

THE SECOND BATTLE OF CABIN CREEK, 1864

By *Marvin J. Hancock**

A person traveling in the "Lake Country" of northeastern Oklahoma could come across Cabin Creek and they would not be particularly impressed. This small tributary of the Grand River does not belie its actual significance. For students of Oklahoma history, however, Cabin Creek looms large in the past. Some of the most important battles of the American Civil War in Indian Territory were fought in this area.

This creek was crossed by one of the most significant arteries of transportation west of the Mississippi River. This artery was variously known as the Osage Trace, Osage Trail, Immigrant Road, Texas Road and the Military Road.¹ Originally the road ran from Springfield, Missouri, into Kansas and then south through Indian Territory into Texas. This study concerns that segment of the Osage Trace which ran from Fort Scott, Kansas to Fort Gibson, Cherokee Nation. In 1863, the United States Government established a military express between these two army posts. It was to run twice weekly and troops were to be stationed at strategic points on the road.² One of these military posts was the station at Cabin Creek.

At the time of the arrival of Union troops at Cabin Creek in 1862, a thriving community already existed there. The settlement included several private residences, a church mission (abandoned several years earlier), and a stage-station. With the coming of the army, a temporary hospital, stockade, and other types of military fortifications were established.³ Cabin Creek's location

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¹ Grant Foreman, *The Texas Road* (2nd ed.; Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954).

² Circular, *General Orders No. 11* (United States Army, by order of Major General Blunt, Fort Scott, August 22, 1863). A copy of this circular is in the library of the Thomas Gilcrease Institute of American History and Indian Art, Tulsa, Oklahoma.

³ Interview with Mrs. Emory Martin, Ketchum, Oklahoma, by Les Hoelscher, February 1, 1961. Mrs. Martin is the wife of J. L. Martin's

was ideal for a military post. A band of timber almost two miles wide stretched east and west of the ford, and the gently rolling prairies afforded an excellent view to the south.⁴ One hundred foot bluffs along the creek gave added advantages to this natural fortification.

The post not only provided an excellent defensive position, but Stand Watie and his Confederate Indian troops found it a strategic site for repeated ambush attempts on the Union Army supply trains coming from Fort Scott.⁵ The Indian troops were well fitted for such quick and silent cavalry attacks.⁶ Stand Watie's numerous raids behind the Union lines along with the work of "bushwhackers" kept the Union soldiers close to heavily fortified positions, and therefore they could travel only in heavily armed groups. Consequently, the Federals held the forts, while the Confederates held the open country.

After the first two years of the war, there was no material advantage in holding the countryside. The land had suffered invasion by Union troops twice in the span of two years. What they did not destroy the Confederate raiders disposed of in the meantime. The War had divided the Cherokee Nation as it had divided the United States. Most of the homes were burned, crops were destroyed, livestock was butchered or scattered. Little remained of the former prosperity and fertility especially in this northeastern part of the Indian Territory. The able-bodied men who were not fighting in one of the two armies were in exile or in hiding. The families of the soldiers were refugees in either Kansas or Texas, depending upon where their loyalties were.⁷

The plight of the refugees was terrible. Not only was there no food to be had but there was no way of earning a living and thousands died of starvation and exposure. Very few people stayed in the Indian Territory during the war. Those who did remain suffered fates the same as those of their brethren in exile.⁸

grandson. J. L. Martin served with Stand Watie throughout the war and was living at Cabin Creek before the Civil War.

⁴ Wiley Britton, *Memoirs of the Rebellion* (Chicago: Cushing, Thomas and Company, 1862), p. 304.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 302-29.

⁶ U. S. War Department, *Official Records of the War of the Rebellion*, 70 vols.; Series I; (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), Vol. III, pp. 287-92. (Hereafter cited as *Official Records*).

⁷ *Ibid.*, Vol. XXXIV, Pt. II, p. 918.

⁸ Letter from Nancy Hitchcock, September 1, 1864. A copy of this letter is in the Grant Foreman Collection, Indian Archives Division, Oklahoma Historical Society, Oklahoma City. (Although this letter is bias in favor of the North it gives one of the best accounts of the conditions within Indian Territory during the war).

Following the Federal occupation of the country north of the Arkansas River in 1863, the refugee Indians in Kansas came back to reclaim their homes. Constant attacks by Confederate raiders and unscrupulous bushwhackers soon forced these people to seek the safety of the nearby army posts. The United States Government had to supply its troops as well as several thousand refugee Indians at these posts.⁹ The problem of supply, therefore, became increasingly acute for the Union Army. Supplies could be brought up the Arkansas River from Little Rock to Fort Smith and, then to Fort Gibson, after the Union Army had occupied Eastern Arkansas. The destruction of the steamboat *J. R. Williams* by Stand Watie early in July, 1864, along with the low water level of the river forced the Federals to depend entirely upon their overland supply route from Fort Scott¹⁰ The Confederates were constantly either attacking Fort Gibson and Fort Smith or threatening to attack. As a result, it was difficult for the Federals to supply enough troops to protect both the supply trains and to garrison the forts adequately. A maneuver of this type was undertaken by General D. H. Cooper, commanding the Indian Division, when he made a fake attack upon Fort Gibson, while the main force of the Indian troops was attacking the Union supply line at Cabin Creek.

Ever since Federal troops had occupied the Territory north of the Arkansas River in 1863, the Indians loyal to the Southern cause had looked forward to the day when they might return to their homes. On February 5, 1864, Colonel Stand Watie¹¹ presented a plan for recapturing the Union held region north of the Arkansas River. The move was into central Kansas, raiding isolated army installations and enlisting wherever possible the aid of the western Indians for a much larger move into eastern Kansas.¹² In late August General Samuel B. Maxey, commander of Indian Territory for the Confederacy, received permission for such an enterprise, providing that it was undertaken before October 1, so that it would coincide with an attack upon Missouri by General Sterling Price.¹³ General Richard M. Gano, who commanded the Fifth Texas Cavalry Brigade, agreed to join General Watie and his Indian Brigade for the impending campaign. The two Confederate generals met on September 13, at Camp Pike in the Choctaw Nation to draw up their battle plans and line of march. Both officers agreed that, since each of their

⁹ *Official Records*, Vol. XLI, Pt. III, p. 300.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, XLI, Pt. II, 997-99.

¹¹ Edward Everett Dale and Gaston Litton, *Cherokee Cavaliers*, (1st ed.; Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1939), pp. 156-57. Stand Watie did not receive his commission until May 10, 1864.

¹² *Official Records*, Vol. XXXIV, Pt. II, pp. 945-46.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Vol. XLI, Pt. II, 1082; also Pt. I, pp. 781-82.

respective commands were from different brigades, each officer would retain individual command of his own troops. General Watie waived rank in favor of General Gano as the commander of the expedition, because the date of General Gano's commission was prior to that of General Watie. General Gano commended the Indian officer for this gesture, as did their commanding officer, General Maxey.¹⁴ This was one of the few examples in either the Union or Confederate army of an officer giving up an opportunity for personal gain and glory to enhance the cause for which he was fighting.

On September 14, 1864, the combined forces of the two brigades began their long trip north. The Indian Brigade consisted of the First Cherokee Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel C. N. Vann commanding; Second Cherokee Regiment, Major John Vann commanding; First Creek Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Chekote commanding; Second Creek Regiment, Colonel T. Barnett commanding; and the Seminole Battalion under Colonel John Jumper. The troops of the Indian Brigade numbered eight hundred.¹⁵ The composition of General Gano's Brigade was as follows: Thirtieth Texas Cavalry, Captain S. M. Strayhorn commanding; Thirty-first Texas Cavalry, Major Michael Looscan commanding; Twenty-ninth Texas Cavalry, Lieutenant Colonel Otis G. Welch commanding; Martin's Battalion of Texas Cavalry, Major W. N. Mayrant commanding; Gano Gurards, Captain William G. Welch commanding; and Howell's battery of six guns, Captain Sylvanus Howell commanding. The combined cavalry and artillery troops numbered about twelve hundred men. There were, therefore, two thousand men in the combined brigades.¹⁶

The expedition camped at Prairie Springs on the night of September 14. The next day they crossed the Arkansas River near the Creek Agency and the following evening found the Confederate force camped at Camp Pleasant in the Creek Nation. The Southern troops were now within only a few miles of Fort Gibson. The Union Army officers had realized the vulnerability of their supply lines for some time and were on the alert for a Confederate move such as this. Major Vann and the Second Cherokee Regiment, who were serving as scouts for the expedition, reported numerous contacts with Union scouts and pro-Union Indians. Consequently, it was not long before the Southern forces were detected and all Union Army units in the area were

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Pt. I, p. 780.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 785 (Gen. Gano's forces and Col. Watie's command set out from Camp Pike located east of the Canadian River in present Haskell County [northern part of Choctaw Nation], northwest of Stigler.—Ed.)

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 791.

alerted. Speed became imperative for the Confederates. They had to pass by just any chance for a fight in order to accomplish their main mission. For the troops of General Watie's command, however, any encounter whatsoever meant a chance to even the score with their "traitorous" red brothers in the Union Army.

On the morning of September 16, the combined forces crossed the Verdigris River at Sand Town. In the early afternoon they discovered a small detachment of Federal troops guarding hay operations fifteen miles northwest of Fort Gibson. The first report brought in by the Union scouts placed the number of the attacking force at 200. Captain E. A. Barker, the Union officer in charge, went to see for himself. He was met by the advance troops of the Confederates, which themselves numbered over 200 men and did not include the main force. Captain Barker fought his way back to his troops and dismounted his small force of the Second Kansas Cavalry in a small ravine with a detachment of the First Kansas Colored Infantry. General Gano sent a regiment of Texas Cavalry and a regiment of Cherokee Indians into the rear of the Union position and, as Captain Barker reported, "attacked me from five different points."¹⁷ The determined Union forces held out for a half an hour before Captain Barker, realizing the futility of his position, mounted the troops that had horses in order to make a final attempt to break through the Confederate lines. There were 65 men in this desperate charge. Only 15 managed to break through, while the remaining dismounted men were left to escape in the best way possible.

There were reports of indiscriminate slaughtering of the colored troops by the Texans.¹⁸ These were all Union Army reports and cannot be substantiated. Although it is true that Southern troops had no love for their former slaves, there is very little difference, in war, between men being killed by the rules or not. The end result is always death.

The Union forces suffered over 100 casualties and the loss of all of their equipment, haying machines, and several hundred tons of hay. General Gano worded the results of the engagement as, "The sun witnessed our complete success and its last lingering rays rested upon a field of Blood."¹⁹ The general's linguistic flair, which was later to serve him well in some forty-five years in the ministry following the war, makes the traditional stylized army report read more like a novel.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 771-72.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 772.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 789. (Gen. Gano here reports the fight with Federal forces guarding a hay camp outfit at Flat Rock ["Flat Rock Battle"], located in the prairie near the mouth of Flat Rock Creek on the west side of Grand River about 5 miles northeast of present Wagoner, in Wagoner County.—Ed.)

From the prisoners taken at Flat Rock, the Confederates learned that the expected wagon train was due any day. Accordingly, the Southern forces made plans to move out immediately. But at sunrise they discovered Union troops advancing from both the north and the south. General Gano sent Major Looscan to drive off the force south of their position (troops sent from Fort Gibson), while Major Vann engaged the enemy on the north (reinforcements going to meet the wagon train). After a brief skirmish to the north, the enemy proceeded on his way. On the morning of September 17, General Gano sent a small party to burn the hay at a nearby farm but the place was strongly protected. Rather than waste more time, the attackers withdrew to rejoin the rest of the command which was already heading north to meet the expected train. General Gano halted his forces on Wolf Creek near the present town of Salina to scout both the Military Road and the Park Hill-Fort Gibson road on the east side of Grand River. Satisfied that the train had not passed this point, General Gano then took 400 men and two pieces of artillery up the Military Road to locate the wagon train. He found the train parked at the station on Cabin Creek, its huge herd of mules grazing on the prairie south of the post.

This train had left Fort Scott on September 12. It contained 205 Government wagons, 4 Government ambulances, and 91 sutler wagons. The escort for the train was under the command of Major Henry Hopkins of the Second Kansas Cavalry who had commanded a battery of artillery since October 22, 1862. In the escort there were 80 men of the Second Kansas Cavalry, 50 men of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry and 130 men of the Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry. Major Hopkins had suspected that the rebels would make an attempt upon his train. He, therefore, sent word to all Union Army posts between Fort Scott and Fort Gibson to be on the alert for the enemy and to send him reinforcements if they could spare the men. The train was met at Baxter Springs by 100 Union Cherokees, but 50 of these were left at Hudson's Crossing on the Neosho River to protect the rear of the train.²⁰

A message was received at Hudson's Crossing to the effect that General Price had crossed the Arkansas River between Little Rock and Fort Smith. This information meant that a diversionary move would come from the Confederate troops stationed in Indian Territory. Major Hopkins immediately forwarded this intelligence to his commanding officer, Colonel S. H. Wattles, at Fort Gibson and asked for reinforcements. On the night of September 17, the train camped on Horse Creek, where a message was received from the commanding officer at Fort Gibson that a rebel force of twelve to fifteen hundred men was heading north.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 766-71 (Union Army reports including that of Major Henry Hopkins, Second Kansas Cavalry).

Major Hopkins was to proceed to the station at Cabin Creek as fast as possible and to await further orders to move the train. The dispatch also stated that Major John A. Foreman with six companies of men and two howitzers was on the way to relieve the train. The escort for the train was increased by 170 Cherokees of the Second Indian Regiment stationed at Cabin Creek and 140 Cherokees of the Third Indian Regiment sent from Fort Gibson to assist the train. The wagon train arrived at Cabin Creek on the afternoon of September 18. Major Hopkins immediately took a patrol to the south of the station to see if any rebels were in the area. He discovered the Confederates three miles south of the train but was unable to ascertain their strength because most of the forces was well hidden.

When he discovered the train parked at the station, General Gano immediately sent word for General Watie to bring up the rest of the men. When Major Hopkins returned to the station, he ordered that the train be parked at close quarters in the rear of the stockade and that all of the buildings be hastily fortified. A number of large hay ricks had been stacked in front of the stockade, extending up the creek to its right; which would afford some protection for both the men and the wagons. The Union troops were thus well fortified by the hay ricks, the temporary fortifications, the high bluffs in the rear, and the dense timber about them.

General Gano placed his troops in battle formation, with the Texas troops covering the enemy's left flank and center and the Indian Brigade covering the right flank. At one o'clock on the morning of September 19, the Confederate advance drove the Union pickets back and sporadic firing quickly broke out all along the front. After a conversation between the advance skirmishers, a flag of truce was agreed upon by both sides. The Confederates waited for what they considered a reasonable length of time and then began to advance. The Union officers later reported the rebels had not given them a chance to answer the flag of truce.²¹ The Union defenders opened fire as soon as the rebels started to advance. The rebels answered with their artillery which had been stationed directly in front of the original attacking line. Major Hopkins was unaware of the presence of artillery among the Confederates and had taken no precautions for such an attack. The cannonade terrorized the mules of the train, some of whom went berserk, entangling the wagons and dragging some of them over the 100 foot bluffs. Most of the teamsters quickly cut one or more of the mules loose from the wagons and rode them

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 764-94. There are conflicting reports as to where the blame should be placed. This is just another one of the rules of a "gentlemen's war" and it has very little to do with the outcome of a battle.

back across the ford of the creek to safety. This action rendered impossible all attempts by Major Hopkins to gather the train for a retreat to safer ground.

General Gano now believed that he had succeeded in preventing a retreat of the train and withdrew his troops behind a small knoll to await the break of day and better visibility. During the rest of the night, each time the Union forces attempted to move the remaining wagons, the Confederates would advance, fire a few volleys, and then retire. Sunrise revealed the exact position of the wagon train and its defenders. General Gano moved one section of his artillery to the Federal right flank and enveloped the train in a devastating cross-fire. At the same time, General Watie sent the two Cherokee regiments across the creek and into the rear of the train in order to capture all wagons that had escaped during the night and to prevent any others from retreating. Now, the Seminole Battalion was sent to the extreme left and quickly drove the Union right flank back a full 150 yards before they came to an abrupt halt. General Gano personally led a charge of the Thirtieth Texas Cavalry on this position, but the Federals were strongly entrenched and repulsed the charge. Three more Texas units were moved to this position and then drove the Federal right flank back through their camp and into wild confusion among the heavily timbered bottoms bordering the creek.

Major Hopkins saw that his position was growing more and more untenable and tried to gather his scattered troops to retreat across Grand River to the east. By nine o'clock on September 19, the Union forces had been driven from the field and were in complete rout. The majority of the survivors tried to make their way back north up the road to Fort Scott. The Federal commander still had hopes of meeting the relief force under Major Foreman and making an attempt to recapture the train. When he did not find the expected troops, Major Hopkins continued on to Fort Gibson to report the disaster to his commanding officer.²²

The fear of the arrival of more enemy troops prevented the Rebels from pursuing the retreating Federals and taking a more complete advantage of their victory. The captured train was a rich prize by anyone's standard and most Southern sources put the monetary value of the train at one and a half million dollars.²³ The booty from the train was a God-send to the ragged and half-starved Indians. As soon as the fighting was over, the force, of two thousand men was outfitted with new clothes taken from

²² *Ibid.*, p. 771.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 788, 792.

the loot.²⁴ All of the wagons that could be salvaged were immediately made ready for the trip back south. This was very difficult, since the devastating artillery fire and panic-stricken mules had turned most of the train into shambles. Despite these handicaps and the limits of time, 130 wagons and about 740 mules were taken from the battefield. Most of the remaining wagons, haying equipment and post equipment were burned. The casualties were very few considering the large number of participants in the fighting. On the Union side, about 20 men were reported killed, 26 were captured, and an undetermined number were injured. General Gano listed 7 killed and 38 wounded in his command, while General Watie reported only two killed and did not report the number of his troops who were injured.²⁵ Within two hours the train was ready to leave but at eleven o'clock contact had been made with a Federal relief force coming up from the south.

These Union troops had been sent from Fort Smith and were under the command of Colonel J. M. Williams of the Seventy-ninth U. S. Colored Troops. By 4:30 p.m., the two forces were engaged in an artillery duel near Pryor's Creek. As soon as it was dark, the Confederates gave the impression that they were parking the train for the night by running an empty wagon over a patch of rocky ground. They then retreated westward in order to by-pass their attackers and get the train safely home. The Federals awoke the next morning to find their enemy gone. Colonel Williams was unable to follow because of the poor condition of his men after the long forced march of the previous few days.²⁶

The captured train continued its retreat until the Verdigris River was crossed near Claremore Mounds. At that point, it turned south to the crossing of the Arkansas River near the present site of Tulsa.

General Watie used several different messengers to make sure that the Indian Division Headquarters received word of the Confederate success. He also indicated in these dispatches that he expected the Union forces to try to recapture the train at some point before it reached Confederate territory. The Indian Officer told General Cooper what route the train was taking and asked him to keep in constant communication with the train in event of enemy attack.²⁷ General Cooper sent Colonel D. N. McIntosh with 400 Creek troops to help bring the train in safely. When Colonel McIntosh saw that the train was proceeding unmolested, he turned back to scout the Fort Gibson area and to find out

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 780.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 792.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 765.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 784.

what information he could about the movements of Union troops.²⁸

The Union forces did not make another attempt upon the train because of the fear that General Cooper was coming north with another large Confederate force to join those from the train for an attack upon Fort Gibson. Major Foreman arrived at Cabin Creek a day after the battle and then continued on to Fort Scott to escort an ox train down to Fort Gibson with desperately needed supplies. He remained at the scene of the raid long enough to care for the wounded and to salvage what scattered equipment and supplies the Confederates had left behind.²⁹

In the meantime, Colonel Williams had withdrawn to Fort Gibson to reinforce that post in case of an attack.³⁰ The Union military telegraph wires hummed with news of their recent disaster. Orders were sent out for all available troops in the area to protect any future supply attempts to Indian Territory. Moreover, troops were ordered to concentrate in southern Kansas in preparation for repelling any Confederate invasion of that state.³¹ A request was sent to the Governor of Kansas to call out the militia to replace troops that had been withdrawn from the regular Union Army posts in the state.³² Rumors sped about both Kansas and Missouri as to the location of the supposed Confederate invasion. The civilians in these two states began to see rebel troops around every corner, bush, and tree. There was also a great concern over the threat of the Indians going on the "warpath" again. These fears were not quieted even when it was discovered for sure that General Price was the one actually making an attempt to invade Missouri. Even the United States War Department showed some concern over the threat by the rebels, although the Union Army was in the dominant positions on all fronts of the war.³³ The Federal officials admitted that the capture of the train was costly and made extensive preparations to see that such an act would be more difficult to perform in the future.³⁴ An attempt was made by the owners of the sutler goods and wagons in the captured train to collect damages from General Watie after the war was over.³⁵ Within a week or so after General Price had been defeated, the Union Army returned to its interrupted pursuit of the war. This was not the situation among the Southern forces in the West.

The Confederates were jubilant over their victory. The war

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 783.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, Part III, p. 301.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, Part I, p. 765.

³¹ *Ibid.*, Part III, p. 439.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 279.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 322.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 314.

³⁵ *Cherokee Cavaliers*, pp. 258-59.

in the East had been going badly for their cause and very little attention was paid to the operations in Indian Territory. The victory at Cabin Creek was one of the few bright spots in an otherwise disappointing year for the South. The Southern troops were loudly praised by their superiors within Indian Territory.³⁶ A letter of thanks and commendation came from the headquarters of the Trans-Mississippi Department.³⁷ General Maxey issued congratulatory orders for his troops and their families. Copies of these were so much in demand that he had to order a reprinting of the orders.³⁸ The Confederate Congress gave a vote of thanks to the Indian troops.³⁹

The Confederate victory had its greatest impact within Indian Territory. Militarily, the raid holds only a small place in a large war. Its importance lies not in the military aspect but in the effect the success of the raid had upon the people in Indian Territory, particularly the Indians. These half-starved and demoralized people had been afforded little cheer throughout the war. Their land was devastated. Their people were divided and those who were not dead, were in exile. Despite the failure of the Confederate Government to keep its treaty obligations with the Indians, they had continued to fight.⁴⁰ Albert Pike,⁴¹ General Maxey⁴² and the Confederate Indian Commissioner⁴³ had all voiced loud and frequent pleas for the Indians, but to no avail.⁴⁴ In July, 1864, the Cherokee regiments had voted unanimously to re-enlist for the duration of the war.⁴⁵ The other tribes had likewise shown faith in the future of the Confederacy. The morale of the Indian troops reached a new high at this point. In December, 1864, General Maxey said they felt that "they could fight a whole army."⁴⁶ This elation was only temporary in as much as

³⁶ Circular, *General Orders No. 26* (Confederate States Army, by order of Brigadier General Douglas H. Cooper. Camp Bragg, September 30, 1864). and *General Orders No. 61*. (Confederate States Army, by order of Major General Samuel B. Maxey. Fort Towson, Choctaw Nation, October 7, 1864). Copies of these general orders are in the library of the Thomas Gilcrease Institute of American History and Indian Art, Tulsa, Oklahoma.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 81.

³⁸ *Official Records*, Vol. XLI, Part IV, p. 1000.

³⁹ *Cherokee Cavaliers*, pp. 222-23.

⁴⁰ *Official Records*, Vol. LIII, p. 857.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, XIII, 819-23.

⁴² *Ibid.*, LIII, 963-66 and XXXIV, Part II, 918.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, XLI, Part IV, 1090.

⁴⁴ There is a large amount of evidence that the Confederate Government considered Indian Territory insignificant in the conduct of the war. The most obvious of this evidence is the neglect that the Territory suffered throughout the war.

⁴⁵ *Official Records*, Vol. XLI, Part II, p. 1013.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, LIII, 1029.

the next spring saw the fall of the Confederacy. But the war was not over in Indian Territory. General Watie did not surrender his arms until June, 1865.⁴⁷ Apparently, he was the last Confederate general officer to do so. The Chickasaw and Caddo troops did not lay down their arms officially until July, 1865.⁴⁸ The people and the land in Indian Territory suffered as much or more than any comparable area in either the North or the South.⁴⁹

The victory at Cabin Creek and its beneficial effects were one of the few bright spots in an otherwise tragic series of episodes in Indian and American history.

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Personal Interviews

Interview with Mrs. Emory Martin, Ketchum, Oklahoma, Les Hoelscher. February 1, 1961. Mrs. Martin's husband, Emory Martin, was the grandson of J. L. Martin. J. L. Martin served with Stand Watie during the war and lived at Cabin Creek before the war.

Interview with Henry Trout, Spavinaw, Oklahoma, by Les Hoelscher. January 28, 1961. Mr. Trout's father, G. W. Trout, served with Stand Watie during the war and fought in the second battle of Cabin Creek.

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