had four branch offices; two in other districts of Tokyo, one in Yokohama, and one in Honolulu. In fact, the president of the Keihin Ginkō, Morioka Makoto (森岡 真), was the one who had founded the Morioka Shōkai in 1894. As shown in the Table 7.2, these five major emigration companies dominated over 90 percent of the immigration business to Hawaii.

### Table 7.2: Emigration to Hawaii through Emigration Companies up to 1899

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emigration Companies</th>
<th>Capital (¥)</th>
<th>Number of Emigrants</th>
<th>Rate of Total Emigrants (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kaigai Tokō Kabushiki Kaisha (Hiroshima)</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>11,731</td>
<td>29.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morioka Shōkai (Tokyo)</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>8,148</td>
<td>20.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nihon Imin Gōshi Kaisha (Osaka → Kobe)</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>5,300</td>
<td>13.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo Imin Gōshi Kaisha (Tokyo)</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>3,382</td>
<td>8.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumamoto Imin Gōshi Kaisha (Kumamoto)</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>7,738</td>
<td>19.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogura Shōkai (Osaka)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>6.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kobe Tokō Gōshi Kaisha (Kobe)</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>909</td>
<td>2.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>39,708</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In particular, the number of emigrants to Hawaii through the emigration companies peaked in 1899 in response to the U.S. annexation of Hawaii. The planters sought to secure as many Japanese emigrants as possible before the application of the U.S. law in 1900 that prohibited the labor immigration. According to Gaimushō Tsūshōkyoku (Commercial section in the Foreign Ministry), more than 90 percent of the Japanese emigrated to Hawaii through the service of emigration companies between 1900 and 1907. For instance, since the establishment of company in 1896 to the close down in 1908, the Nihon Imin Gōshi Kaisha sent out 8,223 Japanese emigrants to Hawaii, of whom, 3,295 (40 percent) left Japan in 1899 alone.

The emigration companies, virtually commercializing emigrants, exploited the countrymen for their business interests. Among the executives of the Kaigai Tokō Kabushiki Kaisha, considerable numbers were non-Hiroshima natives such as Hinata Terutake (Gunma), Sugawara Den (Miyagi), Watanabe Kanjurō (Saga), who were patrons of the Jiyūto (自由党, Liberal Party) and later obtained seats in the House as members of the Rikken Seiyūkai (立憲政友会, Friends of Constitutional Government), a dominant political party founded by Ito Hirobumi in 1900. All of them, utilizing their

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25 Iida, “Meiji Chūki Osaka o Honkyo tosuru Imin Kaisha: Omotoshite Nihon Imin Gōshi Kaisha no baai,” 82.
experience in the United States, served as the Kaigai Tokō Kabushiki Kaisha’s agents of Honolulu branches for a while. Interestingly, Hinata and Sugawara were managing directors of the infamous and corrupted Keihin Ginkō while serving for the Kaigai Tokō Kabushiki Kaisha.  

In fact, before working for the Kumamoto Imin Gōshi Kaisha, Yamaguchi Shunta published newspaper called *Shin Nippon* (新日本, New Japan) that advocated the *jiyū minken ron* (自由民権論, freedom and people’s rights argument). Then, Sugawara, Hinata, and Yamaguchi formed a political society called *Nihonjin Aikoku Yūshi Dōmei* (日本人愛国有志同盟, Japanese Patriotic League, later renamed *Aikoku Dōmei*) in San Francisco in 1888 and published monthly magazine, *Jukyuseiki* (十九世紀, Nineteenth Century). They went to the United States to advocate the *jiyū minken ron* because the Japanese government strictly controlled the press.  

Additionally, Kodama illustrated that there were fifteen managers of Kaigai Tokō Kabushiki Kaisha in Hiroshima, of whom four were members of the House of Representatives, five were members of a prefectural assembly, and three were either presidents or executives of banks.  

Simultaneously, the officers of the Nippon Imin Gōshi Kaisha (Japan Immigration Company) indicated their close affiliation with the financial and political circles highly

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26 Tsurutani, *Amerika Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin*, 77–78. They all belonged to the *Rikken Seiyūkai*. Sugawara studied at Pacific University in San Francisco, Hinata went to the United States and later founded Tairiku Imin Kaisha, and Watanabe went to the United States and later founded the Kaigai Toko Kabushiki Kaisha.


recognized by the government. According to the *Hawaiian Gazette* on November 10, 1896 and Kojiro Iida (1999), the Nippon Imin Gōshi Kaisha was composed of the following businessmen and investors that included prominent minister, owners of steamships, executives of banks, and merchant as shown in Table 7.3: \(^{29}\)

**Table 7.3: Officers of the Nippon Imin Gōshi Kaisha**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tateno Gōzō</td>
<td>Fukuoka</td>
<td>Former Minister to the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamanaka Hachisaburō</td>
<td>Ishikawa</td>
<td>Owner of <em>S.S. Tōyō Maru &amp; Nanyō Maru</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamanaka Hachitarō</td>
<td>Ishikawa</td>
<td>Owner of <em>S.S. Tōyō Maru &amp; Nanyō Maru</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kagawa Shinichi</td>
<td>Okayama</td>
<td>President of Twenty-Second National Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suzuki Katsuo</td>
<td>Okayama</td>
<td>Businessman of Osaka/Manager of Okayama Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fujimoto Seibei</td>
<td>Osaka</td>
<td>Merchant of Osaka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matsushima Hisajirō</td>
<td>Osaka</td>
<td>Clerk of Osaka Forty-Second Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shimauchi Yoshio</td>
<td>Ehime</td>
<td>Merchant of Osaka</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Capitalized at ¥50,000, businessmen in Osaka established the Nippon Imin Gōshi Kaisha in 1896 in Osaka. \(^{30}\) The share of each investor was ¥6,250. Born in Ogura-han (present Fukuoka prefecture in Kyushu), Tateno Gōzō (建野 郷三, 1842–1908) left for England for study in 1870 and became the Governor of Osaka in 1880. In 1889, Tateno


\(^{30}\) The company’s headquarters moved to Kobe in 1898.
held the post of the Japanese Minister to the United States, and resigned the post in 1894. Then, serving as the president of the Kobe Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Tateno played an active part in the business circles.\textsuperscript{31} A shipping agent, Hamanaka Hachisaburō (濱中八三郎) was the owner of \textit{Tōyō Maru} and \textit{Nanyō Maru} and served as the director of the Japan Maritime Insurance Company. Meanwhile, Kagawa Shinichi (香川 眞一, 1835–1920) was Okayama retainer who went to Edo in 1835 to study the Western technology. Kagawa was a member of the Iwakura Mission to visit Europe and the United States in 1872. Then, Kagawa served as the president of the Okayama Chamber of Commerce and the Twenty-Second National Bank, the director of the Kyoritsu Cotton Yarn Spinning Company and the Okayama Rice Mill Company, and an auditor of the Chugoku Railroad Company.\textsuperscript{32} Suzuki Katsuo (鈴木 勝夫) from Okayama prefecture was the managing director of the Asahi Trading Company and the head of the transportation department of the Osaka Chamber of Commerce. Suzuki also served as the manager of the Osaka branch office of the Okayama Twenty-Second National Bank. A prominent businessman in Osaka, Fujimoto Seibei (藤本 清兵衛, 1870–1949) established the Fujimoto Bank in 1896 and became the president of the Fukushima Spinning Company, Osaka Joint Spinning Company, the director of the Japan Savings Bank, and an auditor of the Osaka Life Insurance Company. Although the hometowns of


the officers varied, their businesses centered in or near Osaka. In addition to the Kaigai Tokō Kabushiki Kaisha and the Nihon Imin Gōshi Kaisha, the Morioka Shōkai’s Morioka Makoto, the Tokyo Imin Gōshi Kaisha’s Saito Chutarō, and the Kumamoto Imin Gōshi Kaisha’s Inoue Keijirō and Yamaguchi Shunta had close relations with political and business circles. The executives of emigration companies, utilizing tremendous profits made in Hawaii as political funds, later established themselves as politicians of the Rikken Seiyūkai. Their remittance financially strengthened the Rikken Seiyūkai. Due to their closer associations with the influential politicians, the numbers of fraudulent activities by the emigration companies were overlooked.

As the demand for the immigration increased, a growing number of fraudulent practices became a serious issue. According to Kaigai Dekasegi Annai (1902), an emigrant should expect to procure:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>¥</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commission</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passage fare</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misegane</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>171</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

33 Iida, “Meiji Chūki Osaka o Honkyo tosuru Imin Kaisha: Omotoshite Nihon Imin Gōshi Kaisha no baai,” 72.

34 Tsurutani, Amerika Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin, 77. Yamaguchi was a stowaway to the United States and a member of the Rikken Seiyūkai.

35 Keiho Soga, Gojūnenkan no Hawai Kaisō (Reflections on Fifty Years in Hawaii) (Honolulu: Hawaii, Gojūnenkan no Hawai Kaisō Kankōkai, 1953), 101; Tsurutani, Amerika Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin, 77–79.

36 Misegane, 見せ金, literary “show money.” Beginning in 1894, the Hawaiian government required the Japanese emigrants to present a labor contract or misegane of fifty dollars at the port of entry to be admitted to Hawaii. Aiming to deny the entry of the impoverished people, it was the Hawaiian government’s countermeasure against the rapidly increasing Japanese labor migration into Hawaii.
An emigrant needed total ¥171 to go to Hawaii; however, if one had ¥80 (commission and passage fee) available, the emigration company would lend ¥91 with extraordinary high interest of twelve dollars and fifty cents.\(^{37}\) Additionally, emigrants should prepare for three to four days of lodging charges. Based on the *Imin Hogo Ho* (Emigrant Protection Law), the emigration companies were not supposed to collect money from the immigrants except the set-amount of commission, usually ten to twenty yen. Nevertheless, as *Tobei no Shirube* (渡米のしるべ, “Guide to America”), a guidebook for going to America, pointed out, the emigration companies, making all kind of excuses, would not help emigrants go to America unless they bribe them.\(^{38}\)

In those days, a farmer made three to four yen per month without board or lodging, thus earning fifty to sixty yen a year.\(^{39}\) That meant three-years worth of salary had to be raised for emigrating to the United States. In order to raise money, the emigrants sold off their farms and properties, borrowed from their relatives, or cooperated with other villagers for collecting funds for sending emigrants by turns. Otherwise, they borrowed money from wealthy persons of their villages and later


returned the money with extremely high interest. Accordingly, conspiring with the Keihin Ginkō, these emigration companies made an enormous profit by charging the emigrants high commissions, getting rebates from the shipping companies for each passenger, and charging the employers a commission for bringing laborers. Because of the emigration companies collecting rebates, the shipping companies tended not to reduce the passage fares.

Founded by Ogura Kō in 1894, a merchant in Osaka, the Ogura Shōkai was indeed the first emigration company that sent out the first group of shiyaku imin to Hawaii in June 1894. Ogura made an enormous profit not only by collecting a large sum of money from the emigrants but also by receiving passage fares from the planters in Hawaii for each laborer he sent. These planters paid Ogura $30 for passage of a male laborer and $20 for a female laborer. In addition, Ogura drew terms of labor immigration contract in 1894 that required each emigrant to deposit ¥50 for men and ¥25 for women that would be returned to them or their designated persons when they fulfill the fifteen-month labor contract period (Article 5). Moreover, Ogura Shōkai subtracted two dollars for each emigrant and three dollars and fifty cents for each married couple from their salary for fifteen months that would be paid back to emigrants with interest when their contract ended (Article 6). Ogura Shokai collected ¥10 for commission, half-price for

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40 Murayama, Amerika ni Ikita Nihonjin Imin, 48–49. According to Murayama, the cooperation of villagers was often practiced in Okinawa prefecture. Meanwhile, in Wakayama prefecture, emigrants tended to borrow money from the wealthy persons to raise fund for emigration.

41 Kimura, Issei: Japanese Immigrants in Hawaii, 175; “Prelude to the Immigration to Brazil (1),” 100 Years of Immigration to Brazil, Digital Archive, National Diet Library, Japan, http://www.ndl.go.jp/brasil/s1/s1_1.html#k1_2_1 (accessed May 16, 2009).

42 Kaikoku Hyakunen Kinen Bunka Jigyōkai, Nichibei Bunka Kōshōshi, dai 5-kan, 365.
children between the age of six and fifteen, and free for children under the age of five (Article 7). In the circumstances, Ogura Shōkai could gain about ¥120 yen [$30 (passage) + ¥50 (deposit) + ¥10 (commission)] from a male emigrant and about ¥75 [$20 (passage) + ¥25 (deposit) + ¥10 (commission)] from a female emigrant. In 1895, as the competition among the Japanese emigration companies intensified, Ogura Shōkai no longer paid passages for emigrants because the planters sought to import emigrants without paying their passages. In order to attract more emigrants, Ogura Shōkai not only abolished the security deposit but also reduced the mandatory monthly deposit to one dollar thereafter, according to Iida’s study.

Ogura Shōkai’s fraudulent practices further escalated, and the president of the company Ogura Kō was prosecuted and taken into custody for a violation of the *Imin Hogo Kisoku* (Emigrant Protection Ordinance) enacted in 1894. The Article 17 of the *Imin Hogo Kisoku* had prohibited the emigration companies collecting money from emigrants other than the listed commission of ¥10. While Ogura could obtain a passage for Honolulu for only ¥18 including meals, he charged ¥35 for a passage of contract-laborer and ¥52 for a free-laborer. The contract-laborer ended up paying nearly twice and the free-laborer three times as much as it cost. Losing business license, Ogura Shōkai went out of business in May 1896.

Ogura Shōkai was not the only corrupt emigration company. In 1904, Governor of Wakayama reported that Kōkoku Shokumin Kaisha (Kokoku Colonization Company)

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43 Iida, “Meiji Chūki Osaka Shōnin ni yoru Imin Assengyō: Ogura Shōkai oyobi Nanyū Shōsha ni yoru Sōsōki Hawai Imin no baai,” 69.

44 Ibid., 75.

45 Ibid.
had forced emigrants who possessed enough savings to loan ¥100 for *misegane* and demanded to pay ¥12.5 or 12.5% as interest.\(^{46}\) Many emigration companies had committed fraud in conspiracy with local shops, hotels, and steamship companies. Supplied by the emigration companies, the emigrants had no choice but to buy their clothing and necessities at the designated tailors and general stores, which tended to sell goods of poor quality at high price.\(^{47}\) These emigration companies often took a bribe of ten to twenty yen from the emigrants, who were eager to go to the United States as soon as possible, under the pretext of the ship filled to capacity.\(^{48}\)

As the Japanese government imposed further restrictions on immigration, the emigration companies instructed the Japanese to obtain passports to Latin American countries, Mexico in particular, as a means by which to enter the United States through the indirect channel. A considerable number of Japanese entered the United States by crossing the Mexican border. While some Japanese planned to stow away to the United States immediately after their arrival at Mexico, others determined to work in Mexico for a while and then left for the United States. Dale Ann Sato illustrated that “Issei entered from Mexico to the United States through the southern border towns of California, Arizona, and Texas. In 1901, Japanese emigration companies attracted 8,706 Japanese to work in Baja’s copper mines, railroads in Jalisco, sugar cane fields in Vera Cruz, and coal mines in Coahuila. Some 5,000, including 473 Okinawans, crossed into the United States

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\(^{46}\) Tsurutani, *Amerika Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin*, 72–73.


\(^{48}\) Tsurutani, *Amerika Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin*, 73–75.
to escape the severe working conditions.”

According to Kitamura, Wada Sam from Kagoshima had a similar experience. Obtaining passport for Argentine, Wada went ashore at Mexico, then walking three days, he finally entered the United States without captured. Inspector Braun reported that in 1906 and 1907, the emigration companies transported more than 10,000 Japanese into Mexico as contract laborers; however, most of them had left their jobs to migrate to the United States and only 1,000 Japanese had remained in Mexico in June 1907.

In response to the high-handed practices that lined the pockets of the emigration companies, Osaka Asahi Shimbun called for the protection of the ignorant emigrants. Furthermore, the emigration companies, violating the Immigration Convention of 1886, conveyed numbers of prostitutes as the wives of bachelor emigrants that led to their undoing. The influx of prostitutes not only damaged the national image but also paved the way for the emergence of anti-Japanese movement in America.

Consequently, criticism of the emigration companies arose in the turn of the


__50__ “Mexico kara Sabaku o koeteno Mitsu-nyūkoku: Wada Sam” (Smuggling-in from Mexico through passing the Desert), in *Issei to shite Amerika ni Ikite* (Living in America as First Generation Japanese Americans), ed. Takao Kitamura (Tokyo: Sōshisha, 1992), 52–57.


__53__ Imin Hogo Kyōkai, *Kaigai Dekasegi Annai*, 38. The entry of prostitutes into Hawaii was prohibited based on article 13 of the Immigration Convention of 1886.
century because of their heavy exploitation of their fellow Japanese. Practically, if each emigration company sent fifty emigrants each, they could send as many as seven hundred emigrants monthly on average. However, concerned that the drastic increase of Japanese immigrants would cause diplomatic problems between Japan and Hawaii, the Foreign Minister Komura limited the number of jiyū imin (free immigrants) to Hawaii sent by each emigration company from fifty to thirty emigrants per month after May 1, 1902. These emigration companies sent out emigrants anywhere in the world as long as they could make an enormous profit although they knew some places were clearly disadvantageous to the emigrants. At one point, Secretary Hanihara Masanao (埴原正直, 1876–1934) was surprised at the way the Japanese emigrants were “living like cattle,” and criticized the emigration companies that made profits by making promises to innocent country people who knew nothing about the conditions in foreign lands and helped them obtain passports. In fact, before Hanihara raised an issue of the terrible practices of the emigration companies, Osaka Asahi Shimbun had already reported the reality of these companies:

“The emigration business is well-known for profiteering. Japanese immigrants now in Hawaii, the North America continent and other foreign countries total about 100,000 persons. There are differences in income according to land and profession, but their average saving is 100 yen a year, and they send the money back to Japan. In other words, the sweat of 100,000 emigrants is condensed into a gold-piece worth ten million yen, which is consolidating our national power. On the other hand, however, when we look at what the emigration companies are doing, we cannot dismiss the hundreds of bad results:

54 “Hawai Imin, mata Seigen” (Restriction on Immigration to Hawaii again), Jiji Shinpō (Tokyo), April 18, 1902, in Nakayama, ed., Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen Shi, dai 11-kan, Hokushin Jihen, 405.

55 Tsurutani, Amerika Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin, 68–69.

Each emigration company takes advantage of the naives of emigrants, charges unreasonably high commissions, robs emigrants of their savings, and is only interested in its own self-entered profit-making. It is too harsh to submerge all the good things they have done under the mountain of crimes of which they are guilty; however, it is necessary now to devise some means to correct the bad policies such as: domestically, to have the police department control the soliciting of emigrants more severely and prevent lapses in legality; and abroad, to have the Consulates watch the behavior of agents of the emigration companies more closely and see that the savings of emigrants are deposited in more reliable banks. We wish this kind of reform would be carried out... Now there are 27 emigration companies in Japan, and the number of prospective emigrants is about 14,100 each year. Therefore the number of emigrants per company per month is limited to 45, and the commission is 20 yen per emigrant. Out of this revenue the emigration company must pay their employees both in Japan and abroad, and all their other expenses. Therefore it is quite understandable why they all try to go beyond the legal regulations...

Unfortunately, these proposals by the major Japanese newspaper did not restrict the fraudulent practices of emigration companies at all because the media was rather sympathetic to these companies. Some prospective emigrants, according to Itō, paid as much as fifty yen for commission. It was equivalent to the annual salary of farmers, earning between fifty and sixty yen. These companies exploited the rural Japanese who were ignorant about the price. Considering the income of a Japanese of the time, their commission was extremely high that closed the door for the poorest group of Japanese to emigrate overseas.

In 1902, the Imin Hogo Kyōkai (Association to Protect Emigrants) was established “to encourage emigration, to eliminate the malpractices of emigration

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57 Osaka Asahi Shimbun, October 25, 1902, quoted in Ito, Issei, 66–67.

58 Ito, Issei, 67.


60 Murayama, Amerika ni Ikita Nihonjin Imin, 47.
companies, and to work for free, unrestricted emigration.” The Imin Hogo Kyōkai advised the emigrants to ask the Japanese agents in Hawaii such as Ozawa Jimusho to find jobs for them, and warned them not to rely on the emigration companies, which, aiming to get commission from both emigrants and employers, would wait emigrants spending all their money and then “sell them off” to undesirable occupations. While the Imin Hogo Kyōkai kept the name of corrupted emigration companies’ secret, the Tobei Kyōkai’s (founded by Katayama Sen) monthly magazine called Tobei Zasshi (America-Bound Magazine, later renamed Amerika) carried the names of corrupt emigration companies and agencies so that emigrants could avoid crooked businesses. Tsurutani found out that April 1906 issue of Tobei Zasshi reported that Kansai Imin Gōshi Kaisha in Hiroshima and Nankai Imin Kabushiki Kaisha in Kochi were order to suspend businesses due to the acquisition of excessive commissions from emigrants. In addition, in February 1907 issue, an emigration companies in Nagasaki conspired with imin-yado recruited emigrants by making a false announcement that an extra ship would leave for Hawaii with discount passage rate of sixty yen. Those emigrants waited for as long as three months to up to six months, and spent all they had.

In the early twentieth century, desire to go to America was greater than ever. It indicated that a series of Meiji reforms left heavy burden on Japanese, and Japan was not wealthy enough to support all their citizens. Therefore, such crooked businesses had a

62 Imin Hogo Kyōkai, Kaigai Dekasegi Annai, 39.
63 Tsurutani, Amerika Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin, 73. According to Tsurutani, Tobei Zasshi was sold at 10 sen 5 rin, and Amerika at 13 sen. (1 sen = 0.5 cent / 1 rin = 0.005 cent)
64 Ibid., 73.
chance to thrive all over the country.

Keihin Ginkō

Meanwhile, the Keihin Ginkō was renowned for its unscrupulous quest for profit. The Bank continued to exploit the immigrants by forcing them to loan *misegane* (見せ金, literary “show money”) at an extortionate rate of interest or to deposit in the Keihin Ginkō. To go into details, the Act of 1894 required all Japanese immigrants to show possession of *misegane* of ¥91 (equivalent to $50) in order to gain admission to the country. Therefore, they loaned *misegane* in Yokohama right before leaving. To loan *misegane*, one had to have a co-signer so that the Bank could secure payment. Although they loaned for merely ten days, they had to pay back ¥91 upon their arrival in Honolulu and ¥12.5 was subtracted from their salary as interest.65 In other words, the Keihin Ginkō collected a 12.5 percent interest on loans, which was exceedingly high for a short-term loan.66 What was worse, the Keihin Ginkō demanded more than a thousand co-signers to pay back *misegane* although the emigrants had already returned *misegane* to the bank immediately after their entry to Hawaii.67

The Keihin Ginkō’s unscrupulous practice was beyond one’s imagination. The Bank coerced the immigrants to deposit between $90 to $100 in the Keihin Ginkō so that the immigrants could use it for their return passage in case of failing the physical examination upon the arrival. Once allowed to enter, the immigrants tried to withdraw

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their deposit; however, the Keihin Ginkō occasionally did not release the money from their banking accounts arguing that the fixed deposit could not be withdrawn for three years. Additionally, the Keihin Ginkō collected four dollars and fifty cents from the immigrants for their life insurance premiums. Moreover, the Keihin Ginkō compelled the immigrants to deposit 15 percent of their monthly wages as savings, and two dollars and fifty cents for their return passages when their contracts ended or in case of sickness. To put it simply, the immigrants had no access to their deposits in the Keihin Ginkō and emergency was not an exception. According to a story of an Issei immigrant in Hawaii published in Odo and Shinoto’s *A Pictorial History of Japanese in Hawaii, 1885–1924* (1985), one of his friends died and he went to the Keihin Ginkō with his friend’s dead body in order to withdraw his money for the funeral expense. In fact, he was not the only one who carried corpses to the Bank for withdrawing deposits. Clearly, the Japanese laborers in Hawaii were quite discontented with a fraudulent practice of the Keihin Ginkō cooperating with emigration companies. Typically, the Japanese emigrants in Hawaii, working to pay off their debts to the Keihin Ginkō or the emigration companies, could not accumulate money in their first contract period. Their life in Hawaii in the first three years was quite similar to indentured servitude.

At the turn of the century, the Japanese in Hawaii began to organize themselves to protect their interests. The *Chūō Nihonjinkai* (Central Japanese League) 

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was the first of its kind established in November 1903. Founded by Saitō Miki (Consul General in Hawaii from March 1903 to July 1908), the Chūō Nihonjinkai was initiated to represent all Japanese people living in Hawaii regardless of their class. Nevertheless, the Chuo Nihonjinkai only focused on protecting the interests of the elite class (e.g. consulate, representatives of the Keihin Ginkō, emigration companies, and other business groups). The Chuo Nihonjinkai did nothing to protect the interests of the Japanese plantation laborers. Instead, taking advantage of the fellow compatriots who were illiterate in English, the Chuo Nihonjinkai prevented the Japanese laborers from organizing plantation strikes and migrating to the mainland United States for higher wages.  

In May 1905, in reaction against the Chuo Nihonjinkai consisting of officials of the Keihin Ginkō and emigration companies, the Japanese plantation workers who withdrew from the Chuo Nihonjinkai organized the Kakushin Dōshikai (革新同志会, Japanese Reform Association) in order to represent their standpoint to the Japanese government. As a result of long years of harsh exploitation by the Keihin Ginkō and emigration companies, especially after the Keihin Ginkō’s refusal to repay the deposits of the Japanese workers until after they came back to Japan, the Japanese workers concluded that they need their own association to protect their rights.

The Kakushin Dōshikai made a thorough investigation into the emigration companies and the Keihin Ginkō and reported them to the government for fraud. In addition, the Japanese American newspaper companies such as Hawaii Nichi Nichi Shimbun, Shin Nippon, and Hawaii Shinpō played a leading role in protesting against the

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corrupt Keihin Ginkō and emigration companies. Due to the efforts of the *Kakushin Dōshikai* along with the Japanese American newspapers, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs imposed restrictions on the activities of emigration companies and banned all the forced deposits of the Keihin Ginkō. In 1900, Hawaii adapted the law of the United States that prohibited the entry of contract-laborers. In response, a series of Japanese governmental restrictions urged the Keihin Ginkō to suspend its business, and the emigration companies closed down one after another. Finally, the notorious Keihin Ginkō was closed down in 1905. Most staffs of the Keihin Ginkō and emigration companies withdrew from Hawaii for good in the spring of 1906. Before withdrawing from Hawaii, they contributed $10,000 and their properties to the Japanese community in Hawaii. The *Kakushin Dōshikai*, accomplishing their major goal, dissolved the association at their discretion in September 1906. This class-conscious dispute characterized the early split that had developed between the Central Japanese League and the *Kakushin Dōshikai*. In the end, it developed into an economic conflict between the upper and the lower classes.

Imin-yado (*Emigration Inns*)

In general, located near ports, *imin-yado* (移民宿, literary “emigration inn”) were

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considerably profitable businesses that emerged around the beginning of the *shiyaku imin jidai*. The *imin-yado* were the Japanese inns with licenses for lodging and handling boarding tickets. According to the Statistic of Kanagawa, there were thirty-two such *imin-yado* running businesses in Yokohama in 1891.77 The *Fukuiya Ryokan* (福井屋旅館), *Jōshū-ya* (上州屋), *Taisei-ya* (大勢屋), *Ōmori-ya* (大森屋), and *Kumamoto-ya* (熊本屋) were such inns in Yokohama. As examined earlier, the majority of the Japanese who planned to emigrate came from rural areas, and they needed to stay in the *imin-yado* unless they had a relative or friend who would provide them room and board before their departure.78 Taking advantage of these innocent fellows, the *imin-yado* served low quality meals and bad services, yet they charged the emigrants far more than they deserved. Clearly, there were numbers of *imin-yado* in port cities of Yokohama and Kobe in which the emigrants waited for some days before their departure. While staying at the *imin-yado*, they usually took medical examinations because they had to pass stricter inspections for trachoma, hookworm, and syphilis upon their arrival in America.79 Afraid of failing the hookworm examination, an emigrant smuggled someone’s stool for passing the examination. Another emigrant utilized eye medication to conceal the eye disease temporarily; however, the examiner immediately detected both cases.80

Utilizing scare tactics, the *imin-yado* in conspiracy with doctors ripped off the


79 Ibid.

80 “Shashin Kekkon no Onna ga Kino momeru Imintachi no Taikaku Kensa” (A Physical Examination which “Picture Brides” Felt Uneasy), *Kobe Yūshin Nippō*, March 12, 1920.
innocent Japanese by urging them to take medical examinations for several times. When things came to the worst, they had no money to go to America because of spending all their money for staying in the expensive imin-yado. In other cases, the unprosperous imin-yado that had very few customers intentionally served food such as salted salmon that would negatively affect the result of their eye exam so that customers had to stay longer.  

Harry S. Kawabe of Seattle was a serious victim of an imin-yado in Yokohama:

“It was 1906 when I came to the U.S. Born as the fourth son of a farmer in Maibara, Shiga Prefecture, while doing farming I saved money assiduously. I accumulated 120 yen in the days when a bushel sack of rice cost 5 yen. Chuzaburo Kawabe from my village had emigrated to San Francisco. I was in touch with him and I obtained my passport from Shiga Prefectural Office in preparation for going to the States, but the great earthquake in San Francisco interrupted our correspondence.”

“I had no other contact there, but I thought that anyplace in the U.S. was fine, and so I waited in an emigrant house in Kobe, hoping to make some connection. But there were hardly any ships. Many youngsters like myself were waiting for boats headed for the U.S. During that period I heard that Yokohama was an easier boarding place than Kobe, so I went to Yokohama and again lodged at an emigrant house. A worker at this emigrant house took me frequently for trachoma and hookworm examinations, but as for the most important thing—he wouldn’t let me board. Presumably they were calculating to prolong my stay at the lodging house day by day. I was kept there for three weeks. I spent all my travel money there, and so I went back home, managed to get the necessary money one more, came back to Yokohama and again stayed at an emigrant house.”

In collusion with the emigration companies, the imin-yado prevented emigrants from leaving with various plausible excuses. Undergoing eye operations as many as twelve times, Tamie Tsuboi of Seattle was also a victim of an imin-yado. Ito introduced Tsuboi’s experience in *Issei*:

“I married my husband, Kakichi Tsuboi, in Japan when he came back from America with the Ajisaka Tour Group. He went back to the U.S. in 1920, and I was to follow him, but when I took my physical examination at the emigrant house in Kobe, the doctor said I had trachoma. Therefore I had twelve eye operations. Looking back on it now, I suspect

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that the operations, instead of curing me, made it worse. I was afraid that the doctor,
shaking hands with the operators of the lodging houses, was deliberately delaying me,
whereupon I went to Nagasaki, took the examination and passed it at once. Even now I
still think it was an incredible business.”

In fact, during the late Meiji to the early Taisho periods, a number of *imin-yado*
ran business in Kobe, another port city that sent out many emigrants overseas. According
to Yamada, there were eight *imin-yado* (emigration inns) in Kobe;

| Sakaemachi Boulevard       | Yamazaki Ryokan (山崎旅館) |
|                           | Takaya Ryokan (高谷旅館)   |
|                           | Kobe-kan (神戸館)          |
| Kaigan Boulevard           | Jiyū-kan (自由館)          |
|                           | Imaizumi Ryokan (今泉旅館) |
|                           | Satsuma-ya (薩摩屋)         |
| Motomachi Boulevard        | Iwakuniya Ryokan (岩国屋旅館) |
| Kita Nagasa Boulevard      | Ebisu-ya (戎屋)³⁵         |

The *imin-yado* were usually wooden two- or three-storied houses that accommodated
about 100 guests. The *imin-yado* charged ¥1.5 to ¥3 depending on the services, and they
served meals three-time a day.³⁶ Converting to today’s value (x 3000), it cost them
¥4,500 to ¥9,000 per night. The *imin-yado* made profits by exploiting the prospective
emigrants.

Along with the shipping companies such as the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, Tōyō
Kisen Kaisha, and Osaka Shōsen Kaisha that transported the immigrants to the United
States, the *imin-yado* suffered a severe blow due to the enactment of the Immigration Act
of 1924 that virtually ended the Japanese immigration to the United States. According to

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³⁵ Yamada, *Fune ni Miru Nihonjin Iminshi*, 149.
³⁶ Ibid.
Osaka Asahi Shimbun, the imin-yado and gift shops located near the port of Yokohama were in great trouble due to a steep decline of guests and customers.  

Illegal Emigration Agents

Not only the emigration companies, but also the illegal emigration agents probably made excessive profits from the emigrants. In response to the further restriction of the Japanese government on immigration in 1900 in order to alleviate the anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States, it became difficult to get passports through the formal procedure. Enacted in 1897, Gaikoku Ryoken Kisoku (Foreign Passport Regulations for Travel Abroad) authorized each prefecture to review passport applicants. According to the report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the number of passports issued for the United States and Canada between September 1902 and September 1903, approximately 40 percent of applicants could obtain their passports.  

As shown in the table, Wakayama prefecture, which the government warned to restrict labor migration to the United States, showed low rate of approval. In general, prefectures in southwestern Japan that had sent out majority of emigrants tended to have lower approval rate following the governmental policy. Therefore, the Japanese coming from southwestern prefectures changed their domiciles to prefectures, in which obtaining passports were relatively easy.

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87 “Hokubei Kōro no Konjuku: Iminhō no Isshūnen o Mukaete; Fune Kaisha to Kankeisha wa Shiku-hakk” (Situation of the Trans-Pacific Line: A Year After the Enactment of the Immigration Act; Shipping Companies and Related Business in Great Trouble), Osaka Asahi Shimbun, July 1, 1925.

88 Gaimushō hensan, Nihon Gaikō Bunsho dai 37-kan dai 2-satsu (1904), 275.

89 Imin Hogo Kyōkai, Kaigai Dekasegi Anmai, appendix, 9–15.
Table 7.4: Number of Passports Issued and Disapproved, Sep. 1902–Sep. 1903

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prefecture</th>
<th>Applicants</th>
<th>Issued</th>
<th>Disapproved</th>
<th>Approval Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wakayama</td>
<td>2,033</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>1,416</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kyoto</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>64.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osaka</td>
<td>1,121</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>53.2%</td>
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<td>Kanagawa</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>50.6%</td>
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<td>Hyogo</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niigata</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>89.9%</td>
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<td>242</td>
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<td>Yamaguchi</td>
<td>1,482</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>996</td>
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<tr>
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<td>27</td>
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<td>41.5%</td>
</tr>
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<td>437</td>
<td>957</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
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<td>54</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
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<td>35.3%</td>
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<td>Nagasaki</td>
<td>136</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>77.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kumamoto</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>61.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>9,028</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,737</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,651</strong></td>
<td><strong>41.4%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Despite the restrictive immigration policy, the craze for going to America remained high, encouraged by a great number of guidebooks that exaggerated the achievement of immigrants, and this gave rise to the illegal emigration agents in Japan. The agents, going to the ports or *imin-yado*, recruited those who failed to pass the medical examination (usually trachoma or hookworm) but still desired to go to America. They often made the emigrants use expired passports and passports to Mexico or other South American countries, diverted somebody else’s passports who did not go to America for some reasons, or provided Seamen’s registrations as passports. Otherwise,
they instructed the emigrants how to smuggling-in.\textsuperscript{90} Under the circumstance, illegal passports were in high demand. In Yokohama and Kobe, the price of a passport at a black market was ¥100.\textsuperscript{91} As a result, the number of Japanese that entered the United States reached 65,915 between 1900 and 1910 although the Japanese government issued only 16,148 passports to the United States at the same period.\textsuperscript{92} Moreover, the agents of shipping companies sold passage tickets without verifying whether the emigrants had passports or not.\textsuperscript{93}

Otherwise, the illegal emigration agents urged emigrants to enter Victoria, Canada, first in which the entry was comparatively easier, and then taking foreign ships to smuggle into the United States. The Japanese Consul at Seattle, Hisamizu Saburō (久水三郎), reported to the Foreign Minister Komura on May 12, 1904 that at least thirty-one Japanese, including twelve women, entered the United States with this method. However, this method was so costly that not many Japanese could afford to do that. They needed to pay about eighty yen for passage; seventy to eighty yen for the crew; forty to fifty dollars for an official in charge of disembarkation; and fifty to sixty dollars for the American illegal emigration agent. Consul Hisamizu, concerned about the resurgence of anti-Japanese sentiment, called for the regulation of such illegal immigration as well as better

\textsuperscript{90} Gaimushō hensan, Nihon Gaikō Bunsho dai 37-kan dai 2-satsu (Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, vol. 37, no. 2 [1904]) (Tokyo: Nihon Gaikō Bunsho Ryōfukai, 1958), 280–287.

\textsuperscript{91} Imin Hogo Kyōkai, Kaigai Dekasegi Annai, 37; Tsurutani, Amerika Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin, 53.


\textsuperscript{93} Tsurutani, Amerika Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin, 74–75.
protection of the Japanese immigrants in the United States.  

*Labor Contractor System ("Boss System") in the United States*

Meanwhile, the labor contractor system (also known as "boss system") played a leading role in providing jobs to a large number of Japanese laborers coming to the United States between 1891 and 1907 while the emigration companies played a dominant role in the Japanese emigration to Hawaii. Due to the 1885 Contract Labor Law that prohibited the “importation and migration of foreigners and aliens under contract or agreement to perform labor in the United States, its territories, and the District of Columbia,” the Japanese entering the United States were supposed to be *jiyū imin* (free immigrants). Therefore, the emigration companies could not expand their businesses into the United States. Between 1894 and 1898, the emigration companies transported only 165 Japanese emigrants to the United States. Published in the *Reports of the Industrial Commission* in 1901, the following is the exact translation of the contract signed between one of *jiyū imin* and the Nippon Imin Gōshi Kaisha in January 1898 prior to the foreign ministry’s prohibition of the transportation of any emigrant to the United States by the emigration companies:

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*Footnotes*


95 Gaimushō Tsūshōkyoku-hen, *Ryoken kafusū oyobi Imin Tokei*, 146–161. While over 90 percent of emigrants entered Hawaii through the aid of the emigration companies between 1901 and 1907, less than 1 percent of those who entered the United States relied on the service of emigration companies.


Contract.

The Nippon Imin Göshi Company will contract, accepting the request for transportation of Yoshida Ichitaro, who is a free emigrant, having the purpose of land in San Francisco, North America, and to secure for him work there, within the limitations prescribed by the immigration laws.

1. The emigrant shall perform everything that is needed for getting the passport and must be responsible for all expense needed for the voyage, and should have the money which is necessary when landing.

2. The maturity of the contract is three years from the date that the emigrant starts.

3. If the emigrant gets sick, or loses the means to get along, Narita Toyashira, agent, will help him and provide him means to get back to Japan in case it is necessary.

4. If the emigrant is sent back at the expense of the Japanese Government the company shall pay all the expenses for the emigrant.

5. The emigrant shall pay 10 yen to the company as its fee. If the emigrant has a child who does not exceed the age of 15 years, the charge for it will be half price, and if the child is not exceeding 10 years of age, he will be carried free of charge.

6. The immigrant shall provide two securities to the company according to acts 3 and 4 hereof, and they will be responsible to pay all of the expenses that have been paid by the company under the provisions of sections 3 and 4.

7. The two securities are responsible in all the matters pertaining to the emigrant.

This contract is made in duplicate, one to the emigrant and one to the company. Meiji, 31st year (1898), 1st month (January), 31st day.

HAMANAKA HACHITARO,
Special manager Japan United Immigration Company.

Emigrant: YOSHIDA ICHITARO
Securities: YOSHIDA YOHEI
YAMAMOTO KUSU.

This contract indicated that the emigration company had procured _miseγane_ of thirty dollars in which an immigrant required to present to the Immigration officials for gaining admission to the United States. Clearly, it was a violation of 1885 Contract Labor Law.

The rise of the labor contractors or “bosses” initiated the Japanese mass immigration to the United States in the late nineteenth century. Usually educated in the

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United States or residing here for a while, the labor contractors were initially *dekasegi-shosei* (student laborers) who had a good command of English. On the other hand, majority of Japanese laborers arrived on the West Coast regions without English-language skill did not know how to get jobs. Therefore, the labor contractors or bosses acted as intermediaries “who often housed and fed the workers and assigned them work in exchange for an often hefty portion of their wages.” In addition, they helped the laborers to remit money to their families in Japan. The labor contractors contributed to stimulating the companies in the American West to hire more Japanese laborers as a replacement of Chinese laborers whose efforts had been crucial for the development of industries in the West.

The Japanese immigration to the United States took place intensively after the 1890s largely due to the enactment of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 that banned the Chinese immigration to the United States and the Geary Act of 1892 that extended the exclusion act for ten more years. The Chinese Exclusion Act, which prohibited the entry of “skilled and unskilled laborers and Chinese employed in mining,” was significant because it was the first restriction on free immigration in American history. Especially, after the completion of the transcontinental railroad, anti-Chinese sentiment gained intensity in the West. For instance, in Los Angeles, the Chinese Massacre took place.

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100 Ibid.

101 An Act to Execute Certain Treaty Stipulations Relating to Chinese (Chinese Exclusion Act), May 6, 1882, chap. 126, United States Statutes at Large, vol. 22, 58–61; An Act to Prohibit the Coming of Chinese Persons into the United States (Geary Act), May 5, 1892, chap. 60, United States Statutes at Large, vol. 27, 92. In addition, section 2 of the Act of November 3, 1893 included “Chinese employed in mining, fishing, huckstering, peddling, laundrymen, or those engaged in taking, drying, or otherwise preserving shell or other fish for home consumption or exportation.
place on October 24, 1871, when a racially motivated mob killed and pilloried nineteen Chinese and attacked other Chinese residents of the Chinatown in the city.\textsuperscript{102} Then, the Union Pacific’s white coal miners at Rock Springs, Wyoming territory, who had a hatred for Chinese laborers working as strikebreakers with low wages, attacked the local Chinatown, murdered twenty-eight Chinese and injured fifteen on September 2, 1885. In the Rock Springs Massacre, the loss of Chinese amounted to $148,000; however, no offender was punished.\textsuperscript{103}

While some Americans in the West sought to prevent the Chinese from populating the United States, developing industries such as railroad, mining, lumber, fishing, and agriculture required cheap and effective labor force for the development of the Western and Rocky Mountain States; therefore, the number of Chinese immigrants continued to grow. According to the \textit{Historical Statistics}, only thirty-five Chinese entered the United States in the 1840s, then 41,397 in the 1850s, 64,301 in the 1860s, and 123,201 in the 1870s.\textsuperscript{104} In 1881 and 1882 alone, 51,469 Chinese entered the United States. Nevertheless, the Chinese Exclusion Act resulted in drastic decrease in number of Chinese laborers. Between 1882 and 1892, only 13,078 Chinese were admitted to the United States.\textsuperscript{105} In 1890, 107,488 Chinese resided in the United States while 2,039 Japanese did. In 1900, the number of Chinese reduced to 88,869 and Japanese increased.

\textsuperscript{102} Murayama, \textit{Amerika ni Ikita Nihonjin Imin}, 150; Frank F. Chuman, \textit{The Bamboo People: The Law and Japanese-Americans} (Del Mar, CA: Publisher’s Inc., 1976), 54.

\textsuperscript{103} Tsurutani, \textit{Amerika Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin}, 33–34.


\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., 107–108.
to 24,326, and in 1910, Japanese surpassed the Chinese in the United States; there were 72,157 Japanese and 71,531 Chinese.\textsuperscript{106} It seems it was the growing labor shortage caused by the Chinese Exclusion Act that “pulled” the Japanese laborers to emigrate to the United States as substitutes.

The labor contractors played an important role in providing a large number of cheap laborers to a variety of industries in the United States.\textsuperscript{107} For the rural Japanese emigrants who possessed neither skills nor ability in English, only unskilled labor such as railroad construction, mining, logging, canning, and day-work was available. As long as they could work effectively, the American employers did not mind whether the Japanese laborers could speak English or not because the Japanese were \textit{deka}segi (temporary) laborers not permanent residents. Unlike Hawaii that allowed the entry of contract laborers for operating the vast sugar plantations, the United States had banned the entry of contract laborers. Therefore, most Japanese who entered the United States were free immigrants and sought the help of the labor contractors and Japanese employment agencies located in America who could find jobs for them. According to \textit{Tobei Annai} (1901), a free immigrant needed to raise ¥150 to go to the United States that included:

\begin{align*}
\text{Passage fare} & \quad ¥50 \\
\text{Misegane} & \quad ¥60 \\
\text{Western Clothing} & \quad ¥30 \quad \text{(western clothes, shoes, hat, etc.)} \\
\text{Spending Money} & \quad ¥10 \quad \text{(lodging and incidental expenses)}^{108} \\
\hline
\text{Total} & \quad ¥150
\end{align*}


\textsuperscript{107} \text{Toyokichi Iyenaga and Kenoske Sato, \textit{Japan and the California Problem} (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1921), 70.}

\textsuperscript{108} \text{Hyodayu Shimanuki, \textit{Tobei Annai} (Guide for Going to America) (Tokyo: Chuyodo, 1901), 147.}
In general, to raise ¥150, a farmer who made fifty to sixty yen per year had to have three-years worth of salary to emigrate.\textsuperscript{109}

The labor contractors collected the Japanese laborers in several methods. While some directly recruited the emigrants for work, others recruited through advertisement. In some cases, they sent agents to the British Columbia and furnished the emigrants who sought to enter the United States with \textit{mise-gane} and travel expenses. Once these emigrants successfully entered the United States, the agents sent them the railroads.\textsuperscript{110} Nevertheless, the labor contractors mostly collected the Japanese laborers through the boarding houses. Located in the port cities of San Francisco and Seattle, the large boarding houses were operated either by the major Japanese labor contractors or in cooperation with the labor contractors. The hotelkeepers’ organization managed incoming emigrants, and the labor contractors paid the hotelkeepers the fee of three dollars for each emigrant obtained in San Francisco and one dollar and fifty cents in Seattle.\textsuperscript{111} Significantly, the boarding houses made enormous profits by the quite similar method utilized by the \textit{imin-yado} that conspired with the emigration companies in Japan.

Before 1890, there were no Japanese working for the railroads in the West. However, the end of Chinese immigration to the United States caused labor shortage and


American businessmen in conspiracy with Japanese labor contractors successfully brought cheap laborers into the United States. By 1900, the Japanese laborers numbered 6,351 or 20.3 percent of all the foreign-born railroad workers.\(^{112}\)

Tanaka Chūshichi (田中 忠七), a former seaman and notorious pimp, established himself as a labor contractor by utilizing the profit made by the prostitution. In 1891, Tanaka, providing forty Japanese laborers for the Oregon Short Line Railway, a subsidiary of the Union Pacific Railroad, was the first Japanese railroad labor contractor in the United States.\(^{113}\) According to Yuji Ichioka’s study:

In Seattle he teamed up with one of the Japanese prostitutes and took her to Ogden, Utah, where he put her to work. In 1891 the Chinese subcontractor took a fancy to the woman while visiting Ogden, and persuade Tanaka to let him take her back to Rock Springs as his mistress. Then Tanaka had the woman prevail upon the Chinese to permit him to become his subcontractor. Illustrated but shrewd, he set up his office in Nampa, Idaho, and staffed it with student-laborers drawn from San Francisco... By September 1892 he had 500 workers employed on the Oregon Short Line, 150 of whom were from Hiroshima Prefecture.\(^{114}\)

These Japanese laborers recruited by Tanaka get a monthly pay of thirty dollars in 1891. Compared with the average daily wage of the Japanese in the Pacific Coast regions who got sixty to seventy cents a day, the railroad workers drew a high pay.\(^{115}\) However, Tanaka extracted ten cents from each laborer’s daily wage as commission.


\(^{114}\) Ichioka, *The Issei*, 57.

Tanaka, arguing that the Japanese laborers were “different from Chinese,” forced them to “live like Americans,” and prohibited them from using the Japanese food such as *miso* (soybean paste), soy sauce as well as rice. Therefore, the principal food of the railroad section workers was so-called “*dango jiru,*” dumpling soup made of chopped bacon, potatoes, onions, seasoned by salt and pepper. The Japanese workers suffered from not only heavy labor but also unpleasant and unhealthy meals. Since vegetables were not available, they picked weeds by the railroad and ate with *dango jiru.* Due to malnutrition, many workers suffered from a night blindness. According to Natsuhara Sen of Auburn who described the lives of section workers in Ito’s *Issei*:

After working as a houseboy, and then at the sugar beet farm, I worked as a section worker on the railroad at Newport, Idaho. I worked for one dollar a day and spent 25 to 30 cents for food. We mainly ate dried strips of radish, dried burdock, dried lotus roots, kelp, and so on. Since we did not have *miso* for soup, we used salt instead. Since we were ill-fed, we became night blind in short order. I did not notice but I had to feel my way in the dark.

In addition, working in the railroad section was both physically and mentally severe for the laborers. Especially, the intense heat in the summer enervated workers who lacked appropriate housing, balanced diet, medical care, or sanitation. They had to find their own ways for survival when working in isolated sections. In order to avoid fierce heat, some Japanese workers lived in holes, according to Koyama Kei, staff of *Ôshu Nippô* (Oregon Daily). Koyama described that “The cave was 16’ or 17’ square and about 7’ or 8’ high. On the ceiling—in other words, on the ground—they had put boards with canvas stretched over them, and on the top of that, hay. They had two bunk

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116 Ito, *Issei*, 293.

117 Tsurutani, *Amerika Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin*, 130. They had drinking water supplied only once a week, and food a few times a month.

The Japanese laborers sang a song such as “If a railroad worker was a human being—Then dragonflies and butterflies would also be birds.”

In 1892, Tanaka’s frequent embezzlement of the wages of the Japanese laborers came to light. Taking advantage of the emigrants who had no command of English and depended on Tanaka to remit money to their families in Japan, Tanaka embezzled the laborers’ savings as well. Managing about 400 Japanese laborers, Tanaka had made enormous profit by appropriate the laborers’ wages to his own use. Exploiting their toil, Tanaka bought seventy-five acres of land, built a house like a palace, and lived a luxurious and immoral life. One of his anguished employee exposed Tanaka’s misdeeds to the San Francisco’s Kinmon Nippō (金門日報, Golden Gate Daily) that the Japanese laborers engaged in the construction were “exploited like slaves.”

Attacked by his employees, Tanaka fled to Salt Lake City for his safety; however, he aimed to go back to his old life. Contributing enormous money to Aikoku Dōmei led by Sugawara and Hinata in San Francisco, Tanaka tried to make the Soko Shimbun (桑港新聞, San Francisco News) fight for his interests. The Soko Shimbun entered a severe controversy with the Kinmon Nippō, which came to resort to force. Finally, the Japanese Consul General at San Francisco Chinda Sutemi (珍田捨巳, 1856–1929) went to Idaho to investigate. Tanaka admitted his misdeeds and promised to pay off a debt. This series of events,

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119 Ito, Issei, 344.

120 Ibid., 316.


122 Studying at a University in Indiana for four years from 1887, Chinda Sutemi became the Consul General in San Francisco in 1890.
known as “Idaho Anti-Corruption Incident,” characterized the reality of the relations between the labor contractors and political figures in the 1890s. It also illustrated that the Japanese emigrants were more profitable than previously estimated.

Hasegawa Genji (長谷川源司), the labor contractor in California and Nevada who provided seventy to eighty Japanese for the Southern Pacific Railroad, was an infamous pimp in San Francisco who utilized profits from his brothels to enter the labor-contracting business. Hasegawa was probably the most vicious pimp, referred to as amegoro (American thug). A leading Issei writer named Okina Kyūin gave a good picture of amegoro quoted in Ichioka’s “Ameyuki-san” (1977):

“Amegoro were behind the women, men who had been in abject poverty in Japan or who had come to America with ambitions, but abhorred honest work and had gone the wayward path. To carouse and gamble, they duped women and forced them into prostitution. The worse ones fraudulently married several women and sold them off to the Chinese.”

Consul Chinda again played an active part to dissuade Hasegawa from engaging in prostitution business and urged him to start a decent business.

As the demand for cheap labor increased, three major labor-contracting companies emerged in the Pacific Coast and Rocky Mountain states. Ban Shinzaburō (1854–1926) of Portland, Oregon provided the Japanese laborers for the railroad companies in 1892. Born into a family of the Tokugawa retainer in Tokyo, Ban studied


126 Ichioka, The Issei, 62.
English at Kaisei Gakkō and Daigaku Nankō and served in the Foreign Ministry as a secretary of Consul General Andō Tarō in Honolulu in 1885 due to his friendly terms with Enomoto Takeaki and Hoshi Tōru (星 亨, 1850–1901). While residing in Hawaii and observing the kanyaku imin, Ban saw the emigration business as having great promise. Therefore, Ban participated in the establishment of the Kobe Imin Kaisha (Kobe Emigration Company) after resigning from the consulate in 1891. Working as an employee assigned to the Oregon office of the Kobe Imin Kaisha, Ban helped the Japanese emigrants find jobs.

In 1892, Ban established his own labor-contracting company named S. Ban Shōten in Portland, Oregon, which turned out to be profitable as he had envisioned. Beginning with supplying section workers for the Southern Pacific Railway, Ban provided the Oregon Railway and Navigation Company, the Astoria and Columbia River Railway, the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railway with the Japanese laborers. Ban sent the Japanese railroad laborers to Washington, Montana, Wyoming, Colorado,

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127 Shiro Fujioka, Ayumi no Ato: Hokubei Tairiku Nihonjin Kaitaku Monogatari (A Trail of Footprints) (Los Angeles: Ayumi no Ato Kanko Koenkai, 1957), 352–356. Hoshi Toru went to Britain to study law at Middle Temple Law School, and became the first Japanese lawyer who would qualify to practice in Britain. In 1882, Hoshi became a member of the Liberal Party and along with Ito Hirobumi, he became an influential figure in the Rikken Seiyūkai. Hoshi was assassinated in 1901 while serving as a chair of the Tokyo City Assembly, according to “Hoshi Toru,” Portraits of Modern Japanese Historical Figures, National Diet Library, Japan, http://210.128.252.171/portrait/datas/190.html?c=6 (accessed January 20, 2010).

128 Tsurutani, Amerika Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin, 134. Matsuoka Yōsuke (松岡 洋右, 1880–1946), the Japanese Foreign Minister during World War II, used to work for the S. Ban Shoten while attending law school at the University of Oregon at night.

North Dakota, Nebraska, as well as Oregon. Establishing branch offices in Denver and Cheyenne, the S. Ban Shōten became the largest labor-contracting company in Oregon, taking in five million dollars a year. The S. Ban Shōten had three departments; first, the construction department (dealing with railroad companies and providing laborers based on contracts); second, the business department (running stores); and third, the lumber department (operating a sawmill in Quincy, a dairy farm, and a sugar beet farm that hired section workers during winter). According to the Reports of the Immigration Commission, S. Ban Shōten supplied about 40 percent of the maintenance laborers between 1905 and 1907. At its peak, over 3,000 Japanese laborers worked under the S. Ban Shōten. These Japanese laborers engaged in railroad, mining, and agricultural industries. In addition to finding jobs for emigrants, Ban operated a mercantile shop that sold Japanese food and sundries, which had branches in Denver, Colorado, Sheridan and Cheyenne, Wyoming, and Pocatello, Idaho as well as in Tokyo and Kobe. Ban played a leading role in the development of the Japanese community in Oregon. Ban served as the president of the Nihonjinkai in Portland for ten years, helped to establish Portland


132 Ichioka, The Issei, 58.


Japanese Methodist Church in 1893, and founded the Japanese-language newspaper Ōshu Nippō (Oregon Daily News) in 1906 that provided information, which helped the laborers to live in isolated areas. In 1924, the S. Ban Shōten bankrupted because the Japanese suddenly withdrew their money in response to a rumor that the S. Ban Shōten would go bankrupt. The Teikoku Shōkai (帝国商会, Imperial Trading Company) founded by Matsushima Mosaburō took over the management of the company, and Ban went back to Japan in 1926.

Meanwhile, Yamaoka Ototaka (山岡 音高, 1862–1924) and Takahashi Tetsuo (高橋 徹夫) established the Tōyō Bōeki Kaisha (東洋貿易会社, Oriental Trading Company) in Seattle, Washington in 1898, which rose to be the largest labor-contracting company in the United States. Originally starting as a partnership of Takahashi Tetsuo with Yamaoka Ototaka, Tsukuno Matajirō (筑野 又次郎) joined the partnership in 1899. Then Yamaoka became the president of the company, Takahashi vice president, and Tsukuno treasurer. The Tōyō Bōeki Kaisha was the first company

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137 Ito, Issei, 791.

138 Ibid., 344.

139 Ibid., 85.

140 Tsukuno Matajirō then president of the Tōyō Bōeki and president of the Oriental American Bank and “one of the best known and wealthiest and most influential Japanese residents of Seattle, was instantly killed” yesterday morning “by being hit by a Great Northern switch engine in front of the Great Northern dock at Smith cove,” according to Los Angeles Herald on September 13, 1907.
directly contracted with railroad companies.\textsuperscript{141}

The president of the company, Yamaoka, a radical advocate of the \textit{jiyū minken ron} (freedom and people’s rights argument), had quite a unique background as well. Born into a family of the vassal of the Shogun in 1862 in Hokkaido, Yamaoka studied law in Tokyo, became a lawyer at the age of twenty-two, formed the \textit{Gakunan Jiyūto} (南自由党, Gakunan Liberal Party) in Shizuoka prefecture, schemed for the overthrow of the government, and attempted assassination of several ministers with a bomb.\textsuperscript{142}

According to Fujioka Shirō’s \textit{Ayumi no Ato}, the plotters intentionally committed a burglary afterwards to prevent betrayal. However, there was an informer among them and about two hundred were arrested, of whom forty-nine, including Yamaoka, were imprisoned and sent to Hokkaido’s coal mine. Ten years later, Yamaoka was released from prison under a general amnesty, and he sought a new life in the United States.\textsuperscript{143}

Then, Yamaoka went to the United States in the hope of getting help from his political friend, Hoshi Toru; however, he could not meet Hoshi. Settling down in Seattle, Yamaoka determined to establish himself as a labor contractor with the help of Takahashi Tetsuo who was a \textit{dekasegi-shosei}, studied law in Puget Sound University in Tacoma after working in a butter factory for a year and half. Then, Takahashi taught English to the Japanese young immigrants at the church run by the Japanese.\textsuperscript{144}

The Tōyō Bōeki Kaisha began to provide the Japanese laborers to the Great

\textsuperscript{141} Ichioaka, \textit{The Issei}, 58.

\textsuperscript{142} Fujioka, \textit{Ayumi no Ato}, 295–312.

\textsuperscript{143} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{144} Murayama, \textit{Amerika ni Ikita Nihonjin Imin}, 74–76.
Northern, Northern Pacific, and other local railroad companies in 1898. At its peak, over 6,000 Japanese laborers worked under the Tōyō Bōeki Kaisha. The company also engaged in import-export business for supplying the Japanese food and goods to the laborers, and the business extended to banking and farming.\(^{145}\) Dispatching the company’s agents to the Japanese laborers in the camps, the company sold Japanese vegetables, toasted seaweed, taros, bamboo shoot, pickled radish, tofu, dried gourd shavings, miso, soy sauce, rice, as well as shoes, shoe polish, and tabi (Japanese socks) with high commission.\(^{146}\) The Tōyō Bōeki Kaisha set up the Oriental American Bank (米国東洋銀行) capitalized at $40,000 in 1905. Located at Main Street and Fifth Avenue in Seattle, the Bank was the first Japanese bank “owned and operated by Japanese in their own premises.”\(^{147}\)

Simultaneously in Seattle, Furuya Masajirō (古屋政次郎, 1862–1938), established the Furuya Shōten (Furuya Company), a grocery store, in 1892.\(^{148}\) Furuya made enormous profits by dispatching the agents and selling the Japanese consumer goods to the laborers in remote areas with high commissions. As his business flourished, Furuya expanded into import-export businesses and set up branches in Tacoma, Portland, Vancouver, Yokohama, Yokosuka, Kobe, and Tokyo.\(^{149}\) Furuya Shōten extended his

\(^{145}\) Murayama, *Amerika ni Ikita Nihonjin Imin*, 76.

\(^{146}\) Kumei, *Gaikokujin o Meguru Shakaishi*, 90.


\(^{148}\) Niiya, ed., *Japanese American History*, 142–143. Born in Yamanashi prefecture, Furuya studied the tailoring trade in Tokyo for two years before coming to the United States so that he could enter the United States as a non-laborer.

interest to construction, real estate, mailing, printing, and banking. At first, Furuya began supplying the Japanese laborers to the Chicago-Milwaukee Railway. Furuya later joined Kumamoto Hifumi who established the Tacoma Koji Kaisha (Tacoma Contracting and Maintenance Company) with William H. Remington in 1898 for supplying the Japanese laborers for the Northern Pacific Railway. From 1905, the two major labor-contracting companies in Washington, namely, Furuya Shōten and Tōyō Bōeki Kaisha, began a fierce competition to recruit more Japanese laborers because the railroad company paid two dollars for every worker they brought in.

Meanwhile, playing an important role in the development of the early Japanese community, Furuya rose to be an influential business leader in the Pacific Northwest. In 1907, he established the Japanese Commercial Bank, capitalized at $25,000, in the back of the Furuya Shōten and became its president. Then, Furuya gained control of the Oriental American Bank in 1914, merged the Seattle Species Bank in 1923, and finally created the Pacific Commercial Bank by merging the Japanese Commercial Bank with the Oriental American Bank in 1928. The former Governor of Saitama, Okada Tadahiko who went on a tour of inspection, proudly reported the great success of Furuya in Seattle. When the Pacific Commercial Bank was bankrupt in 1931 due to the Great Depression, many Japanese living in Seattle lost their saving and businesses.

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In California, the founder of the Nichibei Shimbun (Japanese American News) and a leading member of the Fukuin-kai (Gospel Society), Abiko Kyūtarō (我孫子 久太郎, 1865–1936) established a labor-contracting company, the Nihonjin Kangyosha (日本人労業社: later renamed Nichibei Kangyosha, literary Japanese American Industrial Company) in 1902. The company provided Japanese laborers to not only the railroad but also mining and farming industries in many states in the West. Abiko rose to be an influential Japanese leader in California and played an important role in promoting the stabilization of community through “picture marriage.”

By the turn of the century, Japanese labor contractors in the West played leading roles in supplying laborers to states including California, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Nevada, Utah, Wyoming, Colorado, Nebraska, and Kansas and alleviated the labor shortage caused by the Chinese exclusion laws. As shown in Table 7.5, the Great Northern, Northern Pacific, Southern Pacific, and Union Pacific Railroads were the major employers of Japanese laborers, mostly as section hands. Katayama Sen’s Tobei Zasshi reported in the April 1906 issue that 11,683 Japanese worked in the railroads in

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155 Yuji Ichioka, “Japanese Immigrant Labor Contractors and the Northern Pacific and the Great Northern Railroad Companies, 1898–1907,” Labor History 21, no. 3 (1980): 325. The Japanese worked at section, gang, and roundhouse. A section was a group of six to eight persons with a foreman that did maintenance work. During winter, section hands were reduced to two workers on average. A gang was a crew of about 50 or more persons that included a boss and a cook, which was assigned to lay tracks and to cope with accident and emergency. A gang made of Japanese workers was called “Jap gang.” The eight to nine members of a gang and section hands lived in a modified freight car or a small barrack. Otherwise, they lived in a tent. Under the railroad labor contractor, Hashimoto Daigorō of Salt Lake City, there were ten “Jap gangs” in 1906 where as the Oregon Short Line employed seven “Jap gangs” in 1911. Meanwhile, at the roundhouse, the Japanese laborers engaged in maintenance works such as wiping engines and cleaning wheels, according to Tsurutani, Amerika Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin, 127–129.
the United States. Meanwhile, the *Reports of the Immigration Commission* recorded the number of the Japanese laborers as over 13,000 and *Nichibei Nenkan* (Japanese American Yearbook) reported the number to be 13,716 in 1906. Based on the available records and data, *Nichibei Nenkan*’s number seems to be accurate.

Table 7.5: Labor Contractors, Number of Laborers, and Railroads, 1905–06

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labor Contractor</th>
<th>Laborers</th>
<th>Railroads</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tōyō Bōeki</td>
<td>3,037</td>
<td>Great Northern Railway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban Shinzaburō</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Southern Pacific Railway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nichibei Kangyōsha</td>
<td>1,266</td>
<td>Union Pacific Railroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hashimoto Daigorō</td>
<td>1,350</td>
<td>San Pedro Railway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nishimura Unryu/Nishimoto Kumi</td>
<td>1,530</td>
<td>Union Pacific Rail (Eastern)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inukai Saburō</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>Oregon Short Line Railway (Northern)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuranaga Terusaburō</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>Southern Pacific Railroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumamoto Hifumi</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>Northern Pacific Railway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiyama/Takatzuka Kumi</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Denver &amp; Rio Grande Railway</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Although the exact number of employees was unclear, there were quite a number of labor contractors operating in the U.S. West supplying the Japanese laborers to railroads, mining, logging, lumbering, canning, and agricultural industries. For example, Furuya Shōten supplied the Japanese laborers to the Chicago-Milwaukee Railway, Arai

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Jimusho to the Western Pacific Railroad, Miura Kumi to the Rock Island, Colorado Southern, Moffett Railroad, Wakimoto Tsutomu to the Santa Fe Railway, Nishiyama Hajime to the Rock Springs Coal Mine in Wyoming, Oka Hayato to the Bingham Copper Mine in Utah, Toyota Seitarō to the Rush Copper Mine and McGill Smelter, and Hokazono Naoichi to a sugar beet venture in Greeley, Colorado. Like the railroad industry, the mining industry suffered from the shortage of labor after the Chinese Exclusion Act. For the mining industry, Nishimoto Hajime was the first labor contractor to supply the Japanese laborers to the coal mine in Rock Springs in 1898 owned by the Pacific Union.  

Like the emigration companies, the labor contractors commercialized Japanese labor and made excessive profits by exploiting their countrymen. The labor contractors took a commission of 5 to 10 percent from their laborers’ wages and charged other fees including “office fees” and “hospital fees.” For example, in 1899 the Tōyō Bōeki charged one dollar a month for “office fees” and fifty cents a month for “hospital fees” and then took off ten cents as commission from daily wage of $1.05. Therefore, after paying all fees and commission, a laborer could receive only $23.20 a month (26 days). Additionally, the Tōyō Bōeki received a commission from the railroad companies, usually paid in the form of free transportation of Japanese food and goods for laborers.


159 Tsurutani, Amerika Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin, 140–141.


161 Murayama, Amerika ni Ikita Nihonjin Imin, 79.
Some labor contractors charged less commission but required higher “interpreter’s fee,” and others charged higher commissions but required no “interpreter’s fee.” In general, the labor contractors deducted two dollars from laborer’s monthly salary.\textsuperscript{162}

In those days, the labor contractors became extraordinary influential and financially powerful by the laborers’ toil. According to Maruyama’s calculation when the Tōyō Bōeki hired 1,500 Japanese laborers, the yearly income of Yamaoka, Takahashi, and Tsukuno should be at least $3,000—ten times more income than a laborer.\textsuperscript{163} When the Tōyō Bōeki hired 3,000 laborers, the company made $300 a day (3,000 laborers x 10 cents); $7,800 a month ($300 x 26 days); and $93,600 a year ($7,800 x 12). At its peak, the company had 6,000 laborers, making $187,200 a year. Meanwhile, Kumamoto Hifumi earned as much as $2,500 a month, according to Ōtsuka Shunichi.\textsuperscript{164} It indicated that Kumamoto’s annual salary was $30,000—100 times more income than a laborer.

However, as the numbers of labor contractors increased, they had to reduce the amount of the commission in order to secure the Japanese laborers as well as to make a contract with the railroad companies. Especially after 1900, it became difficult to secure the Japanese laborers due to the governmental restriction on labor migration to the United States. The founder of the Tōyō Bōeki Kaisha, Yamaoka went back to Japan and set up a branch office to facilitate the recruitment of laborers.\textsuperscript{165} Yamaoka made approaches to officers of the passport issuing authorities in Shizuoka and Niigata prefectures whom he


\textsuperscript{163} Murayama, Amerika ni Ikita Nihonjin Imin, 79–80.


\textsuperscript{165} Ichioka, “Japanese Immigrant Labor Contractors,” 331.
had connections in his *Jiyūtō* days to issue counterfeit passports. The passports of that
time did not require photographs, which enabled hundreds of Japanese to enter the United
States with illegal passports. Yamaoka supported the using of counterfeit passports to
bring a great number of Japanese laborers for the railroad construction. According to one
estimate, three to four thousand deemed to Japanese entered the United States with
“Yamaoka passports.” Then, Yamaoka, cooperating with a leading emigration
company Morioka Shōkai, attempted to bring more laborers; however, the Japanese
Foreign Ministry, afraid of violating the U.S. Immigration law, refused to issue
passports.

By 1904, the shortage of Japanese labor reached a serious level for the labor
contractors as well as for the railroads. It was partly due to the restrictive immigration
policy of Japan and partly due to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. The war
devastated the Tōyō Bōeki’s business operation for several ways. First, the Nippon
Yusen Kaisha that the company had relied on stopped its trans-pacific service; therefore,
the Tōyō Bōeki could not export the flour to Japan. Second, following the outbreak of
war, many Japanese laborers who worked for the railroads under the contract with the
Tōyō Bōeki returned to Japan. Takahashi described that “With the prospect of hostilities
the patriotic boys who were working at good wages in America gave up their
opportunities and hastened back to Japan to fight for their country.” As a result, laborers
working under the Tōyō Bōeki had reduced to merely 300 to 400 laborers in 1904

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166 Murayama, *Amerika ni Ikita Nihonjin Imin*, 86.
168 Gaimushō hensan, *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho dai 33-kan* (Documents on Japanese Foreign
compared to 1,800 in the previous year of 1903.\footnote{169}{“Jap Shippers Happy: Steamship Lines Are About to Resume Operations,” The Saint Paul Globe (St. Paul), May 30, 1904.}

In April 1905, the Tōyō Bōeki, realizing that obtaining laborers from Japan was troublesome, chartered \textit{Olympia} and sent it to Honolulu to recruit Japanese laborers in Hawaii to the United States. By placing prominent advertisements on Hawaii’s Japanese newspapers, Tōyō Bōeki successfully brought back six hundred laborers. Their advertisement on the \textit{Hawaii Shinpō} on February 27 headlined “Steamship Olympia. Accommodates 500 passengers. Fare, including commissions, $28. Sails April 18, 1905…”\footnote{170}{Reports of the Immigration Commission, Part 25, vol. 1 (S. Doc. No. 633, 61st Cong., 2d sess.), 15; Gaimushō hensan, \textit{Nihon Gaikō Bunsho dai 38-kan dai 2-satsu} (Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, vol. 38, no. 2 [1905]) (Tokyo: Nihon Gaikō Bunsho Ryōfukai, 1959), 317–324. Some Japanese in Hawaii decided to move to the United States because they could no longer bear with the fraudulent practices of the Keihin Ginkō and emigration companies.}

The Japanese laborers preferred to immigrate to the United States where they could obtain higher wages since their goal was to accumulate money as much as possible.\footnote{171}{Suzuki, \textit{Nihonjin dekasegi imin}, 212.} Urged by vice-president of the Tōyō Bōeki, Takahashi Tetsuo, president of the Great Northern Railroad, James Hill wrote a letter to the Japanese ambassador Takahira Kogorō (高平 小五郎, 1854–1926) on March 26, 1906 that expressed his desire to hire three to five thousand Japanese laborers permanently on the Great Northern and Northern Pacific Railroads. Nevertheless, the ambassador rejected Hill’s request to maintain and improve “good relations” with the United States.\footnote{172}{Gaimushō hensan, \textit{Nihon Gaikō Bunsho dai 39-kan dai 2-satsu} (Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, vol. 39, no. 2 [1906]) (Tokyo: Nihon Gaikō Bunsho Ryōfukai, 1959), 394–397; Ichioka, “Japanese Immigrant Labor Contractors,” 334–335.} In 1906, the Tōyō Bōeki attempted to recruit 1,800 Japanese laborers from Hawaii; however, because of the
strong opposition from the Hawaiian government and the owners of sugar plantations as well as competition from other labor contractors, the company could only bring some 600 Japanese. Taking advantage of Japanese who sought to work in the United States, the owner of the Kanjio Hotel in Honolulu charged as high as ten dollars to secure tickets for the Japanese laborers and hotelkeepers got two dollars per capita for securing tickets for them.

The labor contracting system declined sharply especially when President Theodore Roosevelt authorized the Executive Order No. 589 on March 14, 1907 that prohibited the immigration of Japanese laborers to the United States by way of Hawaii, Mexico, and Canada into the United States. The labor contractors suffered a severe blow because they could no longer transport their commodities (Japanese laborers in Hawaii) to the United States. After the signing of the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907–1908 that virtually ended the Japanese labor immigration to the United States, the only way to obtain the laborers was to poach from other labor-contracting companies. In so doing, the labor contractors began to reduce the amount of commission to attract more Japanese to their companies. For example, as Murayama pointed out the Tōyō Bōeki removed the commission for the year 1904 to compete with the rival company of Tacoma Koji Kaisha, and sought to make profits by the sales of Japanese food and goods to the emigrants. In fact, the Japanese laborers in the remote areas consumed more Japanese food than American food, and the labor contractors made undue profits by supplying

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176 Ibid., 82–83.
Japanese items to them.\textsuperscript{177} Regardless of their effort to keep the Japanese laborers under their companies, the Japanese laborers began to make a contract directly with the railroads as their English-language skills improved, and many laborers sought to shift to agricultural labor that generally offered stable and relatively high wages year-round.\textsuperscript{178} Those who succeeded in saving enough money began to purchase or lease land for establishing their economic foundation based on agriculture.\textsuperscript{179} Accordingly, the number of Japanese laborers engaged in railroad work continued to decline and there were about 10,000 Japanese railroad workers in 1909, to 4,553 in 1913, 4,300 in 1920, and 2,148 in 1930, respectively.\textsuperscript{180}

The Tōyō Bōeki determined to diversify the business in response to the Gentlemen’s Agreement. In 1909, utilizing $45,000 from the Oriental American Bank, Takahashi Tetsuo (president of the Oriental American Bank) started a prostitution business by constructing a large-scale brothel; however, three months after the opening of the brothel, Takahashi had to close it down because the designated area for the prostitution business was changed. Since the law no longer allowed the brothel to operate there, Takahashi converted it to a theater. The failure of the prostitution business financially devastated the Tōyō Bōeki, and Furuya Shoten, the long-standing rival of the

\textsuperscript{177} \textit{Reports of the Immigration Commission, Part 25, vol. I} (S. Doc. No. 633, 61st Cong., 2d sess.), 45. The ratio was 70 percent Japanese food and 30 percent American food. Therefore, large contractors made enormous profits by selling Japanese food, clothing, and other goods to laborers.

\textsuperscript{178} Tsurutani, \textit{Amerika Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin}, 137; Murayama, \textit{Amerika ni Ikita Nihonjin Imin}, 84.


\textsuperscript{180} Tsurutani, \textit{Amerika Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin}, 137–138.
Tōyō Bōeki, took over the management of the company.\(^{181}\) The co-founder of the Tōyō Bōeki, Yamaoka Ototaka came to engage in agriculture on the farm owned by Furuya. He died of heart attack in 1924.\(^{182}\) The prime of the labor contractors did not last long due to the emergence of anti-Japanese immigration. Significantly, the labor contractors came to decline as the Japanese immigrants settled in American society.\(^{183}\)

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During the Meiji and Taisho period, taking advantage of the high demand on overseas emigration, the emigration companies, the Keihin Ginkō, and imin-yado, illegal emigration agents, and labor contractors had exploited the ignorant Japanese emigrants who simply sought to make money for helping their families or establishing their own families after returning to Japan. The executives of emigration companies and labor-contracting companies were for the most part educated in the United States and had a good command of English. In addition, advocating the *jiyū minken ron* (freedom and people’s rights argument), they tended to associate with the *Jiyūto* (Liberal Party) and the *Rikken Seiyūkai* (Friends of Constitutional Government).

Although the *Imin Hogo Ho* (Emigrant Protection Law) had existed to protect the Japanese from greedy emigration companies since 1896, it was not able to regulate the unreasonable and sometimes inhumane practices of emigration agencies that enjoyed enormous profit by sending emigrants and finding them jobs in either Hawaii or the

\(^{181}\) Murayama, *Amerika ni Ikita Nihonjin Imin*, 89.

\(^{182}\) Fujioka, *Ayumi no Ato*, 312.

\(^{183}\) Murayama, *Amerika ni Ikita Nihonjin Imin*, 90.
United States. In consequence, the influx of the Japanese laborers, including significant numbers of stowaways, instigated anti-Japanese sentiment in the mainland United States during the 1900 Presidential campaign. The Japanese Charge d’Affaires, Nabeshima Keijirō expressed to Foreign Minister Aoki Shuzo (青木周蔵, 1844–1914) in his report on April 30, entitled “About the Restriction of the Japanese Emigration” that the emigration of Japanese into the United States was not socially beneficial to the Japanese emigrants who had to engage in the lowest kinds of labor and had to endure being hated. Nabeshima emphasized that the Japanese emigrants were merely victims of the emigration companies and only these companies profited by sending out the emigrants.

The practices of emigration companies were nothing but a commercialization of emigrants. However, the Japanese government under the control of Rikken Seiyūkai, which received tremendous money from the emigration companies, could not regulate the activities of these companies. Additionally, the Japanese desire for emigration was growing higher due to the positive information given by guidebooks and the increase in the number of draft dodgers. Ironically, these emigrants were the ones who were desperate to get the emigration companies’ assistance for going to America because they had no command of English. After all, the majority of emigrants, receiving minimum education, were not good at the paper work required for formal procedures such as applying for passports and so on; therefore, the notorious emigration companies continued their business. Simultaneously, the rapid growth of sugar industry created

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184 Tsurutani, Amerika Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin, 73.

185 “Honpō Imin Seigenhō ni kanshi gushin no ken” (About the Restriction of the Japanese Emigration), in Gaimushō hensan, Nihon Gaikō Bunshō dai 30-kan (Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, vol. 30 [1897]) (Tokyo: Nihon Gaikō Bunshō Ryōfukai, 1956), 440–441.
large labor demand that strongly “pulled” the Japanese to Hawaii.

On the other hand, the labor contractors, “pulling” over the Japanese in Japan or Hawaii to the United States, prospered for a ten-year period between 1898 and 1907.\textsuperscript{186} They had enjoyed enormous profits by extracting high commissions from the Japanese laborers daily. Although the labor contractors profited from the toil of laborers, the American companies benefitted the most because they could gain access to the Japanese laborers with lower wages after the exclusion of Chinese laborers. For instance, the Japanese laborers earned $1.10 per day while other groups (Mexican, Indian, and white) received $1.25. Despite offering the lowest pay, the railroad companies had allocated the Japanese laborers to “those divisions where the conditions of work and living were least desirable.”\textsuperscript{187} Nevertheless, it turned out to be a difficult situation in the early 1900s because while the American industries sought to obtain more Japanese laborers who performed undesirable tasks with low wages, American laborers in the West, California in particular, desired to restrict further Japanese immigration to the United States. The laborers worried that the influx of Japanese unskilled laborers would take jobs from white Americans and bring down the standards of living. In addition, while more Japanese desired to go to the United States for accumulating wealth, the Japanese government determined to restrict the immigration of the lowly Japanese in order to keep up Japan’s reputation.

The Gentlemen’s Agreement virtually disabled the emigration companies and labor contractors from conducting their businesses in Hawaii and the United States. By

\textsuperscript{186} Ichioka, “Japanese Immigrant Labor Contractors,” 349.

the time, the Japanese government placed more emphasis on the maintenance of the friendly U.S.-Japan relations than on securing foreign currency through the remittance of the Japanese immigrants. Signed only a few years after Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War, the Gentlemen’s Agreement was a significant turning point not only for the Japanese immigrants who were transformed from *deka* *gegi* laborers to permanent settlers in the United States\(^\text{188}\) but also for the Japanese government that gave priority to the enhancement of the national prestige of Japan among world powers. Therefore, the fate of the Japanese immigrants had always depended on the course of national policies that the Japanese government was taking. The more the Japanese government displayed herself as *itto-koku*, the more the life of the Japanese immigrants became miserable and depressed.

In addition, the Japanese immigration to the United States signified the government’s interest clashed with the businesses’ interest in the process of modernization. As Tsurutani pointed out, both the Japanese and American governments regarded the Japanese immigrants as a tool for the national development. On one hand, the Japanese used to rely on their remittance for pursuing *fukoku kyōhei* policy. On the other hand, the Japanese government came to treat the immigrants as *kimin* (abandoned people). Although encouraging emigration, the government provided no aftercare or backup plan for them.\(^\text{189}\) Simultaneously, Americans regarded them not as members of their society but as “temporary laborers” who were supposed to go back to Japan when

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they fulfilled their duty.\textsuperscript{190} Regardless of their toil, they turned out to be unwanted group of people in both Japan and in the United States.

\textsuperscript{190} Tsurutani, \textit{Amerika Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin}, 209–210.
CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

Macroscopic Analysis—Immigration as a National Project

Beginning with the Meiji Restoration, the modernization process characterized in the policy of *fukoku kyōhei* (enrich the nation and strengthen the military), was the “pushes” or the major causes of the Japanese mass immigration. Unlike some European counterparts that aimed permanent settlement in the United States from the start, the nature of the Japanese immigration was quite different in many aspects. While *dekasegi-nin* (temporary laborers) occupied small portion of immigrants in other countries, in the case of Japanese, *dekasegi-nin* comprised most Japanese immigrants who came to America.\(^1\) The active involvement of the Japanese government, intellectuals, and the business/industry created a unique immigration pattern in the Meiji and Taisho Periods. First, the government promoted modernization for achieving *fukoku kyōhei* through social, economic, and political reforms in order to be equal with the West and to be the *itto-koku*, the first-rank nation. Then, numbers of intellectuals, including famous educator and founder of Keiō Gijuku, Fukuzawa Yukichi, culturally promoted the Westernization as a way of achieving *fukoku kyōhei*. Especially, Fukuzawa’s ideology called *Datsua Nyūō* (literally “leave Asia and join the West”) stimulated Japanese

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\(^1\)“Imin no Shokumin-ka” (Transformation of Emigrants into Permanent Residents), *Tokyo Mainichi Shim bun* (Tokyo Daily News), May 7, 1912.
colonial expansion but also justified the direction that the Meiji government was taking, namely imperialism. ² Japan had to carry out modernization as soon as possible to achieve fukoku kyōhei to distinguish herself from the rest of Asia and to repeal unequal treaties with the Western countries. The Japanese leaders recognized that only the establishment of a modern nation would equalize Japan with the West.

Although neglected from the historical context, a castaway Nakahama Manjirō’s influence on the nation’s modernization process with bewildering rapidity was more significant than previously thought. In fact, he was the first Japanese to study in the United States and advocated the urgency of the Westernization/modernization as a means of defending the country against the Western imperialism. Rescued by a New England whaler and then learning navigation in the United States, Manjirō contributed to the development of Japan’s maritime industry. Another castaway, Hamada Hikozō who was the first Japanese to become a naturalized U.S. citizen played an important role under the Meiji government for the establishment of the new political and economic institutions modeled after the West. Meanwhile, business/industry, particularly the Mitsubishi zaibatsu, contributed to achieving fukoku kyōhei through promoting the large-scale industrialization in shipping, mining, shipbuilding as well as banking and financing.

The cooperation of three modernizing agents (government, intellectuals, and business/industry) enabled the beginning of the large-scale Japanese overseas emigration in the latter half of the nineteenth century. In other words, the Japanese immigration was a byproduct of the nation’s modernization process that aimed at repealing the unequal treaties signed with the West following the opening of Japan. That is to say, the Japanese

immigration to Hawaii and the United States was initiated and then terminated within the national policy.

The Japanese overseas emigration began in reaction to the domestic problems caused in the process of modernization promoted by the government, intellectuals, and the business/industry. Japan in the late Tokugawa to Meiji period was undergoing a drastic transformation from a feudal society to a modernizing nation. Besides modernization, the emigration became inevitable for Japan to achieve the centralization of power in an effective and timely manner. The Meiji leaders played crucial roles in setting up the conditions that would facilitate the process of centralization in the face of powerful Western imperialism in the nineteenth century.

In order to carry out the centralization of power in a short period, the Japanese government had to overcome the domestic problems first. The shizoku (former samurai class) that supported the Tokugawa Shogunate during the Boshin Civil War had a huge potential for obstructing the process of centralization under the Meiji leaders. Those leaders were mainly the former young samurai from Satsuma and Chōshū as well as Tosa and Hizen domains who played major roles in overthrowing the Tokugawa Shogunate. As a means of reducing the influence of the shizoku from the center of the political affairs, the Meiji leaders began to promote emigration to the northern island of Hokkaido and then to Hawaii. In so doing, the Meiji intellectuals (including some government officials), acting as propagandists, contributed to paving the way for mass emigration of the shizoku and the lower class through a number of influential publications that advocated advantages of going overseas. After all, the course of the Japanese immigration was initially a temporary solution for the relocation of the shizoku and
excess rural population in order to prevent uprisings and social unrests within Japan for
the achievement of fukoku kyōhei.

Until the 1890s, both government-sponsored and private students went to
America for study to acquire Western science and technology. Significantly, the
knowledge brought by these students contributed to accelerating the industrialization and
consolidated the foundations of carrying out modernization. At the same time, the
enormous amount of remittance made by the Japanese emigrants in Hawaii encouraged
the Meiji leaders to promote the overseas emigration for obtaining foreign currencies.
For instance, the remittances from the Japanese in Hawaii amounted to nearly $300,000
in 1891.\(^3\) Recognizing the acquisition of huge capital essential for the process of
modernization such as hiring foreign experts and purchasing modern ships, the Meiji
government actively supported sending emigrants overseas for obtaining foreign
knowledge. Although initially reluctant to send emigrants, the Meiji government soon
came to envisage that the Japanese mass emigration would contribute to expand the
nation’s maritime industry through promoting the commercial activity between two
countries.\(^4\)

The large-scale industrialization was essential in the process of modernization.
Therefore, the Meiji government sent the government-sponsored students to the Western
countries to acquire knowledge and skills required for improving machinery and
equipment in Japan. Meanwhile, the Japanese emigrants either sent or brought back vast

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\(^3\) Teruko Kumei, Gaiokujin o Meguru Shakaishi: Kindai Amerika to Nihonjin Imin (A
Social History Concerning Foreigners: Modern America and Japanese Immigration) (Tokyo:

\(^4\) Kaikoku Hyakunen Kinen Bunka Jigyōkai, Nichibei Bunka Kōshōshi, dai 5-kan: Ijū-
Yōyōsha, 1955), 77.
foreign currencies that would facilitate the burgeoning industry in Japan.

Additionally, the increasing demand on the overseas emigration came to stimulate industries such as shipping and banking, and created emigration companies and the *imin-yado* (inns for emigrants). Regarding the “overseas development” as an essential step toward the establishment of national prestige, the Japanese government strongly supported the growth of shipping industry through a series of extended subsidies. Meanwhile, a considerable number of the young males determined to emigrate simply for evading the conscription.

Following the development of the shipping industry, the emigration-related businesses flourished in the port cities such as Yokohama and Kobe as well as in prefectures such as Hiroshima, Kumamoto, Yamaguchi, and Wakayama. The emigration companies, being responsible for arranging the transportation of immigrants and helping them find jobs in Hawaii, made an enormous profit by a commission. The emigration companies commercialized the Japanese laborers and so did the labor contractors or “bosses.” Like the emigration companies, the labor contractors made excess profit by getting a commission of 10 percent per daily wage. In so doing, before the restriction on labor migration, those companies could make a tremendous fortune, and financially supported the *Rikken Seiyūkai*, a dominant political party founded by Ito Hirobumi. In addition, the fortune later enabled some executives of the emigration companies establish themselves as politicians.

In this context, the development of Japanese overseas emigration had intertwined with the nation’s process of modernization for surviving as a sovereign nation. The emergence of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha (Japan Mail Steamship Company) was crucial
for facilitating overseas emigration as well as for developing the Imperial Japanese Navy and industries. In fact, Japan’s victory over China largely attributed to the effective transportation of troops, horses, weapons and food provided by the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, the nation’s first joint-stock company. The development of maritime industry and competitions illustrated the modern Japan’s capitalistic development as well.

A leading Japanese intellectual and communist, Katayama Sen advocated that there was a slight chance to be successful in Japan under current situation due to the post-war depression. Therefore, he argued that following the successful British immigration model, one should immigrate to the United States as a solution to overpopulation problem and start its own enterprise, and those who emigrated should be considered the “most loyal and patriotic subject.” Katayama encouraged the young Japanese men to go to the United States for receiving education and to contribute for the nation’s development rather than serving in the military. Utilizing their power of writing, numbers of the intellectuals who had visited or studied abroad assisted the Meiji government to mobilize the displaced and impoverished population for securing the nation’s economic and diplomatic interests through the propagation of nationalism.

Japan’s victory of the First Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War demonstrated that Japan now became a fully modernized nation at least in military terms. Although Japan rose to be the dominant power of Asia, not all Western imperialists were favorable toward her advancement. Japan’s military advance negatively affected the

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status of the Japanese immigrants in the United States. For example, the anti-Japanese sentiment became apparent as early as May 1892 in California when an immigration officer refused the entry of the Japanese whom he regarded as contract laborers. Subsequently, the major American presses such as San Francisco Bulletin and Morning Call reported the Japanese immigrants as a threat to the United States.  

Indeed, from the beginning to the end of the Japanese immigration to the United States, the government protected the Japanese immigrants only if there was a chance of damaging the national prestige. Although the remittance from the emigrants was an important source of foreign currencies, which Japan could utilize for its fukoku kyōhei program, the government was less concerned about the welfare of the Japanese immigrants. From the Japanese government’s point of view, the overseas emigration was merely a phase of Japan’s modernization, and the emigrants were nothing but financial resources for the establishment of the strong economy and military.

As the immigration issues clearly becoming a tool for the US-Japan diplomacy, the Japanese government concerned that the lowly emigrants would ruin Japan’s reputation. Although the government initially tended to place great emphasis on securing the protection of its citizens overseas, it came to give the diplomatic relations priority over the protection of emigrants. Accordingly, the government restricted the number of Japanese going to the United States in order to keep good relations with the United States. Particularly after her victories over China and Russia, nationalistic sentiment strongly influenced the policy-making of Japan. Imposed from above, Japan’s

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institutionalized nationalism gave rise to ideology such as the *Datsua-ron* (“On Leaving Asia”) that stimulated the Japanese prejudice against China and Korea. Justifying the Japanese domination over Asia, this peculiar nationalism would last until the end of World War II.

Finally, for the sake of the national prestige, the government determined to issue passports to only decent Japanese subjects who would make a favorable impression on Americans. The stricter qualifications for obtaining passports motivated a considerable number of Japanese to enter the United States by illegal methods. By then, the Japanese government was no longer enthusiastic about sending out Japanese laborers to the United States. Considering that they had already acquired all knowledge required for the nation’s modernization and attained their international recognition through the victories over China and Russia, the leaders of Japan preferred to enforce conscription for building a stronger standing army by reducing the number of exemption, including a considerable number of overseas emigrants.

Meanwhile, in the United States, derived from a fear that the Japanese laborers would take over the jobs of American laborers, the rise of anti-Japanese sentiment urged the end of Japanese immigration. Propagating the “Yellow Peril” scare, the exclusionists successfully ended the Japanese labor migration through the Gentlemen’s Agreement. Then, the next target of the exclusionists was the restriction on the landownership of Japanese immigrants and the termination of “picture marriage” system. The anti-Japanese movement would continue until the government completely shut down the Japanese immigration to the United States in 1924 by the Immigration Act. Interestingly, as much as the American laborers wanted to exclude the Japanese competitors, the
Japanese government sought to prevent their subjects from emigration to the United States.

**Microscopic Analysis**

Examining the causes of the Japanese immigration from socioeconomic point of view, the rapid modernization resulted in creating a situation that “pushed” many Japanese out of their country. Significantly, the early Japanese mass emigration seemed to take place for the benefit of the individuals in the politically, socially, and economically turbulent years, and it was not intended to be permanent settlement.\(^8\) The higher wages offered in America “pushed” the Japanese in number and the labor shortage in the West “pulled” the Japanese emigrants to the United States. Approximately 82 percent of those who left Japan for the United States between the years 1885 and 1903 were male emigrants while female emigrants amounted to 17 percent on average.\(^9\) Thousands of Japanese left the country for their survival, for paying off their family debt, or for supporting their families living in poverty. Accordingly, there were numbers of driving forces that “pushed” the Japanese out of the country to the unknown distant places.

The early Meiji financial policy and land reform produced a large number of the unemployed samurai and landless farmers in the rice-growing prefectures. In 1876, the Meiji government carried out the program called *Chitsuroku Shobun* (commutation of feudal stipends) that commutated the feudal stipends for government bonds for dissolving


the samurai class. In addition, the enactment of Conscription Law that drafted commoners made the samurai both economically and socially displaced in the Meiji institution that resulted in “pushing” the distressed samurai to emigrate overseas. Meanwhile, having not enough money, the farmers sold their lands to pay their land taxes. Such socioeconomic problems of the early Meiji period initiated the emigration for improving the standards of living as well as for alleviating population problems caused by the rapid industrialization (Appendix A).

After the First Sino-Japanese War, emigration grew to be a profitable venture as a greater number of draft dodgers from rural areas sought to go to Hawaii. Subsequently, the Japanese population in Hawaii continued to grow and the immigrants began to form their community with cultural ties with Japan. Before the arrival of “picture brides” in the early 1900s, the Hawaii’s Japanese community was “bachelor society” in which gambling, drunkenness, and prostitution widely prevailed. Due to the lack of Japanese women, wife-selling practice sometimes took place and numbers of Japanese immigrants were arrested for gambling before the *yobiyose imin jidai* (1908–1924). The arrival of “picture brides” and the formation of *kenjinkai* (Prefectural Clubs) contributed to eradicating the social evil from the growing Japanese community in Hawaii. As shown in Appendix B, the Japanese living in Hawaii increased from 61,111 in 1900 to 129,901 in 1926.\(^{10}\)

Meanwhile, the early Japanese immigrants, becoming *dekasegi-shosei* (student laborers) known as “school-boys,” came to the United States for studying and obtaining

skills that would facilitate Japan’s modernization. Then, after the 1890s, the shortage of labor caused by the Chinese Exclusion Acts “pulled” the Japanese laborers into the United States in great numbers. Subsequently, the Japanese laborers quickly surpassed the “school-boys,” whose goal was not for study but for accumulating wealth for their better living in Japan. The labor contractors or “bosses” played an important role in supplying the Japanese laborers in large numbers to the industries in the West. They were previous “school-boys” who voluntarily came to the United States for studying while performing domestic services at the American homes for room and board.

Utilizing appealing advertisement, the labor contractors “pulled” numbers of laborers from Japan and Hawaii. The fate of the Japanese laborers in America was unfortunately not much different from that of Chinese in America. Since they were *dekasegi-nin*, they tended to engage in the most dangerous and undesirable jobs with cheaper wages.

Unlike the majority of European counterparts, a significant percentage of the Japanese emigrants did not intend to reside in the United States permanently. As Fujii Yoshito from Hiroshima prefecture emphasized, the Japanese emigrants simply sought to accumulate wealth and return home in order to live happily with their families in Japan, and there were virtually nobody who came to the United States exclusively for studying. It was not much different from the emigration to Hokkaido except they could make more money. Working in America for five to ten years to make $1,000 to $2,000 enabled them to build a nice house in Japan.\(^\text{11}\) In fact, $1,000 dollars (equivalent to ¥2,000) were

From the Japanese laborers’ point of view, socioeconomic pressure was the major “push” for emigration. Following the drastic increase in population in the early Meiji period, many farming families could no longer practice their subsistent farming. Especially, the rural areas, having more births than cities, showed a marked increase in population; however, the land was limited and second or third sons of farmers had to find their own way to survive in the capitalist society. The number of passports issued in the prefectures mainly consisting of the peasantry reflected the urgent socioeconomic conditions. The higher wages offered in America “pushed” the Japanese in number whereas the labor shortage in the West “pulled” the Japanese emigrants to the United States.

The Gentlemen’s Agreement significantly changed the pattern of Japanese immigration to the United States, transforming them from temporary laborers into permanent residents. While the United States sought to limit the number of Japanese living in the United States, the agreement actually “pulled” a great number of “picture brides” and provided the immigrants opportunities to establish families for permanent settlement that resulted in a greater birth rate. Like the earlier immigrants, many Japanese women left the country either for survival or for escaping from a conventional

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12 Kitamura, *Issei to shite Amerika ni Ikite*, 282. In Ōshima-gun in Yamaguchi prefecture that sent out numerous emigrants to America, land price went up from 350 yen to 1,000 yen per *tan* (1 *tan* = 0.2451 acres). Many returnees who used to be tenant farmers competed with others in buying land for honor, according to Tsurutani, *Amerika Seibu Kaitaku to Nihonjin*, 118.


life in search of independence and liberty, which the Meiji intellectuals had propagated. Ironically, these “picture brides” ended up with living more conventional life as the *ryōsai kenbo* (good wives and wise mothers). In 1900, there were 24,326 Japanese in the mainland United States that increased to 111,010 in 1920, which indicated the Japanese population had quadrupled in twenty years. The world of scholars and journalists interpreted the prevalence of the “picture marriage” as an evidence of Japanese emigrants becoming permanent residents.

*Cultural Analysis*

It was the emergence of nationalism in the Meiji period that psychologically bypassed all classes of Japanese for the sake of national prestige. To some degree, they were united under the Meiji Spirit that emphasized national consciousness to attain success by raising competent citizens. It did not matter whether they were the impoverished people, educators, intellectuals, socialists, businessmen, or even the *yakuza* and prostitutes, they all contributed to the nation’s development under the system of highly-institutionalized nationalism. *Okuni no Tame ni* (“For the sake of the nation.”) became Meiji people’s common slogan.

Many Issei, instead of assimilating into the American society, chose to remain the Japanese subjects and kept their Japanese cultural identity. In order to demonstrate their patriotism, they contributed to Japan’s war effort by sending money or necessities during the Sino-Japanese and Russo Japanese Wars. As a Japanese prostitute in Hawaii once

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commented, the Japanese emigrants made tremendous efforts to enrich the country by remitting money. Regardless of their earnings, the Japanese emigrants lived a frugal life so that they could send every penny to their families in Japan.

The Japanese emigrants strongly kept their Japanese identity and cultural bonding to their homeland. Simultaneously, the Japanese considered these emigrants as the “Japanese” living abroad. In this context, the Japanese people felt insulted when the Japanese schoolchildren were segregated from the public school in San Francisco. Furthermore, the Gentlemen’s Agreement and the California Alien Land Laws of 1913 and 1920 that categorized the Japanese with other Asian groups severely hurt their national pride. These incidents in addition to Wilson’s denial of “racial equality clause” of the Covenant of the League of Nations at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 would give rise to a strong anti-American sentiment in prewar Japan. After all, the Japanese government stood up not for the protection of its subjects but for the improvement of the national reputation. Published in 1907, the illustrations in Appendix C well portrayed how Americans perceived the attitude of the Japanese government as well as the male emigrants.

Ironically, the Japanese who had abhorred the “unequal treaties” and racial discrimination indeed came to practice harsher racial prejudice against its neighboring countries, namely China and Korea, which would continue until the end of World War II. The rapid institutionalization of nationalism had harmful effects. In order to diffuse a concept of nation and nationalism, the intellectuals implanted a sense of Japan’s superiority over China and Korea and emphasized Japan as an entity out of Asia. Such fledging nationalism consequently led Japan to overvalue itself and underestimate the
mighty United States.

In the course of building a nation-state, Japan’s nationalism crashed with the U.S. nativism, and the relations between two countries deteriorated after the Immigration Act of 1924. The Japanese immigrants were merely victims of the “grave consequences,” and they had no means to protect themselves from the fierce diplomatic conflict. After all, the Japanese immigration took place within a framework of the national scheme, and the Japanese immigrants who simply sought to make money and to live happily were affected by the developing nationalism and capitalism in Japan and the United States. Meanwhile, becoming “aliens ineligible for citizenship,” the Japanese immigrants tended to maintain their cultural ties with Japan where their nationality belonged.

In conclusion, the Japanese immigration for the most time had taken place of the nation, by the nation, and for the nation. In the name of the “nation,” the government and emigration businesses had exploited the Japanese emigrants. Despite keeping the Japanese cultural identity and always serving for the development of their nation, the Japanese immigrants were abandoned by their government that gave priority to keeping up the status of itto-koku (“first-rank nation”). Being oversensitive about keeping up appearances, the Japanese government virtually gave up helping the development of Japanese immigrant communities in the United States. The Japanese immigrants became the real kimin (literally “abandoned people”) or “stateless” until they gained the right to be naturalized through the enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (also known as McCarran-Walter Act).\(^\text{17}\)

Meanwhile, as the Japanese immigration to the United State banned in 1924, the

\(^{17}\) The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (also known as Hart-Celler Act) reopened the door for the Asian immigration.
number of Japanese immigrating to South America increased drastically. By 1935, there were close to 200,000 Japanese in South America. Especially after the Manchurian Incident and the establishment of Manchukuo, the large-scale Japanese immigration took place and the Japanese in Manchuria reached half a million by 1937.18 As illustrated throughout the chapters, the Japanese government, intellectuals, and businesses/industries actively involved in the course of the development of the Japanese overseas emigration. From the beginning of the organized immigration to Hawaii in 1868 to the abolishment of the Japanese immigration to the United States in 1924, the Japanese government played a crucial role in initiating and then regulating the Japanese overseas emigration, and the process of modernization shaped the emigration pattern.

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SPEECH


VISUAL MATERIAL


ELECTRIC SOURCES


## APPENDICES

### Appendix A


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population (1,000)</th>
<th>Population Increase (1,000)</th>
<th>Population Growth Rate (%)</th>
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<td>1916</td>
<td>53,496</td>
<td>26,841</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>1.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>54,134</td>
<td>27,158</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>54,739</td>
<td>27,453</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>55,033</td>
<td>27,602</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>55,473</td>
<td>27,812</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>673</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Naikaku Tokei-kyoku (Cabinet Statistical Bureau). *Meiji Gonen iko Waga Kuni no Jinko* (Japanese Population after 1872). Tokyo: Tokyo Tokei Kyōkai, 1930. Estimated population at the beginning of the year. Including the Japanese in Okinawa, Ogasawara, Chishima as well as forty-seven prefectures. Not including foreigners in Japan. However, including the soldiers and civilian war workers overseas. According to the 1920 national census, there were 42,492 nationals of colonial origins such as Koreans and Taiwanese. Also there were 35,569 foreigners in Japan.
Appendix B

Population Estimates of the Japanese and the Japanese Americans in Hawaii from the Beginning of Meiji to the End of Taisho Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Increase/Decrease</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>153</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>– 37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>2039</td>
<td>+ 1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>12,360</td>
<td>+ 10,321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>22,329</td>
<td>+ 9,969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>61,115</td>
<td>+ 38,786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>64,319</td>
<td>+ 3,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>79,674</td>
<td>+ 15,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>83,100</td>
<td>+ 21,985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>91,490</td>
<td>+ 8,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>97,000</td>
<td>+ 5,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>102,479</td>
<td>+ 5,479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>106,800</td>
<td>+ 4,321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>+ 3,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>112,221</td>
<td>+ 2,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>113,339</td>
<td>+ 1,178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>115,967</td>
<td>+ 2,568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>118,832</td>
<td>+ 2,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>125,368</td>
<td>+ 6,536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>128,068</td>
<td>+ 2,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>129,901</td>
<td>+ 1,833</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix C

Image of the Japanese, 1907.

“Learnin’ Mary Had a Little Lamb.”


“’Tis Because They Are Little Ye’ve Got to be Polite to Thim.”
“The Well-known Unyform iv th’ Glorious Race.”

“He’s a Live Wire.”

VITA

Hosok O

Candidate for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Dissertation: CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE EARLY JAPANESE IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES DURING MEIJI TO TAISHO ERA (1868–1926)

Major Field: History

Biographical:

Education: Received the Bachelor of Arts degree in History from Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado, in May, 2000. Received the Master of Arts degree in History from the University of Central Oklahoma, Edmond, Oklahoma, in May, 2002. Completed the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in History at Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, in December, 2010.

Experience: Associate editor, American Review of China Studies, 2000-present; Visiting Professor, Western Pacific Institute, University of Central Oklahoma, 2004-2010; Graduate Teaching Associate, Department of History, Oklahoma State University, 2010; Course Instructor, Department of History, Oklahoma State University, 2010.

Professional Memberships: Phi Alpha Theta, Nu Chapter; Phi Beta Delta, Epsilon Upsilon Chapter; Association of Chinese Professors of Social Science in the United States; Association for Asian Studies; Association for Asian American Studies; Southwestern Social Science Association; Korea Association of Military Studies.
Name: Hosok O                                                                Date of Degree: December, 2010

Institution: Oklahoma State University                      Location: Stillwater, Oklahoma

Title of Study: CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE EARLY JAPANESE IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES DURING MEIJI TO TAISHO ERA (1868–1926)

Pages in Study: 442               Candidate for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Major Field: History

Scope and Method of Study: Focusing on the years between 1868 and 1926 during which Japan underwent drastic socioeconomic, political, and cultural changes, this study traces the “pushes” (forces that caused the people to leave Japan) and “pulls” (things that attracted the people to go to Hawaii and the United States) of Japanese immigration. Utilizing a variety of primary sources such as Japanese and American newspapers, *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, Reports of the Immigration Commission*, Japanese and the U.S. census records, and works of the Meiji intellectuals, this study offers cultural analysis of the Japanese immigration to Hawaii and the United States.

Findings and Conclusions: Following the opening of Japan, the Japanese immigration was a byproduct of nation’s rapid modernization which created a modern nation-state. Unlike colonized countries, modernization/Westernization was voluntary for the Japanese and was a way of achieving the national policy called *fukoku kyōhei*. Nakahama Manjirō, a castaway who obtained navigation and shipbuilding skills in the United States, not only inspired the young Japanese but also facilitated Japan’s modernization process. Nationalistic leaders promoted *fukoku kyōhei* to equalize with the West by repealing “unequal treaties.” To pursue this policy, the government fostered the growth of industries—Mitsubishi played an important role in developing the nation’s maritime industry and the Imperial Navy. While actively adopting advanced western science and technology, Japanese cultural values were emphasized for implanting the institutionalized nationalism. The Meiji intellectuals like Fukuzawa Yukichi contributed to the government’s aim by indoctrinating the superiority of Japanese over other Asians. Significantly, the cooperation between the government and industries for achieving *fukoku kyōhei* both directly and indirectly resulted in a large-scale overseas emigration. The emigrants’ remittance became an important source of foreign currencies required for carrying out expensive modernization. Meanwhile, the Japanese emigration alleviated the labor shortage problem in Hawaii and the United States. This study illustrates that the government with the help of certain individuals created a climate, which made immigration possible. The socioeconomic conditions of the emigrants as well as the national policy and attitude towards the West made the United States the place to go as opposed to China.

ADVISER’S APPROVAL:    Dr. Ronald A. Petrin