LEADERSHIP IN AN AD HOC CATALYTIC LOBBYING ASSOCIATION

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The leadership of the State Council for a Pennsylvania Fair Employment Practice Commission, during its 1953 campaign, was concentrated in an "active minority." Two factors help to explain why an active minority arose: first, the necessity found in a group of any significant size of delegating authority to a few; second, the fact that the council needed to act quickly and with discipline. Certain other factors serve to explain why three particular individuals formed the active minority. These factors included: (a) the development of manipulative knowledge and skills of the three individuals through their preoccupation with affairs of the State Council; (b) congeries of leadership skills and talents which each had already developed before he became active in the council; (c) the ability of each to represent the council's attitudes and expectations before the public; (d) the fact that each was rewarded with at least one office in the council; (e) large resources which two of these individuals brought to the council's campaign through organizations they represented in the State Council.

Very little systematic treatment has been given to one type of political interest group in the United States. This is the ad hoc, catalytic lobbying association. By this term is meant that type of group organized temporarily for the purpose of coordinating and stimulating the work of other groups in establishing, maintaining, or eliminating a single public policy. Through a study of the 1953 campaign of the State Council for a Pennsylvania Fair Employment Practice Commission, attempts were made to shed some light upon one aspect of ad hoc, catalytic lobbying associations, that of their leadership.

The State Council lobbied during all of the sessions of the Pennsylvania General Assembly from 1949 to 1955. Its 1955 campaign ended with the enactment of a strong FEPC bill, its objective. The focus in this essay is upon the 1953 campaign because the author participated in that campaign. Except where noted otherwise, sources for this paper are files of the State Council and notes of the author, who was associate director of the council in 1953.

DECISION-MAKING BODIES OF THE STATE COUNCIL

On 11 June 1948, representatives of various organizations seeking the enactment of a Pennsylvania Fair Employment Practice Commission formed an association entitled the State Council for a Pennsylvania FEPC. Participants at this organizational meeting decided that the council was to consist of one representative for each group represented at the meeting and any other individuals admitted by the council's executive committee. This committee, consisting of the full membership of the council, was to have full power and responsibility for directing the affairs of the council. In the 1953 campaign the executive committee admitted to the council's membership one representative from each of its affiliates and four other persons.

These four persons were: Dr. Jesse D. Reber, Dr. N. S. Duff, Robert J. O'Donnell, and Dr. Philip Bookstaber. The first three were included because of the offices they held in the council. Dr. Reber was chairman of the State Council, Dr. Duff was treasurer, and O'Donnell was executive director. As a member of the council's advisory committee, Dr. Bookstaber was invited by O'Donnell to attend each meeting of the executive committee in the 1953 campaign. He attended three of the committee's meetings.

Three other bodies undertook to make decisions for the organization. One was a subcommittee of the executive committee known as the steering committee. Shortly after the organizational meeting of the council, the executive committee created this
subcommittee with authority to take action for the council in between meetings of the parent body. The steering committee survived through the 1953 campaign, and in three meetings it made several decisions for the council.

The other two bodies entered into the State Council's decision-making because of a dispute within the council over the recommendations it should make to the person designated by the governor of the state to formulate the administration's FEPC bill. At its meeting of 15 January 1953, the council's executive committee considered the proposed bill and reached agreement on all but one set of provisions. It appointed two groups, legal representatives of the Allegheny County Council on Civil Rights and the State Council's legal committee, to decide the council's recommendations on these provisions. These two groups came to an agreement on the provisions in question and presented their recommendations to the governor as those of the State Council.

**DECISION OF THE STATE COUNCIL**

Decision-making bodies of the State Council made thirty-six decisions for the council during the 1953 campaign. Six of these dealt primarily with internal relations of the council, twenty-five were concerned mainly with external relations, and five were concerned with both internal and external relations in essentially equal proportions. Of the six decisions concerned primarily with internal relations, four dealt with the formal structure of the council, one with how long to maintain the council's office, and one with securing resources for the operation of the council's office. Among twenty-five decisions concerned mainly with external relations, fifteen dealt with contacting influential persons, two with the coordination of activities of the council with those of friendly organizations, seven with external propaganda, and two with legislative tactics. Of five decisions classified as being concerned with internal and external relations, one dealt with the admission of a prospective affiliate, one with the expenditure of the Council's funds on operations in the state capital rather than in the organization of affiliates, and three with the wording of the bill the council sought to have enacted.

**EMERGENCE OF AN ACTIVE MINORITY**

In the making of these decisions, three men emerged as the leaders of the State Council in its 1953 campaign. They were: Robert J. O'Donnell, Harry Boyer and Nathan Agran. These individuals, more than any other members of the State Council, proposed actions accepted by decision-making bodies of the council. (Here a leader is defined as a member of a group who, more than most members of the group, initiates those actions which receive a generally favorable response in the group.)

**Table 1. Originators of proposals which became decisions of the Executive or Steering Committees of the State Council in its 1953 campaign.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Person</th>
<th>Number of Proposals</th>
<th>Which Became Decisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nathan Agran</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert J. O'Donnell</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harry Boyer</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lillian A. Friedberg</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanton W. Kratzok</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. F. Motz</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fred Grossman</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jesse D. Reber</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip Bookstaber</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 points to Agran, O'Donnell, and Boyer as the leaders of the council. Nine members of the executive committee proposed thirty-six decisions of the council in the 1953 campaign. The nine persons divide into two clusters. One cluster consists of Friedberg, Kratzok, Motz, Bookstaber, Grossman, and Reber grouped around a low number of decisions, and the other cluster is made up of Agran, O'Donnell, and Boyer grouped around a high number of decisions. The first cluster proposed a total of eleven actions which became decisions, and the second proposed a total of twenty-five. Since the latter group proposed most of the decisions, we may conclude that Agran, O'Donnell, and Boyer were the "active minority" of the council in its 1953 campaign.
HOW THE ACTIVE MINORITY AROSE

If leadership of the State Council in the 1953 campaign was in the hands of three individuals, two questions arise: 1. How did leadership come to rest in the hands of three out of some fifty members of the council's executive committee? 2. Why did Agran, Boyer, and O'Donnell and not some other members of the council make up the active minority? Answers to these questions can be found in an examination of the biographies of the three members of the active minority and in an analysis of their activity in the council.

Biographies and State Council Activities of members of the active minority

In his career up to 1953 Robert J. O'Donnell exhibited two strong interests: one was the improvement of human relations; the other was the study and teaching of philosophy and history. This latter interest arose from undergraduate work at Mount St. Mary's College, Emmitsburg, Maryland, and graduate work at Fordham and Columbia Universities and the Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies at the University of Toronto, where he studied under Jacques Maritain. For several years he taught philosophy and history in colleges and universities mainly around New York City. He also lectured before the public on these two subjects.

In the meanwhile, O'Donnell followed his interest in bettering human relations. He became managing editor of Christian Social Action, a Catholic laymen's magazine; he delivered lectures on intergroup relations; and he wrote articles and reviews of books, both of which concerned social action. His interest in improving human relations became so strong that he dropped teaching as a source of livelihood and took a position with the National Conference of Christians and Jews, an organization promoting understanding among Protestants, Catholics, and Jews through a cooperative educational program. From 1949 to 1953 he was director of two divisions of the New York office of that organization. One was the Religious Organizations Division and the other was the Labor-Management Division. As director of these two divisions O'Donnell organized two courses in intergroup relations given at Cooper Union, participated in numerous panel discussions and debates on intergroup relations, served as a consultant on religious organizations to a UNESCO conference, prepared radio programs for Brotherhood Week, prepared a directory of New York City churches and synagogues for members of the armed forces, organized a summer intergroup relations conference for the New Jersey Young Men's Hebrew Association, organized the 1952 Roosevelt House Conference on "Religion at Work in the Community," and conducted a year-long labor-management seminar for New York City employees of the Federal Security Administration.

A description solely of the interests and activities of O'Donnell would fail by a large margin to disclose all of the factors which contributed to his ability as executive director of the State Council. Of medium height and with a stocky build, O'Donnell possessed the face of a choir boy, cherubic but with a hint of mischief. Upon first meeting him observers were struck with his Irish affability and vigor. Later, in seminars, informal conversations, and meetings such as those of the decision-making bodies of the council, they would discover his skill as a speaker, his quick mind, and the depth of his knowledge in philosophy, theology, and history.

It was with this personality and background that O'Donnell was hired in the late fall of 1952 to be executive director of the State Council in its 1953 campaign. Prior to the examination of applications for the position of executive director in the 1953 campaign, the State Council's executive committee laid down certain duties for whomever was chosen to fill that position. These were: to organize groups to support a fair employment practices bill, within the various counties of Pennsylvania; to approach legislators and urge their support of the FEPC measure during the legislative session; and to prepare and distribute widely, on a weekly basis, educational material, particularly an excellent newsletter or bulletin.
Harry Boyer looked like a steelworker who had moved up the ladder of union offices. He was a large, heavily muscled man grown a bit fleshy from pursuit of the more sedentary tasks of union leadership. His robust physique was reflected in a quiet, forceful manner, but it contrasted with his attitude of suspicion, acquired in his Pennsylvania Dutch upbringing and in climbing up "the hard way." Boyer's manner of conduct and his immense knowledge of Pennsylvania politics and labor union affairs commanded respect among the members of the State Council.

When the State Council opened its 1953 campaign Harry Boyer had spent twenty-seven years in the trade union movement. In his own union, the United Steelworkers of America, he was an international representative in 1946, and still held this position in 1953. By 1946 he had moved through the hierarchy of the Pennsylvania CIO Council to its highest office, the presidency, and it was this office which he occupied during the State Council's 1953 campaign. Boyer had undoubtedly developed considerable skill in union leadership and had acquired a great knowledge of attitudes common to CIO unions and other unions in Pennsylvania.

In the offices which he occupied in the Pennsylvania CIO Council, especially as president, Boyer spent a great deal of time with state legislators, state administrative officers, and representatives of various interest groups for the purpose of securing legislative and administrative action endorsed by the state CIO organization. Through his experience as a state CIO official he acquired political information, developed a keen political sense, and cultivated techniques useful in lobbying for welfare legislation in Pennsylvania.

While ascending the ladder of offices in the state CIO Council, Boyer began to represent this organization on the governing boards of a number of certain state-wide associations which sought specific welfare goals either in legislation, administration or community services. In 1953, Boyer had served as a member of the State Council's executive committee since its formation in 1948. He also had served one year as vice-president of the United Defense Fund, two years as a director of the Pennsylvania United Community Defense Services, two years as a director of the United Defense Fund, seven years as a member of the Governor's Committee on Refugees, and one year as a member of the Governor's Industrial Race Relations Commission.

Boyer was responsible for more significant contributions to the 1953 campaign of the State Council than any other council member except possibly O'Donnell and Agran. These contributions were mainly his political knowledge and ability, his lobbying in the state capital, and money given to the State Council's office by the CIO in Pennsylvania.

As president of the Pennsylvania CIO Council, Boyer sent several appeals to each CIO local in the state asking for monetary contributions to the State Council for a Pennsylvania FEPC. Primarily because of these pleas to the locals, the CIO gave more money to the council's office than did any other affiliate of the State Council.

Boyer probably achieved more in lobbying for the State Council than did any other member of the council except O'Donnell. The council derived three benefits from Boyer's lobbying. One of these came through his influence among the Democratic legislators. As president, Boyer represented the State CIO organization before the organs of government in the state capital from 1946 to 1953. In 1953, and for many years previously, the state CIO organization exercised a great influence over the Democrats of the General Assembly (1). A valid assumption would be that Boyer's influence with the Democrats and his representation of the State Council before Democratic legislators helped to bring out the large and unanimously favorable vote of the Democrats in the House on the bill for which the State Council was lobbying. A second benefit came from Boyer's actions leading to the restoration of a provision which had been taken out of the bill by the committee to which it had been referred in the House. If Boyer had not undertaken this action, the bill might well have
passed the House without the provision. A third benefit came from Boyer's interviews with the governor of the state. Boyer held interviews with this gentleman eight times during the 1953 session of the legislature in order to push forward the council's campaign. State Council files, notes of the author, and interviews with members of the council's affiliates who were active in the 1953 campaign fail to disclose that anyone else in the council, except O'Donnell, interviewed the governor as often as did Boyer. Boyer was responsible to a great degree for the council's rapport with the governor.

Boyer served as the council's chief advisor on lobbying in the state capital. Almost daily Boyer was in the capital. O'Donnell consulted with him on tactics to be employed among the legislators and with the governor. Before undertaking maneuvers in the capital, the steering and executive committees generally sought and relied upon Boyer's judgment.

At the time of the 1953 campaign, the first impression gained by a visitor to the office of Nathan Agran was one of intensity and nervous energy. Those working with him in the State Council found that, with his incisive mind sharpened by legal experience and years of tournament bridge, Agran quickly came to the heart of a problem. Using his well developed adversary skills and the knowledge he acquired while working in Jewish and human relations agencies in Philadelphia, he was always able to present a strong case for his point of view. At meetings of the State Council's decision-making bodies, he could always be counted on to present a number of views. Usually they reflected the latest thought among Philadelphia affiliates of the council.

A lawyer, a former college teacher of mathematics and sociology, and a member of several Jewish organizations, Agran, in 1946, joined the Philadelphia Jewish Community Relations Council, an agency which coordinates the activities of other local Jewish agencies. As soon as he joined this coordinating agency, Agran was appointed director of its Community Service Department, the position he held in 1953. In this capacity, he instituted legal action in incidents of violence and vandalism which might be attributed to anti-Semitism. He made surveys in employment, education, and housing in Philadelphia for the purpose of revealing instances and causes of discrimination. He developed educational activities among the Jewish community and other elements of the Philadelphia population concerning the problems of prejudice and discrimination in employment, educational institutions and housing. From 1946 to 1953, he represented the Jewish Community Relations Council in the executive committee of the Philadelphia Fellowship Commission, a body coordinating eight Philadelphia agencies in their efforts to promote understanding of racial, religious, and nationality groups. In the same period he also represented the Jewish Community Relations Council on the executive committee of the Philadelphia Council for Equal Job Opportunity, and, after the formation of the State Council, represented the Philadelphia CEJO on the executive committee of the council. As this representative, Agran became chief spokesman of the council's Philadelphia affiliates. The Philadelphia CEJO coordinated the State Council's campaigns in Philadelphia through periodic meetings of the CEJO's executive body and special committees established for the campaign, and through informal conferences called by Agran before meetings of the State Council's steering and executive committees. Those invited to these conferences included representatives of all of the State Council's Philadelphia affiliates. Individuals attending these conferences usually agreed upon actions to be proposed or opposed, and delegated to Agran the task of initiating and opposing actions in the meetings of the council's key committees.

In his role as chief spokesman for the Philadelphia affiliates, Agran exercised a high degree of control over the contributions made by those affiliates to the campaign, and these contributions were probably of greater significance to the campaign than those of any other source in the State Council except possibly those of the state CIO organization. The Philadelphia affiliates
made three noteworthy contributions to the campaign. These affiliates devoted considerable efforts towards securing the vote of the Philadelphia legislators for H.B. 1165, the bill for which the State Council lobbied in 1953; they contacted individuals in key points in the Pennsylvania legislative process; and they added about $1,800 to the council's treasury.

Findings

This review of the biographies and State Council activities of Agran, Boyer and O'Donnell points to a few observations about the emergence of the active minority. Two findings may be inferred from the data to explain the emergence of such a leadership group. One is the proposition advanced by Michels (2) that, in any group whose membership numbers more than a few, it is impossible for all of the members to act on every problem coming before the group. In order to accomplish their work within a reasonable length of time, the many find it necessary to delegate some authority to the few. This they may do informally or through formal organization.

Both informal and formal delegation of authority occurred in the State Council. The formal delegation appeared in its early days when the executive committee created a steering committee to act for the larger committee between its meetings. The informal delegation arose through the differential rate of initiation of proposals which became decisions of the council. Only nine of the forty-nine members of the State Council's executive committee initiated any of the council's decisions. Some members of the executive committee rarely, if ever, attended meetings of the committee. Others came to only a few meetings. Some came and spoke, but offered no suggestions for action upon which the committee might debate and vote. Finally, there were a few who offered suggestions for action, but the committee did not agree to follow. Thus, without any statement as to delegation of authority, members of the executive committee did delegate authority to act for the council to the nine whose proposals were accepted as decisions. A still further stage of delegation emerged in the executive committee's accepting the proposals of Agran, Boyer, and O'Donnell to such an extent that their proposals formed the basis of the overwhelming majority of the council's decisions.

The second finding that helps to explain the emergence of the active minority was that, in the legislative struggle, the State Council had to act quickly and with discipline. Once the bill the council favored was introduced in the General Assembly, its legislative opponents could act quickly to kill it or emasculate it. To defend the bill the council would also have to act immediately and would have to mobilize its groups behind the friends of the bill in the legislature and in the governor's administration. When the need for quick action by the council did arise, the executive director conferred with other members of the steering committee concerning the proper tactics for the moment by telephoning them or by speaking to them face-to-face. After this consultation, he then quickly notified members of the executive committee and thereby mobilized all of the council's affiliates behind the action decided upon. The steering committee thus maintained the leadership role it acquired by formal delegation from the executive committee.

The observations on the need for quick action and discipline and on the delegation of authority offer some understanding of why an active minority, regardless of its membership, arose. Several other findings suggested by the data help to explain why certain individuals, namely, Agran, Boyer and O'Donnell, belonged to the active minority.

One of these is that the preoccupation of Agran, Boyer, and O'Donnell with the affairs of the State Council undoubtedly developed their manipulative knowledge and skills. This preoccupation for Agran and Boyer was evident, in the first place, in the fact that they had been at the forefront of the State Council's activities since its inception and in the movement for a state FEPC before that. It is also clear that the positions Agran and Boyer held in the council's affiliates inclined them to spend much time in those organizations on matters con-
cerning the State Council. Finally, the preoccupation of all three members of the active minority was manifest in the positions they held in the council. All three were members of the steering committee. Agran was secretary of the council, Boyer was chairman of the steering and executive committees, and O'Donnell was executive director, a job which demanded full-time concern with the council's work.

A second element explaining the emergence of Agran, Boyer, and O'Donnell as members of the active minority was the congeries of leadership skills and talents which each brought to the council. Data indicated that most of the skills and talents exercised in the council by these men were not acquired there, but were developed previously.

In his legal experience, college teaching and work with the human relations agencies in Philadelphia, Agran undoubtedly acquired and developed most of his leadership abilities. Boyer gained his leadership tools and skills mainly in his union experience, and O'Donnell acquired most of his in journalism, college teaching, and work in human relations agencies.

A third element which contributed to the leadership potential of these three men was the ability to represent the State Council's attitudes and expectations before the public, particularly the public in the state capitol. All three possessed considerable knowledge of the State Council. Agran and Boyer obtained their knowledge in long service to the council while O'Donnell acquired his through full-time work as executive director. In addition, all three knew how to present a good case before the council's public. Agran and O'Donnell could do so through forensic ability, Boyer through his familiarity with Pennsylvania politics, politicians, and lobbying.

A fourth element making for the leadership of Agran, Boyer, and O'Donnell was their being rewarded with offices. O'Donnell, of course, received his office of executive director and membership in the steering committee by virtue of being hired. Long service played a large role in the granting of membership on the steering committee to Agran and Boyer, and in Agran being elected secretary, and Boyer chairman of the executive and steering committees.

In exercising two functions of his office, O'Donnell fulfilled two powerful roles. As chief of intelligence, the executive director was the focal point for information about the council's internal and external affairs. No other council member had access to all the information available to the executive director. O'Donnell probably presented nearly all of his current information to meetings of the steering and executive committees. Yet council members could not be as well informed as O'Donnell on State Council matters because the two key committees could not remain in continuous session. Between meetings committee members had to rely on O'Donnell's informing them by mail, telegraph, or telephone. The State Council lacked sufficient resources to enable O'Donnell to telephone or telegraph every council member whenever he acquired new intelligence, so generally council members were kept informed between meetings of the two key committees by mail. Between meetings of the two key committees, the executive director, as intelligence chief, potentially held in his hands information not yet made available to council members. Thus he possessed a sanction not given to other members of the State Council.

In addition to being the director of intelligence, the executive director was the chief stimulator and coordinator of the work of the council's affiliates. This role gave O'Donnell an advantage in the council's decision-making. Exercising the authority given to him in this function, he called meetings of the executive and steering committees and set the agenda for these meetings. Matters other than those on the agenda might be brought up for consideration, but the agenda set the stage for discussion and usually governed the issues brought before the council's decision-making bodies. Also under O'Donnell's coordinating and stimulating function was the authority granted to him, as well as other members of the steering committee, to initiate a decision in this committee by telephone should an emergency arise. Since the executive director was the
council's chief source of intelligence, he was that member of the steering committee with the greatest ability to make use of this authority. Although the data do not clearly establish that the steering committee reached a decision by telephone during the campaign, the fact that O'Donnell was that member of the steering committee most able to make use of this latter authority did grant him at least a potential advantage over other State Council members in decision-making.

A fifth condition contributed to the leadership of Agran and Boyer, but not to that of O'Donnell. This was the matter of large resources which the affiliates, represented by Agran and Boyer, brought to the council's campaign. Boyer's organization, the Pennsylvania CIO, contributed a very large sum of money. The contributions of the organizations represented by Argan, the Philadelphia affiliates, consisted of money, efforts to secure votes of the Philadelphia legislators, and contacts at key points of the legislative process.

REFERENCES